NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: October 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 10, 1975
CONTENTS
LEBANON:
MOROCCO: King, foreign minister reaffirm
position on Spanish Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PORTUGAL: Cabinet issues tough
statement against violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
USSR: Temporary storage
problems for imported grain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ARGENTINA: Peron determined to
resume her presidential duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ANNEX: Panama Still Committed to Canal Talks
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 10, 1975
LEBANON
The security situation in Beirut continued to deteriorate last evening. Casualties
are reported high, and damage is said to be extensive. Fighting also continued
yesterday in the Tripoli-Zagharta area and was reported to have spread to Christian
and Muslim villages about 20 miles north of Tripoli.
Prime Minister Karami last night publicly admitted that Lebanon's security
forces cannot control the situation. He continued, however, to rule out the use of
the Lebanese army. The government believes that leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt and
Phalanges Party head Pierre Jumayyil can no longer control their followers. Groups
of both Christians and Muslims were said to be taking to the streets in undisciplined
gangs heedless of the instructions of their titular leaders.
The initial response to Kuwait's call for a foreign ministers' conference has
been generally favorable. Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia have supported it, and the
Sudanese ambassador to Lebanon is expected to recommend that his government
approve. The Syrians have declined comment.
The reaction of the PLO and its chief, Yasir Arafat, is not known, but
"Palestinian sources" in Beirut reportedly oppose a conference "because they
consider the problem to be purely Lebanese. Lebanese leftists are also reported to
have expressed opposition, declaring that the fighting is an internal matter.
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October 10, 1975
King Hassan, in remarks to the diplomatic corps in Rabat on October 8,
reiterated a promise he made in August to await the forthcoming advisory opinion
by the International Court of Justice before resorting to force in Spanish Sahara.
Hassan said he would inform his countrymen of the course of action Morocco
will take once the court's opinion-which may be released soon-is known. Hassan
added that he expected support from other Arab states in return for what Morocco
provided during the October war and in subsequent peace negotiations. He also
appealed to African states, reminding them that territorial integrity and national
liberation were important concepts in their past.
The King's remarks have eased somewhat the atmosphere of tension, but he has
not abandoned his year-end deadline or his threat to use force if necessary. If the
court's opinion is ambiguous or unfavorable to Morocco, Hassan probably will
initiate some form of military action in Spanish Sahara. On the other hand, one
source claims that the King will act no matter what the decision.
In a parallel speech to the UN General Assembly, Moroccan Foreign Minister
Laraki also appealed for international support. He argued that the assembly, in
recommending proposals for the decolonization of Spanish Sahara, must respect the
"fundamental law" of the territorial integrity of Morocco and Mauritania. He also
criticized Spain repeatedly and reaffirmed Morocco's claim to the Spanish enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla in northern Morocco. He called on Spain to negotiate their
return, drawing a parallel between his country's claim to the enclaves and Spain's to
Gibraltar.
By reviving its claims to the northern enclaves and linking them to Madrid's
claim to Gibraltar, Morocco may be hinting that it will support Spain on Gibraltar in
return for an overall settlement on the Sahara and the northern enclaves.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 10, 1975
The Portuguese cabinet issued a tough statement last night warning that the
government would take action against any groups using violence and calling for a
joint meeting between the government and the Revolutionary Council to map out
measures that would guarantee stability. The statement endorsed the recent actions
of the Popular Democrats and the Socialists in support of the government and
indirectly condemned the Communists for supporting the continuing wave of
military, political, and industrial agitation.
Mutinies by extreme leftist soldiers have polarized Portugal's factions, and as
room for compromise becomes progressively narrowed, violence is becoming more
likely.
Socialist Party leader Mario Soares, addressing a Socialist-sponsored
pro-government rally in Coimbra on Wednesday, warned that unless a minimum of
order and stability is created within a month, Portugal will face great economic
hardships. He said the economic problems cannot be solved by disorder or
demonstrations like those recently instigated by the far left and applauded by the
Communists. Soares was responding to a recent Communist Party statement that the
seizures of military units by the far left were legitimate acts and "a lively expression
of the struggle of the working people."
Soares said that after 18 months of revolution, the people are tired of disorder.
He said the Azevedo government had been formed to create an atmosphere of calm
in which the country's problems could be solved.
After the rally, the Socialist demonstrators marched to the headquarters of the
Central Military Region to reiterate their support of the government.
The Communists have denounced as a "counterrevolutionary provocation" a
pro-government demonstration by the Popular Democrats on Wednesday evening in
Porto, which was climaxed by a free-for-all with rock-throwing leftists. About 5,000
Popular Democratic Party supporters clashed with defenders of an artillery post
seized by dissident soldiers on Tuesday. The Communists appealed to President
Costa Gomes to take "energetic action" against the Popular Democrats, whom it
accused of trying to storm the post by force.
Extreme left elements occupying the artillery post reached a standoff with
loyalist forces yesterday as the Northern Region commander, General Veloso, again
backed away from the use of force to quell the mutiny. Veloso's earlier efforts to
enforce discipline have made him the principal target for leftist attacks.
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Veloso is believed to have enough loyal troops to reassert control in Porto if he
is ordered to do so, but such orders have apparently not been issued. The hope
apparently is that Veloso can restore order without resorting to excessive force and
thus risking bloodshed and possibly widening the area of conflict.
Some pro-government military elements, however, appear to be taking steps to
prepare for a showdown. ~
The Soviets have indicated to a European subsidiary of a US grain trading firm
that they are seeking short-term grain storage space in Antwerp and other European
ports.
This effort suggests that grain shipments from the ports to the interior are
running into some delays. The Soviets have reported car shortages at grain ports,
probably because the crush of the movement of the grain crop to market is still in
progress. The USSR has enough railroad cars and barges to move grain imports, but
scheduling for additional shipments has been difficult.
We believe that these difficulties are transient-similar shortages occurred in
1973-and that the USSR will be able to organize both the overseas and the internal
transport required to move the large volume of imported grain needed to maintain
the economy.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 10, 1975
President Peron apparently is determined to resume her duties next week,
despite strong pressure on her to extend her leave or even resign. The government
has announced she will return to the capital on October 16 and attend an important
Peronist rally the next day.
The US embassy reports that both Acting President Luder and Interior Minister
Robledo flew to the presidential retreat on Tuesday to confer with Peron. Luder
almost certainly urged her to remain out of the picture. Robledo, said to differ with
Luder on the issue all along, may well have urged her to come back.
When the two men reached Buenos Aires late Tuesday, they refused to reveal
the results of their talks. Robledo said only that the President would be at the rally
and that all else was speculation.
Meanwhile, opinion in political, press, and military circles continues to harden
against Peron. According to a press account, the commander of the air force also
visited the President to tell her that the military wanted her to prolong her vacation.
The officers regard the controversy over her role and her demonstrated
inability to lead as detrimental to the pursuit of their principal goal, the suppression
of terrorism. In recent days, the administration has created two new bodies designed
to streamline the anti-guerrilla effort and give the military a stronger hand in the
fight.
The generals and Luder will almost certainly step up their efforts to prevail on
Peron to stay away. Another embassy source reports that if other arguments fail,
Luder is prepared to threaten the President with a full-scale investigation into
long-standing charges that she blatantly misused public funds.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 10, 1975
WEST GERMANY - POLAND: West German Foreign Minister Genscher
arrived in Poland yesterday and signed an agreement providing West German
economic aid in return for the repatriation of 125,000 ethnic Germans over the next
four years. The agreement was worked out by Chancellor Schmidt and Polish party
boss Gierek during the European security conference summit in July. It specifies
that Bonn will make a lump-sum payment of about $500 million to a Polish pension
fund and extend a low-interest loan of about $400 million. Genscher also met with
G ierek and other high-ranking officials to discuss bilateral relations, particularly the
future development of economic cooperation.
NETHERLANDS: According to press reports, Defense Minister Vredling has
bowed to NATO and parliamentary opposition and announced that the navy's
Neptune reconnaissance aircraft will remain operational. The squadron's
deactivation had been proposed earlier as part of proposed cuts in the Netherland's
defense budget. Critics of the planned elimination of the squadron stressed the
adverse effect it would have on allied submarine surveillance and antisubmarine
warfare capabilities.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 10, 1975
ANNEX
Panama Still Committed to Canal Talks
This Annex was prepared in consultation with the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
US-Panamanian negotiations for a new canal treaty have again run into several
dangerous snags. In September, several incidents raised the possibility of serious
disorders and suspension of the talks. The government of Panamanian strongman
Torrijos will probably try to keep demonstrations within bounds as long as the talks
seem to the Panamanians to offer the prospect of success.
For now, the Torrijos government sees talks rather than violence as being in its
best interests. It has thus far displayed a convincing ability to control Panamanian
reaction to the talks.
Torrijos appears confident he can continue the negotiations and maintain his
position through 1976. If at some point he became convinced that the talks would
not produce an agreement acceptable to the Panamanians, he probably would permit
some violence in an effort to force more acceptable terms on the US.
A Change in Mood
Ambassador Bunker returned to Panama on September 7, following a
four-month pause in the treaty talks. Although the renewal of negotiations had
generated considerable optimism, the mood quickly changed as a result of a series of
developments, including:
--The release by leftist students of purloined Foreign Ministry documents
setting out several of the initial conceptual accords reached by US and
Panamanian negotiators.
--intense criticism in Panama's controlled media of statements by US
officials-including Secretary Kissinger-construed as indicating a hardened US
position.
--An angry private reaction from Torrijos to US statements and a discouraged
reaction from the Panamanian negotiating team after it heard the new US
proposals.
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PANAMA
-??- E fisting canal zone
boundary
- Proposed canal zone
military base proposed
for retention
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 10, 1975
--The publication by the Panamanian government of confidential positions of
the two sides and its public and emphatic rejection of several US negotiating
proposa Is.
--The stoning of the US embassy and the Panamanian Foreign Ministry by
students protesting the course of the negotiations and the Torrijos
government's position in the talks.
According to the Panamanians' public statement, the major sticking points in
the negotiations are:
--Duration: Panama proposes that no treaty extend beyond the end of the
century, while the US seeks a longer term role in defense of the canal.
--Defense Sites: Panama proposes that the US retain no more than 3 instead of
14.
--Lands and Water: Panama proposes that the US retain for canal operations
only a strip of land equivalent to 10 percent of the present Canal Zone.
Disagreement extends to other issues, such as compensation and canal
expansion. While these issues are stumbling blocks, the differences have not been so
clearly-and publicly-spelled out.
With the imperiled negotiations as backdrop, the government is preparing for
the celebration on October 11 of the anniversary of the revolution in 1968 that
brought Torrijos to power. The government is apparently aiming at a massive
turnout, and its handling of the event will reflect to some extent its policy line
toward the negotiations.
Panamanian Strategy
Right now, the Panamanians seem committed to the negotiations as the only
rational policy. Their dismay over the latest round stems partly from the unrealistic
optimism that preceded the arrival of Ambassador Bunker in September.
Torrijos is prone to visceral reactions, but on balance he probably believes that
he can still negotiate an acceptable treaty that will eventually end the US presence
and thus assure him an honored place in Panamanian history.
At the same time, the Panamanians have complicated the negotiations for
themselves with their public declarations; they have locked themselves into positions
that sharply reduced their bargaining range. The Panamanians are least likely to
budge from their repeated statements that the US presence must expire no later than
the end of the century.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 10, 1975
There is probably more give on other issues. Panama's media, for example, have
stressed that extreme opposition to US bases is unrealistic. The government has
drawn a public contrast between its territorial proposal and that of the US and can
later point up the extent of US concessions in a compromise-especially if Panama
gains its point that the US give up holdings near the terminals of Panama City and
Colon,
Still, Panama will yield ground very grudgingly on any issue. The Panamanians
believe the US is under considerable international pressure to accept their positions
and that time is on their side. Panamanian media consistently stress that the treaty
battle may be lengthy and that the people should not respond to provocations to
violence, as these are designed to blunt Panamanian aspirations by derailing the
talks.
Recently, the media have specifically noted that the treaty talks may drag on
through 1976 because the administration of President Ford does not want the treaty
to be a campaign issue. The public is clearly being prepared for the possibility of at
least another year of talks.
Torrijos has always been reluctant to offer specific counterproposals to US
positions; he apparently worries that the US negotiators might accept and he would
find himself settling for less than he should have. The Panamanian strongman also
fears accepting a treaty draft that would not win an overwhelming vote in the
referendum he has promised. These factors and Torrijos' apparent expectations that
the talks may continue through 1976 argue against early Panamanian compromises.
I n prolonged negotiations, Torrijos will continually feel the need to
demonstrate that he is pursuing Third World goals in order to refurbish his
"revolutionary" credentials at home. He is planning to visit Cuba around the end of
the year, and he may establish diplomatic relations with both the USSR and China.
He must also show that he is keeping up the pressure on the US. With this in mind,
he plans to invite all Latin American chiefs of state to Panama next year for a
pan-American anniversary celebration that will highlight Canal Zone "colonialism."
Panama's assumption of a seat on the UN Security Council in January 1976
will give it new leverage. These and other well-publicized international moves should
help keep most domestic critics at bay.
Pressures on Torrijos
Torrijos and other government spokesmen often cite pressures on the
government and the possibility of a popular explosion, and to some extent these
exist.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 10, 1975
The business community is largely suspicous of and uncomfortable with
Torrijos. Since he took power, however, businessmen have lost their political clout
and cannot do much more than grouse. Recognizing this, most businessmen have for
the time being accommodated themselves to Torrijos and do not represent a political
threat.
The economy is a source of some concern because growth is down from
previous years, but we do not see this now affecting the treaty issue in any
meaningful degree. The Torrijos government's need for financing is not so severe as
to force compromise in its negotiating. position. The Panamanian administration is
also reasonably adept at manipulating public opinion by controlling the media to a
large extent.
For all practical purposes, the real danger of an explosion is from the students,
an unpredictable group. Students are a significant political force in Panama. They
sparked the riots in 1964 that left many dead and wounded and caused a break in
US-Panamanian relations. Those riots remain an emotional pegpoint for Panamanian
nationalism.
The government controls the largest student organization and has manipulated
it to good advantage. The more violence-prone ultraradicals oppose the government
and its stand in the treaty talks (indeed, they deride Torrijos' "revolution") and have
played the major role in organizing recent demonstrations, including the stoning of
the US embassy in September. The National Guard, however, has demonstrated that
it can contain student demonstrations when it wants to. It closely monitors student
planning.
The Torrijos administration is conducting a widespread propaganda campaign
to isolate the ultraradical students and cast them as the unknowing tools of the
oligarchs and US provocateurs-a line that will stand Torrijos in good stead if he has
to use force to keep them in line.
There are obvious dangers in dealing with the students, who are keenly aware
of the government's sensitivity to their protests and its demonstrated responsiveness.
National Guard personnel, under orders to avoid a confrontation, have found that
students do not always obey the instructions of guard officers, and occasional
defiance of the guard could easily whet radical appetites. Thus, unplanned violence
or an escalation resulting from government miscalculation cannot be ruled out. If
students got out of control and a confrontation with the guard ensued, Torrijos
could suddenly find himself in the unaccustomed position of being a major target of
student dissidence.
For the present, however, student dissent remains largely at a level that serves
Torrijos' purposes in pressuring the US to agree to Panamanian treaty terms. He
almost certainly recognizes that uncontrolled violence would not be in his interests
at this time. We believe he has the capability to keep the students in line and-at
least for the present-the motivation to do so.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 10, 1975
Anniversary
With this in mind, we believe the government will aim at providing a massive
show of support for the administration tomorrow, unifying the public behind its
goals and strategy. I n contrast to the three previous years, when the celebration was
quite muted, the government is apparently seeking a large-scale turnout-perhaps as
many as 100,000 people. The rhetoric will probably be severe-Panama will also be
marking the 50th anniversary of the renters' strike in 1925, when US troops put
down demonstrations in Panama City at the request of the Panamanian government.
In whipping up enthusiasm, Torrijos runs the danger that radicals may seek to
take advantage of the situation to stir up violence. If hotheads attempt to enter the
zone and violence results, this may trigger a crowd reaction. The government is
concentrating on a positive show of unanimity, however, and National Guard troops
will be on the scene in large numbers.
As Negotiations Continue
As long as Torrijos feels he has a chance of securing an acceptable treaty, he is
likely to continue his present strategy. Torrijos is often quoted as having said he will
lead his people into the Canal Zone "when the right time comes," but we do not
believe he sees or seeks that "right time" in the near term as long as negotiations
continue.
Although Torrijos is frequently upset by events related to the
negotiations-such as the Snyder amendment in the US Congress that attempted to
cut off funding for the negotiations-he maintains his belief that the US executive
branch is bargaining in good faith. Probably confident that he can maintain his
position-the National Guard is the only force capable of removing him, and it
appears to back him solidly at present-he will continue to focus on the bargaining
table to gain his objectives.
If negotiations break down, however, or if the US executive is denied the funds
or the authority to continue the talks, Torrijos will undoubtedly be frustrated and
angered and may come to feel he has been duped. In that case, he would first step
up international pressure as best he could and gradually loosen restraints on student
demonstrators. Serious violence, resulting from a possible foray into the Canal Zone
itself, would be increasingly likely.
As a last but practical resort, Torrijos would be willing to have riots and
student martyrs in an effort to brin the US back to neaotiatina table under
ti
renewed international pressures
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