NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 5, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 5, 1975
CONTENTS
USSR: Press coverage of
President Ford's China trip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
PHILIPPINES: Protest to coincide
with President Ford's visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
PORTUGAL: Purge of pro-Communists
from Council continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SPAIN: King will probably delay
replacing Prime Minister . . . . . . . .
SPANISH SAHARA: Moroccans
moving to consolidate foothold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
TURKEY: Student unrest, violence
draw military's concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
FRANCE: Union organizers
in military arrested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CUBA: Closure of coastal waters
around Havana this month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
ARGENTINA: President continues
to ignore official duties . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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Most of the limited amount of press coverage of President Ford's trip to Peking
has been devoted to lambasting the Chinese for their "vicious attacks" on the Soviet
Union's policies of detente.
By reporting all US statements emanating from Peking in defense of detente,
the Soviets have implicitly indicated satisfaction with the way the President has
defended the improvement in US relations with the USSR.
Moscow has prepared its domestic audience to expect some progress on trade
and in scientific and cultural exchanges as a result of the trip. It has also reminded
the Soviet people that the US and China have common ground on some foreign
policy issues like Angola and the Middle East. On the whole, however, most Soviet
officials seem to believe-and Soviet media have so indicated-that there will be no
significant improvement in Sono-US relations.
So far, Moscow has not expressed its concern to the domestic audience about
one particularly sensitive subject-the possibility of military cooperation between
China and the US. This theme has appeared in Moscow's overseas propaganda
broadcasts ever since the US press raised the possibility earlier this fall.
One such broadcast just prior to the President's departure even implied that
military cooperation would be on the agenda during the President's visit. The
broadcast, noting that Peking has supported keeping American forces in Asia in the
hope of getting something in return, quoted one Western press account that the
Chinese were allegedly interested in transport planes, armored carriers, tanks, and
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 5, 1975
PHILIPPINES
Activist Catholic priests and nuns, labor union leaders, and members of the
pro-Peking Communist Party are planning a protest rally in Manila to coincide with
President Ford's visit on December 6. Although the main focus of the rally will be
opposition to a recent labor decree by President Marcos, the Communists hope to
take advantage of the demonstration to agitate against the US presence in the
Philippines.
The church-labor-Communist coalition has organized several successful rallies in
the past, the latest a gathering of some 4,000 in late November. The demonstrations
have been peaceful, but they are embarrassing to the Marcos regime. The church has
been the main center of public opposition to Marcos since he declared martial law in
September 1972.
The target of the latest round of rallies is a presidential labor decree of early
October that, among other things, imposes a total ban on strikes and prohibits
foreigners from engaging in trade union activities. Missionary priests, many of whom
are foreigners, are among the most active union organizers and supporters of labor
activities. Moreover, some priests fear that the decree may be part of a broader
attempt by Marcos to neutralize the church's effectiveness as a means for organizing
opposition.
The Communists have had little success since martial law in organizing protests
on their own. Arrests and surveillance have seriously disrupted the party's
organization and undermined its ability to conduct antigovernment activities. As a
result, the Communists have paid increasing attention to cultivating the more radical
Catholic activists.
Not all activist priests are comfortable with their new allies, despite a
confluence of interests in many areas. It is possible that the moderates within both
the church and the labor movement may decide that holding a protest rally during
President Ford's visit could do more harm than good. It could precipitate a major
government crackdown and might cause Marcos to carry out recent veiled threats
that his government is considering new restrictions against foreign priests who work
in the Philippines.
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December 5, 1975
Portugal's ruling Revolutionary Council yesterday pressed ahead with plans to
prosecute those responsible for the paratroop rebellion last week and continued the
purge of pro-Communists from its ranks.
The Council named air force Brigadier Luis Araujo to head a commission of
inquiry to look into events surrounding the uprising and instructed investigative
organs to prepare legal proceedings against the accused.
Approximately 100 soldiers have been arrested, and others are still being
sought. All of those implicated have been military personnel, but the government
has averred that they were part of a larger plot with broad political implications.
The naval high command announced the arrest yesterday of pro-Communist
naval Lieutenant Commander Almada Contreiras, and a warrant has been issued for
the arrest of his deputy. Contreiras also was removed from the Revolutionary
Council. His departure leaves only one pro-Communist still on the Council-navy
Commander Martins Guerreiro.
The military purge-which has now claimed 36 members of Prime Minister
Azevedo's personal staff-yesterday prompted an outcry from the Communist Party
newspaper Avante. In a front-page editorial, the paper appealed for an end to the
purges and arrests, charging that they were part of a witch-hunt by reactionary
forces.
The Communists have been placed increasingly on the defensive by the sharp
reversals in party fortunes, which began in September with the overthrow of
pro-Communist former prime minister Vasco Goncalves. But they still appear
unprepared to accept the conditions recently set forth by the Socialists for their
continued participation in the cabinet-repudiation of the military uprising and a
pledge of loyalty to the Azevedo government.
In rejecting the Socialist demands, Avante said yesterday that a capitulation by
the party on such a matter of principle was neither viable nor possible.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 5, 1975
King Juan Carlos does not appear to be having as much success getting a new
prime minister as he did in having his candidate installed as president of the
parliament.
Juan Carlos probably would like to replace Prime Minister Arias soon. By
choosing a new prime minister with a liberal image, the King could emphasize his
break with Francoism and signal to the leftist opposition that he is serious about
liberalizing the political system.
Adding to the pressures for an early change are reports that the Prime Minister
would like to retire now. His personal loyalties lay with Franco, and he would rather
end his career as Franco's last prime minister than as Juan Carlos' first.
Arias is physically and emotionally worn out from the stresses of
Franco's protracted illness.
There are, on the other hand, several reasons for delaying the choice of a new
prime minister:
--Rightists, miffed by their failure to secure the retention of Rodriguez de
Valcarcel as president of the parliament, and fearing that Juan Carlos will
appoint a liberal prime minister, have apparently stiffened their resistance to
changes in the government and thrown their support behind Arias.
--Disagreements among the 17-man Council of the Realm over nominations for
the presidency of the parliament may have caused the King to have second
thoughts about the Council's readiness to accept his choice for the more
important, and more emotionally charged, appointment of a new prime
minister. The Council has the statutory power to refuse to place the King's
nominee on the slate of three names from which he must choose the new prime
minister.
--The tenure of a "transition" prime minister would at best be precarious. It
could well last only a few months, or until Juan Carlos has had a better chance
to gauge the political temperature of the country.
If the King decides to replace Arias now, he will probably wait a week or so
until he and Fernandez-Miranda are assured of enough support from the Council of
the Realm. Should Juan Carlos decide to retain Arias for several months-according
to press reports, the King has asked Arias to stay on "temporarily"-he will almost
certainly go ahead with a major cabinet shuffle, bringing in figures more acceptable
to the center-left and the non-Communist opposition.
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December 5, 1975
The left, already impatient with the lack of significant liberalization since Juan
Carlos took over, is stepping up its protest activity. The Madrid construction
workers' strike which took place on December 3 was relatively unsuccessful-partly
because of confusion and poor organization-but more serious strikes and
demonstrations are scheduled for next week. In Madrid, plans are being made for a
Socialist demonstration on December 8, a demonstration by political prisoners in
the main prison on December 9, and strikes by construction and metal workers on
December 10 and 11. The strikes will initially be confined to the Madrid area, but if
successful there they will spread to Barcelona and various Basque cities.
The Communist-dominated Workers' Commissions hope to use these local
strikes to build support for their Ion nding goal of a paralyzing national strike,
perhaps early in the new year.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 5, 1975
SPANISH SAHARA
Morocco is moving rapidly to consolidate its foothold in Spanish Sahara.
Numerous Moroccan officials have traveled to the territorial capital of El Aaiun
to participate in the new administration. Postal services, airline connections, and
telephone links have been set up. On Monday, Morocco's deputy governor, Ahmed
Bensouda, visited the north-central town of Semara, which Moroccan troops
occupied on November 27.
Morocco's claim that Saharan views are being taken into account was
buttressed on November 29 when the Saharan territorial general assembly formally
approved the recent Spanish-Moroccan-Mauritanian agreement and declared
allegiance to King Hassan. A Spanish correspondent reports, however, that fewer
than one third of the assembly's members were in attendance at the special meeting.
A delegation of representatives of the assembly and tribal chiefs, claiming to
represent all Saharans, flew to Rabat on Tuesday to give their allegiance to King
Hassan.
Algeria's public reaction to Morocco's growing presence in Sahara has become
more acrimonious. The Algerian media have accused Spanish officials of facilitating
Rabat's take-over of Semara and some outposts in the northern part of the territory.
The Algerian press and radio are highlighting the activities of the Polisario
Front, a Saharan independence movement backed by Algiers. The Front is alleging
Moroccan atrocities against civilians in Sahara and says it is fighting fierce battles
against invading Moroccan forces. Clashes between Moroccan troops and Polisario
guerrillas have been occurring for several weeks in the northeast, but most have
probably been small-scale skirmishes contesting control of areas abandoned last
month by Spanish forces.
The Algerians reinforced their western borders with Morocco and Spanish
Sahara last month and continue to make limited military preparations
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Algeria has steadfastly maintained that it has no territorial claim to Sahara and
is likely to limit its involvement in the dispute to backing the Polisario Front in a
sustained insurgency effort. The Algerians, believing that time works in favor of
liberation movements, hope the Polisario Front will tie down the Moroccans for a
long time.
Algiers is still maneuvering at the UN for a formal disavowal of the tripartite
agreement and is unlikely to undertake direct action that would prejudice its case
with the same nonaligned nations it needs to support a General Assembly resolution
calling for a referendum on self-determination.
The Spanish seem committed to the recent agreement and are accelerating their
withdrawal from the territory to avoid involvement in any hostilities between
Morocco and the Polisario Front or Algeria. Spanish press reports from El Aaiun
claim the withdrawal may be completed by the end of this month or in early
January-well in advance of the scheduled February deadline.
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Continuing student unrest and attendant left-right violence are heightening the
military's concern over the government's ability to govern.
Turkish General Staff officers reportedly expect General Staff Chief Sancar to
relay the military's growing impatience to Prime Minister Demirel in a private
meeting today. Sancar's criticism reportedly will focus on the government's failure
to make progress on the Cyprus problem and its inability to control student
violence, which continues to take lives and disrupt classes on many Turkish
university campuses.
The General Staff officers want Sancar again to warn Demirel-as he reportedly
did early last month-that the military cannot stand by while the political climate
deteriorates to the point that military intervention might be required, as occurred in
1971. Sancar is also expected to advise Demirel to begin preparations for instituting
martial law in Istanbul and Ankara provinces as a possible means of controlling the
wave of violence.
Perhaps in anticipation of a stern warning from Sancar, Demirel held a lengthy
cabinet session yesterday, after which it was announced the government was taking
all necessary measures against "those who would provoke anarchy."
Military fears about the student disorders may have been fanned earlier this
week by the murder of two students in Istanbul. A wave of sympathy
demonstrations followed in Ankara and Izmir as well as in Istanbul.
little desire at this time to take on Turkey's seemingly intractable problems, but
some of the more enthusiastic junior officers may not have the same reluctance.
These incidents provoked another round of bitter recrimination among
Turkey's major political parties. Demirel's Justice Party Council accused Ecevit's
oppositionists of "moving the political struggle into the streets" in an effort to seize
power. The opposition responded by charging that the instigators of the violence
were hidden within the government-a reference to Demirel's right-wing coalition
partners-and that the disorders were being used to divert public attention from
internal divisions in the coalition and from Turkey's increasingly serious economic
and social problems.
There is no evidence that the military is preparing to go beyond putting
pressure on the government to act, but the increasing violence and the near paralysis
of the government brought on by the continual squabbling among politicians are
clearly testing the patience of military leaders. Most senior officers appear to have
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 5, 1975
Paris has acted swiftly against radicals trying to organize unions in French
military units stationed in France and West Germany.
The government arrested 15 recruits on charges of "actions detrimental to the
national defense." The 15 allegedly were involved with West German and Portuguese
extremists, as well as with French opposition parties and labor unions, in efforts to
undermine military discipline. Two of the recruits had been members of the Socialist
Party. The 15 recruits could be sentenced to five to ten years in jail.
Two regional officers of a Socialistleaning trade union have been arrested on
similar charges. The police have also detained several other union officials for
questioning.
French leftists have reacted with restraint, but they continue to insist on
improvements in the conditions of military life. Leftists deny they intend to
unionize the military. Leftist party and union members charge that the government
has overreacted to the recruits' efforts to obtain greater freedom of expression and
association and better grievance procedures already available in other West European
nations' armed forces.
The issues have been confused by the careless interchange of terms like
"military unions," "soldiers' committees," and "military consultative commissions."
Unions and committees are opposed by most French political parties, but the
opposition and even some government members support consultative commissions.
The arrests may have been in response to growing concern among senior
military men. General Bigeard, the number-two man in the Defense Ministry, told a
US official on November 26 that neither the defense minister nor the President had
been very concerned about the recent activity until he and the chief of the General
Staff threatened to resign if strong action was not taken.
Within a week, the arrests had been made, and last week Prime Minister Chirac
made a hard-hitting speech to the National Assembly on the issue. Chirac singled out
the French Socialists for special attack, accusing them of trying to undermine
military discipline.
The Socialists, who strongly oppose extremist activity among the military and
unionization in particular, were caught off guard by the arrests. A senior party
official now says the two arrested Socialists were being expelled from the party at
the time of their arrest.
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Chirac sees the Socialists as a major threat to his Gaullist party, and his words
may have been sharpened by concern over the Socialists' increasing popularity
among recruits-a reflection of a general trend in French society. So far, the clearest
result of the government's actions has been a closing of ranks in the fragmented left.
The French military does have problems. Sheltered from social changes since
1968, the military has resisted modernization. The problem is partly the result of
budgetary constraints, but French soldiers are aware that it is not greater financial
resources that enables many West European armies to grant more personal and
political freedoms to draftees than are available in France.
Attempts have been made over the past year to respond to military discontent,
and the government's immediate response to the current unrest reaffirms the
thinking of the military leadership that, while only a small minority of its personnel
is involved, such activities cannot be ignored. The government will have to undertake
additional efforts to create a more flexible military structure attuned to the needs
and grievances of the recruits, if unrest is to be dealt with effectively.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 5, 1975
Havana has announced that a strip of coastal waters approximately 75 nautical
miles in length around the Cuban capital will be closed to shipping during darkness
hours from December 10 to 28 because of military exercises. No ships will be
permitted to enter the zone without prior authorization.
The rationale for this unprecedented closure is questionable; it is much more
likely that the action was taken as a security measure against raids by Cuban exiles
intent on embarrassing the Castro regime during the first Cuban Communist Party
congress, which is scheduled for this month. In the past, exiles using armed launches
have staged hit-and-run attacks on the Cuban coast
There have been unconfirmed reports that General Secretary Brezhnev may
attend the congress. His presence would lead the Cubans to undertake extraordinary
security precautions. The unusual length of the closure was probably necessary
because the specific dates of the congress have not yet been announced- ossibl a
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President Peron's inattention to official duties continues to generate political
uncertainty.
Despite the impression given by Interior Minister Robledo that relations
between President Peron, the cabinet, and Peronist party officials are normal, she
remains inaccessible to all but a few. She reportedly has failed to attend two
scheduled cabinet meetings and has spent only about five hours in her office since
her release from the hospital on November 13.
One of the most respected retired military generals, Alcides Lopez Aufrane, has
defended the armed forces' right to intervene when basic liberties seem threatened
or when the country is faced with chaos. Although a military move against Peron is
still not considered imminent, the general's remarks could be intended to test the
public's reaction to such a development and indicate that such currents are still in
the air.
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December 5, 1975
VENEZUELA: Caracas' purchase last week of an unusually large quantity of
Argentine wheat, yellow corn, and sorghum grains appears to have been motivated in
large part by anger over the US Trade Reform Act, which excluded Venezuela and
other OPEC members from the generalized system of preferences. President Perez
personally intervened in negotiations with Argentine officials and instructed Finance
Minister Hector Hurtado to negotiate a large contract, contrary to the advice of
senior Venezuelan marketing officials, who normally handle such matters. In the
past, nearly all of Venezuela's needs for imported wheat were filled by purchases
from the US. The shift in suppliers, in addition to reflecting Venezuela's ire over the
trade act, shows Perez' interest in solidifying Argentina's cooperation on
hemispheric issues of interest to Venezuela.
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