NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 31, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 31, 1975
LEBANON: Situation report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SPAIN: Juan Carlos
accepts temporary power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
SPANISH SAHARA: Talks suspended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ISRAEL-EGYPT: Cargo for Israel
to transit Suez Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CANADA: Ottawa considering reduction
in Middle East peace-keeping force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
PORTUGAL: Troops seize
Lisbon's main arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CHINA: Party officials shuffled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
OMAN-IRAN: Progress
against Dhofar rebels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ANGOLA: Rival nationalist groups
may unilaterally declare independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
ARGENTINA: Peron appoints
controversial minister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CHILE: Pinochet disavows
Chile's anti-Zionist vote in UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 31, 1975
Fighting diminished in all sections of Beirut yesterday following an early
morning announcement of yet another cease-fire. Prime Minister Karami has
threatened to resign if this agreement is not respected.
Karami won approval of the accord at a meeting Wednesday of Lebanese leftist
and Muslim politicians and representatives of the PLO, the Lebanese internal
security force, and the Lebanese army. Leaders of the large Christian political parties
did not attend, but had offered assurances that they would respect a new cease-fire.
Prior to the cease-fire, the Christian militias were gradually being driven from
their forward positions in central Beirut and the city's western hotel district. These
setbacks resulted from the continued strengthening of leftist forces with increased
numbers of commandos from the large fedayeen organizations.
Christian elements reportedly withdrew and allowed internal security force
units to replace them in one major hotel, and were negotiating a similar withdrawal
from two others. Leftist forces reportedly also withdrew some distance, but were
left in a stronger position than before the clashes spread into the hotel district last
weekend.
The Phalangists may now be willing to engage in more serious political
negotiations. At a minimum, a round of private talks would allow time for the
Phalangist militia to regroup and obtain additional arms and ammunition.
The terms of the latest cease-fire are much like those of previous accords,
although they include a threat that the government radio will for the first time
publicize the identity of persons or groups responsible for cease-fire violations.
Although this tactic ordinarily would not intimidate the offending parties, they may
in this case be sensitive to the fact that Karami has identified himself with this novel
scheme.
Karami almost certainly does not want to resign. He presumably put his job on
the line to demonstrate that he has run out of ideas for solving the present crisis, but
in the expectation that he would be urged to stay on. In fact, Syrian Foreign
Minister Khaddam, Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt, and PLO chairman Yasir Arafat
immediately appealed to Karami to remain in office.
Arafat reportedly played a central role in negotiating the new cease-fire
io ations of the agreement by the Lebanese radicals and tedayeen
re~ectionists-if it is respected by others-could be interpreted by Arafat as a slap at
him, and could ultimately lead to more forceful efforts by the major Palestinian
groups to control the rejection ists.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 31, 1975
Spain's pressing need for an active head of state, plus the near certainty that
Franco will not recover, apparently convinced Prince Juan Carlos yesterday to
accept once again designation as temporary chief of state.
Prime Minister Arias and other high officials have reportedly been urging the
Prince to follow this course for several days. The need has grown more acute during
the past few days because of the divisive struggle within the government over policy
toward the Spanish Sahara.
Juan Carlos had been resisting the temporary arrangement because of his
experience in similar circumstances in the summer of 1974, when he was only a
figurehead. He is concerned that a repeat would damage his reputation as a leader
and the future of the monarchy in Spain. It seems likely that Juan Carlos has
accepted the temporary arrangement again only because of a tacit understanding
that his rule will be "temporary" in name only.
Following a meeting yesterday with Juan Carlos, Arias sent a telegram to the
president of the parliament, informing him that Article 11 of the constitution had
been invoked. The article provides for temporary assumption of power by a
designated successor during a chief of state's illness. This telegram fulfills the legal
requirements for Juan Carlos to take power for as long as Franco remains ill. Juan
Carlos is expected to preside over a cabinet meeting today.
Should Franco die or be declared incapacitated, the three-man Council of the
Regency would take over the routine functions of chief of state until Juan Carlos
has been formally sworn in as King Juan Ill.
Franco continues to surprise his doctors. His medical team-now expanded to
17 doctors-is agreed that he cannot recover, but the doctors are no longer willing to
predict how long he will hold on. Franco is lucid most of the time. He has had no
major surgery, and medical machines are not being used to keep him alive
Franco's lingering illness has encouraged speculation over the changes that will
be made when Juan Carlos takes over permanently. Over a dozen candidates have
been mentioned as possible replacements for Prime Minister Arias, but Juan Carlos
may conclude that in the interest of maintaining a smooth transition it would be
better to retain Arias for a period.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 31, 1975
The Spanish government has sent security reinforcements to the French border
in response to an announcement that French leftist groups will stage a march on
November 1. he march is 25X1 DIA
planned to end at the border, where there will be demonstrations, bonfires, and
possibly the launching of balloons with propaganda leaflets into Spain.
Talks on Spanish Sahara among Spanish, Moroccan, and Mauritanian officials
were suspended yesterday after two days without any sign of progress.
Although Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki, in his departure statement,
characterized the negotiations as "very advanced," he defensively claimed Algeria's
representations made by the Algerian delegation in Madrid were totally discounted.
He reaffirmed Morocco's opposition to including Algeria in the talks. The Algerians,
led by Interior Minister Abdelghani, one of President Boumediene's closest advisers,
have been holding parallel talks with Spanish officials and were still in Madrid when
the Moroccan delegation left for home.
Abdelghani presumably is reiterating Algeria's position that the principle of
self-determination for Spanish Sahara must not be ignored. Algerian Foreign
Minister Bouteflika is apparently making similar demarches to UN Secretary General
Waldheim in New York.
Algeria opposes turning the territory over to Morocco and Mauritania without
first giving the Saharan people a free choice. Saharans would almost certainly opt for
independence in any fair referendum.
A senior Algerian official recently told the US ambassador in Algiers that, once
the Saharans choose their own future, some arrangement should be worked out
between an independent Sahara and its neighbors. Although he did not elaborate, he
may have been referring to a proposal Algiers floated last year. The proposal
suggested a referendum be held under UN auspices, leading to an independent
Spanish Sahara guaranteed and supported economically by Spain and the three
neighboring African states. Although such a solution might be acceptable to Madrid
and possibly Nouakchott, Rabat would reject it out of hand.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 31, 1975
The first ship carrying cargo bound for Israel since 1956 is scheduled to transit
the Suez Canal today. Cairo's agreement to permit such cargoes to transit the canal
was one of its major concessions to Tel Aviv in the second Sinai disengagement
accord.
The Greek-flag freighter apparently will deliver a load of cement from Romania
to the Israeli port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba.
Transit of an Israel-bound cargo has been postponed several times, usually at
Egyptian request. The decision to go ahead now, while President Sadat is in the
midst of his trip to the US, suggests Cairo hopes that Arab news coverage of the
transit will be overshadowed by reports of the US visit. The Egyptians probably also
calculate that coverage of the transit by US media will help Sadat score points with
his US audience.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 31, 1975
Canada is considering reducing its UN peace-keeping contingent in the Middle
A Canadian proposal to the UN Secretariat calls for the withdrawal of 120 men
from the communications function and 150 men from the disengagement observer
force. As compensation for the proposed reductions, Ottawa has offered to increase
the air unit by 50 personnel and four helicopters. Ottawa is claiming that its
specialists are needed in Canada in connection with the Olympics to be held next
summer.
In informal discussions with the US embassy, Canadian Director for Defense
Relations Marshall has stressed that no cabinet decisions have been made and that
the US reaction will be considered before final steps are taken.
Ottawa's decision will be influenced by the availability of a replacement
contingent that is both technically capable and politically acceptable. Australia
would be a candidate, but the Canadians have not yet approached Canberra.
Another factor is Moscow's reaction; negotiations that eventually produced the
Polish-Canadian force were complex, and the Soviets could raise difficulties over the
Canadian proposal.
Marshall implied that a US approach to Ottawa could influence the cabinet to
forgo cuts for now. He also said no thought is being given to reducing Canadian
forces on Cyprus.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 31, 1975
The Portuguese government, which has had some success in recent days
combating military indiscipline, was presented with a new challenge yesterday when
Lisbon's main arsenal was seized by troops charged with its security.
The troops issued a statement saying they had too few men to guarantee the
security of the arsenal. Their action probably is related, however, to wider concerns
expressed by leftist military elements over demobilizations. Eighteen percent of the
army will be discharged today, and another 9 percent is scheduled for
demobilization on December 2. The left has protested that these reductions are
designed to transform the army into a reactionary corps.
Leftists in the military have been losing momentum recently, and efforts to
keep pro-government military regional authorities under pressure have been
somewhat less than successful. Two rallies this week sponsored by radical military
elements were poorly attended and unimpressive. In contrast, anti-Communists in
the military appear to be organizing themselves more effectively. Officers
sympathetic to the anti-Communist faction of Foreign Minister Antunes have
formed a "Single Military Front" to combat leftist attempts to bring down the
Azevedo government.
The left also is losing ground on the civilian front. Dissident employees of a
Communist-influenced Lisbon newspaper occupied the paper's editorial offices on
Wednesday and demanded the removal of the left-wing management. Earlier this
week, the anti-Communist employees won by a 4-to-1 margin a vote to dismiss the
pro-Communist management committee.
The Azevedo government is unlikely to move against the anti-Communist
workers because their action falls in line with its recent efforts to loosen the
Communist grip on the press. The government might even use the incident as an
excuse to revamp the management of other left-leaning newspapers. The left-wing
press has been largely responsible for stirring up political tensions in Lisbon and
spreading reports of alleged plots to return the country to right-wing rule.
Yesterday, for instance, left-wing newspapers gave wide play to a communique from
a new radical military group, the Air Force Revolutionary Vigilance Committee, that
accused air force leaders of planning a right-wing coup.
The statement cited the transferral of aircraft and weaponry, the intensification
of training for air force personnel, and the persecution of "progressive" soldiers as
proof of a plot. These charges are probably related to air force action in moving
planes and other equipment from the Lisbon area to guard against sabotage in the
event of a leftist move to take over the capital. While the chances for such a
take-over seem to have receded, the air force high command reportedly still expects
a leftist attempt to eliminate the relatively conservative air force.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 31, 1975
Peking apparently has decided to shift some provincial party chiefs. Thus far,
we have information on only one three-way shuffle, but the moves reportedly will
be more widespread.
Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching, long-time party boss of Kwangsi Province,
was identified on October 29 as the new chief of Kwangtung Province. The former
Kwangtung boss reportedly will move to the top job in Szechwan, and the Szechwan
leader will go to Kwangsi.
Wei's transfer, in particular, seems to be a step up. A member of the Chuang
ethnic minority group, Wei is the first minority leader to be put in charge of a
predominantly Chinese province. He was party boss of Kwangsi prior to the Cultural
Revolution and is the only provincial party boss to have survived that ordeal without
at least temporary removal from his province. He has shown himself to be a capable
administrator under extremely difficult circumstances; Kwangsi was one of the few
provinces that followed Peking's directives to the letter during last year's
anti-Confucius campaign.
Although Wei's transfer to more important Kwangtung may be a reward for his
past performance, it is probably also related to the presence in that province of
Politburo member Hsu Shih-yu, a military man who commands the Canton Military
Region. Peking probably wanted a Kwangtung leader of equal party status to that of
Hsu to act as an effective civilian counter to him. Wei also retains his earlier position
as first political commissar of Hsu's military region.
According to some Chinese officials, more transfers are in the offing in an
effort to prevent the provincial leaders from developing independent power bases.
This rationale seems to fall short in the case of Wei and the two others involved in
the current shift. Wei is merely moving to a contiguous province, and the Szechwan
party leader has been in place only three years; he was originally stationed in
southeast China, the area to which he is now returning.
A widespread shift of provincial party leaders, most of whom are civilians,
could be intended as a sop to the military. Several military men at the regional and
district level have been relocated to remove them from their power bases. These
transfers were probably not popular with some military men, but they may be
placated somewhat by seeing similar rotations among their civilian counterparts.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
The combined
Iranian-Omani offensive in
Dhofar has been successful
during its first two weeks, and
the Omanis are optimistic that
the rebels can be defeated in this
campaign.
Omani troops near the
border have seized several large
arms caches and have cut rebel
supply lines from South Yemen,
depriving the rebels of critical
sources of water. The guerrillas
are now boxed in on three sides
by Iranian and Omani troops
who are preparing to assault their
main supply caves.
The rebels can still inflict
heavy casualties on government
forces, but there is little doubt
that a military solution to the
rebellion is within Oman's grasp.
Hornbeam
Rebel line
S O U T H Supply
Caves
YEMEN ;
Hawf, \7MV
Dam avand
line
October 31, 1975
The military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman will soon cease
to be an effective fighting force unless it receives substantial reinforcements. Rebel
fighting strength is estimated to have dwindled over the past 18 months from about
1,000 to fewer than 300 men. Defections are steadily increasing, local tribesmen are
less willing to serve in a support role, and the estimated 350 South Yemeni irregulars
serving with the rebels have been reluctant to enter battles.
The increasingly shrill rebel pleas for help from other Arabs have produced
some Libyan arms, but little else. Oman has been able to convince the moderate
Arab governments that recent rebel charges that Iranian troops are on South Yemen
soil are untrue.
South Yemen-the Front's principal backer-apparently moved some forces. to
its Sixth Governorate adjoining Oman but has shown no sign of intervening on
behalf of the rebels. A meaningful, military response is probably beyond Aden's
capability.
Aden may find comfort by accepting a long-standing Saudi-Egyptian offer to
provide economic aid in return for an end to its support of the rebellion. The South
Yemenis would thereby realize some gain from a development that it seems
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 31, 1975
powerless to reverse. Aden for the first time reportedly seemed more willing to
cooperate in helping resolve the Dhofar problem when the subject came up at an
Arab League meeting in Cairo last week. Meanwhile, Oman has assured Aden that
Muscat seeks only an end to that support and not wider war or the toppling of the
government in Aden.
There is no evidence that leaders of the Popular Front have made peace
overtures, either directly to Omani leaders or through intermediaries. They could
opt simply to withdraw into the hills or into South Yemen, effectively ending their
military effort but seeking no formal accommodation with the government of Sultan
Qabus. This would be an ideal course of action from Aden's point of view. It would
be absolved from having to choose between military intervention or acce tance of
the olitical conditions attached to the Saudi offer.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 31, 1975
The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola reportedly are preparing to form a provisional
government that would unilaterally declare Angola independent. The move would be
aimed at countering an expected similar declaration by the Soviet-backed Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
National Union leader Jonas Savimbi told US officials in London this week that
he expects the Popular Movement to claim sole sovereignty on November 11.
Savimbi indicated that his group and the National Front intend to declare their own
government and continue to fight the Popular Movement while seeking international
recognition. Savimbi professed to believe that such a government could win a
reasonable amount of international support. Its existence would also provide an
excuse for countries to remain neutral if they did not want to recognize a Popular
Movement government.
The fighting will continue no matter who claims sovereignty or when. All three
liberation groups have unequivocally rejected a pre-independence coalition. Between
now and independence, the National Front and the National Union intend to mount
major offensives designed to discredit the Popular Movement's claims to control all
important areas of Angola.
The National Union's secretary for foreign affairs says his group believes it can
recapture the port of Lobito and the town of Benguela and reopen the Benguela
railroad to Zambian and Zairian traffic.
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October 31, 1975
The secretary had reservations about the National Union's future relations with
the National Front, however, and those reservations are undoubtedly shared by
Savimbi himself. Relations in the field between troops of the two movements are
frequently strained.
Furthermore, the National Union continues to believe an ultimate political
settlement must include all three liberation groups, since no single one or
combination can expect to govern a country as sharply divided tribally as is Angola.
The National Front, however, appears determined to destroy the Popular Movement,
despite the fact that the Popular Movement's base of political support will be
necessary to run the country.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 31, 1975
Hardly two weeks after resuming office in a seemingly conciliatory mood,
President Peron has defiantly named a follower of Lopez Rega to the ousted
strongman's former post of social welfare minister.
Her choice of Anibal Demarco, a lackluster welfare ministry official, has
aroused fears that the residual influence of Lopez Rega-whose role provoked a
major crisis last June-is still strong. Some of his followers-such as presidential
secretary Julio Gonzalez-remained in office in the wake of Lopez Rega's departure,
despite the purge of high-level supporters.
Opposition delayed and almost prevented Demarco's appointment. Peron's
decision is particularly inopportune because congress is preparing to launch an
investigation into alleged misuse of funds and authority by the ministry under Lopez
Rega.
The President, in choosing to ignore overwhelming sentiment against such an
appointment, cannot fail to contribute to the hardening of opinion, in and out of
government, against her. The decision clearly was made against the advice of her
government's top figure, Interior Minister Robledo, who has promised the military
he will keep the President in line. If he cannot do so, his own position will be
seriously weakened.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 31, 1975
President Pinochet has made an abrupt about-face on Chile's controversial
decision to vote for a UN resolution declaring that Zionism is a form of racism. The
move points up the level of Santiago's sensitivity to US criticism and illustrates again
the government's ambivalence in dealing with its growing international isolation.
By stating publicly that he did not approve of his mission's vote, Pinochet
appeared to signal a fresh attempt to undo the mounting damage to his country's
image among Western nations. Chilean support for the Arab-backed resolution had
brought allegations that it was a crass maneuver to gain Arab support in toning down
a UN statement condemning human rights practices in Chile.
Chilean officials have been desperately seeking new friends and badly needed
loans and investment in recent months. Although active courtship of the Arabs has
netted little so far, some of Pinochet's advisers evidently thought the UN vote would
elicit Arab goodwill prior to Finance Minister Cauas' trip to the Middle East.
Most Chilean diplomats, however, recognized the folly of further alienating US
opinion in exchange for slender expectations of support elsewhere, and Pinochet
himself has belatedly come to perceive this. Since Chile cast its vote in the Social
and Humanitarian Affairs Committee on October 17, Chileans have been stung by
press reports that the US intends to suspend all military aid.
As criticism mounted, Chilean Justice Minister Schweitzer, who was visiting
Washington, implied that Chile might be reassessing its stand on human rights
investigations. He told the press that if the next OAS General Assembly were held in
Santiago, the Chilean government would "allow all OAS agencies to see for
themselves the human rights situation in Chile." Chile obviously hopes to defuse
some of the criticism directed at the junta for its refusal to admit a UN mission last
July.
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