NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 11, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 11, 1975
LEBANON: Another
cease-fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ASIA-US: Reaction to
President's Honolulu speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
CHINA: Propaganda
offensive from party's left wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CHINA-ANGOLA: Reflections
of Sino-Soviet rivalries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ANGOLA: Popular
Movement offensive stalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SPAIN: Cabinet changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
PORTUGAL: Military makes
small concessions to civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
INDONESIA-TIMOR: Jakarta's
friends move to find compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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BRAZIL - WEST GERMANY:
Building closer ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
WEST GERMANY: Coalition
agrees on labor legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
RHODESIA: Nkomo-Smith talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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Prime Minister Karami announced last night that his extra-governmental
"security committee" had agreed to still another cease-fire.
The committee contains representatives of Lebanon's principal Muslim and
Christian political factions, including the right-wing Phalanges Party, but no radical
leftists. Radicals led by Ibrahim Qulaylat have been the Phalangists' chief opponents
in the widespread clashes this week and will attempt to keep the fighting going.
Fighting continued in Beirut after the cease-fire announcement, according to the
press.
Karami came under great pressure to negotiate a new cease-fire yesterday when
socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt joined Qulaylat and other radical leftists in charging
that the army had intervened to rescue right-wing Phalangists in the hotel district.
The army had in fact prevented either side from making significant new gains, but
had failed to reduce the level of fighting. According to press reports from Beirut, as
many as 850 army commandos and other troops have taken up positions in the
city's commercial center. This represents the most extensive army involvement in
internal security functions since the state of emergency in May 1973.
If the fighting should continue at a high level or become still worse, the army
might not be able to provide much additional help. The 18,000-man force includes
only about 3,600 infantry troops who could be used for security duties. An
estimated 2,000 of these troops have over the past several weeks been seconded to
the government's exhausted 6,000-man internal security force. They have been
guarding government buildings in Beirut, patrolling the periphery of the city,
securing the road to the airport, and manning buffer zones between opposing
factions in the Tripoli-Zagharta and Zahlah areas. The army's effectiveness in wider
hostilities would be limited by an increased tendency for its units to divide along
religious lines. Because the force so far has been used primarily for patrol duties and
has seen little sustained combat, this has not yet become a significant problem.
Karami's willingness to have the army stay in place to help enforce the new
cease-fire despite leftist criticism is a result of the generally constructive attitudes
taken by the Syrian government and leaders of the Palestine Liberation
Organization. The Lebanese branch of the Syrian Baath Party has been one of few
groups to reaffirm its support for Karami this week. Palestinian leaders have helped
by avoiding criticism of the army, by endorsing the latest cease-fire, and by privately
ordering their forces to stop backing the increasingly powerful Qulaylat.
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The Prime Minister is attempting to mimimize the damage to his political
position by claiming that the army was ordered in by Interior Minister Shamun, a
Christian, and that army forces remain under the command of the internal security
forces. Karami has also pointed out that the government has not declared a state of
emergency, which theoretically is required for army intervention.
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ASIA-US
Japan and South Korea have praised President Ford's speech in Honolulu this
week, but North Korea has strongly denounced it.
The Japanese are clearly pleased that Washington has reaffirmed its
commitment to play an active Asian role and the importance of the US-Japan
alliance. Both the President's trip and his address were widely publicized in Japan,
with editorial comment emphasizing the US resolve to remain a Pacific power. Since
the fall of Indochina, there has been some concern in Tokyo that a US retrenchment
in Asia could bring instability damaging to Japanese interests.
Tokyo is pleased to see that US relations with Peking remain on course and to
note indications of a flexible US approach to Indochina. The Japanese also view the
President's visits to Jakarta and Manila as important symbols of continued US
involvement in Southeast Asia.
South Korea has generally expressed satisfaction with the speech, focusing
more narrowly on Washington's determination to maintain its commitments to allies
in Asia. President Ford's comments on the importance of maintaining security and
peace in Korea and his statement that Seoul must participate in any dialogue on the
future of Korea were particularly well received.
Hoping to see a further US withdrawal from Asia after the fall of Indochina,
Pyongyang has reacted in predictably vitriolic fashion. Denouncing US policy as
aimed at perpetuating the division of Korea, Pyongyang also directed special
criticism at the US-Japan alliance and ignored the President's remarks about
improving US-Chinese relations.
Hanoi, meanwhile, has rejected the President's expression of good will toward
Vietnam, stating that the US still refuses to address the issue of compensation for
war damages. The Vietnamese have maintained that Article 21 of the Paris
Agreement, which calls for "healing the wounds of war," is still in effect and that
war reparations must be negotiated before any consideration can be given to the
establishment of diplomatic relations.
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CHINA
December 11, 1975
The left wing of the Chinese Communist Party, which has watched the
excessive policies of the Cultural Revolution being overturned in the past year, has
launched a strident propaganda counterattack. This assault focuses mainly on the
new educational policies announced this fall but includes a broader defense of the
Cultural Revolution in general and of the "new things," a codeword for policies
adopted during that turbulent period.
An article carried in the party's two major publications attacks point by point
the shifts in educational policy announced in a speech by the minister of education
and reportedly endorsed by Chairman Mao. It dismisses as ridiculous the charge
made by the education minister that the universities have failed to provide quality
education. It specifically criticizes the notion that the universities must emphasize
basic technical courses, a direct rebuttal to the reported statements of Mao and the
education minister on the need to increase the study of basic scientific theory. It
attacks the policy, reportedly approved by Mao in 1974, of sending students directly
to the universities without their having spent a few years in the rural areas first.
The article also reiterates the favorite leftist position that political training is
the most important function of the universities, despite the reported statement by
Mao that university students need not study politics in college but can do so at their
places of employment.
The article has prompted one communist official to express his concern over a
possible resurgence of ultra-leftist activity. After a steady erosion of leftist political
influence, particularly in the cultural arena, the recent changes in educational policy
forced the leftists with the choice of striking back or abandoning their last remaining
area of influence to the moderate coalition headed by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.
The educational debate has apparently caused some disruption in two of
China's most prestigious universities, those in Peking and Tsinghua, where students
on both sides of the issue have put up wall posters. Some posters complain that
educational policies are depriving students of a good education, while others attack
what they see as a return to the "elitist" policies in vogue before the Cultural
Revolution. The latter posters include specific attacks on the minister of education,
whom they blame for reinstituting higher educational standards.
Leftist assaults on the new educational policy will probably stave off,
temporarily at least, any major changes in the education system. Efforts to regain
some lost ground and to expand this attack into a defense of the Cultural
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Revolution are likely to meet with less success. The broader attack is contained in an
article by Liang Hsiao, a pseudonym for an unidentified but influential person or
group in the party leadership. This article attacks those who have "negated" the
policies of the Cultural Revolution by endless criticism. The only specific policy
mentioned is that of education, but the defense of the "new things" that emerged
during the Cultural Revolution is clearly meant to include a wide range of policy
issues.
This broad attack is a response not only to the changes made recently in
Cultural Revolution policies and to Mao's apparent abandonment of the left, but
also undoubtedly to the growing power and prestige of Teng Hsiao-ping. Teng is a
particular irritant to the party's left wing because, as a victim of the Cultural
Revolution, he personifies all of the "evils" that the leftists wanted to eradicate
during that period.
It is precisely Teng's power, greater now than before the Cultural Revolution,
that is likely to confine leftists' attacks to propaganda broadsides, while limiting
their actual influence over policy. Nevertheless, these recent articles clearly
demonstrate that the left retains access to the media and is capable of stirring up
propaganda debates. In the past year, the left has been unable to sustain an attack
on current policies. If kept up over time, such leftist activity could force the
hard-nosed Teng to take firm action against his antagonists or, in the tradition of
Premier Chou En-Iai, to tread more cautiously in nyertiirninn he policies of the
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December 11, 1975
CHINA-ANGOLA
Peking's policy toward Angola continues to reflect Chinese efforts to capitalize
on Moscow's heavy-handed support for the Popular Movement. Publicly, the Chinese
are maintaining a position of strict neutrality, and there is no evidence that any
significant new amounts of Chinese military assistance are reaching the National
Front or National Union.
Chinese may also have given aci
ilitary
,Q 111pat equipmen
long as Peking is left with a plausible case for denying direct involvement a.
As long as other countries maintain their current levels of assistance to the
National Front and the National Union, China can be expected to maintain a low
profile with its former clients, endorse the Organization of African Unity's call for
neutrality toward Angola, and score propaganda points at Moscow's expense. Peking
is clearly concerned, however, that it may not be able to sustain this approach.
Any significant reduction in support for the National Front and National
Union by other countries, for example, would present the Chinese with difficult
ions.
The prospect of a reversal of the Organization of African Unity's position on
Angola or an agreement among its members to go their separate ways on the
recognition issue would be equally unsettling to the Chinese. This would almost
certainly lead to much wider African and Third World recognition for the Popular
Movement and leave Peking on the wrong side of the fence. Such valued friends as
Tanzania, Mozambique, Romania, and Yugoslavia have already followed Moscow's
lead in formally recognizing the Popular Movement.
ThP Movement. for its part, has carefully avoided closing the door on Peking.["
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 11, 1975
Soviet pressures to side with Moscow in the ideological dispute with China. There
are no signs, however, that Peking is seriously considering switching its political
position. On the contrary, the expanded Soviet and Cuban role can only have
darkened China's views of the Movement.
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December 11, 1975
The offensive launched last week by the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola against Ambriz, the headquarters of the National Front for the Liberation
of Angola, appears to have stalled some 50 miles south of its target.
The National Front has been destroying bridges as it falls back to Ambriz and
positions farther north. Moreover, the Popular Movement's supply lines to Luanda
probably have been slowed by the onset of the rainy season, a factor that annually
hampered Portuguese operations during the insurgency.
In the fighting southeast of Luanda, forces of the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola yesterday retook Mussenide from the Popular Movement,
which had captured the town the day before. The National Union had used
Mussende as an operational base in its drive, now stalled, to take Malanje.
A National Union spokesman announced in Lusaka, Zambia, last weekend that
Union forces had "launched an offensive" against Henrique de Carvalho, the Popular
Movement's major stronghold in eastern Angola. The extent of the fighting in that
area cannot be determined.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 11, 1975
Preparations are under way for an extensive cabinet reshuffle that is expected
to bring to the fore leaders who are willing to nudge Spain toward a more open
political system.
The new government, which could be sworn in as early as tomorrow, may
retain only three members of the present 19-member cabinet, according to Jose
Maria de Areilza, a prominent monarchist politician. Prime Minister Arias told
Areilza that Juan Carlos had specifically requested that portfolios be given to
Areilza, to former ambassador to London Manuel Fraga Iribarne, and to Christian
Democrat Federico Silva Munoz. Areilza claimed that he would be given the Foreign
Ministry, that Fraga would be offered the Ministry of the Interior, and that Silva
Munoz would become minister of either justice or information.
Arias said he would proceed only if all three men accepted the appointments.
They will be cautious about what kind of government they might be associated with,
but they are also very ambitious and anxious to get in on the ground floor of a new
political era. In any case, Areilza implied that he was satisfied with Arias' assurances
that the new government would attempt to move Spain closer to a Western-style
democracy. Fraga had wanted to be prime minister, but the interior portfolio will
provide him the base he wants to build a political power structure.
Areilza said he inferred from Arias' remarks that the three ministers who will
remain are Minister of Labor Fernando Suarez Gonzalez, one of the most liberal
members of the current government, Minister of the National Movement Jose Solis
Ruiz, a moderate proponent of change who is widely acceptable across the political
spectrum, and the more conservative Minister of the Navy, Admiral Gabriel Pita da
Veiga.
According to Areilza, Arias may appoint General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado to
be deputy prime minister for coordinating the three military ministries-perhaps
foreshadowing the formation of a defense ministry in the near future. Gutierrez
Mellado, who is the chief military spokesman at the US base negotiations, is
generally considered one of the brightest general officers in the Spanish armed
forces. He favors a gradual evolution of the regime and is liked by most of the
democratic opposition, including the Socialists.
Whatever the composition of the new government, it will face a baptism by
fire. The localized strikes that are taking place this week are likely to be forerunners
of more serious labor unrest this winter. A number of important collective
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bargaining contracts are due to expire on December 31, and last month the
government extended for a year the wage freeze that was introduced last summer.
The extension has angered the entire working class and will make the labor
movement more receptive to Communist attempts to use the country's economic
difficulties to organize a paralyzing general strike early next year.
The government will also have to cope with an increasing number of potentially
violent demonstrations as the opposition steps up its demands for complete amnesty
for political prisoners, legalization of the Communist Party and all other parties, and
an opening up of the government labor organization.
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December 11, 1975
Foreign Minister Melo Antunes, a key member of Portugal's Revolutionary
Council, has announced that the military is prepared to allow civilians a greater role
in running the country, but he ruled out an early return to civilian rule.
Speaking at a press conference on Tuesday, Antunes conceded that the Armed
Forces Movement-which has dominated Portugal for the past 20 months-may have
to surrender its role as the vanguard of the revolution. He confirmed that a revision
of the pact signed with the political parties last spring is under way, but he stressed
that a precipitate withdrawal by the military could endanger its program for leading
the country to socialism. Antunes, who has political ambitions of his own, was
responding to recent demands by military and civilian leaders that the Armed Forces
Movement relinquish power and "return to the barracks."
Among the officers pushing for the military to withdraw from politics are a
number of respected professional soldiers who believe the people should be allowed
to decide whether they want socialism. Although their number and influence are not
known, several of the officers are believed to have played a key role in putting down
the leftist military rebellion of November 25-26. There is evidence that the strength
of the group is growing and that it may exert increasing pressure upon the Antunes
faction to change both its gradualist approach to returning power and its attachment
to socialism as an unalterable goal.
The Azevedo government, meanwhile, has survived a split in the centrist
Popular Democratic Party. The compromise resolution on Communist participation
in the cabinet, passed by the Popular Democrats at their congress on Saturday, has
assured continuation of the sixth provisional government. A subsequent power play
by party Secretary General Sa Carneiro, however, led to the resignation of the
leadership of the party's left wing. Reacting to the secretary general's autocratic
attempts to dominate the party secretariat, one cabinet minister, two secretaries of
state, and 17 members of the party's delegation to the constituent assembly have
already bolted and more defections are expected.
Prime Minister Azevedo has agreed to allow Sa Carneiro to replace dissident
Popular Democrats in the government, but the status of the assembly members has
not been determined. The split has resulted in a more homogeneous party firmly
under Sa Carneiro's control, but the party has lost some of its most effective
political organizers. Unless a reconciliation is achieved, which now seems unlikely,
the party may have succeeded in limiting its appeal exclusively to the right.
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Indonesia's Asian friends are working to undercut criticism of Jakarta by other
Third World states and to work out a UN resolution on Timor that all sides can
accept. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Malaysia,
Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand-have joined other Asian statesatthe UN in
seeking a compromise resolution on Timor that will avoid condemning Indonesia for
aggression.
The problem is particularly delicate for the Australian government, which is in
the midst of a bitter election campaign. Left-wing trade unionists supporting the
Fretilin cause of Timorese independence are being joined by usually conservative
World War I I veterans who served in Timor and feel an emotional tie to its people.
Australia is presently supporting a compromise resolution that avoids any mention
of Indonesian action and talks in general about respecting the rights of Timorese
self-determination, but the Australians fear that the resolution in its present form
has little chance of passing.
Even Jakarta's severest critics display no belief that Fretilin is a viable
government worthy of substantial support as such. Both Peking and Hanoi have been
outspoken in denouncing Indonesian aggression, but neither has recognized Fretilin's
declaration of independence. As the self-proclaimed leader of the Third World,
Peking must have felt obliged to criticize Jakarta, but the Chinese hope that the
Timor issue will not become an obstruction to Peking's continuing efforts to
improve relations with Jakarta. Hanoi took the opportunity to blame Washington
for encouraging the Indonesian attack.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 11, 1975
Ties between Brazil and West Germany have been improved significantly by
Foreign Minister Genscher's visit last month to Brasilia. Both German and Brazilian
officials are already speaking of a "special relationship" between the two countries.
In an exchange of diplomatic notes implementing the nuclear cooperation
agreement signed last June in Bonn, Genscher and Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira
agreed to establish joint venture companies in the nuclear field before the end of the
year. Nuclebras, the Brazilian state nuclear enterprise, will begin placing orders in
1976 which are expected to amount to $1 billion over several years.
The two foreign ministers also issued public statements that could be
interpreted as playing down the role of international safeguards in nuclear policy.
While Genscher said that the restrictions imposed by the International Atomic
Energy Agency apply only to the binational program, Silveira asserted Brazil's right
to undertake peaceful nuclear explosions. Genscher chose not to point out that the
agreement specifically prohibits the use of joint projects and technology to
undertake nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
Genscher also curried favor with the Brazilians by emphasizing the importance
of improving trade relations between the developed and less developed nations-a
theme that has been sounded by Silveira in two recent appearances before the UN.
It is apparent that West Germany wants to improve relations with several Latin
American countries. Genscher also visited Venezuela and Peru to encourage a
widening of economic cooperation. Brazil, however, is the main attraction. German
investment there already is close to $1 billion, with over 400 firms represented. This
extent of economic involvement is second only to West German investment in the
United States.
Bonn seems to view Brazil as a "bridge" to Latin America and the less
developed nations in general, both because Brazil offers profitable opportunities for
investment and because, as an emerging world power, it has an approach to many
issues that is compatible with the interests of the industrialized nations. Brazil is also
an important cultural "bridge," owing to a large population of German extraction.
From Brazil's point of view, the relationship with West Germany provides an
opportunity to chart a more independent foreign policy, to reduce the traditional
dependency on the US, and to assert its national interest as a major power. This is
especially important at a time when Brazil is becoming increasingly strident in the
assertion of its interests in international forums.
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The maintenance of West Germany's currently favorable position in Brazil will
of course depend in large measure on how smoothly the nuclear agreement is
implemented. There do not appear to be any specific points of conflict at this time,
but given the complexity of the series of agreements, there will undoubtedly be
some difficulties.
The two parties in Chancellor Schmidt's coalition government, after protracted
negotiations, reached agreement this week on new legislation to increase the role of
labor in industrial management. Both parties will push for parliamentary ratification
in the spring.
Many compromises were necessary, given the sharp differences between the
Social Democrats and the business-oriented Free Democrats. Leaders of both parties
feared, however, that the Schmidt government would lose crucial votes in the
national elections if it could not deliver on this major reform, which was promised
by the Brandt-Scheel administration six years ago. The coalition parties have a
comfortable majority in the lower house of parliament, but recent polls indicate that
the electoral challenge of the opposition Christian Democrats could be strong.
In striking a compromise with their more conservative coalition partners, the
Social Democrats are running a calculated risk. Trade union leaders, particularly
spokesmen for the nation's labor federation, are disappointed in the draft legislation.
Although workers will enjoy equal representation with management on supervisory
boards projected for firms with more than 2,000 employees, tie votes will be broken
by a chairman elected by each firm's stockholders.
The concession was unavoidable after German firms and subsidiaries of
multinational corporations raised serious legal objections to permitting unions to
dictate or stymie management policy. The bill now should also survive attacks from
the opposition parties, which, along with the conservative Free Democrats, had
argued that earlier proposals were unconstitutional.
Despite their disappointment, union leaders have indicated that they will
respect the compromise legislation. This moderation is partly a result of strenuous
efforts by Schmidt and Economic Minister Friderichs to persuade workers that their
maximum demands are unrealistic.
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Joshua Nkomo, the leader of a major faction of Rhodesian black nationalists,
announced yesterday that formal negotiations with Prime Minister Ian Smith aimed
at achieving a constitutional settlement will begin today.
Nkomo and Smith last week signed a "declaration of intent" to begin the
formal talks, but they had been expected to hold another preliminary meeting this
week to settle final details. Nkomo's announcement suggests that all procedural
matters may already have been worked out.
Nkomo said he would lead a 12-man delegation to the talks, but he did not
indicate whether representatives of other nationalist factions will be included. The
delegation almost certainly will not include Nkomo's most prominent rivals,
Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa, who have denounced from exile the
Smith-Nkomo meetings.
Settlement talks will be prolonged and difficult, and ultimate success is far
from assured. In any event, Smith can be expected to employ tactics aimed at
avoiding a final settlement for as long as possible.
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CHINA: The Chinese have released a new figure for 1974 grain output that is
far larger than the output claimed for any previous year. At a UN conference held in
Rome in mid-November, vice minister of agriculture and forestry Yang Li-kung
reported that the total grain output was 274.9 million tons. This is consistent with
US estimates of the 1974 harvest. A Western press dispatch from Peking, using this
figure as a base, speculates that China's 1975 harvest could be more than 280 million
tons. Peking announced recently that the 1975 harvest was "even higher than 1974,
itself a high production year." This statement downgrades the 1974 harvest, which
previously had been termed a record harvest, and suggests that any increase this year
will be small
GREECE-ROMANIA: A barter arrangement has been concluded by which
Bucharest will provide Athens 2,000 Romanian-manufactured ARO-240
three-quarter-ton jeeps in return for agricultural products. Delivery is to be
completed by April, if possible, because of tensions with Turkey. Since early 1974,
when Athens withdrew from the grant-aid portion of the US military assistance
program, it has been purchasing military materiel from both Western Europe and the
US. This is the first time Greece has arranged for materiel from a communist
country specifically for military use.
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