NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 3, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 3, 1975
SPAIN: King fills key posts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR: Industrial production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
USSR: Visit by Yasir Arafat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
NATO: French proposal
on arms standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CANADA: Defense review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ICELAND-UK-NATO: Fishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
FRANCE: Pluton program slows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
TURKEY: Review of US relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
EC: UK wins concessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
JAPAN: Concern about
protectionist trade policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
NIGERIA: End of purge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
PANAMA: "Ultimatum" on canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
PORTUGAL: Further friction possible
between military and civilian leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
LEBANON: French mediator
optimistic on easing tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 3, 1975
King Juan Carlos appears to have won his first battle to put his own men in the
government.
Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda, his former tutor, will be sworn in today as
president of the Cortes-the Spanish parliament. Fernandez-Miranda will also
become president of the Council of the Realm, the powerful advisory body that
would play a major role in any other major government changes.
the Council followed the expressed wish of
Juan Carlos in selecting Fernandez-Miranda as one of the three nominees for the
post. A press service quotes government sources as saying that the choice of the
three nominees was hotly disputed in the council; militant right-wing members
wanted to renominate outgoing conservative president Rodriguez de Valcarcel,
whose term expired last week.
Fernandez-Miranda can be expected to do the King's bidding. A former
professor of law and a political theorist, he served as minister secretary-general of
the National Movement, Spain's only legal political party, and deputy prime minister
under the late Carrero Blanco. Although Fernandez-Miranda showed some signs of
supporting moves to open the Movement to broader participation, he finally
followed Carrero's lead in opposing liberalization. According to a close colleague, he
will be more liberal now than when he was in the cabinet in 1973.
Fernandez-Miranda will play an important role in promoting the King's choice
for prime minister, should Juan Carlos decide to replace Carlos Arias. As president
of the Cortes and the Council of the Realm, it will also be Fernandez-Miranda's duty
to countersign a number of executive decisions, which would give the King more
freedom to act.
Meanwhile, the government faces its first confrontation with labor since Juan
Carlos became King. A two-day strike in Madrid has been called by the clandestine
Workers' Commissions to start today in the building industry. The strike is being
called ostensibly to protest the government's recently announced decision to limit
wage increases to no more than 3 percent above the annual increase in the official
cost-of-living index. The leaders of the Workers' Commissions-which are dominated
by the Communists-reportedly want to see how much support the Madrid strike
receives before deciding whether to call a general strike later.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 3, 1975
Economic speeches at yesterday's session of the USSR Supreme Soviet
projected an increase in industrial production during 1976 of only 4.3 percent, the
lowest planned rate since 1961.
Moscow radio reported that Nikolay Baybakov, chief of the State Planning
Committee, ascribed this unusually low forecast to anticipated shortages of
agricultural raw materials resulting from this year's harvest failure and to delays in
completing new production facilities. Baybakov failed to provide an official estimate
of the size of the 1975 harvest, which has been described by other Soviets as
"terrible" and "disastrous."
The magnitude of Moscow's economic problems next year is indicated by the
fact that growth of industrial production has averaged more than 6 percent for the
period 1971-75. As in previous downturns, it is likely that consumer goods and
services will bear the brunt of next year's reduced industrial growth, although heavy
industry clearly will experience cutbacks as well.
Baybakov said the USSR's national income this year will increase by 4
percent-versus a planned increment of 6.5 percent. In 1976, however, Baybakov
foresees national income growing by 5.4 percent, a goal that is probably based in
large part on hopes that the agricultural sector will recover from the shortfall in
1975.
Available excerpts of Baybakov's speech preclude a more detailed analysis at
this time. The accompanying report on the state budget for 1976 by Minister of
Finance Garbuzov was unremarkable, according to the available selections. In
keeping with current practice, Garbuzov gave a figure for projected defense
spending-17.4 billion rubles-that is virtually unchanged from those in recent years.
The domestic radio broadcast reporting on his speech, however, failed to include a
figure for the large and growing "science" category, which is believed to contain a
substantial share of the actual defense budget.
The announced figure for defense spending has little meaning in terms of the
size of Soviet defense programs, and the trend of the announced spending figure
does not match the path of observed Soviet defense activities. For example, from
1970 to 1973 the announced figure remained at 17.9 billion rubles and was cut in
both 1974 and 1975. During this period, however, there have been major increases
in military procurement programs, growth in military manpower, and two large
raises in military pay. Published plans to keep defense outlays at the same level this
year help buttress the detente image the Soviets are attempting to project at home
and abroad.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 3, 1975
The visit to Moscow last week of a PLO delegation headed by Yasir Arafat
appears to have broken little new ground.
The communique marking the end of the visit indicates that Arafat gave little
more than lip-service to Moscow's initiative of November 9 to reconvene the Geneva
conference. The Palestinians seem to be looking to the UN to generate momentum
for their cause, but Moscow is cool to pursuing Middle East issues in a forum where
its influence will be diluted.
The Soviets apparently again pressed Arafat to make some gesture toward
affirming Israel's right to exist. The communique, however, only said a Middle East
settlement should be achieved on the basis of UN resolutions and the UN charter.
Although the Soviets can take this as implicit acknowledgment of Israel's existence,
the wording is sufficiently ambiguous to leave Arafat considerable room for
maneuver. Although the communique attacked the second Egyptian-Israeli
agreement and castigated "certain quarters" for undermining Arab unity, it did not
criticize either Sadat or the US by name.
The Soviets continue to withold formal endorsement of the PLO as sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinians. As a result, Moscow is able to maneuver
among different fedayeen factions and exercise some leverage over Arafat.
The situation in Lebanon and Soviet arms supplies to the fedayeen were
undoubtedly discussed, but were not mentioned in the communique. Three
fedayeen leaders with military responsibilities went to Moscow with Arafat,
suggesting that the Palestinians intended to press for additional arms supplies to
replace weapons given to Lebanese leftists.
Arafat's reception in Moscow was similar to that accorded him during his visit
last spring. He had no conversations with any official higher than Foreign Minister
Gromyko and party secretary Ponomarev. Last spring, Arafat had a brief, ceremonial
encounter with Brezhnev; this time he was accorded somewhat greater media
coverage.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 3, 1975
NATO today will consider the implications of a somewhat forthcoming French
response to recent arms standardization initiatives by the Western allies. Arms
standardization will be an important discussion topic at next week's NATO
ministerial meetings.
The standardization of military weapons and equipment is part of a complex
attempt by the NATO allies to ensure that the West retains an effective conventional
defense capability in an era of strategic parity and super-power detente. As part of
the standardization effort, the caucus of most European NATO members-the
Eurogroup-has proposed, and the US has tentatively agreed, to purchase more arms
from European sources. This proposal anticipates the development and
consolidation of a European arms industry that would lay the foundation for an
enhanced indigenous European defense capability.
French cooperation is important to any effort to standardize armaments and
upgrade NATO's military capability. The recent initiatives in both the NATO forum
and the Eurogroup have thus been drawn in such a way as to accommodate Paris'
desire for independence while slowly and pragmatically increasing French
cooperation with the allies.
France has now reaffirmed its intention to cooperate on arms standardization
with NATO, and especially with its European allies. The French have said, however,
that they will not sanction institutionalization of their participation either in a
permanent NATO steering committee or in a European defense procurement
secretariat as proposed by the Eurogroup.
The French are insisting that any meetings with their European allies on
standardization must be informal. They also insist that the NATO committee must
be a temporary body and be clearly subordinate to the North Atlantic Council and
avoid a comprehensive discussion of standardization principles. The French remain
opposed to any transatlantic dialogue until the Europeans sort out problems related
to standardization and cooperative European defense production. The French
proposals would in effect transfer the initiative for NATO-wide standardization to
the Europeans in general and France is particular. Paris' cautious response appears to
confirm European expectations about present French attitudes. It may also confirm
indications that Paris' consideration of its alternatives in this area is at a preliminary
stage and that any change in traditional French attitudes will come slowly.
Attention will now focus on European reactions-especially those of the British
and the Germans-to France's announced position. A major issue will be how far the
allies are prepared to take a united stand on the need for an even more forthcoming
French attitude.
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The recommended ministerial position on standardization proposed by
Secretary General Luns would establish the ad hoc steering group in NATO, but it
would delay approval of a particular policy until next May. In view of the French
position, the allies appear likely to approve this course.
Defense Minister Richardson, in a recent report to Parliament on the defense
review, reassured the members that a creditable defense establishment would be
maintained.
According to Richardson, the year-long review has brought about no changes in
the four basic roles of the military-national defense, cooperation with the US in the
defense of North America, participation in NATO, and support of international
peace-keeping under the auspices of the UN. The defense review establishes fiscal
guidelines for the defense budget that will permit a 1.5- to 2-percent increase per
year in real terms, beginning in 1977, as well as a minimum level of 20 percent of
the budget for capital expenditures by 1982. In order to meet government economic
restraints, however, initial funds for the new long-range maritime patrol aircraft and
tank modernization would be taken out of next year's already approved budget.
This will probably require some offsetting belt-tightening in support functions.
An earlier proposal to replace temporarily Canadian F-104s in Europe with
F-5s already in the inventory has been dropped, and there will be no replacement for
these aircraft until the early 1980s. Richardson's report affirmed the need for
maintaining the current air capability in Europe, but was equivocal on North
American air defense, saying only that it would meet "sovereignty requirements for
identification and control of intrusions." Richardson also told Parliament that for
the first time forces will be specifically earmarked for UN peace-keeping duties. The
2,000 men tabbed for this assignment will presumably include those already in UN
contingents in the Middle East and on Cyprus.
Ottawa will not seek consultations with NATO on the review because no
reductions in its alliance commitments are to be made. While Richardson's report
holds the line on defense policy, the long-term nature of major weapons system
programs and the delay in implementing new fiscal guidelines will make later
slippage possible.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 3, 1975
The tensions generated by the fisheries dispute between Iceland and Britain
continue to strengthen the hand of Icelandic opponents of NATO and the
US-manned base at Keflavik. At a news conference on November 28, Foreign
Minister Agustsson declared that Iceland will withdraw from the alliance and
dismantle the Keflavik base unless the UK removes its frigates from Iceland's
200-mile fishing zone.
Agustsson also intimated at his news conference that he would not attend this
month's NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. He suggested there was a strong
possibility that Iceland's permanent delegation would be withdrawn before the
scheduled meeting. Agustsson also threatened to take the fisheries dispute to NATO
or to the UN Security Council. The foreign minister said his remarks reflected his
private opinion and not necessarily the position of the Icelandic government.
Prime Minister Hallgrimsson suggested in a recent newspaper interview that
Iceland might recall its ambassador to London, or break off diplomatic relations
with Britain. Reykjavik issued similar threats, including withdrawal from NATO,
during a similar outbreak of the "cod war" in 1972-73. The statements are intended
to force the US and other NATO members to put pressure on London. Norway and
West Germany have already offered their good offices. Several Icelandic politicians
admit privately that their government, in fact, has taken no official position on the
NATO issue.
The coalition is not under overwhelming public pressure at this time to
withdraw from NATO. Last week, it easily got parliament to ratify its controversial
fishing pact with West Germany. An anti-British demonstration, furthermore,
attracted only a small crowd, and its mood was more festive than angry.
Icelandic politicians are prone to engage in hard rhetoric, and the greatest
danger now is that they could become its captive. If prospects for settling the
dispute remain dim and there are incidents at sea in the coming weeks, the
oliticians will face crowin ublic pressure to follow through on their threats.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 3, 1975
The US defense attache in Paris reports that France is cutting back on its
Pluton tactical nuclear missile program because of budgetary considerations.
General Bigeard, French state secretary for defense, recently told the defense
attache that Paris now plans to deploy four Pluton regiments instead of six and to
reduce the number of nuclear warheads to be procured from 120 to 70. It is not
clear whether the French decision is final or whether the Pluton deployment
program will merely be held in abeyance, in the hope that economic conditions
become more favorable and the prospects for reaching an agreement on stationing
Pluton units in West Germany improve.
The French currently have two operational Pluton regiments. The third
regiment will begin forming this month, while the fourth is scheduled to be
operational late next year. The army, which is in the process of reorganizing, will
undoubtedly assign all four regiments at the army corps level in France, leaving the
one corps that will remain in West Germany without its own nuclear support.
The Pluton is a highly mobile missile system designed to provide battlefield
support to ground forces at the army and corps level. The missile can carry either a
10- or 25-kiloton nuclear warhead from 6 to 65 nautical miles.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 3, 1975
The Turks appear to be willing to back off somewhat from their hard-line
position in the negotiations with the US for a new defense cooperation agreement,
although major differences remain between the two sides on key issues.
The General Staff's decision appears to have grown out of Turkey's ill-fated
attempts in recent months to find an alternative to the US for arms. The US
approach to the negotiations, which Turkish military leaders believe has been
reasonable and fair so far, also helped persuade the generals to be more flexible,
Perhaps in response to the General Staff's decision, Turkish negotiators at
recent working-level sessions of the negotiations have given indications that
compromise may be possible on a number of issues. There have been no signs,
however, that the Turks are prepared to back down from their demand for some sort
of guaranteed annual compensation for US use of the bases.
The General Staff reportedly is urging the Turkish negotiators to press for a
minimum payment of $150 million annually. This would represent a significant drop
from the $1.5 billion originally mentioned, but with the arms embargo still fresh in
their me r the Turks have been adamant on the rinci le of a guaranteed
payment.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 3, 1975
The UK won significant concessions at the EC summit in Rome yesterday in
return for abandoning its demand for a separate seat at the Conference on
International Economic Cooperation. That conference can now presumably get
under way in Paris as scheduled on December 16, as the question of
developing-country representation was settled late last week.
London's insistence on separate representation was aimed largely at potential
domestic charges of "giving away" British North Sea oil resources if the UK could
not defend its special interests as a producer at the international conference. Now
Prime Minister Wilson will be able to show that all his EC partners have accepted the
concept of a minimum price for energy, in effect guaranteeing a profit for North Sea
oil against a theoretical future collapse of world oil prices.
France, moreover-in addition to accepting the minimum-price mechanism for
the first time-agreed to share oil among the Nine in a supply emergency. Paris will
presumably still remain aloof from the consumer countries' International Energy
Agency, but the French concession on oil sharing will no longer be a potential
obstacle to the other EC members' participation in the agency's emergency sharing
scheme.
The UK will still be able to present its own statements at the international
conference "as the major EC oil producer," but the Community will clearly be
represented by a single delegation. The EC's initial positions on energy and the other
conference topics are, in fact, composed mostly of generalities and, now that
agreement has been achieved on a minimum price concept, may not give rise to
many differences among the Nine.
The dispute in Rome over the energy issue led to one of the more heated rows
in the Community's history and brought to the fore explicit arguments based on
national power: Wilson's threat to join OPEC, for example, and German Chancellor
Schmidt's reminder that Bonn might not be available to bail Britain out financially
in the future.
This debate may leave its mark on the Community, but the fact of the ultimate
accord is likely to be more significant. At the least, the Rome European Council
session will probably confirm the importance of the summit as a device for forcing
agreement among the Nine on difficult questions.
Apart from the energy question, the major achievement of the Rome meeting is
the commitment to go ahead with direct elections in 1978 for the European
Parliament without waiting for the UK and Denmark, if they have not ironed out by
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that date their own problems with electoral procedures. Most observers believe that
popular elections, replacing the present appointing of parliamentary delegations, will
inaugurate a determined drive for a stronger parliamentary role. Although details
remain to be worked out regarding the common passport, which the Community
leaders agreed will come into use in 1978, it is intended to be a symbol that will
revive flagging popular interest in the EC.
The larger EC countries that participated in the Rambouillet summit with the
US and Japan got a reminder in Rome that the interests of the smaller countries
must also be given expression. In response to Belgian, Dutch, Danish, and Irish
criticism of the lack of proper EC preparation for the Rambouillet meeting, it was
agreed that no similar summit would take place again without prior Community
coordination.
Tokyo has expressed its concern that the major industrial nations are moving to
a more protectionist trade policy, violating the free-trade principle outlined at last
month's economic summit.
In a low-key note to Washington, Tokyo cited the growing number of actions
filed by US companies charging their Japanese competitors with dumping. So far
this year, 16 investigations have been undertaken involving a total of $2.5 billion in
Japanese shipments to the US market, of which about $1.8 billion are in the car
export category.
Tokyo is particularly concerned about the effect of these actions on Japanese
auto exports. Retail sales of Japanese cars did exceptionally well in the US market
this year, up 23 percent in volume compared with 1974. During the model year
ending in September, Japanese car sales accounted for 11 percent of total car sales in
the US, up from 7 percent in 1974.
Tokyo is also concerned about the possible imposition of import controls by
the UK. Japan probably will be the hardest hit of the industrial countries because
the controls will be directed at cars, machinery, and textiles, which account for 60
percent of Japanese sales to the UK.
Japanese exporters have already been severely hurt by barriers erected by other
industrial nations. Australia adopted controls in December 1974 that cover 25
percent of Japanese shipments to the Australian market. Canada is also close)
monitoring imports from Japan.
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The military government has announced that its purge of the armed forces and
civil service is over. The announcement, which exhorted all concerned to settle down
and resume normal activities, clearly came in response to signs of growing discontent
over the purge among junior- and middle-grade military officers and some senior
government officials.
The decision to end the purge reportedly was made at a recent meeting of the
ruling 22-man Supreme Military Council
Last Thursday, the regime announced that 244 officers, including a state
military governor, had been dismissed or retired as a result of the military purge that
began last month. In the three-month-long purge of the civil service, more than
9,000 civil servants and university officials were removed. While the announcement
ending the purge made no reference to the regime's previously stated plan to
demobilize an unspecified number of servicemen, including ex-soldiers recalled to
duty during the civil war, this may be undertaken at a later date.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 3, 1975
The purported message from the Panamanian leader, General Torrijos, to US
Ambassador Bunker, telling him not to return to Panama without serious treaty
proposals, was never passed, but was manufactured and publicized locally for
domestic political purposes.
Shortly after the ambassador's departure from Panama last week, the
pro-government media publicized an "ultimatum" implying that unless the
ambassador could commit the US to further concessions he need not return for
additional talks. The story alleged that contrary to Panamanian expectations, the
ambassador had brought no concrete US commitments or favorable proposals and
that the "ultimatum" was in response to a no-longer positive US attitude toward the
treaty talks.
US embassy officials in Panama believe that Torrijos' action was designed to
offset expected leftist and ultranationalist accusations that the government was
deliberately stalling the negotiations to accommodate the US elections and to
minimize pressure on General Torrijos to reveal negotiating details. A need to
placate the left while making cabinet changes favorable to conservatives and business
elements, the declining economy, rumors of scandal in the national bank, and
residual frustration over the lack of progress in the talks have also been credited as
motivating the government's move.
Despite official denial by the US that any such message was received, the
publication of the "ultimatum" is probably viewed by General Torrijos as
accomplishing several objectives. It will allow him to appear to retain the initiative in
the talks, temporarily offset leftist claims of a sellout, and justify an extended lull in
the negotiations. Recurring official frustration and insecurity throughout the
negotiating process make further such Panamanian ploys possible, particularly since
top officials continue to believe they retain a psychological advantage over the US
and appear unwilling to make further concessions.
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December 3, 1975
The military's dominant political role in Portugal could become a source of
increasing friction between civilian and military leaders.
The popularly elected constituent assembly took up the issue yesterday when it
met for the first time since the failure of the leftist military rebellion last week. The
assembly meeting coincided with the lifting of the state of emergency in the Lisbon
area.
Military participation in the government was formalized before the constituent
assembly elections last spring, when the leftist military leadership dominated by
pro-Communist former prime minister Vasco Goncalves forced the political parties
to agree to a continuing role for the military for a period of three to five years.
Under the terms of the agreement, the military has the power to override an elected
government, in addition to having veto power over presidential candidates and the
selection of key cabinet ministers.
At the assembly session yesterday, the Socialist Party announced that it was
prepared to participate in talks to renegotiate the pact. The party emphasized,
however, that it was not prepared to call the agreement with the military into
question on its own.
The Socialists' reluctance to challenge the military at this juncture is
understandable. They have cooperated closely with the anti-Communist Antunes
faction since the overthrow of the Goncalves government and hope to use their
present favored position in the government as a springboard to power in the general
election promised for next year.
The other democratic parties, however, have shown no such reluctance and
may be expected to press the Socialists now that the latter have opened the door.
Francisco Sa Carneiro-head of the Popular Democratic Party, which also belongs to
the present government partnership-on several occasions has called on the military
to return to the barracks, and, more recently, urged the popular election of a civilian
successor to General Costa Gomes as president. The Social Democratic Center, a
center-right party that is not represented in the government but which does sit in the
constituent assembly, can also be expected to throw its weight behind the proposal.
Popular sentiment for an end to military rule has been on the increase in
Portugal, and there is support for such a move within the military as well. Although
the present military leaders have promised at various times to respect the results of
the election planned for next spring, they have given no indication that they intend
to withdraw from politics completely,
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December 3, 1975
French mediator Couve de Murville, who completed preliminary talks with
Lebanese leaders this week, is optimistic that the government's effort to expand the
cabinet will lead to real progress in easing Lebanon's turmoil. In discussions with US
Ambassador Godley, Couve said he thought a cabinet including representatives of
the major factions could be put together within the week, if the current cease-fire
holds.
The French envoy apparently is encouraged by the hints of moderation
recently shown by Christian Phalangists and the Maronite clergy, who apparently are
now responding to pressure from him and from the Vatican. The French emissary
also believes leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt may be prepared to back away from his
previously rigid refusal to be represented in a cabinet including the Phalanges Party.
The unusual show of unity between President Franjiyah and Prime Minister
Karami last weekend-which was encouraged by Couve-will make the task of
expanding the cabinet easier. Karami has been trying to broaden his government
since his appointment as Prime Minister in July, but until now has not had the
backing of the President. As expected, however, Karami is apparently having some
difficulty with Jumblatt and other leftists who rightly perceive advantages for the
Christians in an enlarged government.
Expansion of the cabinet would benefit the Christians by reducing the
importance of the national dialogue committee, in which Lebanese leftists are
over-represented. By moving the focus of political debate from the committee to the
cabinet, the Christians would also have a better chance to delay or influence the
terms of any agreement on fundamental political changes that would erode their
dominant position.
On the other hand, Karami's ability to control and direct a reform program
would be improved if he succeeded in eclipsing the national dialogue committee
with a broad-based cabinet. The Prime Minister has not been able to exert effective
control over the committee, which is chaired by a former prime minister.
Karami apparently is moving as quickly as possible to put together an
acceptable cabinet slate; his difficulties with leftist leaders may drag on well beyond
this week, however. In addition, renewed tensions in the north around Tripoli and
Zagharta and fighting in the eastern city of Zahlah may increase the reluctance of
the leaders of warring factions to cooperate with the government. A flare-up in
Zahlah triggered nation-wide fighting last August; all roads into the city reportedly
were blocked by Lebanese security forces yesterday in an effort to contain the
fighting.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 3, '1975
The parliament passed an army conscription bill yesterday, which is expected
to be quickly approved by President Franjiyah. Long advocated by the military high
command,, the conscription law will over the long run substantially improve the
army's effectiveness, particularly against private militias. For the present, however,
the security forces are carrying the burden of enforcing the tenuous cease-fire.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 3, 1975
USSR-SOMALIA: A Soviet-built floating drydock with a capacity of 8,500
tons arrived at Berbera, Somalia, on December 1 after being towed from the Black
Sea by three merchant tugs. A drydock of this size can accommodate Soviet ships as
large as a Kresta I I class guided-missile cruiser. If it remains at Berbera, the drydock
will facilitate the maintenance of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean.
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