NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010027-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 6, 2006
Sequence Number:
27
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 7, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010027-9.pdf | 313.58 KB |
Body:
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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
Copy N2 669
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 7, 1975
PORTUGAL: Communists withdraw
backing for Azevedo government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SYRIA: Asad links Golan
negotiations with Palestinian issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
MOROCCO-SPAIN: Moroccans reportedly
move forces to Algerian border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
YUGOSLAVIA-CHINA-USSR: Soviet ambassador
leads walkout at reception in Peking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR-CYPRUS: First economic and
technological accord signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 7, 1975
The political situation deteriorated yesterday when the Communist Party
ended the backing it had ostensibly been giving Prime Minister Azevedo and threw
its support behind a rebellious left-wing military unit in Lisbon.
Believing that the political tide in Lisbon is turning against Azevedo and his
Socialist-dominated government, the Communists apparently are seeking to shore up
their relations with left-wing extremists who are leading the challenge to Azevedo.
The Communists and extreme leftists have worked together occasionally, but the
leftist fringe groups have more often been sharply critical of the Communist Party.
The Communists took a neutral stand when the military occupied radio and
television stations last week. They were reportedly trying to avoid breaking with the
newly formed Azevedo government. The Communists' action yesterday could
foreshadow a decision to withdraw from the government.
In Lisbon, 10,000 demonstrators, including about 1,000 soldiers and sailors
from several leftist units in the capital region, responded last night to the
Communist-backed appeal to show support for the Lisbon Light Artillery
Regiment's defiance of the government's attempts to bring it to heel. The rebellious
artillerymen have mounted antitank and machine guns outside their barracks,
claiming that government leaders are trying to "annihilate" the regiment.
Thousands also demonstrated in Porto last night to protest the government's
decision Saturday to disband a military transportation unit there. The
demonstration in Porto-where there have been almost continuous disturbances
since Saturday-was preceded by a rally in support of the government by about
5,000 people, led by the centrist Popular Democratic Party. The Popular Democrats,
along with the Socialists, have called for another rally in Porto today.
Prime Minister Azevedo shows no sign of buckling in face of the pressure from
the left, and he appears to have won the support of President Costa Gomes. Costa
Gomes sent a message to the armed forces Sunday night, following his return from
Moscow, appealing to the soldiers not to follow political leaders but to obey their
commanding officers. A government official was quoted in the press as saying that
there may not be enough loyal troops in the Lisbon area to hold out if the left-wing
civilian and military groups make a serious bid for power.
In a press interview over the weekend, Azevedo seemed to confirm the Socialist
Party's claim that the leftists had planned a take-over last Wednesday. A source in
the Prime Minister's office told the US embassy in Lisbon that the Socialists had
mobilized at the request of anti-Communist military officers in the government.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 7, 1975
Azevedo also spoke about the new military force which he said he had formed
last week to end dependence on the forces under General Carvalho. Carvalho has
switched sides often in recent days, but most often he appears inclined to the far
left. Press reports indicate that Azevedo is having trouble getting the new force
organized because several dissident units are refusing to serve in it.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 7, 1975
President Asad, in another sharp attack on the Sinai agreement, asserted
yesterday that Syria would not engage in any further negotiations for a Golan
Heights accord unless concurrent negotiations on the Palestinian question are held
with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
This appears to represent a serious change in Syria's negotiating position and all
but rules out any chance of the US getting talks going soon between Syria and Israel.
Syrian propaganda attacks on the Sinai accord over the past week have been
leading toward this shift. Some middle-level Syrian officials recently indicated in
private that Syria was no longer in any hurry to recover a few more kilometers on
the Heights and needs something for the Palestinians as well before an agreement
with Israel can be politically acceptable.
This is the first time, however, that Asad has insisted in public on a direct
linkage between Syrian-Israeli negotiations and the Palestinian problem. Indeed, it
marks a sharp change from early last month when the Syrians were telling US
officials in Damascus to disregard Syrian criticism of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement
because these attacks were largely for domestic consumption.
It is not clear what triggered Asad's about-face. He may have concluded from
Foreign Minister Khaddam's talks with Secretary Kissinger last week in New York
that there is no hope of rapid progress in negotiations. Asad may, therefore, believe
he cannot afford to settle for what the Israelis were willing to offer without
suffering acute public embarrassment and strong attacks from the Iraqis and his
domestic opponents.
It is not certain what position Damascus will now take toward the renewal of
the mandate of the UN forces on the Golan Heights, which expires on November 30.
Asad may still find some way of rationalizing an extension of the mandate in order
to allow the US more time to deal with the Palestinian issue. In the meantime, Syria
is likely to redouble its efforts to obtain the support of other Arabs for its
negotiating position.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 7, 1975
Morocco reportedly has moved some military forces from the Tarfaya area near
the border with Spanish Sahara. According to a senior Spanish officer, the troops
began moving out over the weekend and appeared to be redeploying to the Algerian
border.
The officer said Madrid was surprised by the move and so far has been unable
to come up with a satisfactory explanation. Spain reportedly does not believe it is a
maneuver to cover an imminent attack by the Moroccans into Spanish Sahara. The
officer noted that the Moroccan army has in the past moved troops from the
Spanish Saharan to the Algerian border.
There is no information at this time to confirm any move from the Tarfaya
garrisons. If indeed troops are being moved, it is possible that they are relocating to
the central Spanish Saharan border area to bolster forces there. Morocco has military
units much closer to the Algerian border area that it would more likely deploy there.
A move by Morocco against Spanish Sahara in either the central or the eastern
border area would involve less risk for Rabat than one in the coastal area, where
most of the Spanish forces are concentrated. Morocco initially might be able to gain
some success in the less defended areas.
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Yugoslav Premier Bijedic's precedent-setting visit to China began on a sour note
yesterday when Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov led a walkout at the official reception.
All ambassadors from the USSR's East European allies except the Romanian
joined Tolstikov in departing when First Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping said, "The
most dangerous source of war is the superpower that is most zealous in preaching
peace." The last Soviet protest of this kind in Peking took place in 1972. The
walkout yesterday is significant because Teng's anti-Soviet statement did not go
beyond the language he had used at the recent reception for North Vietnamese party
chief Le Duan; Tolstikov did not leave on that occasion.
The Soviet action probably was intended as a demonstration of unhappiness
with the Yugoslavs and the Romanians, who also have been flaunting their ties with
Peking. Earlier reports from Belgrade had suggested that the Soviets are less than
happy with the Bijedic trip, which comes in the midst of Soviet-orchestrated
polemics against Maoism.
Yugoslav commentaries on the Bijedic visit generally have tried to maintain a
discreet distance from the Sino-Soviet conflict. Economic relations and an exchange
of views on foreign affairs were described as the prime topics on Bijedic's agenda.
One knowledgeable Yugoslav commentator stated last Friday that Belgrade is ready
to reopen bilateral party relations, but he admitted this development may be some
distance off. Chinese diplomats in Belgrade have confided that there is no possibility
for an early resumption of party ties.
Yugoslav leaders have long suspected that Peking wants to embroil Belgrade in
its conflict with Moscow. The Chinese charge in Belgrade last week told the US
embassy that an agreement had been reached to exchange top-level military
delegations and that the Bijedic party intends to discuss "strategy" during the visit.
If Belgrade decides that these reports were in any way behind the Soviet protest,
Tito could order a slowdown in contacts with Peking.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 7, 1975
Nicosia announced last week that it has signed its first economic and technical
cooperation agreement with Moscow. As with other recent Soviet agreements to
extend aid to developing countries, no dollar value was placed on the assistance.
The agreement points up President Makarios' desire to obtain aid wherever he
can. It probably also represents a Soviet attempt to indicate continued support for a
unified Cyprus but without being too closely identified with the archbishop.
Moscow will extend long-term credits to cover the foreign exchange costs of
construction after Soviet technicians have surveyed projects for possible assistance.
Items mentioned include dams and a new airport at Nicosia.
SINGAPORE-ISRAEL: Singapore is negotiating purchase of the Gabriel II
naval cruise-missile system. Israel Aircraft Industries has quoted a price of $8 million
and has said the first system could be delivered within 30 months. Singapore will
probably use the system to upgrade its six Seawolf-class large guided-missile boats.
Four of these boats are armed with the Gabriel I, which has a range of 11.5 nautical
miles. If an agreement is reached, Singapore will become the second country to
order the improved 22-nm. version of the Gabriel. Taiwan ordered 25 missiles in
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