NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010049-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: December 31, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Too Secret
H'2
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA & DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 31, 1975
CONTENTS
ANGOLA: Tempo of fighting
likely to increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LEBANON: Agreement in principle
with Syria to settle crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
THAI LAND: First serious challenge
to Khukrit government . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
WARSAW PACT: Exercises
since Helsinki agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
SPANISH SAHARA: Morocco continues
to expand its control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CYPRUS: Efforts to
resume talks hit snag . . . . . . . . 13
INDONESIA: Timor intervention
causing problems for Jakarta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
MALAYSIA: Razak's medical problems
spur speculation on resignation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
VIETNAM-USSR: Hanoi to
receive Soviet aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CUBA: Party congress results
in stronger political structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
LATIN AMERICA - ANGOLA: Reaction
to Cuba's involvement . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
ICELAND-UK: Ramming incident
prompts Icelandic reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 31, 1975
With the Organization of African Unity's emergency summit on Angola now
less than two weeks off, the tempo of fighting in Angola is likely to pick up as each
of the two rival regimes attempts to impress African leaders with its strength.
In northern Angola yesterday, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
withdrew from Camabatela after forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola had bombarded the town with rockets for several days.
In eastern Angola, heavy fighting is still
taking place around Teixeira a ousa, which the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola claimed it had captured last week with National Front
forces.
Clashes between National Union and Nationai Front troops under the
command of Daniel Chipenda have spread to Lobito, Benguela, and Sa da Bandeira,
1 11 he Popular Movement has become
aware ot the clashes, and it is now publicizing them in an effort to discredit the
National Union - National Front alliance.
The Popular Movement is trying to create an impression of African nations
banding together against the much publicized South African intervention on behalf
of the National Front and National Union. A Movement military spokesman
currently on a swing through Latin America seeking diplomatic support announced
in Georgetown, Guyana, yesterday that Nigeria, Congo, and Guinea-Bissau are ready
to send troops to Angola to support the Popular Movement.
It seems unlikely that either Nigeria or Congo plans any such involvement.
Some troops from Guinea-Bissau, another former Portuguese territory, may already
be fighting alongside the Popular Movement. Relations between the ruling party in
Bissau and the Popular Movement have long been close.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 31, 1975
President Franjiyah's confidant, Lucien Dahdah, has reportedly reached an
agreement in principle with Damascus on settling the troubles in Lebanon. The
problem of agreeing on specific reforms, however, will make it extremely difficult to
reach a final accord.
According to Dahdah, the understanding allows for Franjiyah to remain in
office until his term ends next September and for formal meetings between
Franjiyah and Prime Minister Karami-as representatives of the country's Christian
and Muslim communities-to negotiate the details of a settlement. An agreement
would include concessions by Lebanese Christians to bolster the power of the prime
minister and strengthen Muslim representation in parliament and the civil service.
Also included would be implementation of existing agreements between the
Lebanese government and the Palestinians.
While this broad outline appears feasible on the surface, the prospect appears
bleak that Franjiyah and Karami can come to terms on specific reforms and satisfy
the demands of their constituents. The Syrians reportedly are prepared to guarantee
the agreement on their own. The Christians, however, insist on a co-guarantor, such
as France, Belgium, the Arab League, or prefeirably the UN. The Christians also want
an outside force to maintain security until the Lebanese internal security forces can
be strengthened to perform the job.
The terms of an agreement pose serious problems themselves, in addition to
any specific reform proposals. While the plan offers some hope, the road to a final
solution will be difficult, and any of the man ro lems could prove to be a fatal
stumbling block
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 31, 1975
Growing discontent over the way the government of Prime Minister Khukrit is
handling Thailand's economic and political problems is prompting the first serious
challenge to his eight-month-old coalition.
Many army otticers an other conservatives believe the Khukrit-led coalition has not
dealt effectively with student demonstrations, strikes, and what many perceive to be
a growing communist threat from Laos and Cambodia.
The opposition Democrat Party, the largest single party in the National
Assembly, met on December 24. It condemned the Khukrit government for
decisions contributing to the high cost of living and political unrest in southern
Thailand. The Democrats agreed to meet on Tuesday to decide whether to press for
a special session of parliament to vote on a no-confidence motion before the next
regular session convenes on February 5.
How the Democrats vote should provide a good indication of the depth of the
assembly's sentiment for a change in government. Most political parties have not yet
recovered financially from last January's election, and Khukrit has effectively used
the threat of calling for new elections as a means of keeping both his own coalition
and the opposition in line.
The threat of a strike on January 2 by leaders of the Federation of Labor
Unions of Thailand is adding to Khukrit's problems. Labor leaders are protesting the
government's decision to raise the price of rice and sugar at the beginning of the new
year-a move that in itself could precipitate a political crisis.
Unless Khukrit moves forcefully in dealing with the economic and political
problems now facing him, it is clear that he will be faced with a major parliamentary
challenge when the National Assembly convenes in early February, if not sooner.
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Warsaw Pact Areas Affected by Notification Agreement
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 31, 1975
Warsaw Pact countries have conducted a number of large military exercises
since the signing in August of the agreement at the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. None of the exercises appeared to have required prior
notification, as established by the Helsinki agreement.
The confidence-building measures reached at the conference provide for
notification by each side prior to military maneuvers involving a troop strength
greater than 25,000 and for an invitation to exchange observers at the exercises. The
final agreement also includes a provision calling for voluntary notification of
"smaller scale military maneuvers." In any case, the final agreement is a policy
statement of intent and not a formal treaty binding under international law.
Although apparently none of the Warsaw Pact exercises exceeded the
notification limit, several were good candidates for the discretionary notification.
During late August, the East Germans held a field-training exercise involving
parts of two divisions, which could have involved up to 18,000 troops. This was
probably the largest of the maneuvers held since the conference. Two other
exercises-one a combined Czechoslovakian-Hungarian-Soviet and the other East
German-involved widespread geographic areas, although troop participation was an
estimated 10,000.
There appears to be a trend in the Warsaw Pact during the last few years toward
holding numerous small exercises. The last large Pact maneuver that received wide
media coverage was "Shield 72." It was held in Czechoslovakia in September 1972
and involved some 50,000 to 60,000 troops.
It is still too soon to judge the overall Warsaw Pact reaction to certain aspects
of the confidence-building measures, such as the exchange of military observers. In
mid-December, the chief of staff of the Hungarian army intimated that the Warsaw
Pact was studying their military aspects.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 31, 1975
Morocco is continuing to expand its control of northern Spanish Sahara.
On Sunday, a broadcast from Rabat announced that Spain has turned over the
military air base and civilian airport at El Aaiun to Morocco. Madrid has all but
completed its withdrawal of military and civilian personnel from the territory. The
few remaining Spanish troops will leave by mid-January. A Spanish diplomatic
mission will stay in El Aaiun, along with a small number of policemen to protect the
mission.
Moroccan troops control most of the towns in the northern part of Spanish
Sahara. Last week, the Moroccans took a group of journalists and press attaches on a
tour of El Aaiun and two northern towns to demonstrate that the Moroccans
control the area and to deflate claims to the contrary by the Polisario Front-the
Saharan independence movement backed by Algeria.
So far, the Moroccans have not contested the Front's control of Mahbes, a
town in the northeastern border area. Rabat probably wants to consolidate its grip
elsewhere before risking Algerian military intervention by conducting operations
close to the border.
In the southern border area, Mauritanian troops, reportedly aided by a
Moroccan unit, have made headway against the Polisario guerrillas. After a week of
fighting, the Front was dislodged on December 19 from the border town of Guera.
The Mauritanians are concerned about protecting the rail line that runs along the
southern Saharan border.
Although unsuccessful in conventional fighting against Moroccan and
Mauritanian forces, the Polisario guerrillas are still capable of carrying out harassing
operations. On one occasion, the guerrillas machine-gunned the conveyor belt
system that carries phosphate ore some 60 miles from Bu Craa to El Aaiun.
On the political front, Morocco is tryin to prevent a further deterioration of
relations with Algeria over Spanish Sahara.
a a s
efforts are unlikely to make much headway in Algiers, given Algiers' continuing
opposition to the Moroccan take-over in Sahara and its strong support of the
Polisario Front.
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The prospect of prolonged tension over Spanish Sahara has been spurring
Algeria to strengthen its military forces along its frontier with Morocco and the
disputed territory. he US consul in Oran reports a constant flow for the
last three weeks of military convoys passing south through Bechar toward Tindouf,
where Algeria maintains a military base.
At this time, we doubt that Algeria is preparing for a direct assault on Morocco
or an incursion into Spanish Sahara. Algiers' military moves still seem intended to
strengthen its border defenses and exert psychological pressure on Rabat while
continuing to provide material support to the Polisario insurgency. An Algerian
official recently said that unless Rabat tries to close infiltration routes into Spa ish
Sahara, he did not expect a clash between Moroccan and Algerian forces.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 31, 1975
UN Secretary General Waldheim's efforts to reactivate the moribund Cypriot
intercommunal talks have hit a snag, mainly over procedural differences between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. If not resolved soon, these differences could delay the
resumption of the talks, which Waldheim prefers to convene in mid-January because
of other commitments later in the month.
The current effort to resume the talks came out of the meeting between Greek
Foreign Minister Bitsios and Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil in Brussels on
December 12. The two reportedly agreed that the talks should be resumed under
Waldheim's auspices, with the aim of arriving at a package deal covering all aspects
of the Cyprus problem, including the crucial territorial question on which the Greek
side is prepared to make the first proposal. They called on Waldheim to set a time
and venue for the talks in consultation with the interested parties, including the
Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
Waldheim envisages a marathon negotiating session in New York, commencing
on January 15 and lasting as long as two weeks, with Greek Cypriot negotiator
Clerides and Turkish Cypriot negotiator Denktash. Waldheim hopes to work out the
basic principles of a settlement with the negotiators, following which the talks
would be shifted to another site where Clerides and Denktash would settle the
details under the auspices of UN special envoy to Cyprus Perez de Cuellar.
Thus far, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots seem willing to go along with
Waldheim's plan, provided any follow-up sessions are held outside Cyprus. The
Greek Cypriots, however, are insisting that the talks be linked to this year's General
Assembly resolution, which favors their case.
For their part, the Turkish Cypriots have rejected any such linkage. They are
expressing strong opposition to New York as a meeting place, and say that any
subsequent sessions should be held in Nicosia.
Much will now depend on whether Athens and Ankara are willing to play a
positive role behind the scenes and exert pressure on their respective Cypriot
counterparts to resolve differences and get on with the talks. But even if these most
recent procedural objections are overcome-which seems likely-Turkish Cypriot
leader Denktash's recent claim that only minor territorial adjustments will be made
indicates that the two sides are still far apart on substance.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 31, 1975
International reaction to Indonesia's intervention in Portuguese Timor
continues to trouble Jakarta, but the Suharto government is confident that the
problem is manageable.
The UN Security Council resolution of December 22 was little more than a slap
on the wrist, and the Indonesian ambassador at the UN indicated in advance that
Jakarta could live with the wording. Indonesia subsequently made a pro forma
official statement regretting the UN action, but welcoming UN participation in
settling the Timor issue. Jakarta is still taking a very cooperative public position
while working behind the scenes to postpone implementation of the fact-finding
mission called for in the resolution.
Jakarta insists that all outside parties, including the UN, must work through the
new provisional Timorese government set up in Dili on December 19. Dili has
publicly told the UN it must delay sending representatives until their physical safety
can be guaranteed. Once the Indonesian forces have full control over the handful of
important Timorese towns, a carefully escorted UN team could be allowed to go
through the motions of a fact-finding visit.
The new regime has made a public appeal for Indonesian military, political, and
economic assistance, giving Jakarta a nominal legal basis for publicly admitting its
presence in Timor any time it chooses. Indonesia still maintains that only
"volunteers" are fighting in Timor.
The most critical factor for Jakarta in limiting international interest in Timor is
how fast Indonesian forces can suppress lingering Fretilin resistance. The longer the
fighting continues, the greater the likelihood Fretilin leaders overseas will be able to
obtain public support from third world countries. Thus far, few governments have
paid more than lip-service to Fretilin's cause, but this could change if Fretilin can
keep forces in the fight.
Two self-styled ministers of the Fretilin "government" are in Peking, evidently
seeking Chinese recognition. The Chinese have, in fact, gradually intensified their
verbal support for Fretilin, but have stopped short of formally recognizing the rebel
government. At a reception for the visiting officials, Foreign Minister Chiao
Kuan-hua for the first time declared the Chinese government's condemnation of the
Indonesian invasion and implied its support for the Fretilin government.
Chinese leaders apparently recognize that Jakarta is not now in any mood to
improve relations with Peking and that support of Fretilin at the current level is not
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 31, 1975
apt to upset seriously prospects for eventual improvement in Sino-Indonesian
relations. More important, the Chinese almost certainly view support for Fretilin as a
contribution to their claim to third world leadership, especially when compared with
Moscow's relative silence on the Timor question.
Jakarta is still fairly relaxed about international reaction, especially from its
important neighbors in the region. A significant exception is President Suharto's
anger at Singapore for abstaining on the UN General Assembly resolution criticizing
Indonesia; other partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations voted
against the resolution.
Another potential problem area for Jakarta is its relations with Canberra.
Indonesia was willing to disregard Australia's unfavorable General Assembly vote,
believing it was directed at a domestic audience during a national election campaign.
Jakarta, however, is certain to resent Foreign Minister Peacock's continuing strong
statements against Indonesian actions in Timor.
Australian public reaction is, in fact, heating up and forcing the government to
take a strong public stance. Close relations with Indonesia, however, are as
fundamental to the Southeast Asian policy of the new Liberal-Country government
as they were for the previous Labor re ime, and Prime Minister Fraser will doubtless
work privately to minimize the strain.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 31, 1975
Prime Minister Razak's trip to Europe for medical treatment has prompted
speculation that he may have to step down.
Kuala Lumpur made only a perfunctory announcement on the 53-year-old
Prime Minister's departure two weeks ago, and it has released no information on his
whereabouts or condition since then.
A government spokesman has stated privately that Razak will be away until
late February. We have no clear evidence of the Prime Minister's current condition.
Rumors concerning Razak's health have already triggered some maneuvering by
would-be successors. Razak has dominated the Malaysian political scene since the
serious communal rioting of 1969, and no consensus on a line of succession has
developed within the politically dominant United Malays National Organization.
Deputy Prime Minister Hussein-himself in poor health-may have to resign.
Leaders of the large Chinese minority are concerned that any successor would
be more of a Malay chauvinist than Razak. Razak has been identified with the
government's moderate policies, which have kept racial tensions in check, and his
departure from politics may well lead to heightened communal tensions.
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Major Vietnamese efforts to obtain economic assistance and to expand trade
with the USSR appear to be bearing fruit.
Moscow agreed in late October to provide technical assistance and long-term
loans to Hanoi on a most-favored-nation basis for five years. The official
announcement indicated that the Soviets would coordinate their aid with
Vietnamese economic plans in the future and suggested that Vietnam might draw
closer to the Soviet-sponsored CEMA. The five-year agreement, while apparently
containing no grants, will facilitate Hanoi's long-range economic planning.
Throughout the war, the Vietnamese carefully balanced their relations with
Moscow and with Peking. Recently, however, they have leaned toward Moscow on
several issues. For example, the joint communique following the October agreement
contained Vietnam's strongest endorsement of Soviet detente policies to date. The
agreement's long-term provisions suggest that Hanoi could support Moscow on other
foreign policy issues. Reports indicate that the Soviets, through Hanoi's good
offices, have increased their influence in Laos.
This warming relationship with Moscow has come at a time of apparent cooling
between Hanoi and Peking. In late September, the Vietnamese and Chinese
concluded a one-year economic agreement with no grant aid. Their failure to issue a
joint communique was a break with custom and indicated negotiations were not
smooth. The Chinese also brought up the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel and
Spratly islands just prior to the economic negotiations.
Hanoi reportedly believes Moscow has more to contribute and is less capable of
directly influencing affairs in Indochina. The Vietnamese perceive China as a more
direct rival for regional influence, a view reinforced by Peking's position in Phnom
Penh.
Nevertheless, the Vietnamese want neither to lose Chinese aid nor to provoke
China. Therefore, Hanoi will probably not let relations deteriorate to a dangerous
level.
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Fidel Castro has emerged from last week's Cuban Communist Party congress
with a stronger political structure and a leadership more unified than ever before.
Although some movement was made to include new faces at the highest level of the
party, Castro clearly still looks to his former guerrilla comrades as his primary source
of support.
Although 13 Central Committee members were removed and 35 others added,
more than two thirds of the group still comes from the "guerrilla elite"-those
among the leadership who fought under Fidel Castro during the revolution in the
late 1950s or joined forces with him shortly thereafter. Most have a military
background; some are currently in the military or security services; and others have
retired from the military establishment to assume high political or administrative
posts.
Three members of the pre-Castro Communist Party were removed while five
were added. Although the "old" communist faction has increased its total
membership, because of the Central Committee's expansion, it has barely managed
to maintain its relative strength. It did, however, gain three seats on the 11-man
Political Bureau, where previously it had had no representation at all. As the most
pro-Moscow force in the leadership, the faction was expected to improve its position
in recognition of the increased responsibilities it had borne since 1970.
An increase in the number of women on the Central Committee had been
anticipated, in view of Castro's strong endorsement of women's rights over the past
year and his criticism that women did not have adequate representation in the party.
Only two were added, however, and one was dropped, leaving women with 6 of the
112 seats.
The elevation of some of the new members to the Central Committee appears
to have been based on nonpolitical criteria. A top sugar expert, a long-standing
"hero of socialist labor," and Cuba's most noted poet gained seats. Others have been
pulled from virtual obscurity. One, for example, was previously noted only as the
administrator of a cookie factory. In short, the olitical composition of the party
remains virtually unchanged.
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December 31, 1975
Latin American reaction to Cuban involvement in Angola has been mixed and
for the most part relatively muted. Leftist governments are giving mild support to
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
Some moderate countries like Colombia and Venezuela, which have recently
normalized relations with Cuba, have found the Cuban actions somewhat
embarrassing. Right-wing governments have responded with predictable
denunciations of Cuba, and Brazil's early recognition of the Popular Movement
placed Foreign Minister Silveira in a politically awkward position.
The Colombian press has criticized Cuba's intervention in Angola, but
government leaders who worked to remove the divisive Cuba issue from
inter-American politics are loath to see it reintroduced. They see the Soviet role in
Angola as the real issue, with the Cubans, as clients, acting only as the Soviets bid
them.
The Venezuelan government is reported to be following the Angola situation
closely. Some officials in Caracas are said to feel that US prestige requires a firm
stand to prevent the fall of Angola into the Soviet camp. Some Venezuelan military
officers are concerned that if the Cubans are able to act with impunity in Angola,
Havana will be encouraged to resume revolutionary activity in Latin America.
Leaders of Chile and Uruguay see the Cuba-Angola connection as clear proof of
their repeated claims of Cuba's continuing subversive policies. Their distrust of the
Soviets and of detente, already strong, has been strengthened.
The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has been under strong attack by the country's
prestigious, conservative press for the quick recognition of the Popular Movement
regime in Angola. The ministry has been forced to deny that President Geisel was
displeased over the handling of Angolan policy.
The departure of the Brazilian special representative from Luanda-officially
for reasons of health-has fueled speculation that Geisel is reconsidering Brazil's
position on Angola. The press continues to intimate that Foreign Minister Silveira is
in trouble with the President over Angola, and there are signs that influential
military conservatives are displeased with Silveira.
The Peruvians have so far stuck with the nonaligned declaration, which was
silent on Soviet and Cuban activity in Angola but criticized South African
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aggression. Guyana seems inclined to recognize the Popular Movement, but may wait
to follow the lead of the Organization of African Unity.
In Jamaica, Prime Minister Manley recently received a Popular Movement
delegation. He is considering their request for technical help in livestock
development and health.
On Sunday an Icelandic coast guard vessel reported it had been rammed by a
British frigate well within Iceland's unilaterally declared 200-mile fishing zone, thus
ending the two-week lull in the dispute between Iceland and Britain over fishing
rights.
London called the collision an accident while Reykjavik claimed the incident
was a carefully planned attack. This ramming is the first such incident since
December 11, when a similar episode prompted an Icelandic complaint to the UN
Security Council.
Responding to a letter from British Prime Minister Wilson, Icelandic Prime
Minister Hallgrimsson on December 24 merely reiterated Reykjavik's positions and
renewed old threats. Hallgrimsson warned that the continued presence of British
frigates could jeopardize Iceland's membership in NATO. In the letter, Wilson had
renewed the UK's offer to resume negotiations if Iceland would stop harassing
British trawlers.
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