NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010047-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: November 29, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 29, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Neutralization
of leftist opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TURKEY: Student violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
LAOS: Communists may abandon
coalition government facade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
LATIN AMERICA- US: Latinswill
look closely at product preferences list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
BANGLADESH-INDIA: New Delhi
remains uneasy about events in Dacca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ITALY: Christian
Democrats meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FINLAND: Kekkonen orders
center-left government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
CHILE: Church averts breakdown
of relations with government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SINGAPORE: Narcotics controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 29, 1975
Anti-Communist military leaders moved yesterday to bring much of the radical
Portuguese press under direct government control-a further indication that they
intend to capitalize on their victory this week by neutralizing leftist political
opposition.
Following the forced resignation of Army Chief of Staff Fabiao and security
chief Carvalho on Thursday, the country's leftist press was virtually dismantled
when the management and editorial boards of eight newspapers and magazines were
dismissed. According to a communique issued by the Armed Forces General Staff,
the publications, most of which were dominated by the Communists or the far left,
will remain suspended until the government can appoint new administrators.
Pro-Communist Lisbon newspapers had undermined the government's efforts
to establish its authority and put an end to political factionalism in the armed
forces; although the Communists were not specifically mentioned in connection
with yesterday's action, they were the principal target. The general staff is ruling by
fiat, as martial law was declared earlier this week during the rebellion led by leftist
paratroopers.
Prime Minister Azevedo indicated last night that the state of emergency in the
Lisbon military region will be lifted soon and that the government will resume its
normal functions.
Other actions aimed at limiting leftist strength which reportedly are being
considered include:
--Military action to put an end to the Communist-inspired occupation of farms
in the fertile agricultural south.
--Disarming of illegally armed civilians, possibly by means of a nationwide
house-to-house search.
--A crackdown on foreign revolutionaries, mostly Latin Americans who,
according to some reports, have formed an international brigade to assist
Portuguese leftists.
The general staff also announced yesterday that all labor contract negotiations
will be suspended until the end of the year. The announcement stated that the
government will define a wage policy aimed at eliminating large wage inequities.
Communist-led construction workers recently forced the government to agree to
excessive wage demands. The general staff's decree is apparently aimed not only at
reversing this trend, but also at promoting a long overdue program of economic
25)1 stabilization.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 29, 1975
Student violence in Turkey has now spread throughout the country, and could
threaten Prime Minister Demirel's fragile coalition government.
Several deaths and many injuries have led to the temporary suspension of
classes at universities and technical schools and created a mood of suspicion and fear
on most Turkish campuses. The problem appears to have spread even to secondary
schools. Despite the nationwide dimensions of student demonstrations, the violent
activities seem to focus on local student and faculty grievances and on hostility
between extreme left- and right-wing groups.
Urged on by the press, government and opposition leaders have only railed at
each other on the subject. Chronic tensions within the coalition government and
continuing parliamentary paralysis make the student problem ripe for exploitation
by those looking for a political issue to use against their opponents.
The military leadership is no doubt also keeping close watch on the situation,
particularly given its reported concern about renewed activities by the radical left.
Earlier this month Chief of the General Staff Sancar warned Demirel's government
that the military could not tolerate continuing serious student violence.
Reports of government suppression of news about recent deaths stemming from
the violence suggest that the military warning was taken seriously. Only in the past
week, however, has the government taken action to deal with the problem. It
arrested several hundred alleged leaders of student violence, confiscated weapons and
explosives, announced a police modernization program, and proposed legislation
toughening present laws on demonstrations.
Modernizing the police and sending new legislation to a parliament paralyzed
by procedural differences are not likely to have any early impact, however, and the
military has indicated that its patience is already wearing thin.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 29, 1975
LAOS
The communists are apparently ready to discard the facade of a coalition
government.
Yesterday they launched a well-rehearsed campaign against the coalition in
Vientiane. In the morning, the communist party newspaper featured a speech by
Pathet Lao cabinet member Khamouane Boupha calling for the replacement of the
coalition with a "people's democratic government." Later the same day,
well-orchestrated demonstrations began in several areas of Vientiane calling for the
abolition of the coalition. A group of about 1,000 marched to the residence of
Prime Minister Souvanna demanding his removal. Radio Pathet Lao also carried
appeals from local revolutionary councils in several parts of the country requesting
the dismantling of the coalition.
Four days earlier, most of the remaining non-communist politicians in
Vientiane were flown to the communist headquarters near Sam Neua, deep in
northeastern Laos, ostensibly to attend a meeting of the coalition joint national
political council. It is likely that they will be detained there indefinitely, joining
other former ranking politicians and military officers in lengthy re-indoctrination
sessions.
Prime Minister Souvanna was hustled off to Luang Prabang on November
27-perhaps to prevent him from attempting to escape into exile. One of Souvanna's
sons fled to Thailand when he learned that most non-communists had been flown to
Sam Neua.
The communists have been laying the groundwork for Souvanna's retirement
since last September, but the Prime Minister had expected to remain until the
completion of national elections in April. Now, however, the communists have
apparently decided that they have neutralized all opposition and can effectively
operate the government. They have the election process well under way throughout
me coalition
b
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the country and see no reason to maintain the occasiona
structure.
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LATIN AMERICA - US
Latin American governments will be closely examining the newly authorized
general system of preferences product list, which they regard as an important
indicator of US approaches toward their development aspirations. Whether the
exclusion of the area's two OPEC members, Venezuela and Ecuador, will stimulate
broad regional criticism of US trade policy will probably turn on how beneficial or
disappointing the rest of the governments find the list for their own countries.
Several governments, including Brazil and Colombia, have reacted favorably to
US assurances that the new list will grant better access for their exports to the US
market. They intend, however, to scrutinize carefully the actual list in order to make
their own analysis of its impact on their commerce. One reference point will
probably be Washington's original proposal of products on the general preference
list-some of which have since been deleted.
Ecuador's officials and media have been venting their anger over Quito's
exclusion from the preference scheme, but have also criticized its applicability to
"too few products." Similar reaction is almost certain to come from Venezuela. No
move has been made yet to call a special session of the OAS to review the situation,
as was done last spring following the passage of the Trade Reform Act. This action
could be repeated in the event Quito and Caracas find sympathetic ears in
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Indian officials are still uneasy over events in Bangladesh, but the US embassy
in New Delhi continues to believe that India has not reached a decision to intervene
militarily.
Indian Foreign Minister Chavan told Ambassador Saxbe on Thursday that New
Delhi is seriously concerned over the "anarchic situation" in Bangladesh. The foreign
minister said that the assailants who wounded the Indian high commissioner on
Wednesday were incited by propaganda from pro-Pakistani and Islamic elements that
the Dacca government could not control. At the same time, however, Chavan said
New Delhi would continue to treat the situation as an internal Bangladesh matter in
the hope that Dacca will be able to manage it-"and soon."
The embassy views reports of continuing Indian military preparations and sharp
Indian press comments on Bangladesh as primarily reflections of an effort to exert
psychological pressure on Bengalee leaders to adopt attitudes and policies acceptable
to India. The embassy cautions, however, that New Delhi could decide on short
notice to move militarily if there were a large-scale exodus of refugees into India or
if communal violence erupted in Bangladesh involving the Hindu minority.
A Soviet official in New Delhi told a US embassy officer that Prime Minister
Gandhi had informed the Soviet ambassador on Wednesday that there would be no
Indian military intervention in Bangladesh.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 29, 1975
The EC heads of government, meeting in Rome on Monday and Tuesday, are
likely to focus on three major problems: Britain's odd-man-out attitude toward
Communist decisions; reforms in the management of EC finances; and proposals for
changes in the structure and operation of the Council, the Commission, and the
European Parliament.
London's insistence on a separate seat at the Conference on International
Economic Cooperation -still scheduled for mid-December-could prove the most
contentious issue, as its partners try to persuade it to accept EC representation. If
the British position is intended to bargain for concessions on a minimum support
price for North Sea oil, the meeting in Rome is the last convenient opportunity to
work out such an agreement. London's overall commitment to the Community may
well, in fact, be questioned, especially as it has also recently held out alone against
other common EC decisions.
The heads of government will take up several EC institutional matters, the most
important of which is the question of substituting direct elections to the European
Parliament in 1978 for the present system of appointment from national legislatures.
Only Britain and Denmark hope to postpone such elections until after the proposed
date.
Ideas on reforming the Council's working methods and improving the
Community's management of its finances and budget have proliferated. Chancellor
Schmidt outlined his proposals in a letter to the other leaders and is expected to
table specific recommendations in Rome. While reaffirming the importance that
Bonn accords the Community, he made clear that limitations on German financial
contributions to the EC make it essential for the Community to establish more
clearly its priority objectives. In particular, he urged that its finances be more closely
audited and that a finance commissioner be appointed with the authority to suspend
policy proposals that exceed financing capabilities.
In addition to these intra-EC matters, the Nine will exchange views on several
international issues, such as the situation in Spain and Portugal and the possibility of
joint EC moves to combat terrorism. The leaders may also discuss the Euro-Arab
dialogue in the light of the just-completed working sessions in Abu Dhabi. The heads
of government of the smaller countries-irritated by their exclusion from the
Rambouillet summit last week-probably will expect an account of that meeting and
may register their concern that important economic policies may have been
formulated outside of the Community framework.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 29, 1975
The leaders of Italy's Christian Democratic Party reached a compromise at their
national council meeting this week on the contentious issue of when to hold their
party congress. They made little progress, however, toward resolving differences on
the more basic questions-such as how to deal with the Communist Party-that will
be at the center of congress debate.
The congress will open on March 4, a date acceptable to both the Christian
Democratic left-led by interim party chief Zaccagnini and Prime Minister
Moro-and the opposing center-right group that is seeking to gain control of the
party. The latter group, which includes a majority of the party, wanted the congress
held as soon as possible, since Zaccagnini is scheduled to step down at the meeting.
The center-right maintains that his tendency to encourage a "dialogue" with the
Communist opposition threatens to edge the Christian Democrats toward broader
cooperation with the Communists.
Zaccagnini was trying to delay the congress until spring or later in order to
consolidate the influence the party left has been gaining since he took over in July.
Both Zaccagnini and his opponents sought to gain control of the congress by
pushing for changes in the delegate selection process, which would have
strengthened the leverage of their respective groups. Neither, however, could muster
the two-thirds majority required to alter the procedure.
A significant development at the council meeting was the emergence of a loose
centrist faction consisting of some uncommitted party leaders, such as Treasury
Minister Colombo, and those, like Foreign Minister Rumor, who were not firmly
allied with the two major groups vying for control. They apparently want to work
for a broadly based majority that would include all but the extreme left and extreme
right in the party. Prime Minister Rumor's closing remarks to the council suggest
that he leans toward joining with the centrists, a development that would
substantially increase their chances of success.
Defense Minister Forlani remains the favorite to succeed Zaccagnini. He is
continuing to take steps to establish his independence of the center-right group,
whose support gave his candidacy its initial impetus. The new centrist faction seems
to view Forlani as its natural candidate, but many share the irritation of his original
supporters over his growing reluctance to choose sides.
On balance, the picture that emerges from this latest gathering of the. Christian
Democratic leadership is that of a party that has avoided an open split but is still far
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from agreement on how to deal with the problems that led to unprecedented
Communist gains in the elections last June. This makes the coming congress a crucial
event; failure at that time to unite behind a new leader and settle on a coherent
policy line would leave the Christian Democrats in poor shape to compete with the
Communists in the next round of local elections this spring.
In a dramatic reversal, Finnish President Kekkonen went on national television
on November 27 to order the five center-left parties to form a "crisis government"
by Monday. Only two days earlier, he had asked the caretaker government to stay
on because the five parties had been unable to agree to form a coalition.
Lecturing party leaders and the nation, Kekkonen for the first time stated that
Finland's stark economic situation demands a strong government. He denounced the
haggling over a program, which wrecked the last negotiations, and said that assuring
employment was the only program needed at present. He picked formateur
Miettunen of the Center Party to be prime minister, and said that the distribution of
portfolios is all that remains to be negotiated. Even this, however, will be no small
problem, given the parties' insistence on being represented in the cabinet according
to their relative strengths in parliament.
Kekkonen's intervention, never before so blatant, almost certainly will lead to a
majority coalition of the Center, Liberal, Swedish, and Social Democratic parties.
They may not meet his deadline, however. These parties made up the last coalition,
which foundered last spring because of deep policy differences. It is also possible
that the badly divided Communists, the fifth party, may defy Kekkonen and remain
in opposition.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CHILE
A breakdown in relations between the Pinochet government and the Catholic
Church in Chile, which had appeared imminent, has been averted, although deep
differences remain.
By bowing to President Pinochet's recent request to dissolve its Committee for
Peace, the church indirectly admitted that some of the committee's members had
assisted fugitives from the terrorist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).
Some of those arrested for sheltering leaders of the terrorist group were church
persons holding US citizenship.
Earlier this month, Cardinal Silva, the Chilean prelate, publicly threatened to
excommunicate an influential and ultraconservative adviser to Pinochet who had
attacked the church for complicity in the MIR affair. The church seemed on the
verge of an open clash with the government. This, as well as the church's acute
embarrassment over the MIR matter, probably impelled church authorities to back
off from their previous tough stance.
The government has been careful to keep church-state differences within
manageable limits and to leave the door open for cooperation. Pinochet has met
privately with Cardinal Silva, presumably to work out an understanding, and both
have appeared disposed to take an even-handed approach in dealing with their
quarrels.
Pinochet's handling of the arrest and subsequent expulsion of the US citizens
can also be attributed to a desire to avoid further complicating relations with the
Cardinal Silva is currently in Rome where he is expected to hold talks with the
Pope on the church's position in Chile. The church will remain cautious in dealing
with the military regime; further strife over sensitive issues is likely, but it is to the
advantage of both sides to seek compromises. The junta would stand to lose the
most if it used an iron hand against the church because of the inevitable
international repercussions. At the same time, the church could lose the support of
conservatives, who have already criticized its involvement with the terrorists, if it
continues to confront the government.
November 29, 1975
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November 29, 1975
A bill introduced recently by the Singapore government will impose stricter
penalties, including mandatory death sentences, for narcotics trafficking. The bill,
which is expected to be passed by parliament next month or early next year,
reportedly will be enforced against Singaporeans and foreigners alike.
Efforts to deter narcotics traffic in and through Singapore would confront
international traffickers with a considerable roadblock. Although Singapore is not a
producing area, it is an important distribution, transshipment, and financial center
for traffickers of opium products from the Golden Triangle. Some narcotics move
through Singapore to Europe and the US.
Perhaps the primary reason for the imposition of heavier penalties is the
alarming rise in the use of smoking heroin in Singapore during the past year. More
than 1,000 heroin users were arrested there in the first half of 1975, compared to
i 10 for all of 1974
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November 29, 1975
PORTUGUESE TIMOR: Fretilin yesterday unilaterally proclaimed Timor's
independence from Portugal. The front apparently hopes to gain international
recognition to forestall an anticipated major Indonesian military assault. Fretilin's
proclamation may do more harm than good for its cause. Indonesian authorities
have maintained that a declaration of this type would be adequate grounds for
launching a full-scale assault against Fretilin forces.
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