NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 14, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
I
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January 14, 1976
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 14, 1976
LEBANON: Situation report .
USSR-US: Growing concern in
Moscow about effect of Angola
on follow-on SALT accord . . .
ITALY: Moro designated formateur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
NORWAY: New policy on attacking
unidentified submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
PORTUGAL-CUBA: Azores
as refueling stop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
SPANISH SAHARA: Spanish
military withdrawal complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
USSR-JAPAN: Effect of
Gromyko's visit to Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
ETHIOPIA: Violence
in the provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 14, 1976
Christian militiamen appear to have gained the advantage over Palestinian
forces fighting to break the Christian blockade of Tall Zatar refugee camp. Phalanges
forces reportedly have been able to hold a stationary line encircling the camp,
despite heavy fire from adjacent Muslim areas and a nearby Palestinian camp.
The Christians say they will not lift the blockade of Tall Zatar and other camps
until the camps are disarmed and brought under control of the Lebanese army. The
Palestinians have countered with threats to blockade Christian communities in
predominantly Muslim areas of Beirut. 25X1
Clashes continued in virtually all areas of Beirut, and most roads leading into
the capital have been cut as the fighting has spread to surrounding villages. The
fighting has also intensified in Zahlah and the Tripoli-Zagharta area, where the army
has failed in its attempts to separate warring Christian and Muslim militiamen.
President Franjiyah met with leaders of the major Christian groups yesterday,
presumably to work out a coordinated position before he meets with Syrian
President Asad. The two leaders are now expected to meet on Saturday. Franjiyah is
almost certainly intending to use Christian military successes as his major bargaining
point in negotiations with the Syrians.
Apparently in reaction to an appeal from Yasir Arafat for Arab action to
relieve the Palestinians' siege, Egypt yesterday called for an Arab League initiative to
put an end to the "intolerable" Christian blockade.
President Sadat, declaring Egypt's concern to preserve the Palestinian presence
in Lebanon, later denounced the recent turn of events there and added an additional
injunction against Israeli intervention. Without elaborating, he said that Egypt would
"assume its responsibilities" if Israel intervened. He reiterated his position yesterday
that Arab or other foreign intervention is not the way to resolve the crisis.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 14, 1976
A prominent Soviet academician, V. V. Zhurkin, who closely follows Moscow's
relations with Washington, says there is growing concern in the USSR that Soviet
actions in Angola could prejudice chances for a SALT I I agreement.
one of the few signs
I
to date that at least some influential Soviets have begun to give serious consideration
to US warnings about the potential ramifications of the Angolan affair. Zhurkin, a
deputy director of the USA Institute, almost certainly is sensitive to the impact of
such a situation as Angola on the US-Soviet relationship.
Zhurkin nevertheless defended Soviet assistance to the Popular Movement and
reiterated Moscow's standard position that the USSR would not for the sake of
detente sacrifice its long-standing policy of support to national liberation
movements. He expressed confidence that detente would continue, despite periodic
irritants and inevitable debates over detente within Western countries. Drawing an
analogy to the recent controversy over Soviet activity in Portugal, Zhurkin offered
the opinion that Western criticism of Soviet support for the Popular Movement
would eventually subside.
He acknowledged, however, that Western public opinion entailed an element of
risk for Soviet policy, especially if that opinion jeopardized chances for US
Congressional ratification of a new SALT agreement. Progress toward strategic arms
limitation remains the linchpin of improved US-Soviet relations, he said, both
because of its intrinsic importance and because of the impetus a new agreement
would give to other negotiations, such as the MBFR talks.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 14, 1976
Italian Prime Minister Moro was asked by President Leone yesterday to try to
form another government.
Moro's Christian Democrats have reportedly instructed him .to attempt to get
all four parties of the center-left-Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats,
and Republicans-to return to full participation in the government.
Following the collapse in late 1974 of the last coalition in which all four
participated, only two of these parties-the Christian Democrats and
Republicans-had positions in the cabinet headed by Moro that fell last week. The
Socialists and Social Democrats limited their role to parliamentary support for his
government.
Since differences among the parties have deepened in the past year, Moro will
have major hurdles to clear before he can revive the alliance. The Socialists maintain
that the growing strength of the left entitles them to treatment as a political equal
by the dominant party.
Although the Socialist representation in parliament does not approach that of
the Christian Democrats, the Socialists are actually in a pivotal position. Their votes
alone are sufficient to give the Christian Democrats the majority they need to
continue governing without the Communists. A Christian Democratic attempt to
satisfy the Socialists by giving them more ministries and influence, however, will
undoubtedly draw objections from the two smaller parties.
The Christian Democrats and Socialists remain at odds also on whether to
establish a more open consultative relationship between the government and the
Communist Party-a development the Socialists feel would limit the Communists'
ability to capitalize on their opposition status. The Christian Democrats are opposed
and, although the Socialists have been backpedaling on the Communist issue, they
have yet to drop the demand altogether. The situation is complicated by the latest
Communist statement, in which the party says it wants either to remain in the
opposition or to have full membership in the government.
The Communist refusal so far to be drawn into an arrangement like that
proposed by the Socialists could help ease the way for a compromise between the
latter and the Christian Democrats. On the other hand, the Communist move might
reinforce the Socialist tendency to view earlly parliamentary elections as preferable
to being the only major party on the left that has to accept responsibility for
government actions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 14, 1976
The government has announced a new, more aggressive policy on attacking
unidentified submarines in its territorial waters.
The new policy is consistent with the more assertive posture Norway has
adopted toward the USSR in recent months. Norway is locked in negotiations with
the USSR over delimiting the continental shelf in the Barents Sea, and is stepping up
efforts to assert its sovereignty in the Svalbard archipelago against Soviet
encroachments.
Demands for new rules developed following an incident in 1972 when contact
was made with a suspected submarine in a fjord. The intruder was later lost before it
could be positively identified or induced to surface. The search continued for almost
two weeks without conclusive results and generated much public interest. There
have since been several other intrusions into Norwegian waters.
Pressure for a new policy came from both the right, which thinks such
intruders are Soviet, and the left, which claims they are US.
The new rules differentiate among three areas-outer and inner territorial
waters and fjords. In the latter, no warning will be given and attack will commence
immediately. In outer waters, beyond the base line but within four-mile territorial
waters, three warnings will be given. In inner waters, not in a fjord, only one will be
given before attack.
A general statement regarding the stricter policy has been published by the
government, but detailed rules are classified. Implementation will occur within three
months when operational directives are published.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 14, 1976
Portuguese officials, claiming that "legal" considerations had impeded efforts
to block Cuban use of the Azores as a transit stop for flights destined for Africa, say
they are now prepared to make a "political" approach to the Cubans on the matter.
he Azorean military governor
o the press yesterday that "the Cuban ig its wou d no longer be allowed to refuel
in the Azores.
A Portuguese Foreign Ministry official in Lisbon said yesterday, in reply to the
latest in a series of US demarches, that the government is now prepared to act, but
that it had felt constrained by the commercial air agreement between Portugal and
Cuba. A Foreign Ministry official stated publicly last week that there was no
evidence the Cuban planes in question were transporting military personnel or
equipment.
A Foreign Ministry official told the US embassy yesterday that Portugal
intends to be guided by an African consensus, concerning recognition of the
government set up by the Popular Movement. He did not indicate, however, how
many African countries would have to recognize the regime before Portuguese
recognition would be forthcoming.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 14, 1976
Spain's military withdrawal from Spanish Sahara was completed on Monday
when the last Spanish troops left Villa Cisneros, the territory's largest commercial
center.
According to press reports, both Moroccan and Mauritanian troops were on
hand to assume control of Villa Cisneros. Spain had earlier promised to hand over
the town to Mauritanian troops, but Rabat may have insisted on sending its own
forces, perhaps believing they are needed to secure the town against occupation by
guerrilla forces of the Algerian-backed Polisario Front.
Morocco's action may also have been influenced by its interest in the town's
commercial fishing industry. Nouakchott probably views Villa Cisneros as its fair
share of the spoils, in view of Morocco's acquisition of the important phosphate
deposits in northern Spanish Sahara, but Rabat may have other ideas. The two
countries apparently have not reached full agreement on how Spanish Sahara will be
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 14, 1976
Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Tokyo evidently accomplished no more
mhan either side had anticipated.
Diplomats from the two countries were still haggling over the final
:ommunique after Gromyko departed. The result of their long labor was a short
document that expressed the usual platitudes about the desirability of expanding
economic and cultural relations, confirmed that talks on a peace treaty would
continue, and announced that Foreign Minister Miyazawa would go to the USSR in
1976.
One major stumbling point was the Japanese desire to include some reference
co the Northern Territories issue. In line with Moscow's current tough line toward
japan, Gromyko would not go beyond the statement included in the
Brezhnev-Tanaka communique of 1973, which implied that the territorial issue
would be covered as part of the continuing negotiations on a peace treaty. Gromyko
;-aised the possibility of an interim treaty of friendship and cooperation that did not
stover the Northern Territories, but he reportedly did not press the point when the
Japanese demurred, as they had done last year.
Gromyko was especially harsh on the Japanese for considering a treaty with
Peking that would include an anti-hegemony clause. He said publicly that Moscow
would have to review its relations with Tokyo if the Japanese went ahead with the
i:reaty. Claiming that Peking seeks hegemony in Asia, he attacked the Chinese for
pressing the Japanese to go along with an anti-Soviet policy. The Japanese, for their
part, insisted that the anti-hegemony clause is not aimed at the USSR and moved
quickly to dispel any idea that Soviet objections would dissuade Tokyo from further
normalizing its relations with Peking. Shortly after Gromyko left, Prime Minister
Miki said publicly that Japan would continue working to conclude a treaty with
Peking, despite Soviet objections.
The Soviet foreign minister made some attempt to put a more positive light on
his visit. He was relatively conciliatory on the fisheries problem, saying that Moscow
would soon release 32 Japanese fishermen detained in the USSR, and promising
increased Soviet efforts to carry out the fisheries agreement that the two sides signed
last summer.
Gromyko also went out of his way to call on a variety of influential
Japanese-including the Emperor, some of the factional leaders of the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party, and leading industrialists-who would normally not be on his
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 14, 1976
schedule. Most Japanese, especially Prime Minister Miki, used their sessions with
Gromyko to defend staunchly Japanese interests. With national elections a
possibility as early as this spring, Miki and other conservative party leaders, in any
case, would have been unlikely to adopt a compromising posture on the
long-standing differences between Moscow and Tokyo.
Peking is no doubt delighted at Gromyko's failure to stimulate any progress in
Soviet-Japanese relations. Ever since the visit was announced, the Chinese have
maintained a steady drumbeat of press comment against Moscow. The Soviets'
refusal to return the Northern Territories, they charge, is an example of Soviet
"hegemonism," and Gromyko's primary objective in the visit was to throw obstacles
in the path of improving Sino-Japanese relations. Peking will highlight Miki's
comments on the importance to Tokyo of the proposed Sino-Japanese peace treaty.
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N. .;
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F.T. A Y:
Djibouti c r L F OF .. 91
hen,
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 14, 1976
The new year in Ethiopia is beginning much as the old one ended, with violence
occurring in nearly all of Ethiopia's 14 provinces.
The secessionist movement in Eritrea Province is still the most serious
insurgency facing the ruling military council in Addis Ababa, although the fighting
has been stalemated. Fighting could pick up soon, but neither the Eritrean nor the
government side has the ability to overcome the other.
Logistic problems, indiscipline, a shortage of trained officers, and low morale
have restrained government military operations. A battalion of reinforcements
arrived in Eritrea last week, and more troops may soon follow. The reinforcements
may signal an increase in government operations against the rebels.
The insurgents, also suffer from poor leadership and from divisions within their
ranks. Their leaders apparently do not have a consistent military strategy, nor have
they tried to apply theories of modern guerrilla warfare.
The rebels, still divided into two rival factions, seldom coordinate their field
operations against government forces. The military commanders of at least one
faction are close to breaking with their own political leaders, who live abroad.
Parts of four other northern provinces are outside government control because
of rebellions led by landlords opposed to the military regime's land reform program
and by prominent figures from the old regime.
A group called the Ethiopian Democratic Union began an insurrection in
Bagemder Province in November. The group, which reportedly is also active in Tegre
Province, periodically cuts a main road leading to the Sudanese border. The group's
two main leaders, who are believed to have widespread support throughout northern
Ethiopia, are probably also in contact with local notables who lead minor
insurrections in Bagemder, Tegre, Gojam, and Shoa provinces.
The Afar Liberation Front, operating in southern Eritrea and eastern Wollo
provinces, occasionally is able to cut the road between Addis Ababa and Assab,
where Ethiopia's only oil refinery is located. Most of the clashes between the Afars
and government forces are minor, but in December the Afars reportedly executed 18
suspected government sympathizers. Government troops executed 40 Afars in
reprisal.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 14, 1976
Sultan All Mirah, the Afar leader, remains in exile in Saudi Arabia, where he
fled after fighting between his tribesmen and government forces broke out in June.
He is seeking aid from Arab states, so far with little success.
During the past six weeks, insurgents in the Ogaden region, particularly Harar
and Bale provinces, have become active. Periodic resistance to central authority is
endemic to the Ogaden, which is inhabited by many minority groups, including large
numbers of ethnic Somalis. Mogadiscio claims the Ogaden as part of "greater
Somalia."
Both ethnic Somalis and Ethiopian Gallas are probably involved in the Ogaden
insurgencies. Somalia, however, has apparently aided all of the groups with arms and
training in guerrilla warfare.
Ethiopia's ruling military council, in an attempt to deal with the growing
violence, has begun enlarging the armed forces. Large numbers of veterans have been
recalled and local militia forces are to be created. The new troops, however, will be
costly and will place additional burdens on the government's already strained logistic
capabilities.
Such new forces will enhance the government's ability to contain for a while
longer the various insurgencies, but will not significantly improve the government's
military capacity. The military council may be able to hang on in Addis Ababa, but
its authority is likely to diminish outside the capital.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 14, 1976
MOROCCO-USSR: The Soviet fish factory trawler which had been detained
by the Moroccan navy sailed from Agadir on January 10, according to the defense
attache in Rabat. Reportedly, the release was ordered after a fine was levied. To save
face, the Moroccans now say the trawler Sapfir was stopped off Cape Rhir, some 10
nautical miles northwest of Agadir, for fishing inside the 70-nm economic zone
claimed by Morocco. The Soviets claimed the vessel was in international waters
testing the trawler net following repairs when it was seized.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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