NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010021-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 3, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Moven-m-
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 3, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Coup rumors
aggravate tension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LEBANON: Security situation
improved yesterday . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
EC-PORTUGAL: Financial
aid to Lisbon approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR-PORTUGAL: Costa Gomes visit
getting favorable Soviet coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
UK: Army reorganization
presented to NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
RHODESIA: Nationalists split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
USSR-CHINA: Soviet treatment of Peking's
anniversary follows normal pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 3, 1975
Tension remains high in Portugal, where political and military factions in
Lisbon are becoming increasingly polarized.
The mobilization by Socialists Wednesday night to head off an alleged coup
attempt from the far left has become the subject for bitter recriminations. Both the
Socialists and the Popular Democrats asked their supporters Wednesday to be
prepared to resist expected moves by the left wing. Socialist leaders say they have
evidence that extreme left-wing political groups, in league with several military units
in and around Lisbon, were planning a coup for yesterday morning.
The Communist Party is accusing the Socialists of aggravating tension in the
country and of preparing for a counterrevolutionary action of their own. A
pro-Communist newspaper warned on Wednesday of a "colonel's plan" designed to
reverse the course of the revolution and to restore a right-wing government in
Portugal. Several of the goals said to be in the plan have already been enacted by the
Azevedo government.
The far left, however, has denied that it planned a coup, saying coups were for
right-wing organizations like the Socialist Party. Many of the extremist groups have
armed militias aided by like-minded soldiers.
The split between the anti-Communist parties and the far left wing is mirrored
in the military, where the Lisbon radicals are becoming more and more isolated from
troops in the rest of the country. General Carvalho's left-wing internal security
command-many of whose troops refused to obey orders during the occupation of
the radio and television stations earlier this week-is accusing the Socialists of
playing "war games." The command says it saw no need for special security
measures on Wednesday night.
The Socialists, however, say their actions Wednesday night were backed by the
commanders of all the military regions but Lisbon. A spokesman for the northern
region verified that the military had information that a coup was planned by leftist
groups with some military support and that the Socialist alert had spoiled it.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 3, 1975
The situation in Beirut improved yesterday after a night of clashes and sniper
fire between Christian and Muslim militiamen in the southern suburbs. Lebanese
security forces took over positions of the Christian Phalanges Party in those areas
and were attempting to work out a similar agreement with Muslim and leftist
elements.
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The future of the national reconciliation committee continues to be in doubt.
Saeb Salam, a middle-of-the-road Muslim leader, has joined Raymond Edde, a
Christian centrist, in announcing that he is reconsidering his membership in the
group. Both men have, however, been attending committee meetings. Their move is
apparently part of an effort to force the resignation of President Franjiyah-a step
both have called for publicly. Salam indicated the move was not aimed at either
Prime Minister Karami or Interior Minister Shamun.
Edde and Salam are members, along with Karami, of a centrist alliance of
Lebanese parliamentary deputies. Edde, as a Christian Maronite, considers himself a
candidate to succeed Franjiyah should the latter resign before his term expires next
August. Because of Franjiyah's close identification with the hard-line Phalangist
position, Lebanese centrists, both Christians and Muslims, may see his resignation as
a necessary step in the achievement of a compromise whereby the Christians would
cede some political and economic power to the Muslims.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 3, 1975
Without fanfare, Prime Minister Karami has given the army a larger role in
preventing further flare-ups. He is moving cautiously, however, to avoid the political
controversy that abrupt military intervention would excite. Lebanese Muslims
believe that the army, whose senior officers are mostly Christian, would inevitably
side with the Phalangists if it became directly involved in any further ighting. The
army's new mission is restricted to protection of main lines of communication and
relief of civilian security forces stationed in outlying areas to free them for service in
n in the cease-fire in Beirut and Tripoli
EC officials have agreed to give Portugal financial aid, and the foreign ministers
of the Nine plan to approve a specific program on Monday.
The ministers have invited Portuguese Foreign Minister Antunes to
Luxembourg on Tuesday to discuss an initial aid package, expected to total about
$200 million in loans over a two-year period, from the European Investment Bank.
The loans will be tied to specific project proposals; the necessary preparatory work
will delay the transfer of funds for at least four to six months.
Lisbon had also asked for direct assistance to cover its balance-of-payments
problem. The EC will probably insist that such funds should come from the
International Monetary Fund or from commercial banks. It is unlikely that these
institutions would agree to loan commitments, however, until Lisbon puts its
economic house in order.
EC officials hope their decision, which demonstrates strong Community
support for the new government, will encourage additional private investment in
Portugal.
EC recognition of Lisbon's moves toward "pluralist democracy" should also
open the door to West German and Dutch bilateral assistance programs. These
national programs will probably be coordinated through the EC which also plans to
continue low-key contact with the US on aid to Portugal.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
USSR-PORTUGAL
The Soviets are playing up the visit to Moscow of Portuguese President Costa
Gomes in an effort to emphasize Moscow's desire for friendly relations with Lisbon,
despite the recent setbacks the Portuguese Communists have suffered.
Costa Gomes was greeted by President Podgorny, Foreign Minister Gromyko,
and Defense Minister Grechko. Reference to the visit in the Soviet press as being at
the "summit level" suggests Costa Gomes will see General Secretary Brezhnev. In a
speech at a dinner for Costa Gomes or Wednesday, Podgorny reiterated Soviet
sympathy for the Portuguese revolution and spoke out against outside interference
in Portuguese affairs.
Preceding the visit, the Soviet media emphasized economic relations between
the two countries. This may be an indication Moscow will make some additional
effort to help Portugal economically, although the Soviets have been notably
reluctant to propose substantial aid to Lisbon. In his speech, Podgorny spoke only in
vague terms of the Soviet intention to broaden bilateral cooperation.
The Soviets will probably press Costa Games to sign, as he did in Poland, a
joint declaration that incorporates the basic principles of the document signed at
Helsinki, pledges both sides to periodic political consultations, and commits them
"to deepen and strengthen detente in Europe." Costa Gomes also signed a
communique in Warsaw supporting the Soviet approach to such issues as the Vienna
force reduction negotiations and a world disarmament conference. The Warsaw
communique referred to the importance of the US-USSR strategic arms limitations
talks and expressed hope for an early follow-on agreement.
Soviet optimism about the visit has probably been enhanced by the absence of
Portuguese Foreign Minister Melo Antunes, who led the recent drive to reduce
Communist influence in Portugal. He was scheduled to accompany Costa Gomes but
Oct fiber 3, 1975
canceled out because of the turmoil in Portugal.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 3, 1975
London has presented to NATO's Defense Planning Committee the details of
the British army reorganization, which was directed by the defense review earlier
this year.
The reorganization will reduce active army strength by 15,000, but will not cut
manpower in the 55,000-man British Army of the Rhine. The cuts will come in
non-European overseas commitments, and in headquarters, support forces, and
reinforcement units in the UK.
The major feature of the reorganization for British forces in Germany is the
complete remodeling of the division structure. The UK claims that this, combined
with other measures aimed at streamlining support units, will increase flexibility
while reducing headquarters and support overhead.
The Planning Committee raised questions about the compatabilit f of the new
division organization with those of the other allies and the possibility )f the loss of
support capability. UK representatives assured the Committee that adequate liaison
would be provided to ensure proper coordination with the allies and that the
streamlining of support would entail no reduction of war reserve stocks or
capabilities.
A sharp debate in NATO could develop over the UK's plans, but pressures for
economy moves in Britain will allow only minor alterations to the plans
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 3, 1975
The congress of the umbrella African National Council that convened in
Salisbury last weekend widened the breach among Rhodesia's rival black nationalist
leaders. Unless they are forced together again by the four African presidents who
pressed them to merge into the council last year, the schism spells the end of a
unified nationalist approach to dealing with the government of Prime Minister Ian
Smith.
The congress elected Joshua Nkomo, the moderate leader of one of the two
main nationalist factions, as head of the council in place of Bishop Muzorewa, the
compromise president since the body was formed last December. Other council
leaders immediately condemned the congress as illegal and scheduled a rival congress
for October 19.
Nkomo's orderly election by several thousand delegates lends some support to
his claim to control of a majority of the council's branches inside Rhodesia. Nkomo
is bitterly opposed, however, both by Muzorewa's supporters-who have called the
rival congress-and by Ndabaningi Sithole, the militant exile leader of an important
rival faction. Sithole's group, which was largely responsible for the insurgency that
began in Rhodesia in late 1972, came into the council only grudgingly and has long
wanted to abandon further efforts toward settlement talks with Smith and return to
all-out guerrilla warfare.
Nkomo's election by the congress poses new problems for the four
presidents-Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania, Machel of Mozambique, and
Khama of Botswana. Unifying the Rhodesian nationalists for talks with Smith has
been fundamental to their cooperative effort to bring about, in collaboration with
South African Prime Minister Vorster, a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian
problem.
There have been indications that Kaunda, who does not want new fighting in
Rhodesia because it would intensify his country's economic problems, and perhaps
Khama, might accept Nkomo. It is doubtful, however, that Nyerere and Machel,
who have had closer ties with Sithole's faction, would go along.
At this point, the four presidents probably have no firm ideas about how to
proceed. They may await the results of the rival congress before committing
themselves to new-and probably differing-courses of action.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 3, 1975
Moscow's treatment of Chinese National Day has followed the pattern of
recent years.
The Soviet government, but not the party, sent standard felicitations to the
Chinese, and the same Soviet officials who attended last year turned up at the
Chinese reception in Moscow. Pravda and Izvestia carried commentaries strongly
criticizing the Chinese and Mao, but also expressed the usual sentiments that one
day relations between the two countries will get better.
The National Day coverage fails to convey any new sense of direction in
Moscow's polemical campaign against China that began in a long article in the
mid-August issue of the party's theoretical journal Kommunist. The article is
essentially a rehash of this year's Soviet criticism of Maoist domestic and foreign
policies.
Subsequent Soviet commentary on the "Water Margin" issue has betrayed
Moscow's interest in what it regards as evidence of politicking and, perhaps, even
pro-Soviet sentiment in China. The head of the China office in the Institute of
Oriental Studies recently went so far as to publicly, and explicitly, assert that there
seems to be pro-Soviet forces in China who are arguing for a chance in Chinese
foreign policy
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