NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 7, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 7, 1975
CONTENTS
BANGLADESH: Another coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ?
RA Moroccan
RA
2
SPANISH SA
marchers cross the border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ?
PORTUGAL: New set of 3
challenges to Azevedo government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LEBANON: Showdown brewing over
unloading of arms shipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CYPRUS: UN debate could 8
harden Greek, Turkish positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
UN: Debate on Zionism may 9
strain voting alignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
WEST GERMANY: Slight rise 10
in industrial output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ?
USSR: Pelshe's speech 11
commemorating Bolshevik Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . .
GUATEMALA-UK-BELIZE: British 14
reinforce garrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ?
NORTH KOREA - AUSTRALIA: Canberra's 15
embassy in Pyongyang ordered closed . . . . . . . . . . . .
LAOS: Increased Harassment 16
of diplomats in Vientiane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 7, 1975
Major General Zia ur-Rahman seized power in Bangladesh early this morning.
Major General Musharraf, who had taken over early this week, may have been killed
by troops loyal to Zia.
There has been considerable shooting and troop movements in various parts of
Dacca, including the area near the US embassy, but resistance by Musharraf's forces
has apparently now faded. Zia announced over Dacca radio that he has been named
martial law administrator and chief of the armed forces. Former president
Mushtaque, who had named Zia chief of staff last August, is said to be drafting a
radio speech amid speculation he may be asked to reassume the presidency. We still
have no word on the status of A. M. Sayem, who was named president on Thursday.
Musharraf had arrested Zia earlier this week and briefly succeeded him as chief
of staff. The 39-year-old Zia is evidently highly popular among army troops; he
played a leading role in Bangladesh's war of independence in 1971, and he is the
man who first broadcast the country's declaration of independence. The US embassy
reports that Zia's move seems to have aroused more enthusiasm among civilians as
well as among the troops than did either Musharraf's power play earlier this week or
the coup last August.
India, which was caught off guard by Musharraf's move, seems to have been
surprised again. The continuing instability in Dacca increases the chance that India
may try directly to influence events in Bangladesh. Indian officials have indicated in
recent months that continued turmoil in Bangladesh or a massive influx of refugees
into India, such as happened in 1971, could result in Indian military intervention.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 7, 1975
Moroccan marchers, led by Prime Minister Osman, advanced only a few miles
into Spanish Sahara yesterday, but Morocco has threatened to break its agreement
with Spain on limiting the march. Despite a UN Security Council resolution passed
last night calling on Morocco to withdraw the marchers, Rabat has said the march
will continue unless Spain agrees to resume negotiations on the fate of the territory.
Morocco's government-
controlled media, however, assert that the marchers have gone past the town of
Daora, a point nearly halfway between the border and the territorial capital of El
Aaiun. Spanish defensive positions are north of the town, and the Rabat story
apparently is an exaggerated reference to the token number of Moroccan marchers
whom the Spanish will allow to proceed to El Aaiun.
Algeria has condemned the march and King Hassan for launching a "suicidal
operation."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 7, 1975
PORTUGAL
Prime Minister Azevedo's government may face a new set of challenges in the
next few days as extremist elements begin to recognize that their opportunities for
attaining power are slipping away.
Many problems remain, but Azevedo has had considerable success asserting the
government's authority and demonstrating his own popular support. He has reduced
Communist influence in the media and the military, and he is determined to purge
Communists and their allies from key positions in the government.
Azevedo's success, however limited, has put the Communists on the defensive.
The Communists are also resorting to street action to recoup some of their
losses:
--On Wednesday, 50 pro-Communist transport workers occupied the office of
the labor minister to protest the "purge" of leftists from the ministry's staff.
--Leftist telephone workers occupied Lisbon's main post office yesterday,
demanding the dismissal of five administrators with alleged right-wing
connections.
--Communist and Socialist workers battled Wednesday night for control of one
of Lisbon's main newspapers.
--Yesterday, leftist mobs protesting the government's drive to reduce
Communist influence in the media attempted to seize the Information
Ministry.
In addition to testing the regime's will, these disturbances may be intended to
get those elements within the government that have become increasingly impatient
with the lack of discipline to attempt a coup. The Communists are betting that such
an attempt would not be successful and that their own fortunes would rise in the
aftermath. Their repeated warnings of the dangers of a "reactionary take-over" still
elicit a sympathetic response in many quarters.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 7, 1975
There is no hard evidence that the disorders are a prelude to a coup from the
left. Communist strategy is more likely dependent on promoting the danger of a
move from the right. Portuguese police recently arrested several "Communist
activists who were painting signs favoring the Portuguese Liberation Army, an
ultraright organization based in Spain composed of remnants of the Caetano and
Spinola eras.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 7, 1975
Beirut was relatively quiet yesterday, but efforts by warring factions to rearm
themselves threaten both the cease-fire and the uneasy reconciliation between Prime
Minister Karami and Interior Minister Shamun.
A showdown between Karami on the one hand and Shamun and President
Franjiyah on the other is developing over attempts by Christian forces to unload a
shipment of arms that arrived on Tuesday at Juniyah, 12 miles north of Beirut.
Karami complained to Ambassador Godley yesterday that his order to army units to
halt unloading the ship's cargo was not being followed.
The wide publicity being given the incident at Juniyah will only complicate
Karami's difficulties by calling further attention to his inability to exercise
authority.
Tensions in Juniyah apparently have not affected Beirut, where life is slowly
returning to normal. More shops and banks have opened, and many citizens are
venturing out to replenish food stocks. The wave of kidnapings seems to have ended.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 7, 1975
The U N General Assembly will take up the Cyprus issue next week, but it is
unlikely that prospects for a settlement will improve. There is a danger, in fact, that
an acrimonious-debate could harden both Turkish and Greek positions.
The discussion will probably reflect the General Assembly's increasingly
anti-Turkish mood, which stems from Ankara's failure to live up fully to the
resolutions the Turks helped negotiate at last year's session. Ankara's proposed draft
resolution this year amounts to a significant retrenchment; it avoids substantive
issues entirely, stressing only the need to reinvigorate the communal negotiations.
The situation will be aggravated by the Greek Cypriots, who intend to obtain a
thorough airing of their grievances. Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Christophides
has indicated he will ask for a draft resolution calling for prompt withdrawal of
Turkish troops, return of Greek refugees to Turkish-controlled areas, and criticism
of Turkey for blocking progress regarding negotiations and Turkish actions on
Cyprus.
The same nonaligned countries that worked out last year's compromise have
agreed to try again, but they are not optimistic that an agreement can be reached on
this year's resolution.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 7, 1975
The UN General Assembly's debate on the resolution condemning Zionism as a
form of racism-passed last month in a committee of the assembly-is scheduled to
begin on Monday. The issue threatens to strain traditional UN voting alignments on
African issues and further erode support by some.of the developed countries for the
organization.
Although the Arab countries are united in their support of the resolution,
which is unqualified in its condemnation of Zionism as a form of racism, some want
to minimize negative reactions to the resolution.
It is unlikely that amendments to the resolution will result in a significant
change in voting support, despite intensive lobbying by both sides. The African
states are in a particularly difficult situation because the resolution's passage could
jeopardize Western support for their campaign against racial discrimination. The
only hope for defusing the issue at the present time lies in motions to defer the vote
until the end of the session in the hope it will not be taken up or to postpone the
entire debate. until next year. This tactic has some chance for success.0
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 7, 1975
Although the German economy still shows no sign of a sustained upturn, the
slide in production, which has lasted a year and a half, probably touched bottom in
the third quarter. Industrial output rose 2 percent in both August and
September-month-to-month changes, seasonally adjusted-and the volume of new
industrial orders is on the rise.
The revival reflects the extremely depressed levels of those indicators, which
are barely above 1970 levels, rather than the onset of a robust recovery. We expect
gross national product to rise at an annual rate of less than 0.5 percent the second
half of this year and only 1 percent in the first half of 1976.
The most encouraging sign for West German industry is the three consecutive
monthly rises in the volume of new foreign orders. The volume of exports between
January and September was some 12 percent below a year ago, the major reason for
the slump in production.
The foreign market normally accounts for at least a third of industrial output,
and Bonn is expecting foreign demand to play a key role in recovery. A further
upsurge in foreign orders, however, appears unlikely. West German exports are
heavily investment-oriented, and no major trading partner seems primed for an
investment boom.
With German industry now operating at three fourths capacity, domestic orders
for capital goods should be weak. Local firms recently surveyed indicated that
investment spending next year would be at the current depressed level.
Weak consumer demand-restrained by high unemployment levels-and Bonn's
intention to hold increases in federal spending to 4 percent next year will further
moderate recovery. The earliest prospect for a clear-cut recovery is next summer,
when West German consumers and businessmen may turn optimistic if favorable
trends persist.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 7, 1975
Soviet Politburo member Arvid Pelshe, chairman of the party's Control
Commission, delivered the traditional speech yesterday on the 58th anniversary of
the Bolshevik Revolution. The choice of the 76-year-old Pelshe reveals nothing
about the current political situation in the Kremlin.
Pelshe's emphasis was in keeping with his domestic responsibilities; more than
half the speech was devoted to domestic accomplishments under communism. He
acknowledged that there are problems with this year's grain harvest, but he gave no
hint of their magnitude and asserted that Soviet agricultural policies are basically
sound.
The foreign policy section of the speech was noticeably different in tone from
the speech delivered last year by Foreign Minister Gromyko-even allowing for the
differing responsibilities of the two men. Pelshe devoted only one short paragraph to
relations with the US. He made favorable mention of the Apollo-Soyuz mission, but
omitted the standard Soviet references to milestones in relations between the two
countries; he said nothing about the contribution of summitry to the relationship or
of Brezhnev's next trip to the US. Pelshe did endorse the strategic arms limitations
talks, but he lumped them together with the force reduction talks elsewhere in the
speech.
Pelshe's treatment of the US may have been nothing more than an attempt to
avoid controversial or difficult subjects, but his handling of the topic was very
cursory for such a key aspect of Soviet foreign policy. He made no prediction, as
Foreign Minister Gromyko has in recent statements, that the party congress in
February will reconfirm the foreign policy line of the 24th Congress in 1971.
The remarks Pelshe made on China were not appreciably different from those
of Gromyko last year, except that he noted the Soviets would rebuff any Chinese
encroachments on the interests of Soviet "friends." The reference probably was
added to reassure North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan, who is having problems
with the Chinese and who was present at the anniversary celebrations. The reference
may have also been intended to reassure India in light of the recent Sino-Indian
border clash.
Pelshe devoted considerable attention to the world communist movement,
citing the meeting of Latin American communist parties in Havana last June and the
preparations for a European communist party conference in a way that suggests
Moscow is still intent on another world communist conference.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 7, 1975
London has reinforced its 600-man garrison in Belize with 500 troops and six
Harrier attack aircraft. This is the largest British reinforcement sent to the area since
early 1972, when a similar move caused a furor in Guatemala because of its
territorial claims in Belize.
In an apparent effort to avoid the misinterpretations that occurred in 1972,
London will inform the Guatemalan government that its latest reinforcement is
solely a defensive measure taken in response to a Guatemalan buildup near the
Belize border. The UK is trying to reassure the Guatemalans that a negotiated
settlement to their territorial dispute is still possible. British officials have indicated
they are prepared to discuss territorial concessions in future negotiations, even
though the UN is likely soon to pass a UK-sponsored resolution stipulating that the
territorial integrity of Belize must be maintained.
In any event, Guatemalan officials will seek some public gesture from the UK
to provide them with a face-saving basis for negotiations.
When the reinforcement is complete, UK forces in Belize will have the
capability of simultaneously defending Belize City, Punta Gorda, the capital of
Belmopan, and the terrain adjacent to the Western Highway near the Guatemalan
border. The British will also have increased their border patrol capability.
The most significant element of their reinforcement is the Harrier aircraft,
which are superior to the Guatemalan A-37Bs and provide the British with the
ability to strike at bases and staging areas inside Guatemala.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 7, 1975
NORTH KOREA -AUSTRALIA
North Korea has demanded that Australia immediately withdraw its diplomatic
mission from Pyongyang.
The trouble began last week when Pyongyang threatened to break relations if
Canberra followed through on its publicly announced intention to vote against the
pro - North Korean resolution at the UN. Prime Minister Whitlam yielded to
Pyongyang's pressure at the last moment and abstained, but the North Koreans had
already withdrawn their mission from Canberra-a move accompanied by a harsh
statement attacking "unfriendly" Australian actions.
Both sides were embarrassed at this point-Canberra for having yielded under
obvious pressure and Pyongyang for having "retaliated" prematurely. Canberra
subsequently decided that it would not let the North Koreans return until they
agreed to forgo similar walkouts in the future. The latest North Korean move
followed yesterday.
Pyongyang's ultimatum last week was probably based on a calculation that
Australia's vote would influence other UN members. Australia's unexpected
abstention in the UN General Assembly's Political Committee did in fact facilitate
abstentions by a number of other Southeast Asian countries, thus increasing
Pyongyang's margin of victory.
The next move is up to the Australians. The two Korean resolutions will almost
certainly come up for a vote again this month in the plenary session of the General
Assembly. Prime Minister Whitlam will be under conflicting pressures: from the
Australian left to accommodate the North Koreans once again and from some
Australian officials to change the vote. Whitlam will find it difficult for reasons of
face to alter his policy, but if Australia does shift, several other countries may do the
same.
Pyongyang's rough tactics will detract from the reasonable image it has been
trying to foster, but the affair seems unlik,fly to cut into the North's hard core of
communist and militant nonaligned backers.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 7, 1975
Communist efforts to control population movement in and around Vientiane
have resulted in increased harassment of foreign diplomats.
In recent days, Communist authorities have used police, militia, and students to
establish roadblocks and checkpoints throughout the capital in order to inspect
identity cards as well as all vehicles and travelers. Lao authorities apparently are not
using the new control measures deliberately to harass foreign diplomats, but several
incidents involving embassy officials have occurred during the past week. For
example, a French and a West German diplomat were jailed for two days.
Personnel from the US embassy have experienced only minor harassment; one
US official was briefly detained at his residence by Pathet Lao security guards for
several hours.
With the enforcement of stricter control measures by largely untrained
personnel and the slowness of the government to protect the rights of the diplomatic
f
corps,
urther more serious incidents are likely.
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