NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 2, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Elk"' 1111191 01"L"I
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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December 2, IM
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 2, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Conservative officers
seek to maintain momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ISRAEL: Cabinet rejects Security
Council stand on mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
USSR: Party meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
TIMOR-INDONESIA: Jakarta increases
support for integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ANGOLA: Popular Movement
offensive continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA: Moscow
denies meddling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
GUATEMALA-BELIZE: Agreement
to negotiate in February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 2, 1975
New divisions are beginning to appear within the Portuguese military as more
conservative officers seek to maintain the momentum gained in putting down the
leftist rebellion last week.
According to the US army attache in Lisbon, a group of such
officers-reportedly including some who played a key role in suppressing the
rebellion-held a meeting on November 29 at the Amadora commando regiment
outside of Lisbon to discuss Portugal's political future. According to officers who
attended the meeting, many of those present opposed the policy of "forcing"
socialism upon the Portuguese people. Both the Antunes faction in the military,
which dominates the Revolutionary Council, and the Socialist Party, which has the
largest party representation in the cabinet, have declared socialism to be their goal
for the country.
While it is too early to assess accurately the strength of the conservative
officers, it seems likely that they have already exerted a strong influence by insisting
on a severe crackdown on the left. The goals of the group are ambitious-the
replacement of President Costa Gomes and members of the Antunes faction before
the elections scheduled to be held next spring-but there is little evidence at the
present time that they have the wherewithal to reach them.
Reflecting the fears of Portugal's political right, the group reportedly suspects
that the Antunes faction may try to avoid holding elections out of fear that the
more conservative Popular Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Center will
win a majority, rather than the Socialists.
Hoping to swell their own ranks, the officers reportedly are seeking the release
of rightist political prisoners held since the abortive coup attem t of March 11.1 25X1
e group advocates
a strict ivision between politics and the military an wi insist that military
officers-who have played a dominant role up to now in Portugal's revolution-make
a choice between the two.
Although there is no evidence of a direct connection between this group and
any political party, there is some parallel with recent statements by Popular
Democratic Party leader Sa Carneiro, who said that the present military leaders are
talking a lot about socialism, but not about democrac . He called for the
replacement of Costa Gomes with an elected civilian. 25X1
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 2, 1975
In a relatively restrained response to Sunday's UN Security Council resolution,
the Israeli cabinet yesterday rejected the Council's linkage of the question of
renewing the UN mandate on the Golan Heights to broader political issues involving
the Palestinians. The cabinet said Israel would adhere to the Israeli-Syrian
disengagement on the Golan, but it rejected those portions of the Security Council's
decision that are not strictly connected with the disengagement.
The Security Council resolution called for a debate in January on the Middle
East problem "including the Palestinian question." A separate statement of
understanding, which was supported by a majority of the Council but opposed by
the US, urged that the Palestine Liberation Organization be allowed to participate in
the debate.
The cabinet statement said Israel regards the Council action as "likely to
disrupt" progress toward peace. It reiterated Israel's determination not to negotiate
with the PLO in any forum or to attend the Geneva conference if the PLO is invited.
The statement did not close the door to further negotiations with Syria. It noted,
however, that a ministerial committee has now been authorized to "discuss and
decide" on the establishment of new settlements in the Golan Heights. The
government has refused for the past several months to act on applications for new
settlements in order not to jeopardize any future negotiations with Syria.
The cabinet statement avoided criticism of the US vote on the resolution, but
most of the initial press commentary has indicated that Israeli officials are "deeply
disappointed" that the US gave in to what is termed Syrian and Soviet pressure.
Even where criticism of the US is not direct, Israeli newspapers are playing the US
vote in such a way as to associate the US obliquely with a decision they regard as
unacceptable.
Despite a statement by US Ambassador Moynihan disapproving the Council's
statement of understanding on PLO participation in the Council debate next month,
the Israelis appear to be reading both the resolution and the statement of
understanding as a single package that will have the net effect of placing them under
greater pressure to recognize and negotiate with the PLO.
The Security Council action will probably trigger a strong response in Israel in
favor of adopting an intransigent position toward future negotiating initiatives and
possibly in favor of boycotting negotiations in any forum. Nevertheless, the Rabin
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December 2, 1975
government, anxious to keep its relations with the US in good repair and to avoid
further diplomatic isolation, is likely eventually to begin casting about for some
means to accommodate foreign pressure to face up to the Palestinian issue, while
still trying to avoid negotiations with the PLO.
The cabinet debate apparently provoked a recommendation from some
ministers that Israel revise its position on the Palestinian question, but in the end
any such accommodation was rejected, at least for the present. According to
Jerusalem radio reports, five ministers proposed that the government announce that
Israel would negotiate with any Palestinian element that recognized Israel's
existence.
This is a position the government has consistently rejected. The ministers
apparently dropped their recommendation in the course of the debate; the vote on
the final cabinet statement was unanimous. The minister who led the move has told
reporters, however, that he will raise the issue again in government debates.
Syria, the PLO, and Egypt not unexpectedly have issued statements expressing
satisfaction with the Security Council resolution.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 2, 1975
The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee announced yesterday that
General Secretary Brezhnev will deliver the main report at the party congress that
opens February 24. Premier Kosygin will speak on the next five-year economic plan
(1976-80). This is the standard pattern for a party congress.
The Central Committee did not announce the agenda last April when it set a
date for the congress, perhaps because of uncertainty over topics and speakers. The
announcement now that Brezhnev will speak indicates that, health permitting, he
will be in office through the congress, although it does not carry any implications
for the period that follows.
Brezhnev made his customary address to the end-of-the-year plenum yesterday,
but the text of his speech probably will not be made public. At the meeting, the
Central Committee approved next year's economic plan and budget; the Supreme
Soviet begins discussion of them today.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
TIMOR-INDONESIA
December 2, 1975
In response to the unilateral declaration of Timorese independence last Friday
by the left-wing Fretilin party, Jakarta is increasing military and political support for
local groups that advocate integration with Indonesia.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik flew to Timor yesterday for talks with
integrationist leaders, who had declared the colony a part of Indonesia the day after
the Fretilin announcement. These meetings could produce a public appeal from the
pro-Indonesia parties for overt intervention to restore order and assure
decolonization in accord with what the integrationists claim is majority sentiment
for incorporation into Indonesia.
Before leaving Jakarta, Malik said in effect that the Fretilin declaration had so
changed the situation in Timor that a negotiated political solution on the basis of
prior understandings with Lisbon was no longer possible. Jakarta is publicly blaming
Lisbon for the Fretilin declaration, implying collusion between the Portuguese and
the Timorese radicals, and is claiming that Timor is now without any recognized
legal authority.
Fretilin's bid for international support has fallen on deaf ears. Australia and
Portugal have publicly rejected the independence declaration. Thus far few foreign
governments have recognized Fretilin as an independent state on Timor. Some
former Portuguese colonies may recognize the new state, and the more radical
members of the third world may also decide to side with Fretilin because they
dislike the Suharto regime. Such support is unlikely to improve the Fretilin state's
slim prospects for survival 17 1
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 2, 1975
The military offensive launched last week by forces of the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is meeting with considerable success.
North of Luanda, the Popular Movement reportedly has occupied the key town
of Caxito, and its troops are expected to advance toward Ambriz, headquarters of
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, and Carmona. East of Luanda,
Popular Movement forces have consolidated control over the town of Malange, from
which they subsequently moved southward against a mixed force of the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front near
Mussende. Although the defenders have so far managed to hold off these assaults,
further attempts by the Popular Movement to regain territory lost last month are
expected.
Pressures on the National Front - National Union coalition have not been
limited to the military arena. Idi Amin, chairman of the Organization of African
Unity, has warned coalition leaders against accepting South African aid. I
many African nations may now decide to follow the lead o
Nigeria, which recently recognized the Popular Movement regime of Agostinho Neto
as the legitimate government of Angola, largely as a result of South African
involvement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 2, 1975
Moscow last week issued another public denial of complicity in subversion
against Yugoslavia. This time, however, the Soviet disclaimer contains derogatory
remarks about the pro-Soviet "renegades" who hope to take power in Yugoslavia in
the post-Tito era.
In an authoritative article under the pseudonym I. Aleksandrov, Pravda on
November 27 claimed that the Western media were seeking to tie Moscow to the
pro-Soviet "cominformists." Despite accusations that the Western media had
resorted to the "most incredible slander," the Pravda article also acknowledged
Belgrade's "active" campaign against counterrevolutionary forces.
The Soviet denial is an indirect response to the Yugoslav leadership's
increasingly anti-Soviet allegations. Last week, for example, Vice President Bakaric,
with an eye toward Moscow, said that "neo-cominformists" had sought to form an
illegal communist party which in a period of instability intended to call for foreign
intervention as a means of gaining power in Yugoslavia.
Pravda, however, claimed that the current accusations and earlier charges that
Moscow had supported Ustashi separatists were unfounded. Instead, it claimed that
the Ustashi and other groups seeking to break up Yugoslavia were actually tied to
the West, which also provided them with arms. The article concluded by asserting
that Soviet-Yugoslav relations are in fact steadily improving and that the current
campaign of slander is doomed to failure.
On the following day, Belgrade's Politika carried excerpts from the
Aleksandrov article, which it said represented the views of the Soviet leadership. In
its preliminary analysis, Politika concluded that the item reflected Moscow's
negative attitude toward the cominformists. In connection with the 30th anniversary
of the Yugoslav republic, General Secretary Brezhnev sent a congratulatory telegram
to President Tito which, among other things, said that mutual efforts to strengthen
the atmosphere of trust was in the "vital interests" of both peoples.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 2, 1975
A visit by British Undersecretary Rowlands to Guatemala has produced a
commitment to resume negotiations in February over the Belize issue. Although the
prospect of new negotiations has temporarily eased tensions, the positions of both
parties remain far apart.
In his talks with Rowlands, President Laugerud again insisted that some type of
territorial settlement would be needed to help assuage public disappointment over a
less than total recovery of Belize. Rowlands stated that the British government
understood Laugerud's dilemma, but cautioned him that a territorial concession
would be very difficult in light of the Belizean government claim that it would not
yield one inch of territory. Rowlands indicated he was encouraged by the fact that
the talks would first consider economic and security matters, leaving the territorial
issue for last.
Laugerud also reiterated that he would be forced to take military action if the
UK unilaterally granted independence to Belize. Rowlands minimized this
possibility, noting that the independence process would take six to twelve months.
Rowlands hoped by that time a working agreement with Guatemala could be
reached.
Concerning the present military situation, Laugerud discussed past and future
movements and proposed that Guatemalan and British representatives exchange such
information in order to avoid misunderstandings. Rowlands accepted this
recommendation but refused to commit the British to a force reduction in Belize,
noting the significance the UK government attached to the presence of Guatemalan
armored personnel carriers in the Peten region.
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