NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 6, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA & DOS review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 6, 1975
CONTENTS
SPAIN: Arias begins reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USSR: Serious grain shortfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
USSR: Harvest problems causing
problems for leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS: Turks
call for renewed intercommunal talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
PORTUGAL: Popular Democrats
expected to take anti-military line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
NORWAY-USSR: Barents Sea talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
THAILAND-LAOS: Thai economic pressure . . . . . . . . . . . 11
SPANISH SAHARA: Dispute continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
SYRIA-IRAQ: Renewed propaganda
attacks against Damascus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
BANGLADESH-INDIA: Tensions
appear to be easing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
ISRAEL: Four new settlements
on Golan Heights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
EGYPT-LIBYA: Salim visit
smoothes economic relations . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CUBA: Preparations for party congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
ARGENTINA: Retired general assassinated . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
ECUADOR: President may leave office soon . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 6, 1975
Prime Minister Arias yesterday moved to begin reorganizing the government
after agreeing to King Juan Carlos' request to remain in office.
I krias and members of his cabinet have
prepared a decree authorizing the Prime Minister to carry out the reorganization
without seeking approval of the rightist-dominated parliament. Formal
announcement of the decree apparently will be held up until Arias announces his
choices to head the reorganized ministries. The delay suggests Arias is meeting
resistance to some of his plans.
Government sources told the press yesterday that the reorganization will be
extensive. The separate service portfolios are to be merged into a ministry of
defense; such a move would facilitate modernization of the armed forces. Franco
had blocked previous attempts to create a defense ministry, and implementing such
a change now will help give the Arias government an image of breaking with the
past.
Another change under consideration is the abolition of the cabinet-level
Secretariat General of the National Movement, the only legal political party under
the Franco regime. This change, which would enrage ultrarightists, could be designed
to prepare the way for the legalization of other political parties.
Juan Carlos is said to have given Arias a free hand to name the members of his
cabinet. The Prime Minister is expected to select some ministers who will appeal to
those wanting liberalization of the government, but not without some objections
from the right.[ I
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 6, 1975
Soviet officials have recently indicated that this year's grain harvest was the
lowest since the mid-1960s.
A published statement by a middle-level Soviet official indicates that the
harvest may have been about 137 million tons. Soviet Agriculture Minister
Polyansky gave the British ambassador some figures that point to a crop of between
142 and 152 million tons. This could mean the worst harvest since 1965. One Soviet
official told that the weather this year was the worst in a
hundred years.
A harvest of 137 million tons would leave the USSR short of at least 40 million
tons of grain even if it imports all it can. The Soviets have bought 26.5 million tons
so far this year and, under the existing agreement, they can buy another 3.5 million
tons from the US. Because only minimal amounts are available from other suppliers,
we estimate that total imports will not exceed 30 million tons. The Soviets thus
would have to curtail domestic consumption sharply.
Our latest estimate of the Soviet grain crop is 150 to 155 million tons; that of
the Department of Agriculture is 160 million tons. Earlier, unofficial estimates given
by Soviet officials had been in the range of 160 to 170 million tons. So far, the
Soviet leadership has not employed all-out tactics to compensate for the grain
shortage. Bread lines have not appeared, but bread quality has already declined. We
have, however, good evidence of distress slaughtering of poultry and livestock,
reductions in feed rations, and increases in the prices of farm products in the
collective farm markets.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 6, 1975
The Soviet Union's harvest disaster and related economic problems will
complicate the leadership's propaganda efforts before the party congress meets in
February. Politics could also be affected.
The regime's defensiveness is demonstrated by the attempts to evade reporting
harvest results at the Supreme Soviet session this week. Early in his report to the
session, planning chief Baybakov contrasted the alleged "economic crisis" in the
West to what he claimed were Soviet economic successes. Propagandists will
probably be making increasing use of this device in coming months.
The economic slowdown resulting from the poor harvest, however, will
undermine the leadership's efforts to clothe itself in the mantle of policy success.
Another reason the leadership is treating economic subjects gingerly is because
it realizes the potential for recriminations and policy disputes. By stressing that the
weather was the cause of the poor harvest, the regime is trying to block attempts to
blame individuals or policies. Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitsky, a protege of
Brezhnev, warned this fall that a "correct approach" must be taken in appraising the
harvest, and that the work of the party in agriculture "must not be belittled."
At the moment, the leadership seems to be sticking with its past policies.
Brezhnev's program of heavy investment in agriculture will apparently be
maintained. References to Brezhnev's speech at the Central Committee meeting on
December 1 suggest that he offered hackneyed prescriptions such as "socialist
competition" rather than new approaches to economic problems.
Pressures may nevertheless build behind the scenes. The economy's poor
performance will require preliminary goals for the next Five-Year-Plan period to be
revised downward. Advocates of limited reform measures and schemes to reorganize
agricultural and industrial management could find their cause strengthened. In the
end, it may be impossible to suppress recriminations entirely and to avoid offering
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 6, 1975
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS
Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil last night called for a reopening of the
intercommunal talks on Cyprus and the inclusion of representatives from Greece and
Turkey. He also proposed discussions covering the spectrum of Greek-Turkish
relations.
Caglayangil's statements-obviously timed to coincide with the report to the
US Congress on the status of efforts to achieve a Cyprus settlement-referred to the
necessity of resuming negotiations "as soon as possible" on all aspects of the Cyprus
problem, presumably also including the important territorial question. His proposals
would include Greek and Turkish representatives in the intercommunal talks, but
they would exclude UN Secretary General Waldheim, under whose auspices earlier
talks were held, in favor of a lower ranking UN official.
The move to exclude Waldheim is clearly an effort by the Turks to save face
after their defeat in the UN General Assembly. A Turkish Foreign Ministry official
did indicate to the US embassy, however, that Ankara might be willing to give
ground on Waldheim's role.
In what may be an attempt to link progress on the Cyprus dispute to
movement on the Aegean controversy, Caglayangil suggested that the talks on
airspace rights over the Aegean be accelerated and that another joint committee
consider the continental shelf issue. He further proposed periodic meetings between
the foreign ministers of the two countries.
The Greeks have indicated that they want to get on with the Cyprus talks and
that they may be willing to search for common ground with the Turks. They will be
cautious, however, about any Turkish effort to involve them in bilateral talks on the
ntinental shelf issue, which they prefer to submit to the International Court.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 6, 1975
Portugal's centrist Popular Democratic Party-the country's second
strongest-is expected to oppose continued government participation by both the
Communists and the military when it convenes its national congress today in Aveiro.
Party Secretary General Francisco Sa Carneiro reportedly will seek a resolution
insisting that the Communist Party be expelled from the Azevedo government.
Although there is a consensus within the party for denying the Communists
entry to any future governments, Sa Carneiro's conservative faction and party
liberals disagree on whether tactical considerations should not dictate at least token
Communist participation in the present government. Since the abortive rebellion last
week, however, Sa Carneiro's hard line against the Communists appears to have
gained ground.
Approval of the resolution will confront the Antunes military faction and the
Socialist Party with a serious dilemma. Both have said that they want the
Communists to remain in the government. While they could decide to continue
governing without either the Communists or the Popular Democrats, this would
leave the government open to attacks from both the left and the right.
The Popular Democratic congress is also expected to challenge the pact signed
by the military and parties last spring guaranteeing a dominant role for the military
in the government for three to five years. Sa Carneiro argues that the agreement is
no longer valid because the military broke it last summer when it appointed a
military triumvirate to rule the country. He has repeatedly called for officers
engaged in politics to return to the barracks.
Sa Carneiro's tough anti-Communist and anti-military line may only be a tactic
to minimize the Communist role if the present government is shuffled. It could,
however, be a signal that the Popular Democrats are preparing to leave the
government and join the center-right Social Democratic Center in opposition in
preparation for parliamentary elections next spring.
Conservative sentiment in the country reportedly has increased, and these two
parties may now seek to capitalize on popular dissatifaction with recent leftist
governments as well as with the military to fashion a parliamentary majority of their
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BARENTS SEA AREA
Equidistant line
Sector line
'IRi ENLA.ND
(Denmark 4,
G R L E :N L A ,,',N
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1 q SVALBARD
(Norway)
-,-Jan Mayen
(Norway)
V~OR ;LG1,1
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SOVIET }
CLAIM
4 K Ii :A' TS
.5 L A
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 6, 1975
The second round of talks between Norway and the Soviet Union on
delineation of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea has ended with the two sides
still deadlocked.
A short communique issued at the end of the series of meetings held in Oslo
over the past two weeks said only that the negotiations took place in a "factual and
friendly atmosphere." No date has been set for another round of negotiations.
The main sticking point is the delineation of national waters in the Barents Sea.
Oslo wants a median or equidistant boundary zigzagging between Norwegian and
Soviet islands to the North Pole. Moscow backs a straighter sector line running
directly from the Norwegian-Soviet frontier to the North Pole.
The Soviets promote the sector concept in order to push Norwegian control
further from the Kola Peninsula and its extensive network of military bases. Moscow
is also apprehensive that future oil installations in the region might be used by
NATO for military surveillance purposes.
Although mindful of Soviet strategic interests in the area, the Norwegian
government in recent months has made clear that it intends to protect its own
interests in the area-particularly now that there is a possibility of offshore oil
deposits in the area between the Norwegian mainland and the Svalbard Archipelago.
With solid domestic support, Oslo is looking for ways to increase its presence on
Svalbard and may be similarly encouraged to hold the line in future negotiations
concerning the Barents Sea.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 6, 1975
Prime Minister Khukrit appears determined to maintain economic pressure on
Laos to induce the communists to adopt a more "reasonable" attitude toward
Thailand.
He told US officials this week that he is in no hurry to reopen the Mekong
River border with Laos, closed last month following a Lao attack on a Thai patrol
boat. Although Bangkok will maintain a conciliatory posture in public, the border is
to stay closed pending a more accommodating posture in Vientiane.
Khukrit indicated that "starving them for a while" would impress on the Lao
their dependence on Thailand for supplies and an access to the sea. He also said he
views this as an experiment to see if the Vietnamese could provide enough supplies
to compensate for the loss of Thai shipments. Stocks of gasoline in Vientiane are
virtually exhausted, and prices for food and consumer goods are rising in response to
short supplies.
The Prime Minister subsequently told a press conference that Bangkok is
uncertain about what effect the change in government in Laos would have on
relations, but that the Thai would be responsive to any friendly gesture from
Vientiane.
Khukrit's stiff attitude will certainly have the support of the Thai military, and
the Prime Minister probably also feels encouraged by US assurances of continued
support during Foreign Minister Chatchai's Washington visit last week. The tough
stance toward Laos may well affect relations with North Vietnam. In view of
Hanoi's continuing invective, Khukrit may decide there is no great urgency in
resuming talks with Hanoi over outstanding difficulties.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 6, 1975
Debate in the UN trusteeship committee on Spanish Sahara ended
inconclusively on Thursday with the passage of two opposing resolutions. The
General Assembly will now consider the matter. Whatever the outcome there, it is
unlikely to affect the growing Moroccan foothold in the disputed territory.
Algeria's official anger over Morocco's strengthening position continues at a
high level. One official has implied that Algiers may no longer block outside
interference in Moroccan affairs-an apparent reference to restrictions placed on
Moroccan dissidents living in Algeria. Despite the barrage of official propaganda, the
US embassy in Algiers notes that the popular mood regarding the Saharan issue
generally seems to be one of disinterest.
Meanwhile, Mauritania is becoming uneasy over its position in the Sahara
dispute. Differences with Morocco over the location of the partition line to be
drawn and the potential threat of attacks by the Algerian-backed Polisario Front are
creating increasing concern in Nouakchott and prompting second thoughts about the
tripartite agreement.
Mauritania hopes that most, if not all, of the southern part of Spanish Sahara,
Rio de Oro, will come under Nouakchott's administration. One Moroccan official,
however, has indicated that the eventual partition may provide only a very small
portion of Rio de Oro to Mauritania and at the same time cede some existing
Mauritanian territory to Morocco.
Rather than accept a Moroccan take-over of virtually all of Sahara, Mauritania
would be willing to agree to a UN-sponsored referendum and even push for an
independent state in Sahara. Government officials in Nouakchott are confident that
a referendum would result in overwhelming response for annexation by Mauritania
or an independent state. Mauritania would find either choice preferable to a large
expansion of Moroccan territory.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 6, 1975
The army lacks the capability to launch full-scale offensive operations against
Polisario forces in Rio de Oro, but it could manage to discourage some infiltration.
A prolonged security operation against the Polisario have a disastrous effect
on Mauritania's economy.
After a period of lessened tensions, Baghdad has again increased its propaganda
attacks on the Syrian regime.
Following the Syrian renewal this week of the mandate of the UN force on the
Golan Heights, however, AI-Jumhuriyah, the official Iraqi government newspaper,
described the Syrian decision as "surrendering to criminal Zionist challenges" and
implied that the Syrian action had encouraged the Israeli air strikes on fedayeen
camps in Lebanon. This latest Iraqi blast is likely to draw a response in kind from
Damascus.
Having agreed to the extension of the UN mandate, Damascus is almost certain
to reject Iraq's demand that in return for its joining the so-called "eastern" front,
Syria publicly announce its rejection of UN resolutions 242 and 338. The Iraqis
nevertheless would contribute forces again if war broke out between Syria and
Israel.
Iraq reportedly also had stipulated that as an additional requirement for its
participation in the eastern front, Damascus release its political prisoners, some of
whom are Iraqi citizens. Syria will probably reject this Iraqi demand as well.
Other activities by the two rival Baathist regimes may also be contributing to
the increased hostility. Iraq has reportedly been encouraging tribal elements in
northern Syria to press for an autonomous province. Damascus, for its part, is said
to be lending some support to an Iraqi Kurdish dissident group based in Syria that is
broadcasting attacks against the Iraqi regime. Baghdad also has been angered by
recent harassment of Ira is living in Sri -including Iraqi diplomats-by Syrian
security authorities.
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BANG LADESH-I NDIA
Tensions between Dacca and New Delhi appear to be easing, although Prime
Minister Gandhi has warned that India will continue to keep a close watch on the
internal situation in Bangladesh.
Gandhi made the comment while reporting to the parliamentary defense
committee on December 3. The following day, the president of Gandhi's Congress
Party, in speaking before an "international conference against fascism," roundly
condemned both the US and China for interfering in South Asia. He specifically
denounced the "forces of destabilization" operating "in our neighborhood"-an
apparent reference to recent events in Bangladesh.
The Indian press, which has tended to report events in Bangladesh in both
emotional and pessimistic terms, has described as "successful" the recently
concluded India-Bangladesh border security talks. In a joint press statement, the
participating Indian and Bangladesh border security officials termed the talks helpful
in clearing away "misgivings and misunderstandings" and in reinforcing "mutual
trust and confidence."
The successful outcome of these largely technical discussions may have been
partly responsible for the decision by the regime in Dacca to send a delegation to
New Delhi yesterday to discuss essentially political issues. This delegation had been
proposed to the Indians by President Sayem of Bangladesh as far back as November
27. Its departure was subsequently held up, apparently as a result of disagreements
in Dacca over whether sending the mission would be regarded by the Indians as a
sign of weakness.
The next danger spot in India-Bangladesh relations appears to be a mass
meeting scheduled to take place in Tangail Province, north of Dacca, on December
7. The meeting is expected to have strong anti-Indian overtones. There may also be
trouble for the Dacca government the following week if opposition forces carry out
reported plans to instigate antigovernment demonstrations on or about December
16, a national holiday. Government control over the security forces apparently has
improved in recent days, however, and the authorities in Dacca, warned of these
nlinned events, should be able to muster sufficient force to maintain control.
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December 6, 1975
The Israeli government, after almost three months of delay, has approved the
establishment of four new settlements on the Golan Heights. Defense Minister Peres
described this action as "Israel's Zionist reply to the onslaught in the UN General
Assembly" and announced that planning for five additional settlements was under
way.
According to the US embassy in Tel Aviv, the four new settlements will be of a
paramilitary nature and will be established between the two existent fortified
settlements in order to help close a "security gap" through which two bands of
fedayeen infiltrators recently entered the Golan Heights. Israeli press reports have
indicated that the new settlements may be ready for occupancy within two weeks.
The approval of the new settlements is Israel's answer to the UN Security
Council resolution extending the UN Disengagement Observer Force mandate and
the invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to take part in the Security
Council's debate on the Middle East. More generally, it responds to what Tel Aviv
views as a wave of anti-Israeli actions in the UN.
The government's decision to approve the settlements is likely to hinder efforts
toward peace in the area. Syria will view the decision as further evidence of Israel's
intention to retain control of the Heights, and Israeli organizations pushing for more
settlements in the occupied territorie ill be encouraged to press their demands all
the harder. F7 I
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Egyptian Prime Minister Salim succeeded in smoothing out Egypt's economic
relations with Libya during a brief visit to Tripoli last week. He made no attempt,
however, to bridge the political rift between the two countries.
Salim's visit-the first by a high-level Egyptian to Libya since mid-1973-was
part of a tour of Arab countries to report on President Sadat's visit to the US. Salim
apparently avoided discussion of Sadat's trip in talks with Libyan Prime Minister
Jallud, however, concentrating instead on the theme that Tripoli and Cairo could
improve their commercial ties despite political differences.
Prior to Salim's visit, Libya had tentatively agreed to receive Egypt's economic
minister for talks on Libyan investment in Egypt. The Egyptian Prime Minister, who
knows Jallud well, reportedly feels he has smoothed the way for these talks.
President Qadhafi's staff went through the motions of trying to schedule a
meeting between Qadhafi and Salim, but finally told the Egyptians the President
could not be reached. The snub, although not as serious a slight in the Libyan
context as it might be elsewhere, suggests that a rapprochement between the two
sides will be limited to practical matters. This arrangement will suit the Egyptians.
They prefer working through Jallud and have no desire to tangle with Qadhafi over
what they see as irreconcilable disagreement on Arab political strategy.
Cairo's only concern now is that Qadhafi continue to honor a propaganda truce
worked out between the two countries following the discovery in August of a plot
to overthrow Qadhafi. The leaders of the plot were two members of Libya's
Revolutionary Command Council. Fearful of provoking Egyptian ire at a time when
he is vulnerable at home, and possibly indebted to the Egyptians for warning him of
the conspiracy, Qadhafi has said virtually nothing during the past several months
about the second Sinai disengagement accord or Egypt's friendly relations with the
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December 6, 1975
Havana is readying itself for the first congress of the Cuban Communist Party,
to be held from December 17 to 22. -Fidel Castro may use the occasion to deliver a
verbal blast at the US and to tell his people of Cuba's military involvement in the
Angolan civil war. Moscow will be represented by senior party secretary for ideology
and Politburo member Mikhail A. Suslov.
Rather than serve as an arena for debating major policy issues, the congress will
do little more than place the formal stamp of approval on decisions made months
ago. The new constitution to be presented, for example, has already been given
broad public exposure and is likely to undergo only minor revision before being
accepted by the delegates. Also expected to receive perfunctory scrutiny are several
"theses" outlining domestic and foreign policy. In addition, the congress will
approve a set of party statutes that have been in force since early this year.
There will probably be some changes in the party structure-the Political
Bureau, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee will probably be expanded-but
the top leadership will be unchanged. Castro and his former comrades-in-arms from
the early days of the revolution will maintain control, although some veterans of the
pre-Castro communist party and a few up-and-coming technocrats will be given
positions at upper party levels. In party elections held throughout the country, Fidel
and party Second Secretary Raul Castro have been nominated "pre-candidates" by
virtually all constituencies, signifying their continuation in their respective positions.
The same "honor" has also been awarded all members of the Political Bureau and
the Secretariat.
At least one "old" communist, Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,
is likely to join Castro and his guerrilla elite on the Political Bureau, but this
concession to the pro-Moscow members of the leadership may be balanced by the
addition of one or more former guerrillas. One of these reportedly is Deputy Prime
Minister Belarmino Castilla Mas, who was one of Raul Castro's six guerrilla column
chiefs during the revolution in 1958 and has since served in a variety of top military
and civilian posts.
There are signs that the Central Committee may be broadened considerably.
Party elections at the provincial level have resulted in the nomination of as many as
160 "pre-candidates" for the Central Committee, theoretically the party's supreme
decision-making body, aside from the congress itself. The Central Committee
presently has 90 members, down from the original 100 of October 1965 as a result
of deaths and purges. All but a few will probably keep their membership, and there
may be 30 or 40 additions. A significant portion of the new membership is likely to
consist of women, correcting to a small degree what Fidel sees as a serious political
weakness at the highest policy level. F7 I
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The assassination of a retired general by guerrillas has made officers even more
disenchanted with the Peron administration, but it is not likely to trigger a military
take-over.
The Peronist Montoneros claimed credit for the killing of General Jorge
Esteban Caceres Monie, who had once headed the federal police. The general's wife
was also killed after being abducted by the terrorists.
The killing of Caceres Monie appears to be an attempt to provoke the military
into rash repressive action as well as retaliation against the sharp increase in
counterinsurgency operations in recent weeks. Ranking commanders reportedly
responded to the murder by declaring that the dissidents would be crushed, "no
matter what the cost in human lives."
This strong language notwithstanding, the incident in itself probably brings the
armed forces no closer to a take-over of the government. The Peron administration,
in spite of its numerous failings, is hardly responsible for the killing; replacing the
government for that reason alone would accomplish nothing. Indeed, Peron recently
acceded to a long-standing military wish for a free hand in pursuing the guerrillas.
Moreover, there is still no solid indication that armed forces unity on the idea of a
take-over is sufficient to make such a move practical.
Given time to reflect on the state of Argentine affairs, many officers will surely
conclude again that by assuming control of the government, they will assume full
responsibility for all national problems-with no better prospect for solving them
than under civilian rule-and run the very real risk of incurring widespread popular
dissatisfaction, precisely the goal of their leftist opponents.
D
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 6, 1975
President Rodriguez reportedly may leave office shortly after he announces his
plan to return Ecuador to civilian rule.
The President reportedly plans to make changes in the constitution to bar
former presidents from office. His plans also call for the establishment of a
legislature drawn from groups other than the traditional political parties.
Rodriquez' decision to announce his plans may be motivated partially by the
persistent opposition to his regime and the recent resurgence of activity by the
group responsible for the coup attempt last September. Other factors influencing
Rodriguez' decision are the country's continuing economic problems and his
previously expressed desire to step down because he has been unable to reunite the
armed forces and rebuild the support he once had.
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