NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: December 8, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA & DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
NO
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 8, 1975
PORTUGUESE TIMOR: Indonesian
troops capture Timor capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
PORTUGAL: Communist
participation in government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
LEBANON: New round of
fighting feared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
UK: London still plans
selective import . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FRANCE: Fourth ballistic missile
submarine ready for sea trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: Discussion
of monetary reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EC-US
differences over agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
EGYPT-POLAND: Large Egyptian
order of T-55 tanks . . . . .
ALGERIA-MOROCCO: Maneuvering
over Spanish Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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INDONESIA
..,. _. Lesser Sunda Islands
CJDILI
PGGTUGUESE
TIMGH
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 8, 1975
Indonesian troops have captured Dili, the capital of Portuguese Timor.
Yesterday, Indonesian marines and airborne troops equipped with US weapons
mounted a full-scale attack against the city following a naval bombardment. The
In anticipation of the fall of the capital, the Fretilin weeks ago had begun
moving large quantities of supplies and ammunition into the mountains, from which
they plan to wage guerrilla war against the Indonesians.
Indonesia, meanwhile, is attempting to portray its actions in the best possible
light. Foreign Minister Malik, for example, told reporters yesterday that Indonesian
"volunteers" had indeed landed in Timor, but only after Dili had fallen to
indigenous anti-Fretilin forces and only in response to a request from these forces
for assistance in restoring security. He denied that Indonesian forces were involved
in heavy fighting, or that they had shelled or carried out air attacks against the
capital.
Malik also indicated that a delegation representing the four pro-Indonesian
parties on Timor would soon depart for the UN to lobby for approval of the
integration of East Timor into Indonesia.
Lisbon has broken relations with Jakarta and will ask the UN Security Council
to order Indonesia to cease military operations. F77 I
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 8, 1975
Portugal's centrist Popular Democratic Party has dropped its inflexible stand
against Communist participation in the government, averting a showdown over the
issue.
At a national congress held over the weekend, Popular Democratic delegates
voted to allow the party to continue to participate with the Communists in the
present government under certain conditions. Many of the conditions either have
already been met or could be met by the government without extreme difficulty.
Popular Democratic leaders, after extensive debate, backed away from a
conflict with the Antunes faction and the Socialists over the Communist issue. The
final resolution may have been a compromise to avoid splitting the conservative and
leftist wings of the party. Party Secretary General Francisco Sa Carneiro had been
calling for the ouster of the Communists for weeks because of their efforts to
undermine the government.
Such calls intensified in the wake of the coup attempt on November 25-26,
which both the Popular Democrats and the Socialists blamed on the Communists.
Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal, meanwhile, told 20,000 supporters in
Lisbon yesterday that the party had not withdrawn from the government because
that would only strengthen the right. He said a new threat from the right must now
be overcome by changing the policies of the Socialists and the ruling faction in the
Armed Forces Movement.
Cunha) told the Communist rally-the first since the coup attempt-that the
rebellion had been "disastrous," and he placed the blame on the far left. He said a
bloody rout of the workers had been narrowly avoided when the Communist Party
failed to support the uprising
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 8, 1975
Security in Beirut deteriorated over the weekend, despite efforts by leaders of
the major combatants to forestall heavy fighting.
Commercial activity, which had gradually been increasing since the latest
cease-fire, has halted as a result of a new wave of kidnapings and gunfights in the
downtown area. Many Lebanese fear that the end-of-the-month "pay day" truce is
over and that radical elements have sufficiently rearmed themselves for another
round of fighting.
The flare-up appears to have been caused by radical elements of both Christian
and Muslim groups seeking revenge on one another. One incident involving a
kidnaping in the hotel district led to the wounding of two Soviet diplomats. Interior
Minister Shamun, Lebanon's most powerful Christian leader, has condemned both
sides and imposed what amounts to a 24-hour curfew on the city.
Prime Minister Karami's recent admission that he is having difficulty
broadening his government has scotched hopes that a new cabinet slate would be
announced by the end of the week and has generally dampened public confidence
that an effective government can be put together at all. Christian politicians are
apparently arguing that security must be restored before Karami can take any new
initiatives, while leftist leaders are demanding that their reform proposals be
accepted prior to formation of a new cabinet.
Although much of this talk is part of the bargaining progress, Shamun and
Socialist leader Jumblatt have not given much indication of softening their positions.
Karami will have to work out an understanding between these two adversaries if an
expanded cabinet is to succeed.
Talks between Phalanges leader Jumayyil and Syrian President Asad over the
weekend may have smoothed the way for greater cooperation from the Christian
Phalangists. Jumayyil has been relatively flexible in recent weeks, and is thought to
be prepared to consider granting limited economic and political concessions to the
Muslims.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 8, 1975
The British government apparently still intends to impose selective import
controls. The final decision on how extensive they will be, however, may have been
held up because of negative international reaction.
Michael Foot, secretary of state for employment in the Labor government, has
told labor attaches of the Western embassies in London that he supports the import
controls and that he expects the government to announce them before the end of
the month.
Foot indicated that selective controls would be part of a "Christmas package"
of measures intended to increase employment. Other measures probably will include
subsidies, designed to create new jobs for young workers, and retraining schemes.
Although unemployment is not expected to peak until next year, the
government may expect that the package would at least offset Chrysler's closing of
its UK operations. Foot claimed that a complete shutdown would directly or
indirectly affect the jobs of 50,000 workers. He declined to comment on the status
of negotiations with Chrysler.
Foot's deputy indicated that the primary target of controls would be textiles
from Hong Kong and Taiwan and clothing from Eastern Europe. Second- and
third-priority targets would be television tubes and automobiles from Japan. Such
priorities suggest that London wants to avoid quarrels with either its EC partners or
the US.
The government has warned the EC of the possibility of controls, Foot stated,
adding that he expected no hostile reaction from that quarter. Several EC countries,
however-West Germany, most recently-have told the British that they oppose
selective controls. The subject was not on the agenda of the EC summit meeting in
Rome, but it may have been discussed in the corridors.
Foot justifies his support of import controls by claiming that they are
necessary to save jobs and retain vital trade union support for the Wilson
government. He believes that the most difficult periods for the government will be
when unemployment peaks and when the unions decide next summer how to react
to phase two of Labor's anti-inflation program.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 8, 1975
France's fourth ballistic missile submarine, the Indomptable, is ready to begin
sea trials. According to the US defense attache in Paris, the initial tests of the
nuclear-powered submarine will be conducted in the coastal waters off Cherbourg.
At the current rate of progress, the Indomptable should be ready to join the
fleet in early 1977. It probably will be France's first submarine to carry a full load
of sixteen M-20 missiles, which have a range of about 1,600 nautical miles and are
armed with one-megaton thermonuclear warheads.
France currently plans to build six or seven ballistic missile submarines. Three
already are operational, and the rest should be in service by the mid-1980s unless the
budgetary squeeze forces Paris to slow development.
The defense attache also reported that the prototype reactor for France's first
nuclear-powered attack submarine went critical in late November. The reactor now
will be studied by naval propulsion specialists for its suitability in the planned class
of 2,500-ton nuclear attack submarines.
Construction of the first submarine of this class has been delayed as a result of
budget cuts already made. Consequently, the first of these boats now will not be
operational until well into the 1980s.
Long-range plans still call for two squadrons of nuclear attack submarines in
the 1980s. These probably will replace, rather than augment, some of the older,
cconventionally powered boats.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 8, 1975
The EC's Monetary Committee on November 28 discussed monetary reform
issues, including the French-US accord at Rambouillet. There was general agreement
over the handling of International Monetary Fund gold sales, but several committee
members had reservations over specific points of the compromise reached at
Rambouillet on exchange-rate practices.
The Monetary Committee agreed that two parts of the gold accord-the sale of
IMF gold to aid less developed countries and the return of some IMF gold to
members-should be implemented simultaneously and as soon as possible. The UK
representative suggested, however, that the IMF ought to attempt to proceed with
the sales to aid less developed countries if the US Congress insists on debating the
gold restitution question.
Several members questioned portions of the US-French exchange-rate accord.
Some were concerned that the agreement does not offer specific guidelines for
intervention by central banks to prevent erratic movements in exchange rates. The
understanding which now is in effect-and which would presumably be superseded
by the new accord-calls for intervention to prevent day-to-day movements in excess
of 1 percent.
Some members were also concerned that the proposed inclusion of Finance
Ministry officials in discussions on intervention practices would jeopardize the
independence of central banks in some countries. The EC Monetary Committee is
composed of Community central bankers. Committee members favored the
expansion of current short-term credit arrangements to accommodate intervention
under the proposed accord.
Several Monetary Committee members objected to the proposed wording of
new IMF articles covering exchange-rate practices. Some felt that under the
proposed rules, the IMF would find it difficult to prevent countries from following
undisciplined exchange-rate policies. Others thought that the proposed rules were
too strict and would hinder the right of countries to adopt independent practices.
All members agreed that the IMF oil facility, due to expire early next year after
two years of operation, should be continued. The Committee was unable, however,
to agree on other methods of expanding member access to IMF resources.
The EC Council of Finance Ministers will meet on December 15 to discuss
further the Community's stance on monetary reform, in preparation for
international discussions later this month and in January. The most difficult
problem will be to find wording for the IMF articles on exchange rates that can
accommodate those countries, such as the UK and Italy, which want to continue
floating their currencies without external pressure and those, such as France, which
want the IMF to have a greater say in dictating exchange-rate practices.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 8, 1975
Differences between the EC and the US over agriculture are complicating the
multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva. The long-standing clash between the US
desire for increased market access for agricultural exports and the EC's refusal to
negotiate fundamental tenets of its Common Agricultural Policy is at the root of the
problem.
The handling of the agriculture talks has been a sticking point since the start of
the trade negotiations. The EC has insisted that agriculture be discussed separately;
the US has favored its integration into the overall negotiations.
The trade negotiations have so far proceeded because of a series of
compromises that papered over fundamental differences. The latest compromise,
which provides for "collaboration" between the Agriculture Group and other
negotiating groups, is proving unworkable. Paris opposes this procedure, and since
the EC must act with unanimity, implementation has been blocked.
EC members and the EC Commission have been meeting frequently to attempt
to break the impasse.
The agricultural impasse is affecting other areas of the trade negotiations.
Negotiations on quantitative restrictions, which specify the quantity of a product
that may be imported, were initiated last summer, but several countries, primarily
the EC, refused to discuss agricultural restrictions outside of the Agriculture Group.
Problems will also arise when tariff cutting is discussed. France reportedly will
insist that agricultural tariffs be negotiated solely in the Agriculture Group. Further,
Paris is likely to propose that negotiations for agricultural products be held on a
case-by-case basis. Agricultural exporting countries such as the US, Canada, and
Australia want a general tariff reduction that applies to agricultural as well as
industrial goods.
Paris is by far the most intransigent member in the agriculture dispute. France
profits handsomely from the EC's Common Agricultural Policy and is unwilling to
see its benefits diluted by the trade negotiations. France also perceives an attack on
the Common Agricultural Policy by other EC members. The UK has long opposed
high food prices, and West Germany is irritated with the cost of supporting
Community farmers.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 8, 1975
With its politically powerful farm bloc closely watching the negotiations, Paris
is even more unlikely to compromise in Qenpva while aspects of the Common
Agricultural Policy are under fire in Brussels.
Egypt has ordered 150 T-55 tanks from Poland, according to he
US defense attache in Cairo. The $30 million agreement-Cairo's largest military
purchase from a communist supplier this year and the largest ever concluded with
Poland-calls for payment in hard currency. Previous accords with Poland, valued at
less than $15 million, included ground force equipment, tanks, machine guns, and
support material.
Egypt, with its large inventory of Soviet equipment, has no practical alternative
to Soviet and East European suppliers for replacement equipment and spares,
although Cairo is increasing its contacts with Western arms suppliers. The Egyptians
now have about 2,200 medium tanks in their inventory, about the same number as
during the October 1973 war.
The Polish-made tanks probably will be used to replace some of the tanks in
Egyptian armor units. They are unlikely to be used for new armor units. Although
150 tanks would be adequate to establish nearly five tank battalions, new units also
would require support equipment, trained crews, and maintenance personnel and
materials which we believe are in short supply in Egypt.
I the T-55s are new tanks, rather than used ones being
removed from the Polish inventories as the Poles receive T-62 tanks from the USSR.
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concurrence o the Soviet Union.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 8, 1975
Algeria is following developments in the Spanish Sahara closely, especially
Moroccan activity, and is expected to increase support for its favored independence
movement-the Polisario Front.
Direct Algerian involvement, including the use of military forces either in the
Spanish Sahara or against Morocco, is not expected. Nevertheless, Algerian military
forces have been improving their posture along the border with Morocco, probably
for defensive purposes and to divert Moroccan forces from their efforts to secure
northern Spanish Sahara.
In the decolonization process, Morocco has augmented its forces in the south
and its units in the northern portion of Spanish Sahara. These forces are being
harassed by Algerian-supported guerrillas. Such activity will most likely intensify
after Spain withdraws. The likelihood of Moroccan forces engaging in "hot pursuit"
missions against the guerrillas based in the Tindouf area of western Algeria will
increase. Under these circumstances, escalation is certain.
Any Algerian military actions, however, would most likely be confined to the
Spanish Saharan - Algerian border area. In addition, poor logistics and difficult
terrain would limit military advances by either side.
A reported build-up of Algerian forces in the Tindouf area has not been
confirmed, although some increase has no doubt taken place. A few MIG-15s have
been flown in, but their ability to support military operations is questionable. There
is no significant local base support for extended ground or air operations, and the
supply line to northern Algeria extends for more than 800 miles over a single road
through desolate, uninhabited Saharan wasteland. Furthermore, the strong logistics
build-up required for offensive operations has not been detected.
The Algerian leadership will most likely opt for increasing its logistics and
training support to the Polisario. The guerrillas are provided arms and equipment by
the Algerian army, and training is being conducted by army personnel in the
Tindouf area. An important element of support is the continuous and immediate
access to a secure sanctuary in Algerian territory.
President Boumediene's fundamental motive is to oppose the increase in
Morocco's prestige and economic potential that sovereignty over Spanish Sahara
would afford. The Algerian President does not want to provoke a military
confrontation with Morocco over this issue. Nevertheless, he wants to be prepared
for any contingencies and to discourage Moroccan attempts to pursue Polisario
forces into Algerian territory.
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