NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010045-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: October 18, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National 1 ntel ligenc~
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
To Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 18, 1975
PORTUGAL: Situation report 1
WEST GERMANY: Nuclear power plant
for USSR creating political problems 3
OMAN-IRAN: Military situation
ANGOLA: Possible MPLA
declaration of independence
9
11
PAPUA NEW GUINEA: Secessionist problem
PANAMA: Delegation to
Cuba to examine arms
18
19
ARGENTINA: Surface calm likely
to be only temporary
FOR THE RECORD
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 18, 1975
The antigovernment campaign being waged by the Communists and the far left
has sparked rumors that radical elements are planning to overthrow the Azevedo
government. In response, President Costa Gomes yesterday issued stringent
directives aimed at recovering illegal arms, many of which are feared to be in the
hands of extreme leftists.
Past rumors of coups-from either the right or left-have often cited November
11 as the deadline for a power play in Lisbon. The rationale for this timing is that a
new government would need to be in complete control in order to influence the
outcome in Angola. Events in Angola have taken on a momentum of their own,
however, and there is little any Lisbon government can do to alter their course
dramatically.
A move to overthrow the shaky Azevedo government by any of its many
opponents is clearly possible. In the near term, however, another confrontation
between radical and loyal elements in the military is more likely.
The radical "Soldiers United Will Win" organization is. spearheading the effort
to keep the government under pressure while plotting to overthrow it. They are
continuing their protests on several fronts:
--Rebel soldiers who mutinied in Porto last week announced that they are not
satisfied with the "compromise" negotiated by army chief Fabiao and are
threatening another round of violence.
--Radical troops joined extreme left-wing civilians yesterday to demand that
Radio Renascenca, the church-owned station previously seized by leftist
workers, be reopened by the government. The station has been silent for three
weeks.
--"Soldiers United" has held a series of rallies during the past wzek, in
conjunction with radical farm and industrial workers groups, calling for
"popular power" and the dissolution of the Azevedo government.
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National intelligence Buii~etin October 18, 1975
The 18-man Revolutionary Council, headed by Costa Gomes, issued new
security directives after an all-night meeting that began on Thursday. Military units
were ordered to open fire on anyone illegally using firearms against civilians,
soldiers, or the police. Individuals possessing illegal arms were given one week to
turn in the weapons or face prison terms and fines. Whether the government
enforces these measures remains to be seen.
The uncertainties in mainland Portugal once again appear to be having
repercussions in the Azores. A call by the Azorean Liberation Front for an
immediate referendum on independence has gotten little response from the
government, but it has stirred separatist activity..
The Azorean flag-which has come to symbolize separatist sentiment-has been
flown in several small towns in the past few days, and an attempt to remove one
near Panto Delgada reportedly led to a scuffle between troops in and out of
uniform. The military has since increased security, but the episode su gists that the
reiiabilit of arm troo s is also uestionabie in the islands.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 18, 1975
Moscow's latest proposal for the construction of a West German -built nuclear
power plant in the Sovet Union is creating political problems far Bcnn. The
principal difficulty is that the Soviets are now insisting that the East Germans
participate in the multimillion dollar installation which is intended to supply electric
power to West Berlin and West Germany.
West German officials told the Western allies earlier this week that the bilateral
project, first proposed by the Soviets two years ago, is virtually dead.
The revised Soviet proposal suggests that political considerations outweigh the
economic attraction of the project. Moscow is reluctant to accept an arrangement
that strengthens ties between Bonn and West Berlin, as would have been the case
with the original project. Moscow is probably also trying to avoid impugning East
German sovereignty, especially at a time when certain Soviet policies appear to be
causing economic problems for East Berlin. The East Germans have long insisted on
control over transmission lines across their territory.
Moscow terms the powerplant project a joint West German -CEMA endeavor in
its new proposal. Putting it in this context has the additional benefit far Moscow of
strengthening the prestige of that Soviet-dominated organization since, if accepted,
the proposal would set a precedent for a Western nation to deal directly with CEMA.
West German officials are sharply divided over the new Soviet proposal. Some
insist that Moscow keep to the original bilateral concept. Others would find a
trilateral project acceptable if the Soviets were to reaffirm a commitment to
transmit electric power directly from the plant in Kaliningrad to the Federal
Republic via West Berlin.
The Soviet proposal does not appear to meet this West German concern; on the
contrary, it recommends that CEMA power lines in Poland and East Germany
transmit the electricity. The Schmidt government can not afford politically to go
along with this proposal because it would give East Berlin and Warsaw control over
power supplies to West Germany.
No firm policy guidelines have yet emerged, but the West Germans are
probably willing at least to discuss the Soviet bid if Moscow gives a firm guarantee
that Pankow will not interrupt power deliveries to West Berlin. To ensure this, Bonn
would insist upon a direct link from Kaliningrad through West Berlin to the Federal
Republic.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 18, 1975
Omani aircraft attacked artillery positions inside South Yemen yesterday,
according to an official announcement in Muscat, probably marking the beginning of
the Iranian-Omani offensive against the leftist rebels in Dhofar Province. Oman
claimed the attack was in retaliation for the continued shelling of its territory and
was launched only after repeated protests to the Aden government failed to halt the
firing. An Omani patrol boat fired on rebel positions east of Hawf.'
The South Yemenis probably will not take any major retaliatory action against
Oman at this time, although Aden will likely dispatch more regular army units to
reinforce its forces in the border area. The South Yemenis have long portrayed the
fighting in Dhofar as a struggle to drive Iranian troops out of the peninsula and are
likely to play up the bombing as an attack upon Arab territory by an
Iranian-supported puppet regime.
The Shah and Sultan Qabus apparently are determined to inflict a military
defeat .on the rebels. Both leaders have criticized the British commander of the
Sultan's forces for his cautious approach to the war. They believe that the rebellion
can be finished much sooner than the present plan calls for.
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National lntelligenee Bulletin October 18, X975
In the last few days, Irani has launched a media campaign playing up communist
support for the Dhofari rebels, The propaganda blitz evidently is aimed at justifying
Tehran's role in the quickening military situation. Padio Tehran is emphasizing that
a rebel victory would threaten nat only the security of the Arabian peninsula b~~t
the Persian Gulf as well., Although acknowledging recent Omani successes aver the
rebei~, Tehran radio has suggested that the retie! acquisition of SA-7 xurfaee-to-air
missiles has altered the military situation.
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National Intelligence Bulletin .October 18, 1975
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-the dominant nationalist
group in the territory-may be moving toward a unilateral declaration of
independence before November 11, the date Lisbon is scheduled to transfer
sovereignty. An attempt to seize full political power could come before the end of
October.
In a speech earlier this week in Luanda, Movement President Agostinho Neto
declared that his organization will proclaim independence for Angola "within a few
weeks, come what may. Neto has previously asserted that the Movement would
seize power only if the Portuguese attempted to turn the Angolan problem over to
the UN.
Neto's remarks may have been prompted by a growing concern within his
organization that Portugal is still not ready to transfer sovereignty to a single
liberation arouo. no matter what advantages it may hold over its rivals.
In recent weeks, Movement officials have worked hard to cultivate the
impression that their organization is the only liberation group capable of running an
independent Angolan government. Their efforts have been based on the belief that
Lisbon eventually would abandon its avowed policy of promoting a coalition
government for Angola.
In early October, however, the new Azevedo government sent an emissary to
Lourenco Marques to underscore to the new nationalist government in Mozambique
Portugal's continuing effort to find an alternative to turning over power to the
Popular Movement. The Mozambican regime has close ties to the Popular Movement.
Foreign Minister Antunes reaffirmed that policy at the UN General Assembly
session last week, stating that his government continues to recognize all three
liberation groups as having a legitimate and equal claim to political participation
after independence. He also proposed convening a meeting of Portuguese officials,
the liberation groups, and selected African mediators to find an effective means of
transferring sovereignty to a coalition. It seems unlikely that the Popular Movement
would agree to attend such a meeting.
Movement officials reportedly decided recently to postpone any final decision
on a unilateral declaration of independence until after the departure of an OAU
reconciliation committee now in Angola. The committee is charged with
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 1a, 1975
investigating the possibility of a coalition of the three liberation groups, The Popular
Movement clearly would like to win the committee's endorsement as the only
legitimate representative of the Angolan people, presumably in expectation that
such an endorsement would convince the Portuguese to back down. The committee
is scheduled to present a report to the OAU secretary general by the end of the
week,.
If the Portuguese continue to hold firm in their refusal to give sole recognition
to the Movement its leaders ma feel hoice but to seize power[
Movement leaders may be
ecause o t e assurances o recognition they have already privately
obtained from Communist and many third world countries, that they can weather a
controversy concerning the legitimacy of a Popular Movement government.
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National intelligence 8u~letin October 1s, ,975
After only one month of independence, the government of Papua New Guinea
is being forced to come to grips with the secessionist problem in its most important
revenue-producing territory, Bougainville Island.
During the last twa weeks, leaders in Port Moresby have learned that the
secessionist movement is far stronger and more dangerous than previously believed.
The movement. reportedly is well organized at all levels, well financed by private
businessmen, and supported by most of the island`s population.
Following long-distance telephone consultations with Prime Minister Somare,
who is attending the UN General Assembly session in New York, Acting Prime
Minister Kiki suspended the Bougainville Provincial Government on C3ctober 15.
This presumably means that the central government is imposing direct rule and that
local provincial officials, most of whom are believed to support secession, are
supposed to stop performing their duties,
A substantial proportion of the provincial officials on Bougainville are likely to
resist the suspension, giving Port Moresby its first severe test since independence.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 1$, 1975
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The visit to Cuba of a high-level Panamanian National Guard delegation,
purported-y to examine Cuban arms and equipment, is probably aimed mainly at
catching the US eye in connection with canal treaty negotiations.
The chief of the delegation told a press conference at the Cuban embassy that
his group planned to meet Prime Minister Castro and to inspect military armament.
According to the Cuban ambassador, this included armor, artillery, rockets, and
aircraft. The Panamanian press has so far cast the visit in terms of an exchange of
revolutionary rapport and as a way to improve the National Guard's defense
capabilities to enable it to assume a larger role in canal defense.
Since the present leadership came to power, the Guard has attempted to
While the Panamanian contingent may investigate the possibility of purchasing
Soviet arms and equipment, it is unlikely that Panama will seriously pursue such a
deal. The Panamanian government is aware of the political pitfalls involved in a deal
with Cuba or the USSR. General Torrijos is aware of the negative impact such an
arms deal would have on his chances of getting a future canal treaty ratified by the
US Congress.
Torrijos could be hoping, however, that the review of Cuban weapons will
cause the US to change what he views as its reluctance to sell Panama arms.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 18, 1975
President Maria Estela Peron appears to have bought some time for her
administration with her non-controversial address yesterday at a major Peronist
rally.
For the present, at least, Peron seems willing to follow the dictates of political
and military leaders. She adhered closely to a prepared text that touched on three
popular themes-evoking her husband's memory, denouncing terrorism, and
promising support for the armed forces in their fight against subversion. In addition,
she reiterated an earlier promise to resume the dialogue with all political groups that
was begun by Juan Peron.
These remarks were well received by a crowd of about 70,000 Peronists-a
larger attendance had been hoped for. Police and labor officials had taken extensive
security precautions in response to terrorist threats, and there were no major
incidents.
The surface calm is likely to be only temporary. The return of the widely
discredited President undoubtedly will increase olitical tensions, especially within
the already factionalized Peronist movement.
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Nati4nai Intelligence ~u~~etin
October 18, 1975
USSR-NORWAY: The Soviets have accepted a Norwegian proposal to resume
talks on November 24 on delimiting their continental shelf boundary in the Barents
Sea, The first round ended inconclusively late last year, and it is unlikely that much
progress will b^ made at the forthcoming session. Norway advocates drawing a
"median line" between the neighboring land masses, while the Soviets want to place
the line farther west, based on what the claim are s ecial historical and
geographical circumstances.
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