NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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NNUM WS =1
Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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Top Secret
November 1, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
SPAIN: Communists attempting
to forge popular front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SPAIN: Speculation on
post-Franco government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
LEBANON: Fighting persists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PORTUGAL: Leftists in military
resist demobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR-VIETNAM: Le Duan's
visit ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ANGOLA: National Front
expected to attack Luanda soon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SYRIA-IRAQ: Relations
may be improving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
BRAZIL: Government
tightens security measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
PERU: Campaign to rid
administration of radicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
The Spanish Communist Party, which has been underground for nearly four
decades, is attempting to forge a popular front. It is having little success, however,
outside of fellow-traveling organizations.
The Communists are pushing for cooperation between the two loose coalitions
of the Spanish left-the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta, formed last year,
and the Democratic Platform of Convergence, launched by more moderate leftists as
a counterweight last June. Since Franco's illness, a primary objective of the
Communist Party has been to get the two coalitions to issue a joint communique
setting conditions for a transfer of power to Prince Juan Carlos. The Democratic
Platform has refused to cooperate.
Yesterday, the secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago
Carrillo, said in Paris that Juan Carlos was unacceptable as head of state. Earlier, the
Communists had said they would accept the Prince if the Spanish people voted for a
monarchy in a popular referendum, but in the meantime Spain should be ruled by a
provisional government.
The issue of amnesty for political prisoners is likely to pose a challenge to Juan
Carlos during his early days in office. Most opposition groups are likely to support
the amnesty demand, but the military and the security forces-on whom Juan Carlos
must rely-will resist.
The wife of one of Spain's most famous political prisoners held a press
conference in Madrid yesterday and called on Juan Carlos to show his commitment
to democracy by granting amnesty. She said that unless the Prince takes action,
there will be a massacre of prisoners by right-wing forces when Franco dies.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
Speculation on Prince Juan Carlos' plans for a post-Franco government is
intensifying.
Prime Minister Arias has indicated he will tender his resignation when the
succession occurs. The Prince will then have to decide whether to retain Arias, who
has three years remaining of his five-year term, or appoint a new head of
government.
Arias' retention would provide continuity through the transition period and the
crisis in the Spanish Sahara, and at the same time placate the conservative elements
upon whom Juan Carlos will have to rely for support. By Spanish law, the chief of
state after Franco cannot remove a prime minister without the approval of the
17-member Council of the Realm. If Juan Carlos feels he must make a change
immediately, he will choose a replacement from among three names presented to
him by the Council of the Realm.
There are at least 11 possible candidates:
--Fernandez Miranda, a former National Movement minister and tutor to Juan
Carlos;
--Rodriguez de Valcarcel, the current president of the Cortes;
--Fraga Iribarne, a former information minister and ambassador to London;
--General Gutierrez Mellado, the chief military negotiator for US bases;
--Count of Motrico, a monarchist and co-member with Fraga of a political
research corporation;
--Silva Munoz, a right-wing Christian Democrat;
--Lopez Rodo, a former minister of Opus Dei persuasion;
--Diez Alegria, ex-chief of the high general staff;
--Admiral Pita da Veiga Sanz, the current navy minister;
--Licinio de la Fuente, a former labor minister;
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National Intelligence Bulletin
--Barrera de Irimo, an ex-finance minister.
November 1, 1975
Almost all of the political groups in Spain are prepared to adopt a wait-and-see
attitude toward the new government. The majority are in favor of some degree of
liberalization but differ greatly as to the speed and extent of the changes.
The next prime minister will almost certainly make some cabinet changes. The
new council of ministers will probably be drawn from a much wider range of
political opinion than in the past.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
Sporadic fighting persisted yesterday in the southern suburbs of Beirut,
following disagreements over the conditions of the latest cease-fire. Muslim forces
reportedly refused to leave a downtown building as called for in the cease-fire, and
the Phalangists were reported to have moved back into the three hotels in the
Qantari area.
The Phalangist move could bring the major fedayeen organizations back into
the fighting. Since Wednesday, when the cease-fire was arranged, Fatah and Saiqa
appeared to have reverted to a role of attempting to calm the situation. These
organizations got involved in the battle in the Qantari area last weekend, but their
involvement, in the opinion of the embassy, does not mean the abandonment by
Palestine Liberation Organization chief Yasir Arafat of his policy of attempting to
avoid direct involvement in the conflict. The embassy notes, however, that the major
fedayeen organizations will respond when they believe they are being attacked.
The latest fighting may be attributed at least in part to leftist Muslims and
Palestinian "rejectionists" who believe their best interests are served by continued
conflict.
One result of the latest fighting has been the emergence of Nasirist leader
Ibrahim Qulaylat as a significant figure on the Lebanese internal scene. Qulaylat,
who controls the Ayn al-Muraysa area near the embassy, is estimated to have 500
militiamen and 1,000 other supporters. The embassy reports that although the less
radical fedayeen organizations were involved in the fighting that began last weekend,
most of the fighting in the Qantari area and adjoining areas involved Qulaylat's
followers, members of the Lebanese Communist Party, and supporters of leftist
leader Kamal Jumblatt.
Efforts on the political front to find a solution are going nowhere. The embassy
reports that parliament has no plans to meet and that the "national dialogue"
committee is inactive, with no sessions scheduled for any of the three
subcommittees. The new ten-man security committee that was established last
weekend is continuing to meet, but without the participation of the major
antagonists, Jumblatt and Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil. The new fighting raises
the possibility that Prime Minister Karami may actually carry out his threat to
resign.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
Leftists in the Portuguese military are resisting demobilization. They reportedly
have petitioned army chief Fabiao to allow those discharged to stay in the military
until at least next March. Eighteen percent of the army was discharged yesterday,
and another 9 percent is to be demobilized on December 2.
A top aide on the general staff told the US army attache that the government
was concerned that many of the troops would refuse to leave after they are
discharged. He thought some might decline for political reasons, but
others-according to the source-were unwilling to return to civilian life because
unemployment is on the rise.
The aide said the army was prepared to cut off the pay and food of soldiers
who resist discharge. He recognized this might not solve the problems; left-wing
parties could support those who refuse to leave the barracks.
The turmoil within the military has spawned new talk of coup attempts from
the right and left. Press reports indicating that various military units are planning
live-fire maneuvers are adding to the tension in Lisbon.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
The communique issued yesterday at the end of North Vietnamese party chief
Le Duan's official visit to Moscow indicates that Hanoi has received some of the
economic aid it was seeking and that Moscow obtained a North Vietnamese
endorsement of some of the USSR's major foreign policy themes.
Le Duan, for example, proved willing to endorse Soviet detente policies more
explicitly than Hanoi has before. The Soviets find this especially welcome in light of
Peking's efforts during Le Duan's visit to China last month to persuade him of the
dangers of detente.
The North Vietnamese party chief praised the results of the European security
conference and expressed support for the Kremlin's line toward the Middle East,
Portugal, and Chile, all of which are points of contention in the Sino-Soviet rivalry.
In the declaration, Hanoi and Moscow were relatively noncommittal toward
Phnom Penh, where Chinese influence is predominant. This stance contrasted
sharply with pledges of aid and support for the pro-Hanoi regime in Laos.
Like the Chinese, the Soviets will provide credit on easy terms, indicating that
the days of grant aid for Hanoi are over. Moscow went a step further than Peking,
however, by promising to discuss support for North Vietnam's second five-year plan.
In another gesture Moscow will find to its liking, Hanoi agreed to develop
economic ties "within the framework of the multilateral cooperation of socialist
countries." Although this may foreshadow a closer North Vietnamese relationship
with CEMA, the vague formulation employed allows for considerable flexibility.
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Barre do panda ` a
LUANDA oifangandn
A a L:4 N'TIC
Per( Amboiml
MOpamedes
rto Alexandre
Areas controlled by:
(MPLA' Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(NFLA) National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(UNITA) National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
Forces of the National Front are concentrated at Quifangando, some 12 miles
northeast of the capital. Their advance has been delayed temporarily by lack of
supplies and by the destruction of two key bridges by the Popular Movement.
Tensions are running high in Luanda. The morale of Popular Movement forces
in the capital is low, and recent military reversals may be causing some shake-ups in
the Movement's military command structure. Large numbers of black residents of
the city are fleeing into the countryside, many of them to escape the mass
mobilization of all men between the ages of 18 and 35 ordered by Popular
Movement leaders last week.
East of Luanda, the National Front is also massing a sizable force and large
amounts of equipment near Carmona in preparation for an assault on Lucala.
The Front and its military ally, the National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola, is continuing to press the Popular Movement in the central coastal area as
well. The Movement's forces there are stretched thin and may be forced to pull back
into defensive positions around Benguela and Lobito, the territory's major port and
rail complex.
The Popular Movement apparently has made some progress, however, in its
advance on the National Union stronghold of Nova Lisboa. The Movement claims to
have recaptured Alto Catumbela, site of the hydroelectric project that supplies
power to Nova Lisboa.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
SYRIA-IRAQ
The recent deterioration in Syria's relations with Egypt and President Asad's
apparent determination to raise tensions on the Golan front have resulted in efforts
by Damascus to improve relations with Baghdad.
Syria has taken positive steps toward Iraq since Asad's recent talks in Moscow.
Soviet leaders reportedly advised him of Iraq's value to Syria's position in terms of
strategic depth and military and economic resources.
Damascus has permitted Iraq's airline to resume flights to Syria, and Baghdad's
reciprocity was highlighted in front-page announcements in two Syrian newspapers.
The Iraqi information minister, moreover, visited Damascus on October 23,
reportedly to discuss ways of further reducing tensions.
It is unlikely, however, that the deep-rooted Baath Party differences between
the two countries will soon be resolved. Iraq's earlier condemnation of Syria for
abandoning the Arab cause is indicative of the ideological struggle between the two
regimes. Despite inflammatory rhetoric on Arab-Israeli issues, Iraq's official actions
often reflect an underlying realism closely tied to its economic development goals
and to efforts to increase its regional and international stature. Iraq may now be at
the point of deciding to try to play a more influential role by continuing to improve
its relations with moderate Arab states as well as with Syria in a united eastern front
against Israel.
Baghdad's terms for a wider reconciliation, as outlined in Iraqi President Bakr's
speech on October 29, call for Syria's "unequivocal refection of UN resolutions 242
and 338."
Syria, on the other hand, is unlikely to accept Iraq's preconditions for a
er over
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ts to
ff
i
p
p
or
nue e
genuine rapprochement. President Asad will probably cont
differences with Baghdad to bolster his bargaining position with Israel, as well as to
exploit the uncertainty about Syria's military and diplomatic intentions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 1, 1975
The Brazilian security forces are stepping up their efforts to prevent potentially
disruptive protests.
Security officials and other disgruntled military conservatives appear to have
been emboldened by President Geisel's concessions to them in a speech on August 1
and have apparently interpreted his call for vigilance against subversion as a license
to move against other critics of the regime.
This pressure will continue because Geisel announced only a halt-not a
reversal-of the liberalization process and because the legal opposition party, with an
obvious eye to next year's municipal elections, is becoming more critical of
administration policies. The recent invitation to foreign companies to prospect for
oil in Brazil has provoked sharp criticism in some sectors. The new policy runs
counter to deeply ingrained nationalist sentiment and reverses the practice of the
past two decades of excluding foreigners from this sensitive area.
Many Brazilians apparently are becoming disenchanted with the Geisel
administration. During its nearly two-year tenure, the vaunted "economic miracle"
has become virtually a thing of the past, as rising prices have put a squeeze on
consumers and balance-of-payments problems have constrained growth. Last year's
impressive gains by the nominal opposition party in congressional elections were an
early indication of popular disaffection.
Moreover, the anticipated political liberalization has all but ground to a halt.
Last week, for example, the Ministry of Justice ordered state governors to prevent
meetings that could prove disruptive. The directive does not substantially add to the
government's powers, but it does provide state officials with greater authority and
considerable latitude in their actions. The opposition Brazilian Democratic
Movement is criticizing the administration's action as unconstitutional and voicing
the concern that it will be used to narrow the scope of legitimate political action.
Widespread apprehension has been heightened by the arrest of several members
of the legal opposition in the drive against communism.
In addition, security officials apparently fear the outbreak of demonstrations
on the issue of human rights in response to the wave of illegal arrests and reports of
deaths of political prisoners caused by torture. Students and local press especially
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
are upset over the recent death of a Sao Paulo newsman charged with subversion,
who officials claim committed suicide while in custody.
administration should eventually culminate in violence, Geisel would be forced to
side with the military conservatives, with whom he has long differed.
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j it public criticism o is
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 1, 1975
President Morales Bermudez has launched a campaign to rid his administration
of a number of radical officers closely associated with former president Velasco and
to consolidate his hold on power. Further military and government changes are
certain in the coming weeks, but Morales Bermudez' position appears secure and
probably will be strengthened over the longer term.
Two top army generals were forced to resign yesterday
of prominent civilians associated with Velasco were detained as part of an
anti-corruption campaign.
The resignations of General Rodriguez, commander of the important Lima
military region, and General Graham, head of the presidential advisory committee,
most clearly indicate the President's intent to clear his administration of potential
troublemakers.
Neither Graham nor
Rodriguez appears to enjoy widespread support in the army, but Rodriguez, at least,
is unlikely simply to fade away.
The current situation may be complicated if leftist civilian groups persist in
their efforts to disrupt and discredit the administration. We believe, however, that
Morales Bermudez maintains sufficient support to withstand any such challenge,
whether from civilians or radical army officers, or both.
SPANISH SAHARA: The Algerian press service claims that Spain, Mauritania,
and Algeria have agreed to a plan proposed by UN Secretary General Waldheim for
settling the Spanish Sahara dispute. The brief report gave no details but said the
plan will respect the right of the Saharan people to self-determination. No mention
was made of Morocco, which wants to settle the dispute by direct negotiations with
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