NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010050-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: January 30, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
January 30, 1976
8
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 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
January 30, 1976
CONTENTS
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Fighting in Spanish
Sahara ends; Algerians withdraw "supply column"
LEBANON: Efforts to rehabilitate
army and security forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
ICELAND-UK: London sets
Saturday deadline on fishing pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
IRAQ: Reports of abortive
coup attempt persist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
INDONESIA-TIMOR: UN fact-
finding mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
MEXICO: No opponent to
Lopez Portillo for president . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 18
ANNEX: Lines Blur Between
French Coalition and Opponents
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January 30, 1976
Moroccan forces yesterday occupied the oasis south of Samara, where clashes
had occurred on Tuesday and Wednesday with Polisario guerrillas supported by
Algerian military personnel. Fighting has apparently ended.
A Moroccan communique said some 100 Algerian soldiers, dozens of Polisario
guerrillas, artillery, and a large quantity of ground-to-air missiles were captured.
Algiers only admitted that its "supply column" supporting the Saharans had
withdrawn from the area after an all-day engagement Wednesday with a much larger
Moroccan force using aircraft and heavy weapons.
High-level envoys from Egypt, Syriia, and Iraq have had little to say so far
regarding their efforts to mediate between Algiers and Rabat.
Algeria called in the ambassadors of the permanent members of the UN
Security Council yesterday to underscore its position in the dispute and its desire to
avoid a war. A senior Foreign Ministry official, speaking on President Boumediene's
instructions, termed Morocco's presence in the disputed territory "totally
illegitimate." Stressing that the only solution to the problem is a referendum on
self-determination, he urged all governments to cooperate with UN Secretary
General Waldheim to ensure the application of UN principles and resolutions
regarding Spanish Sahara.
The Algerian demarche, like the Moroccan overture on Wednesday, is almost
certainly setting the stage for an appeal to the Security Council to discuss the matter
as a threat to international security. According to a press report from Algiers,
Foreign Minister Bouteflika sent a message to Waldheim yesterday saying the
situation is a threat to the peace and stability of the region.
Algeria is also continuing to gear up its propaganda effort in support of the
Polisario Front. In letters sent to all nations, Boumediene urged support for the
principle of self-determination and stressed the determination of Saharans, led by
the Front, to resist the Moroccan-Mauritanian take-over of the territory. He will use
his considerable influence as self-proclaimed head of the nonaligned movement to
whip up international support for the Front as a legitimate liberation movement.
The Algerians are undoubtedly responsible for a resolution reportedly passed
by the OAU liberation committee at its meeting in Lourenco Marques last week
recommending OAU recognition of the Polisario Front as the liberation movement
of Spanish Sahara.
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January 30, 1976
After a week of relative calm, Lebanese leaders have turned their attention to
the problem of rehabilitating the Lebanese army and security forces, which will
ultimately be responsible for maintaining order. During the height of the hostilities,
both the army and the security forces suffered casualties and many defections and,
in effect, ceased to function as effective forces.
According to most accounts, the security forces, which are predominantly
Muslim, divided along religious lines during the last days of the fighting. Many of
their posts were either abandoned or occupied by Muslim and Palestinian forces.
These facilities have been returned to the government, but they have been stripped
of most equipment, weapons, and vehicles.
The army is in somewhat better shape, although it also suffered heavy losses
during the struggle to protect Christian territory south and east of Beirut.I
The Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian peace commission set up to monitor the truce
has given the army limited policing duties in Beirut's commercial district and
apparently plans to use the army eventually in other key areas of the city. This
would be done not only to boost the army's morale but also to lower the profile of
Palestinian troops-whose presence in Beirut has begun to generate resentment even
among Lebanese Muslims.
Prime Minister Karami, sensing the growing controversy over the role of
Palestinian forces in Lebanon, expressed a sense of urgency yesterday over
rebuilding a national armed force. The general collapse of the government's
administrative structure, however, will make the task very difficult. A universal
conscription law recently passed by parliament could eventually be used to
strengthen the military and more carefully regulate its religious composition.
President Franjiyah's proposed trip to Damascus continues to be delayed
because of haggling over terms of the political settlement proposed by President
Asad. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam returned to Beirut yesterday, presumably to
speed up the negotiations.
One of the sticking points, according to the press, involves Christian insistence
that the office of president be held only by Maronite Christians. Some Muslims
reportedly feel the presidency should be open to any Christian; others apparently
are willing to give the Maronites this exclusive right, but object to putting the
understanding in writing.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 30, 1976
Britain has given Iceland until tomorrow to accept its terms for a new fishing
agreement or face the return of British frigates to the disputed waters.
The British terms that Prime Minister Hallgrimsson took back to Reykjavik on
January 27 came close to meeting Iceland's demands prior to the breakdown of the
last round of talks in November. Iceland's position has hardened in the meantime,
and Hallgrimsson is confronted with the difficult task of trying to sell the
compromise to an increasingly brittle coalition, in addition to the Icelandic public,
which now is inclined to favor total exclusion of foreign fishermen from offshore
waters.
London wants an agreement limiting its catch this year to 80,000 tons, of
which 65,000 tons would be cod. Because of coalition pressures, however,
Hallgrimsson was able to offer only 45,000 tons of cod-a reduction of 10,000 tons
since the last talks-plus 15,000 tons of other species.
The leader of the coalition Progressive Party has insisted that the US and
NATO be asked to press Britain to make even more concessions, but Hallgrimsson
has declined. The opposition parties, and even elements of Hallgrimsson's
Independence Party, share the Progressive view that minimal concessions, if any,
were in order.
Foreign Minister Agustsson believes the return of British frigates would be
certain to bring down Hallgrimsson's coalition. As tensions rise, Agustsson also
expects further harassment of NATO facilities in Iceland and renewed questioning of
Iceland's participation and, ultimately, membership in NATO.
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January 30, 1976
Reports of an abortive coup attempt earlier this week have been circulating in
Haghdad. The US interests section reported yesterday that the situation appeared
?iormal, but the persistence of the reports indicates that some kind of incident may
have occurred involving parts of the military and perhaps some civilian officials.
Radio Baghdad continues to broadcast normally. In the past few days, it has
carried news items on routine diplomatic activities of President Bakr and Saddam
Husayn, the Iraqi strong man.
Stories of plotting against the regime began to make the rounds in the capital
,aarlier this month. At that time, the US interests section reported that three or four
Iraqi ambassadors had been implicated in the plotting and had been recalled to
3aghdad.
The appointment earlier this month of Saddam Husayn, a civilian, to the rank
of general probably ruffled a number of senior military officers, with whom he has
;ever been widely popular. They would be particularly upset if they saw the move as
.i prelude to Saddam's appointment to minister of defense, a post consistently given
o:o military men since the army overthrew the monarchy in 1958. Moreover, the
falevation of Saddam-who heads the civilian faction of the ruling Baath Party-may
have shaken the uneasy balance between the military and civilian wings.
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January 30, 1976
The Indonesians appear to have successfully stagemanaged the visit of a UN
fact-finding mission to Timor.
Following his return to Jakarta on January 22, Secretary General Waldheim's
personal representative said that he had detected no sign of Indonesian military
forces. He professed himself impressed that the pro-Indonesian Timorese in Dili had
the civil administration functioning and had even included some former members of
Fretilin.
The carefully coached Indonesian-controlled Timorese assured the
representative that they are now in control. They said they did not want any
referendum on the island's future because they had already decided to integrate with
Indonesia. They used poor weather and lack of adequate landing fields as excuses to
frustrate the fact-finder's plans to visit areas not yet under full Indonesian control.
Lisbon on January 28 offered to carry the fact-finder to the southern coast
aboard one of the Portuguese frigates that has been operating in the Timor area. The
UN representative has in the past avoided travel on military transport, but he has
been unable so far to reach Fretilin areas by other means. Before Lisbon's offer, the
envoy said he was prepared to return to the UN without visiting Fretilin territory.
Jakarta's unwillingness to allow the UN team to contact representatives of
Fretilin may lead to criticism of the Indonesians in the final report. There still
appears little sentiment at the UN, however, to return to serious debate on Timor.
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Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party will apparently have no
opposition in the presidential election this July.
The party's only serious challenger, the National Action Party, failed to
nominate a candidate at its convention this week and will apparently sit out the
election. The other opposition parties support Jose Lopez Portillo, the governing
party's candidate.
An election victory for the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party is
assured whether the opposition puts up a candidate or not. The party, however,
would feel more comfortable with at least token opposition. Without it, the party's
rhetoric about an open political process rings hollow. A challenge probably would
also make it easier for the party to overcome factionalism in its own ranks.
Conservatives in the government party are dissatisfied with both the candidate
and the manner of his selection. Party factions are variously embroiled in attacks
against state governors, land disputes, labor quarrels, and agitation to further their
own interests.
For Lopez Portillo, the absence of an opponent means that his campaign is
likely to continue to be punchless. He has yet to establish a political identity or to
develop a power base separate from that of his mentor, President Echeverria. Lopez
Portillo's stature will gradually increase, but there is a possibility that he will still not
have enough personal political power when he takes over as president next
December to make difficult and potentially unpopular decisions.
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OAU-ANGOLA: Sierra Leone yesterday announced its official recognition of
the Popular Movement as the sole legitimate government of Angola. The recognition
gives the Popular Movement the support of 24 of the 46 members of the
Organization of African Unity. Sierra Leone's action followed visits to Freetown by
delegations from Guinea, Nigeria, and Tanzania. Togo and Upper Volta, also under
pressure from the Popular Movement's partisans, may be next to abandon a neutral
position. If the OAU ministerial-level meeting set for March takes place, the Popular
Movement will probably have little trouble in being seated as the government of
Angola.
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January 30, 1976
LINES BLUR BETWEEN FRENCH COALITION AND OPPONENTS
Maneuvering by France's leading political parties is blurring the lines between
the government coalition and the opposition left alliance and weakening cohesion
within both.
In conversations with a US embassy officer last week, a leader of the French
Socialist Party took positions that would be difficult for the Socialists' Communist
partners to swallow. The official reiterated the "fundamental reassurances" given by
party chief Francois Mitterrand during his visit to the US last November. He said
that the Socialists still believe France ought to seek West European integration and
remain in NATO. He added that the party leadership is preoccupied with European
security, which "we understand can be found only through a privileged relationship
with the US."
If the Socialists came to power in France, the official continued, they would
continue to support arms standardization and other forms of technical cooperation
within NATO. He also noted that his party had recently assured the government that
it would support a proposal calling for the direct election of France's representatives
to the European parliament.
Other reports have indicated that Mitterrand has asked his advisers to look into
policy options on the economy, energy, foreign policy, and multinational
companies, without regard for the Socialists' common program with the
Communists.
Mitterrand's assurances to the US and his orders to his staff suggest that he is at
least considering moving closer to the government on some issues. Mitterrand will be
careful not to overemphasize these attitudes publicly.
Since the publication in mid-1972 of the Socialist-Communist "common
program for governing," the Socialists have played down favorable attitudes toward
such issues as NATO and European integration in order to expand their constituency
to the left. Recently, the party has grown rapidly at the expense of its Communist
allies.
Concern over the Socialists' success 'in appealing to Communist voters led
Communist chief Georges Marchais late last year to begin to reorient his own
policies in order to regain lost ground and convince non-Communist voters that his
Al
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January 30, 1976
party would act responsibly if brought to power in France. His softer line has served
to reduce some of the tension between Communists and Socialists, but the two
parties still have deep differences on many major issues.
The Communists, for instance, have not diluted their nationalistic positions on
defense, European unity, relations with the US, and multinational companies. Their
opposition to arms standardization in NATO and to direct election of a European
parliament, for example, underlines their community of interest with the Gaullists
rather than with the Socialists.
A leading orthodox Gaullist has, in fact, indicated a willingness to join forces
with Communist deputies to defeat the government on the proposal for an elected
European parliament. This sort of suggestion raises concern among Socialists over
the possibility that Communist leaders will be able to exploit this coincidence of
interests to initiate collaboration with the orthodox Gaullists in parliament. The
Socialists worry that this would not only isolate them in parliament, but might also
aggravate division in the party.
While formal collaboration does not seem likely, Prime Minister Chirac is
reported to be concerned that the Communists' more flexible line might enable the
orthodox wing of his own Gaullist party to work with the Communists against some
government programs.
These problems within the left alliance are welcomed by government leaders
who are working to attract leftists into the majority. Interior Minister Poniatowski is
taking the lead in this effort, despite some skepticism about it on the part of
President Giscard. The President reportedly expects to win over some left Radicals,
who are the junior partner in the Socialist-Communist left alliance, but has little
hope of wooing any Socialist as long as Mitterand controls the party.
The President lacks Poniatowski's confidence, but undoubtedly recognizes that
even if explicit cooperation with leftists does not develop, his coalition's only means
of strengthening its majority is to appeal to the large block of uncommitted voters
who recently seem to have been leaning toward the Socialists.
All this maneuvering is a first stage of the campaign for the next legislative
election, which must be held before March 1978. Each party seems to believe that
this race will be a watershed that sets the course of French politics for years to
come.
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