NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010026-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: November 15, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Department review completed
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 15, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Reaction to
Sao Bento siege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . .
SPANISH SAHARA: Provisional 3
administration agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? .
SPAIN: Juan Carlos benefiting 5
from temporary status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LEBANON: Karami reassures the army . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
ARGENTINA: President faces 14
renewed drive to step aside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JAPAN: Unemployment stands 15
at 20-year high . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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ANNEX: Vietnam: Reunification Now
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PORTUGAL
Portugal's democratic leaders have been seriously shaken by the government's
inability to control the mob that surrounded Sao Bento palace earlier this week.
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The minister of internal administration, who is in charge of security, told
Ambassador Carlucci that Portugal is in a "virtual state of civil war; all that is
missing is the shooting. Foreign Minister Antunes has canceled plans for a trip to
Czechoslovakia and will help Prime Minister Azevedo plot his next move.
Lisbon was relatively calm yesterday after the government agreed to grant
construction workers a temporary wage increase while a permanent wage scale is
being negotiated. The deadline for a permanent increase is November 27. A
demonstration scheduled by leftist groups for tomorrow will keep the pressure on
the government to grant the workers' demands.
Both the Socialists and the Popular Democrats were unable to organize an
effective counter-demonstration in Lisbon and were limited to pressuring President
Costa Gomes-with little success-to take strong action against the leftists. Party
activists in safer locations in the north, however, turned out in large numbers to
protest the Lisbon disturbances.
--In Porto, several thousand protesters attacked and looted the local
headquarters of the Communist-dominated labor confederation and threw
Molotov cocktails at the Communist youth organization building.
Demonstrators in Porto also marched on a pro-Communist radio station,
demanding that it cut ties with the main station in Lisbon and revise its
programming.
--A crowd in Viseu, 50 miles southeast of Porto, took over the local transmitter
of the government radio station to broadcast a communique in support of the
government.
In the south, farm workers in Beja cheered security chief Otelo de Carvalho at a
rally which had as its themes the overthrow of the Azevedo government and the
restoration of former pro-Communist prime minister Goncalves.
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A Communist Party statement issued yesterday took the more moderate line
and supported the right of the workers to demand higher wages, but disapproved of
restricting the freedom of movement of government officials.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SPANISH SAHARA
November 15, 1975
Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania agreed yesterday to set up a joint provisional
administration to govern Spanish Sahara until Spain withdraws completely early
next year.
The Spanish information minister predicted yesterday that Spain would be out
of the Sahara by the end of February. He said that details of the new agreement
would not be made public by Spain until the Spanish parliament completed the
process-scheduled to start next Tuesday-of formally decolonizing the territory.
Preliminary comments from Spanish officials indicate they are unhappy with
the pact. One Spanish official who has been involved in the negotiations told the US
embassy in Madrid that it was a "bad agreement," but was made necessary by the
UN's demonstrated inability to prevent the situation from degenerating into war.
With the agreement, Madrid has abandoned its insistence on a referendum for
the area. The Spanish official said that "consultations" will be held with local tribal
leaders on the future of Spanish Sahara. Madrid is uneasy about the arrangement
because it expects Algeria to be displeased. Algeria is Spain's main supplier of
natural gas, but Madrid apparently preferred to risk its energy supplies rather than
become engaged in hostilities in the Sahara.
The UN may not have a role now that it has been presented with an
accomplished fact. At best there may be an attempt to obtain UN approval.
The agreement is a victory for Morocco's King Hassan, who has long sought to
annex at least part of Spanish Sahara. Hassan will be able to present the new joint
authority as fulfilling a promise he made in August to liberate Spanish Sahara by the
end of the year.
As co-administrators, Rabat and Nouakchott will be able to hand-pick Saharan
tribal leaders-including the head of the territory's general assembly, who defected
to Morocco-for any "consultations." The outcome of such "consultations" would
almost certainly be a decision to partition the territory, giving to Morocco the
northern region, with its rich phosphate deposits, and to Mauritania the southern
portion, with its iron ore.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 15, 1975
Algeria looks like the big loser. The Algerian Foreign Ministry yesterday issued
a statement indicating that Algiers would not approve any agreement to which it had
not been a party.The statement strongly reiterated Algeria's unequivocal support for
the principle of self-determination, suggesting it intends to push for a referendum
for Spanish Sahara. An official Algerian news agency warned Madrid that any
attempt to divide the territory would be a grave mistake. The agency said such an
action would jeopardize Spain's interests, apparently a reference to Algeria's natural
gas. Although the agency did suggest that the Saharan people would fight to liberate
their homeland, it did not imply that Algeria would participate directly in the
struggle.
Algeria will, as a first step, try to enlist support in the UN to reverse the
agreement. Algiers will note that the proposed "consultations" are not in accord
with an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which upheld the
Saharans' right to self-determination. Although a UN report last month stopped
short of backing a referendum explicitly, earlier assembly resolutions endorsed
self-determination.
The Algerians will also move to create as many problems for Morocco as
possible. They will, for example, continue to provide arms, training, and possibly
some "volunteers" to the Polisario Front, a pro-independence Saharan group. With
sanctuary in Algeria and sufficient arms, a relatively small number of Front guerrillas
could carry out sabotage and terrorist attacks directed against the new joint
administration. Algiers could also renew its support of dissidents inside Morocco.
Algeria would probably hope that a Polisario insurgency against Moroccan
occupation would tie down a large number of troops for some time to come. The
Front already claims it controls part of the territory. Front leaders want complete
independence for Spanish Sahara and have vowed to fight to achieve that aim. Press
reports from Algeria say that as many as 2,500 armed Polisario members are in the
territory.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 15, 1975
Prince Juan Carlos is extracting maximum advantage out of his status as
"temporary" head of state.
Capitalizing on the emergency nature of the Sahara problem, he has acted
decisively and is given much of the credit for reversing the Moroccan march. His
leadership image has been strengthened by his chairing of two National Defense
Council meetings-something Franco rarely did. Juan Carlos' handling of the Sahara
issue to date has also improved his rapport with top military leaders whose support
he will need in the months to come.
Although Juan Carlos has not been as assertive on domestic issues, Franco's
continued presence has given the prince an excuse not to be. Even so, the media
have applauded Juan Carlos for the recent indications that the government is taking
steps to resolve the sensitive issue of regionalism. On November 11 the cabinet
adopted a decree-initiated several months ago-setting up a commission to pre are a
special administrative statute for two of the Basaue provinces.
11 he press has also reported that a decree approve last
May authorizing the teaching of regional languages in schools and their use in local
government activities will also be issued soon,
In general, however, there is a paralysis in domestic policy-making which will
probably continue as long as Franco lives. During the interregnum, the activities of
the ultra right-if left unchecked-will complicate Juan Carlos' efforts to open up
Spanish society after he is sworn in as king. Blas Pinar, leader of the ultra right New
Force, has been holding rallies around the country warning of the dangers posed by
political parties. Pointing out that the monarchy will derive its legitimacy solely
from Franco, he has called on Juan Carlos to purge the government of all who have
not supported Francoism.
Right-wing extremists, such as the Guerrillas of Christ the King, who have been
linked to the New Force, have recently beaten up student demonstrators and
opposition lawyers, and sent threatening letters to oppositionists and even to some
of the more open-minded establishment figures.
Security forces, meanwhile, have taken full advantage of the wide powers
granted by last summer's anti-terrorist decrees to step up arrests and repress all
forms of dissent. In the past few days, according to press estimates, more than 100
people have been arrested, including the editor of the prestigious independent
newspaper Ya who was indicted for publishing an article on the succession. Six
priests have been fined because of their sermons, and the government has banned
several conferences by important professors, including former minister Ruiz
Gimenez.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 15, 1975
Juan Carlos will not be able to postpone domestic policy decisions much longer
even if Franco lives. A decision is due on a successor for Rodriguez de Valcarcel, the
conservative president of parliament whose six-year term expires later this month.
The position is important because the incumbent automatically becomes president
of the Council of the Realm, which is instrumental in the choice of new prime
ministers, and the three-man Council of the Regency, which will govern from the
time of Franco's death until Juan Carlos is sworn in.
Should Juan Carlos decide to retain Rodriguez de Valcarcel, the decision will
be interpreted by the Spanish left as Francoism without Franco. If someone else,is
chosen, his political credentials will be careful) t examined for clues as to the
direction in which Juan Carlos plans to take Spain.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 15,1975
Lebanese Prime Minister Karami and three principal officers of the Lebanese
army yesterday discussed the army's role in enforcing the latest cease-fire and its
refusal to prevent the continued shipment into Lebanon of arms for the Christian
militias.
Karami probably also wanted to reassure the officers that their views are being
weighed in political negotiations. Many right-wing Christians in the army and the
Phalanges Party are exasperated both with Karami and with President Franjiyah for
their inability or unwillingness to deal forcefully with security problems; Karami
may feel that by meeting with the officers he can head off any wider discontent or
anti-government actions.
Phalangist officials are continuing their unpublicized negotiations with
representatives of Fatah, the largest and least radical fedayeen group. A party leader
claimed this week that the talks are going well, and that the Phalangists are "ready
for some reforms."
The Phalanges-fedayeen talks are angering Lebanese leftist leader Kamal
Jumblatt, thus serving the Christian purpose of weakening further the always
tenuous alliance between the Lebanese left and the Palestinians. Jumblatt this week
repeated that he will not join an expanded Lebanese cabinet that includes a
Phalangist representative until some understanding on political reform has been
reached.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 15, 1975
President Peron, released from the hospital after almost two weeks of isolation,
is facing a renewed drive from within her party and government to step aside, at
least temporarily.
Interior Minister Robledo almost certainly urged this course of action during a
meeting with her on Thursday, when she finally responded to cabinet requests for
consultations. According to press reporting, Senate leaders had earlier told
Robledo-generally viewed as the government's chief coordinator-that they would
ease their attacks on the administration briefly to give him time to prevail upon
Peron.
The senators apparently would be satisfied if she would agree to take another
leave of absence or a long trip abroad. This would allow one of their own, Senate
President Luder, to assume the duties of the presidency, as he did during her last
leave. This would be only an interim solution, but the military would probably back
it, as they did previously.
Presidential loyalists have other worries as well. They are trying to play down
the importance of the rally this week by supporters of Buenos Aires Province
Governor Calabro, a leader of Peronists opposed to the President. The US embassy
reports an enthusiastic crowd of about 30,000 turned out in La Plata, the provincial
capital, to hear Calabro excoriate the administration and belittle the decision to
expel him from Peronist party ranks. The official Peronist newspaper, on the other
hand, claims only 12,000 showed up, and an orthodox Peronist congressional leader
termed Calabro's remarks "subversive." Calabro's following seems to be growing; the
longer the discredited President remains in office the more adherents the governor is
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 15, 1975
Unemployment in Japan has reached a 20-year high, reflecting the sluggishness
of economic recovery.
While the official unemployment rate in September was only 2 percent, this
figure masks the true degree of slack in the labor market. In addition to the more
than one million jobless, large numbers of workers remain on furlough. These
people would be counted as unemployed in most other countries. Were it not for the
Japanese lifetime employment system, the number of jobless and part-timers would
be substantially larger.
Prospects for quick improvement are dim. Job offers to new college graduates
have been sharply curtailed and the ratio of job offers to applicants, a key indicator
of labor market conditions, remains at its lowest level in years.
The impact of unemployment has not been particularly severe because of
generous compensation schemes. In the past, firms alone paid up to 90 percent of
salary for laid off workers. The government has now assumed one half to two thirds
of the financial burden through subsidies.
Although both business and labor are pressing for stronger action to stimulate
economic recovery, Tokyo is holding to its present policy. No change is expected
before the government assesses the impact of the increase in government spending
and the easing of monetary policy that were put into effect in October.
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Vietnam: Reunification Now
The decision to convene the North-South conference on reunification now
meeting in Saigon indicates that Hanoi is ready to proceed swiftly on formally
joining the two countries. The process could be completed as early as next spring.
The conference will be a cosmetic exercise, giving the appearance of mutual
agreement between "northerners" and "southerners" to what has been a political
reality since the collapse of the former government last spring. Vietnam has already
experienced de facto reunification under a single party and military structure, with
Hanoi making all the important administrative, economic, and political decisions.
Heading each of the delegations are senior party officials who are ranking
members of the North Vietnamese Politburo. Truong Chinh, the Politburo's
second-ranking member and head of North Vietnam's National Assembly, is
representing the North, while Pham Hung, the fourth-ranking member on the
Politburo and the party's chief in the South leads South Vietnam's 25-member
delegation.
According to the official announcement, the conference will formulate plans
for a new national assembly and new "common" state organs. The formulation
suggests that Hanoi intends to use the North Vietnamese government structure as a
model and expand established legislative and executive organizations to include
southerners. Southerners will undoubtedly also be appointed to positions in
executive ministries and commissions. The elections proposed are for a new
countrywide national assembly. These elections are intended to serve as a
nationwide plebiscite, reflecting the so-called "national will" of the people for a
reunified state. In reality, the assembly in the North has no power and merely
rubber stamps the bidding of the Politburo and the central committee. The
impression left by the announcement is that the elections will be held soon.
Since the communist victory last April, leaders in both zones have made it clear
that the ultimate goal is to establish a reunified Vietnam. There have been mixed
signs, however, on how rapidly this process would occur and what form it would
take. One reason for the confusion was the rapidity of the communist military
victory, which caught the leadership politically off guard. At the time of Saigon's
collapse, Hanoi almost certainly had no timetable for reunification.
Most of the early indications following Saigon's fal:t::::e:s proceeiiline commadded to
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such speculation by pressing foreign governments for diplomatic recognition of the
southern Provisional Revolutionary Government, by maintaining that economic aid
would have to be provided separately for each state, and by an effort last summer to
gain separate membership in the UN for both Vietnams.
Statements by communist officials, in particular southern communist leaders,
also seemed to suggest that reunification would proceed gradually to permit time to
overcome the severe economic and administrative problems brought on by the
sudden collapse of the former government. Finally, the communists originally
indicated that the military management committees set up to administer the South
were only temporary and would give way to the type of civilian coalition
government long called for by the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the
National Liberation Front.
By late summer, however, signs of a "gradualist" approach to reunification
began to disappear. Public statements by Vietnamese leaders carefully avoided
suggestions of an independent southern regime of indefinite duration. The
once-promised civilian administration never materialized and, perhaps most
importantly, no foreign states, including North Vietnam's closest allies, were
permitted to establish diplomatic representation in Saigon. Moreover, Hanoi's
control over the economy was made more explicit by linking the new South
Vietnamese currency to that of the North and by specific and public references to
the inclusion of the South in a revised five-year production plan.
Starting in June and possibly lasting into September, senior southern and
northern officials, including at times party chief Le Duan, held a series of meetings
in South Vietnam. It seems entirely plausible that Hanoi's decision to move ahead
with reunification was revealed and procedural matters worked out during the
course of these sessions.
The most significant question, however, is not when but why Hanoi decided to
move away from a scenario that seemed to provide for a separate southern
administration for some time, perhaps for several years. The question was probably a
matter of considerable debate if not contention within the North Vietnamese
leadership. A separate southern regime presented both advantages and problems for
Hanoi. Many diplomatic observers in Hanoi, for instance, thought that the
"gradualist" approach would prevail, in part because North Vietnam believed a
facade of southern independence would help attract aid, trade, and foreign
investment. Hanoi apparently decided, however, that any diplomatic or economic
benefits to be derived from two Vietnams would be.,outweighed by the problems
flowing from such a strategy.
The North Vietnamese doubtlessly have been suspicious of Peking's apparent
preference for a gradual approach to reunification, although there is no evidence of a
direct Chinese attempt to influence Hanoi's decision. Moreover there are some
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indications that Moscow has been attempting to exploit North Vietnam's
sensitivities on this score by warning of Chinese "meddling" in the South and the
prospect of a Chinese diplomatic mission's gaining direct access to the Saigon area's
large Chinese population. Given the present uneasy state of Sino-Vietnamese
relations, the North Vietnamese may have reached the same conclusion without such
self-serving help from Moscow.
Hanoi's suspicions regarding foreign interference are related to a far more
fundamental domestic concern-maintaining total control of the political process in
the South. With the end of the war, the question of the political roles to be played
by southern elements, previously confined to front groups or the management of
local problems, became a pressing issue for Hanoi-one that impacted directly on the
reunification question.
Although Hanoi firmly controls the southern segment of the Lao Dong Party, a
separate southern regime could, over time, only encourage independent southern
tendencies. Statements by southern leaders shortly after the fall of Saigon suggest
that they expected to play leading roles in a separate southern administration. There
have also been reports of southern communist resentment over the
heavy-handedness of northern cadre sent south in recent months to administer the
country.
Aside from such unrealized expectations and bruised southern sensitivities, we
lack evidence of serious high-level North-South differences on the reunification
issue. Hanoi's desire to limit the potential growth of vested southern interest in
political autonomy is probably a major factor behind the North's decision to move
ahead.
There are tentative indications that the North Vietnamese will convene their
first party congress in over 15 years sometime early next year to put the capstone on
the reunification process. The congress, which probably would be held shortly after
the election of a joint national assembly and the announcement of formal
reunification, may have to deal with the question of southern political equities.
One move the congress seems likely to make is the expansion of the Politburo
and the central committee by adding members identified with the southern party
apparatus. Such a step would not do away with the problem of southern resentment.
The absorption of southern cadre into the northern party and government structure
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