NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010014-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 8, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National 1 ntel l igence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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I~lational Intelligence Bulletin
November $, 1975
CONTENTS
BANGLADESH-INDIA: Ne~v Delhi
re-examining options 3
INDIA: Court clears Gandhi
of campaign violations 4
PORTUGAL: Crackdown on leftist-inspired
civil disorder 5
SPAIN: Juan Carlos boosts
his public image 7
WEST GERMANY -USSR: Scheel,
Genscher to visit Moscow 8
UK: Britain applies
for IMF loan 10
ANGOLA: OAU attempts to
form coalition in Luanda 11
ZAIRE-USSR: Relations
strained over Angola issue 13
ISRAEL: Government inflating
significance of West Bank elections 14
AUSTRALIA: Opposition's determination
to force elections weakening 16
VIETNAM: Statement may announce
agreement on reunification process 17
FOR THE RECORD 19
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 8, 1975
The most recent coup in Dacca is causing deep concern in New Delhi, with the
result that India is almost certainly re-examining its options-including possible early
military intervention.
The Indian foreign secretary, in conversation with embassy officials yesterday,
noted that his government's main concern was the possibility of a mass exodus of
refugees from Bangladesh into neighboring Indian states. As in 1971, when such an
exodus last occurred, the refugees would pose an immense relief problem for India
and possible political problems as well. The Indian official admitted that no flight of
refugees had begun, but he feared that continued deterioration of the situation in
Bangladesh might evolve into civil war and chaos. He seemed to imply that
intervention could become necessary.
There is no hard evidence that India is about to intervene in Bangladesh
militarily. Nevertheless, continuing instability in that nation, reported popular
demonstrations against both India and Indian firms in Dacca, and the possible deaths
of two Indian army officers during the recent fighting in Dacca all increase that
possibility.
The Bengalees are of course aware of the threat of Indian intervention. Major
General Zia ur-Rahman, who seized power yesterday, and his associates are
attempting to bring calm to the capital and unify the country. Zia, who originally
announced that hP had assumed the post of chief martial law administrator, has
stepped aside in favor of A. M. Sayem, the respected but largely figurehead
President. Sayem will be assisted by Zia and the two other service chiefs, acting as
deputies. Effective power presumably will remain in Zia's hands.
Both Sayem and his predecessor, Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed, who resigned
the presidency earlier this week after being forced from power, made radio speeches
to the nation yesterday evening. They joined in praising the armed services and other
sectors of -the populatian for participating in the "revolution" that toppled Major
General Musharraf. They called for national unity, hard work, and discipline.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 8, 1975
The security situation in Bangladesh appears to be easing. There are reports of
scattered shooting in Dacca and a few other cities, but a curfew has been imposed in
the capital, and Zia has ordered army and police units to return to their barracks.
The Indian Supreme Court yesterday overturned a lower court conviction
against Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for campaign violations in 1971, thereby
freeing her from the threat of being debarred from elective office for six years. Im
addition, the court accepted the validity of electoral laws, passed since the
emergency was declared, that retroactively eliminate the basis for-the charges against
her.
The court has not yet ruled on the legality of a constitutional
amendment-rushed through Parliament with the electoral laws last August-that
would retroactively exempt from judicial review the election of a prime minister and
several other key officials. That question, however, is now academic as far as
Gandhi's case is concerned.
Having won the court battle, Gandf~i may soon give an indication of whether
general elections will be held when the term of the present Parliament expires next
March. She probably is now more inclined to go ahead with elections, even though
she could legally postpone them under the state of emergency.
Partly owing to the government's repressive emergency measures, the
opposition parties are too weak to pose a serious challenge to Gandhi's Congress
Party at the polls. Moreover, the general public appears satisfied with-or at least
reconciled to-her authoritarian rule, largely because of the nation's favorable
short-term economic prospects. Gandhi may be sufficiently encouraged by this trend
to ease some of the restrictions imposed under the emergency.
The Prime Minister may also take steps to restructure the government. In
recent months, she has defended the need to change the constitution and indicated
her desire to reduce the powers of the judiciary while strengthening the legislature,
which is controlled by her Congress Party. Parliament is expected to convene this
month, and such changes may well be on the agenda.
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Natianal Intelligence Bulletin November 8, 1975
The government, with solid backing from the ruling Revolutionary Council, has
announced a strict crackdown on civil disruptions by its far-left opponents.
Although the government evidently feels it has the means to follow through, the use
of force could lead to violent countermeasures.
Late Thursday the cabinet issued a stern and seemingly uncompromising
warning to the left that it would no longer tolerate breaches of public order and
would take all measures necessary to enforce its authority and ensure civil peace.
The statement, which followed several days of disturbances by the leftists, was
announced after a joint session of the cabinet and the Revolutionary Council.
The council subsequently issued an endorsement of the cabinet's position and
cautioned unspecified groups to refrain -from exploiting discontent among the
200,000 recently returned refugees from Angola.
The council's unqualified support for the government's new policy toward the
left was boldly underlined yesterday when it authorized paratroopers to seize and
destroy a leftist-occupied radio transmitter outside Lisbon. The radio had
contributed to unrest in the capital by urging leftist demonstrators to lay siege to
the Information Ministry.
The crackdown comes as a sharp contrast to previous indications that the
government would assert its authority gradually and in areas where there is little
organized opposition. Direct confrontation with militant leftists had been regarded
as a risky policy that might make martyrs out of the dissidents.
In recent weeks, however, the government has been encouraged by the failure
of the far left to mount effective antigovernment demonstrations and by an
impressive show of support for the Azevedo government in the provinces. It may be
inflating its strenght relative to that of the left, however, since the antigovernment
demonstrations failed for lack of support by the Communist Party. The provincial
rallies have been carefully stage-managed by the military's government partners-the
Socialists and the Popular Democrats.
The inherent danger in the crackdown, which had to come sooner or later, is
that the government still may not have had time to put together the security force
necessary to enforce its will upon awell-armed, recalcitrant left.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 8, 1975
According to the US defense attache's office in Lisbon, the government will
shortly launch military maneuvers that will involve units throughout the country.
One of the purposes of these exercises will be to test the responsiveness of various
units to the government's directives.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 8, 1975
The Sahara problem has given Prince Juan Carlos the opportunity to create an
initial impression of energetic leadership, but he faces serious tests on the domestic
front in days to come.
Juan Carlos' surprise visit to the Sahara last weekend boosted his public image;
even the illegal opposition has praised it. Perhaps more important, the visit
strengthened his political base with the military, whose support will be crucial
during the transition period.
On his return, the Prince immediately called for a meeting of the National
Defense Council, overriding objections that it was Sunday night. The Defense
Council recently has been chaired by Prime Minister Arias, but Juan Carlos exercised
his prerogative to convoke and preside over the meeting in a decisive manner. In
contrast to 1974, when Juan Carlos briefly held power, the meeting was held at the
Prince's personal palace, the Zarzuela, instead of at Franco's residence, the Pardo.
Franco's lingering illness nevertheless continues to place a great strain on Juan
Carlos. The Prince probably does not feel free to begin policy innovations on
internal issues until he is sworn in as king. Meanwhile, the left is stepping up its
demands for liberalization.
So far, fragmentation and bickering within the opposition have averted a
serious challenge to Juan Carlos' leadership. The joint communique issued recently
by the two loose coalitions of the left-the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta
and the Socialist-dominated Platform of Democratic Convergence-lacked teeth and
apparently was agreed to only after weeks of arduous negotiations.
The Platform coalition is troubled by internal squabbles. The most extreme
member, a revolutionary Catholic labor organization, has withdrawn in protest over
the coalition's moderate position toward Juan Carlos. Another party in the Platform
group, the late D ionisio Ridruejo's Social Democratic Party, has split.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 8, 1975
The recent rash of arrests and detentions of students and moderate
oppositionists will makQ it more difficult for the moderate opposition to hold to the
line of giving Juan Carlos a "period of grace" in which to move toward
liberalization.
Labor Minister Suarez told Ambassador Stabler that the arrests did not reflect a
hard-line attitude at the upper levels of government. He attributed the actions to the
"policeman in the street" who is used to having his own way for the past 35 years.
In a grim reminder that violent confrontations can be sparked by extremists of
both left and right, masked gunmen-identified by police as right-wing
extremists-pistol-whipped seven lawyers representing groups in the two leftist
coalitions.
WEST GERMANY -USSR
West German President Scheel and Foreign Minister Genscher will make what is
being described as a protocol visit to the Soviet Union next week. The visit will no
doubt be used to celebrate the establishment of Soviet -West German relations 20
years ago and the signing of the treaty normalizing Bonn's relations with Moscow
five years-ago.
The West Germans will spend some time with their Soviet counterparts
Podgorny and Gromyko, and plan to meet briefly with Premier Kosygin. No meeting
has been set with Brezhnev, but the possibility of arranging one has been kept open.
Scheel plans to stress the broad context in which German-Soviet relations are
conducted, while Genscher intends to home in on the West Berlin question. The
continuing dispute over West Germany's relationship with Berlin has blocked
progress toward concluding culturaP, legal, and scientific agreements between Bonn
and Moscow. Genscher also intends to complain about the new Soviet -East German
treaty, the cancellation of a visit by Soviet mayors to West Berlin, and failure to
make progress on the joint nuclear power plant project in Kaliningrad.
There probably will not be any forward movement on these issues, but the
atmosphere may be a little warmer as a consequence of Chancellor Schmidt's recent
visit to China. The Soviets have praised what they regard as his steadfastness in
defending. detente-against Chinese criticism.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 8, 1975
Britain announced yesterday that it had applied to the International Monetary
Fund for a loan of same $2 billion.
More than half the loan-$1.2 billion-will come from the Fund's special oil
facility; the remaining $0.8 billion will come from Britain's normal credit rights in
the Fund. This will be the first IMF loan to the UK since the beginning of the oil
crisis two years ago.
The loan has been under consideration for some time and preliminary
discussions with the IMF have already taken place. With its anti-inflation program
now firmly in place, Britain should have no difficulty meeting the conditions the
IMF is likely to require in granting the loan.
Despite a sharp improvement in its trade position this year, Britain has found it
increasingly difficult to finance its continuing payments deficits. In 1974 it ran a
current-account deficit of $8.8 billion; this year the deficit will be closer to $3
billion.
The deficit last year was financed by a large Eurodollar loan and by substantial
investments by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
This year the inflow of OPEC funds was slowed to a trickle as rampant inflation and
festering economic problems have made foreign investors nervous about
accumulating sterling assets.
Unfavorable interest rates have deterred the UK from trying to raise another
Eurodollar loan. As a result, Britain has had to dip slowly but steadily into its
international reserves to meet its international payments and prevent the pound
from dropping too rapidly.
A large borrowing now from the IMF has several attractions for London. It will
get a better interest rate than it could in open credit markets. The oil-facility loan
will carry an average interest rate of 7.75 percent, while the credit tranche drawing
will bear an interest rate of 4 to 6 percent. The oil facility is now under review at the
Fund, and there is a possibility that it will not be available to Britain next year.
With next year's current-account deficit likely to be about the same size as it is
this year, a $2-billion drawing from the IMF, coupled with a recently announced
$400-million loan from Iran, should cover most of Britain's financing needs through
the middle of next year. By then, London hopes that its anti-inflation program will
be showing results and exports will be growing as world trade begins to recover fram
the recession.
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N~t1011~I Ilntelllg@11C~ BUII@tll'1 November 8, 1975
The Organization of African Unity, which is making alast-minute effort to
patch together a coalition government of Angola's three warring liberation groups,
announced yesterday that leaders of the groups were studying an OAU proposal that
would establish an "interim" government to accept sovereignty from Portugal next
Tuesday. The OAU also continued to urge the Angolans to accept acease-fire.
The African initiative, which was supported by the Portuguese, probably has
little chance of success, despite optimistic press reports out of Kampala and Lisbon.
In the absence of a coalition government, the Portuguese are likely to withdraw
without extending sovereignty to any of the liberation groups. The last 2,000
Portuguese troops will leave the territory Monday night. The Portuguese high
commissioner recently remarked that he will simply "take down the flag and sail
away."
The PopulaY Movement for the Liberation of Angola on one side and the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola on the other will probably declare rival "governments" and
intensify their military effort as they vie for international recognition.
In Brazzaville yesterday, a spokesman for the Popular Movement claimed that
"about 80" communist, Third World, and African states will recognize an
independent Popular Movement government in Angola on November 11. These
states already have sent congratulatory messages to Movement President Agostinho
Neto and many have accepted the Popular Movement's invitations to attend
Independence Day celebrations, according to the spokesman. The announcement
was designed to enhance the Movement's image as the popularly accepted successor
to Portugal.
The National Front and the National Union are also solicitin international
support for a rival government. the two
groups believe they can garner signs scant support, but they will not be able to
match the Popular Movement.
At present, heavy fighting continues in many areas, but reporting is sketchy
and often contradictory. The Popular Movement is still claiming to control the
important rail and port complex of Benguela-Lobito,
e complex is a vital resupply point and a symbol of control over
Angola's transportation system.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 8, 1975
After being stalled at Quifangando, 12 miles northeast of Luanda, for almost
two weeks, National Front forces trying to move on Luanda reportedly were forced
to retreat on Thursday by a heavy rocket barrage from Popular Movement forces.
In Luanda, Portuguese officials believe an attack could come at any time and
have called on all medical personnel to report for duty. Widespread rioting and
looting may occur if the city is attacked. Popular Movement cadres fear the
emergence of a National Front fifth column. Popular Movement military forces in
the city have been can#ined to barracks.
in Cabinda, the Popular Movement's dominance reportedly continues to be
contested by the Zairian-backed Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda,
which is almost certainly assisted by Zairian troops. Congo continues to deny
Zairian charges that it has sent its troops into the enclave.
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Nat~anal Intelligence ~l.llletln November $, 1975
Relations between Zaire and the USSR have become seriously strained over the
two nations' support for rival liberation groups in Angola's civil war. President
Mobutu may be considering breaking or suspending diplomatic ties.
Late last month the Soviet charge in Kinshasa presented a demarche to the
Zairian government concerning Angola and, presumably, Zaire's support for the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola. We do not- know the substance of the
demarche, but it was immediately and publicly rejected by the Zairians.
Since then, the Zairian media and Mobutu's official party have kept up a steady
barrage of attacks on the Soviet Union. The Soviets have been charged with
encouraging fratricidal warfare in Angola, with waging a diplomatic effort to
intimidate Zaire into ceasing its support for Angola's true nationalists, and with
attempting to turn Angola into another Congo, an allusion to Soviet involvement
in the turmoil that occurred in Zaire (the former Belgian Congo) in the early 1960s.
So far, Soviet officials in Kinshasa have remained silent. In Moscow, the media
have been steadily increasing their coverage of the Angolan conflict as the military
fortunes of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola have
declined. Soviet propaganda has emphasized foreign intervention in Angola, with
specific references to Zaire's support of the National Front.
Mobutu has long taken a dim view of the USSR, having led his government's
forces against Soviet-supplied leftists that tried to take over the country in the
1960s. He would probably have no qualms about telling the Soviets to leave if
Moscow recognizes, as it may, the unilateral declaration of independence that the
Popular Movement plans to proclaim on November 11.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 8, 1975
Defense Minister Peres, who is also responsible for administering the
Israeli-occupied territories, is spearheading an apparent effort by the government to
inflate the importance of the elections for 57 West Bank village councils. Those
elections ended this week.
In recent public statements, Peres has cited the elections to support claims that
a trend toward limited self-rule is emerging in the territories.
The Israelis, of course, are eager to foster a local Arab leadership independent
of the Palestine Liberation Organization to help counter claims by the PLO to be the
sole representative of the Palestinian people.
The US consul in Jerusalem reports, however, that most local observers
attribute little political significance to the recent series of council elections, even
though they were the most extensive since the start of the Israeli occupation in
1967. Local issues figured almost exclusively in each election, because most better
educated West Bankers who might have injected more important regional issues
declined to take an active part.
The outcome of the 57 contests did not significantly alter the traditional local
power structure even though a relatively large number of new councilors was
elected. Most of these newcomers apparently filled seats previously held by older
members of their family or clan. According to .press reports, 80 percent of the
eligible voters did cast ballots. The elections were held in accordance with Jordanian
law; thus, only males over 18 years of age were allowed to vote.
Despite earlier predictions in Jordanian dailies that Arab activists would
sabotage the elections, no attempts to disrupt the voting have been reported. One
West Bank notable explained to a US consular official that the PLO did not oppose
the elections. The Arab press, particularly in East Jerusalem, has so far largely
ignored them.
The Israelis plan to hold possibly more significant municipal elections on the
West Bank early next year, and they may also call for local elections in the Gaza
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National Intelligence Bulletin
AUSTRALIA
November 8, 1975
The opposition is weakening in its determination to force general elections by
blocking government appropriations in the Senate.
Prime Minister Whitlam has c-ounterattacked with telling effect, raising an alarm
about the dire consequences of impending government bankruptcy as a result of the
opposition's money blockade. Increasing numbers of disenchanted Australians are
swinging back to at least temporary support of the Labor Party, agreeing with
Whitlam that the Liberal-Country coalition is to blame for the political crisis and the
possible economic dislocations.
Second thoughts among Liberals over the wisdom of stalling on appropriations
may have undercut opposition leader Eraser's prospects of forcing early elections as
the price for funds. Several Liberal senators, unenthusiastic from the start over this
unprecedented tactic, are threatening to break ranks in another vote. Worried by the
strength of public reaction, other Liberals are talking of replacing Fraser.
Eraser's new doubts were reflected this week in his offer to delay elections for
six months-a proposal quickly rejected by the Prime Minister. Fraser has not yet
abandoned his challenge to the appropriations bills, but the opposition's ability to
resist a possible move by the Governor General to for political compromise has
clearly been weakened.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 8, 1975
The Vietnamese communists are preparing to issue a statement that may
announce agreement on the process for formal reunification of the country.
the communique is sc e u e o e eased on Sunday. arty
functionaries in t e South apparently decided on their own to publicize it on
Friday, but they subsequently reversed their decision under pressure from Hanoi.
Although South Vietnam has been under the control of the Hanoi regime since
last April, formal reunification probably will not occur anytime soon. North
Vietnamese military authorities still have day-to-day administrative control in many
urban areas in the southern part of the country, and the government in Saigon is
merely a shell, with real authority exercised by Hanoi through the party and ad hoc
committees. Hanoi may want to bring the governing apparatus in the South more in
line with vvhat exists in -the North before moving too far toward formal
reunification. The regime may also want to achieve further progress in
institutionalizing social and economic reforms.
The communique will most likely restrict itself to vague generalities about the
need for reunification, but it could spell out some of the formal steps leading to this
goal.
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V-class Submarine
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 8, 1975-
FOR THE RECORD
? USSR: What probably is a Soviet V-class attack submarine has been detected
some 120 nautical miles off the coast of North Carolina. No Soviet submarine of this
type has previously been identified closer than about 300 miles from the US coast.
The nuclear-powered V-class is operating near a Primorye-class intelligence collection
ship. The Soviet naval units probably are attempting to gauge US response to Soviet
submarine operations in waters near the US coast. The combined capabilities of
sensors on the V-class, which is designed to hunt and attack other submarines, and
on the intelligence collector, which has a wide range of electronic monitoring
~
ecuipment, would increase Soviet chances of detecting a US reaction.
UK-EGYPT: London is considering lifting its ban on the sale of a mayor
offensive weapon to Egypt. According to a senior British official, the Defense
Ministry may recommend lifting the embargo on the sale of the Anglo-French Jaguar
supersonic fighter aircraft to Egypt. In the past, London's reluctance to sell Cairo
more sophisticated weapons systems like the Jaguar and the Chieftain tank was
based on the concern that such sales could upset the military balance in the Middle
East. Opposition to an end to the embargo is likely from pro-Israel members of
Parliament and elements of the British Labor Party.
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Top Secret
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