NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

~ T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010002-4
Top Secret
National 1 ntell igence
Bulletin
DIA and DOS review(s) completed. 25X1
Top Secret
ecem er ,
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0284000'TO00~~ 9
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010002-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010002-4
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
December 1, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Purge of leftists
from military and government
SPAIN: Rumors of
government shake-up
LEBANON: Franjiyah and Karami
outline joint reform program
SYRIA: Ground-to-ground
missile demonstration
BANGLADESH-INDIA: Dacca fears
New Delhi may support dissidents
NEW ZEALAND: National Party
defeats Labor in election
ITALY-FRANCE: Joint
communist communique
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
10
25X1
Approved For Releas 975A028400010002-4 25X1
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence bulletin December 1, 1975
Prime Minister Azevedo and anti-Communist military officers are carrying out a
full-scale purge of pro-Communists and other extreme leftists in the military and the
government.
Admiral Rosa Coutinho and navy chief of staff Filgueiras Soares are the latest
high-level officers to be forced out in the wake of last week's abortive paratrooper
rebellion. Their departure leaves only two Communist sympathizers on the
Revolutionary Council-both navy officers-and they also are likely to go as the
purge of the military continues. Generals Carvalho and Fabiao, who were forced out
last week, may have had some connection with the rebellion, but Rosa Coutinho and
Filgueiras Soares, both leftists, have clearly been purged on ideological grounds,
indicating that the anti-Communist faction is moving across the board to solidify its
control of the military.
Azevedo reportedly found President Costa Gomes reluctant to sanction a purge
of the navy, but the Prime Minister initiated the move by cleaning out his own
personal staff, which contained many pro-Communist esident Costa
Gomes himself has come in for some sharp criticism,
The government, which had earlier suspended its activities, is now back at
work, but the purge of leftists seems unlikely to end partisan squabbling. The
Socialist Party is insisting that the Communists publicly repudiate the paratrooper
rebellion and swear allegiance to the Azevedo overnment if they are to continue to
participate in the cabinet.
The Popular Democrats are also seeking to capitalize on the retreat of the left,
and have called for immediate elections. In addition, they are calling for the removal
of the Communist Party from its one cabinet post; workers in the northern city of
Porto have signed a petition calling for the removal of Foreign Minister Antunes,
who said last week that the Communists still had an essential role to play.
The Communists themselves have claimed that they had nothing to do with the
rebellion; the party newspaper yesterday pointed to the need for a political, rather
than military, solution to the country's problems. A recent party communique does
not criticize the government's purge of the left, but confines itself to warning the
Socialists and the Antunes militar faction that the extreme right will seek to take
advantage of the situation.
Approved For Release - 975A028400010002-4
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
December 1, 1975
Prime. Minister Arias' two-hour meeting with King Juan Carlos last Friday has
given rise to widespread rumors that a government shake-up is imminent.
It had long been expected- that when Juan Carlos took over he would attempt
to put a new face on the government by naming a new prime minister and that the
selection would be a good indication of whether the King could avoid total
domination by the right. Arias still has three years remaining in his term of office,
however, and the King is not required to replace him at present.
Some of the speculation on government changes centers on the King's retaining
Arias for now but at the same time shuffling the cabinet to bring in politicians more
acceptable to the opposition. Such a move could indicate that Juan Carlos believed
that Franco's old rightist supporters could block the nomination of a new prime
minister who favored significant political liberalization.
The King will not be able to avoid naming a new leader of parliament, however,
as the term of the current president of the Cortes expired on November 26. The
meeting between Arias and the King may have been to discuss this appointment, a
post for which Arias himself is in the running. The president of the Cortes also
doubles as president of the Council of the Realm and will have a major voice in the
council's presentation to the King of the list of three candidates for prime minister,
from which Juan Carlos must choose.
The government has promised, meanwhile, to clarify its recent pardon decree,
which has been criticized as going no further than similar actions by Franco. To
show good faith, the government has already released- many prisoners, some of
whom were jailed for political offenses. Marcelino Camacho, a top leader of the
Communist-dominated workers' commissions, was among the first to be released.
Communist Party leader Santiago Carrillo may soon provide a test of the
government's political tolerance. He announced on Sunday his intention to return to
Spain soon from exile in Paris. His statements, published in the French magazine
L'Express, will make it difficult for the Spanish government to permit his return,
however. He criticized Juan Carlos as "Franco's king," and said that his party would
have accepted the King's father, Don Juan. He also raised the possibility of calling
for demonstrations a ainst the limited nature of the pardon issued by the King.
2
Approved For Rele - 00975A028400010002-4
 Approved For Releas 0975A028400010002-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
December 1, 1975
In separate speeches on Saturday night, Lebanese President Franjiyah and
Prime Minister Karami both appealed for an end to factional fighting and announced
the outlines of a government program to initiate political reform.
Although Karami avoided specifics, he announced that agreement had been
reached to expand the cabinet and to start a dialogue aimed at making "necessary
adaptations" in Lebanon's political balance. Declaring that the continued existence
of Lebanon was at stake, Franjiyah endorsed the program in a speech preceding
Karami's. Noting that all Lebanese factions are minorities, Karami said that the
"triumph of one party over another" would not provide a lasting resolution of
Lebanon's problems. The solution lies, he said, in providing the necessary guarantees
for the continued existence of all "communities."
In marked contrast to previous speeches, which constituted a frank admission
of the government's inability to resolve Lebanon's political problems, Kar?ami's
address on Saturday was more forceful and seemed to be backed by agreement
within the cabinet, for the moment at least. Franjiyah's open endorsement of the
government program, which he said reflects "our common will," gives it an element
of support that has been missing from previous efforts to find a solution. Franjiyah,
a Christian, had been working at cross purposes with the Muslim Karami throughout
the fighting and, by a combination of inaction and behind-the-scenes encouragement
to Christian factions, had thwarted earlier attempts at political reform.
The government's adoption of a reform program and the reconciliation, even if
short-lived, between Franjiyah and Karami may have resulted from the efforts of
Ghassan Tuwayni, a moderate Christian member of the cabinet, and of French
mediator Couve de Murville, who has held extensive discussions with Lebanese
leaders over the last week.
Tuwayni has been active in mediatory efforts between Muslim and Christian
factions of the government and last week drew up a plan for athree-stage program
for enforcing the cease-fire and beginning political reform. Both Tuwayni and Couve
have urged that the cabinet be expanded to include the leader of the Christian
Phalanges Party, Pierre Jumayyil, and socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt. The latter has
consistent) refused to serve in a cabinet with Jumayyil
A concerted effort is reportedly under way, in the meantime, to split less
radical Lebanese Muslims from extreme leftist and Communist groups supported by
Approved For Release - 75A028400010002-4 25X1
 Approved For Relea~
National Intelligence Bulletin
December 1, 1975
Libya and Iraq. Spearheaded by traditionally conservative Saudi Arabia, which is
fearful of the rise of leftist influence in Lebanon, the effort reportedly involves
establishing contacts between the Sunni Muslim leadership and the Phalanaists.
25X1:
4
Approved For Rele 00975A028400010002-4
 Approved For Rele - 75A028400010002-4
National Intelligence Bulletin December 1, 1975
(According to press
reports, President Asad and other high-leve yria~fiiciT6served a long-range
surface-ta-surface missile demonstration on November 27.
The Scud missile was first identified in Syria in late May. Damascus is believed
to have received enough equipment from the USSR to equip one Scud brigade of
nine transporter-erector-launchers. Syrian personnel have reportedly trained on the
Scud missile system in both the USSR and Egypt and could have attained
operational capability.
The launch of asurface-to-surface missile, and its public announcement just
prior to the scheduled November 30 expiration of the UN mandate on the Golan
Heights, was in keeping with President Asad's continuing efforts to focus worldwide
attention on the area. A demonstrated long-range missile ca abilit adds another
dimension to existin tensions on the Golan Heights. 25X1
5
Approved For Release - 5A028400010002-4
25X1
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
December 1, 1975
The .Bangladesh government, already uneasy about possible Indian military
intentions, also appears to be concerned that New Delhi may be giving covert
support to Bangladesh dissidents.
A high Dacca official told a US embassy officer on Friday that he is more
worried about what he sees as continuing Indian support for subversive elements in
his country than he is about the possibility of Indian military intervention. The same
official and at least one other had earlier charged that Indian support for dissidents
was designed to keep the Bangladesh government in a state of tension that would
ultimately lead to its overthrow.
India apparently has given aid and sanctuary to a group of guerrillas led by a
supporter of former president Mujib. Bangladesh security forces re artedl clashed
with the group near the Indian border recent) .
n a i ion, e n ion press
p ommen coverage o pessimistic comments on the Bangladesh
situation by Indian officials. New Delhi papers on Saturday carried Defense Minister
Singh's expressions of "great concern" over events in Bangladesh.
The US embassy in Dacca sees the inability of the Indian media to let the
situation cool as the most troubling element in the India-Bangladesh equation. The
embassy points out that the wounding of the Indian high commissioner in Dacca last
week forced the Bangladesh government to face up to its weak position and that
since then it has generally tried to avoid antagonizing India. Dacca has, for example,
kept the Bangladesh press generally free of stories that would aggravate relations
with India. It also has attempted to ease the concern of the Hindu minority by
increasing olice rotection for that community.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 6 CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010002-4
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence bulletin
December 1, 1975
The National Party's easy victory in Saturday's election will lead to a tightening
of ties with the US, which came in for occasional strain under the ousted Labor
government. Prime Minister-elect Muldoon will probably drop both Labor's ban on
port calls by nuclear-powered warships and its proposal for a South Pacific zone to
be closed to vessels carrying nuclear arms. Muldoon saw these moves as bars to full
military cooperation with the US.
In domestic policies, the National Party, less permissive than Labor toward
trade unions, may abolish compulsory union membership. It is unlikely, however, to
dismantle New Zealand's extensive and popular social welfare programs. The 19-seat
National majority in the 87-seat Parliament could increase stilt further, as several
close contests are yet to be decided. The campaign focused on the economy, and the
party apparently convinced New Zealand's voters that Labor was to blame for the
country's economic problems.
The election result may increase concern in Australia's Labor Party over its
chances in the election to be held there on December 13. Australian Labor,
dismissed from office by the Governor General last month, is under charges of
economic mismanagement similar to those that brought down its New Zealand
counterpart.
Approved For Release ~nmmsma ? r~in_Rnp~aT00975A028400010002-4
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
December 1, 1975
The joint communique signed last month by Italian and French Communist
leaders is another step toward achieving a coordinated West European Communist
stance on basic political issues. This is a goal that the Italians, in particular, have long
pursued through bilateral documents and by sponsoring international meetings.
The two parties strive to give the impression in the communique that, if in
power, they would retain the various freedoms associated with democratic societies,
permit multiparty systems, and tolerate opposition. They also reject "all foreign
interference," express their preoccupation with Portugal's problems, and agree that
public ownership of the principal means of production and trade is essential to the
achievement of a socialist society.
Disagreements between the two parties on such questions have long been a
major stumbling block to the Italians' efforts to push the West European Communist
parties toward a coordinated policy line. The Italians think that such coordination
would help downplay their relations with Moscow while retaining the international
ties that remain important to them, and would also help their goal of closer
cooperation between the Communist parties and the non-communist left. The
Italian Communists think such cooperation would enhance the left's ability to
influence the direction of the EC and of West European social and economic
policy in general.
party chief Berlinguer has also felt
he a o wm renc ommunis suppor o stand up to Soviet criticism of his
political line. Berlinguer probably had some of the same objectives in mind when he
signed a similar communique with Spanish Communist leader Carrillo last July. Parts
of the recent French-Italian document appear to have been lifted nearly verbatim
from the one signed by Carrillo and Berlinguer. On the whole, however, the
French-Italian declaration is more doctrinaire in tone, a reflection of the
compromises Berlinguer had to make to get an agreement with the French.
That compromise has probably left the Italians, who claim they would not
carry out extensive further nationalization if in power, somewhat uneasy over the
inclusion of a statement calling for public ownership of the principal means of
production. Berlinguer will probably deflect criticism on this point by claiming that
that goal is already accomplished in Italy, which has a larger public sector than any
other EC country. Indeed, Italian Communist leaders have gone so far as to suggest
that they would return some parts of the public sector to private hands in the
interest of greater efficiency. Berlinguer probably would also have preferred to avoid
direct mention of the US in a statement opposing "foreign interference." The Italian
Communists continue to believe that US acquiescence is essential if they are ever to
join the government on a workable basis.
Approved For Release 2007/03/068 CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010002-4
 Approved For Release 975A028400010002-4
National Intelligence bulletin December 1,1975
The motives of the French Communist leadership are not as clear. Recently the
party has seemed to be reevaluating its tactics and veering back toward its former
hard-line approach. It has, for example, so harshly criticized its allies, the French
Socialists, that it appears to be trying to goad them into breaking the alliance; it has
also spoken out strongly in favor of the Portuguese Communists. At the same time,
however, the French Communists have consistently defended each party's right to
chart its own route to power, specifically reiterating their own independence from
Moscow.
Party chief Georges Marchais is closely identified with the alliance made with
the Socialists in 1972 and with a flexible party line. He has come in for a lot of
criticism from party members who believe he has not only compromised party
ideology but has also been duped by the Socialists, who now seem on their way to
consolidating a position as the left's premier parity in France. Never very popular
within the party, and weakened by a serious heart attack earlier this year, Marchais
has seemed to be going along with the hard liners. The agreement with the Italians
suggests, however, that he is putting up a strong fight for a flexible approach.
Marchais probably sees clear advantages in his party's associating more closely
with the Italian Communists, who are viewed by many in France as more responsible
and independent. He may, however, have difficulty defending the declaration to his
own members, who are not as receptive as the Italians to less-than-revolutionary
rhetoric. In his recent comments to party gatherings, Marchais has avoided mention
of the communique's points on political pluralism and has emphasized its opposition
to "American imperialism." The communique is flexible enough that Marchais can
exploit it with the French electorate and his own rank and file. His success will be
measured at the party congress in February.
Approved For Release
 Approved For Releas - 00975A028400010002-4
National Intelligence Bulletin December 1, 1975
LAOS: A senior Lao government official told the US charge yesterday that
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the King had decided to step down, and that
an announcement might be made today. The holding of a meeting at Souvanna
Phouma's house in Vientiane yesterday added to speculation. To set the stage for
Souvanna Phouma's removal, the Communists late last week began demonstrating
against the coalition government
FINLAND: Afive-party coalition government that includes the Communists
was announced yesterday. Marti Miettunen, of the Center Party, will be the prime
minister. The "national emergency" coalition was put together only after President
Kekkonen applied strong public pressure on the politicians to stop their haggling and
get to work on the country's serious economic problems. Miettunen declared that
his first priority will be to halt rising unemployment, which has already hit
politically sensitive levels. The government will also have to deal with a large trade
deficit and a 17-percent rate of inflation. Four of the five parties made up the
previous coalition which foundered last spring because of differences over economic
policy.
10
Approved For Releas - 0975A028400010002-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Top ~,,Bnnr~~d For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010002-4
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010002-4