NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 25, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 25, 1975
SPAIN: Transfer
of power delayed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PORTUGAL: Military
forces placed on alert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
LEBANON: Beirut
remains tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SPANISH SAHARA: Morocco's
mass march postponed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CAMBODIA-THAILAND: Talks
in Bangkok next week . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ANNEX: Egyptian President Sadat's
Position in the Arab World
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SPAIN
October 25, 1975
Moves toward the transfer of political power in Spain to Prince Juan Carlos
appear to have stalled yesterday, as General Franco suffered yet another heart
attack.
he new hesitancy about
declaring Franco incapacitated is a ri u a e to u that the move would be
approved by the necessary two-thirds vote of the legislature. Few Spanish officials
seem ready to risk any initiative on the issue when Franco's death could quickly
make it unnecessary.
The cabinet meeting scheduled for yesterday was canceled. A cabinet officer
told the US embassy that "all the decisions that could be taken have been taken."
Madrid remains calm. Armed guards have been increased at several locations,
including the US and Portuguese embassies. Military leaves have been canceled this
weekend.
The communist-dominated Democratic Junta, a coalition of several Spanish
opposition groups in exile, issued a declaration in Paris yesterday opposing the
succession of Juan Carlos. It called on the Spanish people to prepare for
"democratic action" to prevent the formation of a new dictatorship after Franco's
death.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975
The armed forces were placed on "simple alert" Friday in response to a series
of bombings attributed to the rightists. A military spokesman said the alert and the
summoning of Lisbon's military commanders was also in anticipation of a possible
coup attempt.
The explosions caused only minor property damage. Although there is
widespread speculation in Lisbon that a coup is imminent, there is no evidence to
support the rumors. If an attempt is made, the US embassy believes it would most
likely come from the right.
Northern Military Region commander General Pires Veloso may be using the
alert to bolster his forces in the event of a renewed confrontation with leftist troops.
Members of Soldiers United Will Win believe Veloso has not lived up to the
agreement ending the rebellion in Porto on October 14. Prime Minister Azevedo will
visit Porto today to review the political-military situation with Veloso and local civil
authorities. The Socialist and Popular Democratic parties are planning
demonstrations of support for the Prime Minister during his visit.
If there are any further government reactions to the bombings and impending
coup rumors, they would be relatively mild. Any move by the Azevedo
administration will likely be calculated to avoid confrontation and bloodshed while
maintaining at least a modicum of control.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975
LEBANON
Reinforcement of security forces in Beirut and the imposition of a 24-hour
curfew in some sections of the city have helped decrease the fighting, but the capital
remains extremely tense.
Lebanese army units have been given new police duties at strategic points in
and around the city in an effort to alleviate the overburdened security forces. The
decision to use the army units on a limited scale reportedly was worked out late
Thursday by Prime Minister Karami and Palestinian leaders and was probably
coupled with an agreement to supplement security forces with 700 Palestinian
military police.
In a speech to the Lebanese parliament yesterday, however, Karami reiterated
his opposition to using the Christian-officered army in a broad security role. He has
come under heavy fire recently from right-wing Christians for not fully utilizing the
army. Use of the army on a dramatic scale would inflame sectarian feelings and
would be viewed by both leftists and the less radical Palestinians as an effort to
shore up the Christians.
On the political front, movement has been painstaking and generally
overshadowed by controversy over the proper forum for resolving the crisis. The
political subcommittee of the national dialogue committee resumed its deliberations
yesterday on an agenda worked out earlier in the week. The agenda includes
consideration of such controversial issues as: readjustment of religious
representation in government institutions, the restructuring of powers and
prerogatives of all three branches of government, and reorganization of the army.
Neither Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil nor his major antagonist, leftist leader
Kamal Jumblatt, were present for debate on the agenda yesterday, but both were
represented by stand-ins.
Acceptance of the agenda is a conspicuous setback for Jumayyil. He opposes
consideration of a reform program before security is restored and issues relating to
internal unity are resolved-especially the status of Palestinians. According to one
press account, the subcommittee has authorized the preparation of a study on
sectarianism in Lebanon.
The subcommittee's small step forward has been hampered by growing debate
over the usefulness of the "national dialogue" concept and its legality in the face of
parliament's constitutional authority.
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NORTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975
SPANISH SAHARA
There are new signs Morocco will postpone its planned mass march into
Spanish Sahara.
According to press reports from Marrakech, Moroccan officials said yesterday
that the march-expected to begin early next week-may be delayed several days.
Volunteers from the Rabat area have been told by local officials that their departure
for the border has been delayed. Logistic problems are a factor, and some discontent
over the lack of food and tents has developed among the marchers who have already
reached the assembly point near the borde
At the same time, Moroccan spokesmen have declared that nothing will stop
the march. They have denied reports that Rabat has already reached a tentative
agreement with Spain on Spanish Sahara.
King Hassan is probably allowing time for the talks now under way with Spain
to produce results. He may also recognize that Spanish officials are reluctant to
make any policy initiative until Franco's death or power is transferred to Prince
Juan Carlos. Hassan is also awaiting the arrival on Sunday of UN Secretary General
Waldheim.
Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki met with his Spanish counterpart in Madrid
yesterday. Spanish press reports, citing sources close to Moroccan diplomats, claim
that in return for recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the territory, Rabat has
offered Spain military bases in the Sahara, joint exploitation of the territory's rich
phosphate deposits, and a moratorium on Moroccan claims to the Spanish enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla along Morocco's northern Mediterranean coast.
Morocco, in fact, has made similar offers in the past. Spain, however, has
hitherto been unwilling to accept them, and thus ignore Algeria's position that the
Saharan people should be allowed to choose their own future, including
independence if they wish.
The pro-independence Polisario Front, a Saharan political group supported by
Algeria, has announced that if such an agreement has been struck, the front will go
underground and continue to fight against both the Spanish and Moroccans. Algeria
would almost certainly provide arms to the front for a sustained insurgency effort,
and possibly some "volunteers" to help out.
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Press sources in Madrid indicate that Spanish authorities in the Sahara
recommended Wednesday that European civilians and families of the armed forces
leave El Aaiun.
The charged atmosphere created by Hassan's proposed march has prompted
Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, noted for his policies of moderation, to
dispatch his foreign minister, Habib Chatti, to. Rabat and Algiers with a message for
the two countries' leaders to exercise restraint.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs leng Sary will travel to
Bangkok next Tuesday for talks with Thai officials.
The Cambodians almost certainly want to regularize border trade with
Thailand, especially in rice and petroleum products, and will probably be interested
in any economic concessions Thailand may offer. The trip to Bangkok will also
afford leng Sary the opportunity for a first-hand appraisal of the Thai leadership and
its views on relations with its other communist neighbors.
I Bangkok will offer Cambodia some humanitarian
assistance and believes that the' opening of government-authorized trade with the
Cambodians would be an appropriate step toward normalizing relations. The Thai
are also interested in arranging the visit of a diplomatic delegation to Phnom Penh,
but the Cambodian communists may be reluctant to permit non-communist
observers to view conditions in Phnom Penh in the near future.
The Thai, who are eager to establish diplomatic relations and have been
pressing for high-level talks in either Bangkok or Phnom Penh since this summer,
apparently attach a high priority to the Cambodian leader's visit. Thai Foreign
Minister Chatchai has postponed a trip to the US, presumably in order to be on hand
for leng Sary.
If the upcoming talks in Bangkok should founder, it would most likely be over
the question of the disposition of Cambodian refugees and former Cambodian
military equipment now in Thailand. Thai leaders have 0 taken the position
that Bangkok is unwilling to return Cambodian refugees against their will. Bangkok
would also be reluctant to accede to a Khmer communist request for the return of
aircraft moved into Thailand during last spring's communist take-over, since they are
still resisting similar demands from the Vietnamese.
Phnom Penh broadcasts, however, have not focused on either the refugees or
the equipment, and the Thai are hopeful that leng Sary will continue to sidestep
these questions in order to obtain the trade and other economic concessions that
Phnom Penh wants.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975
Egyptian President Sadat's Position in the Arab World
President Sadat's position of leadership in the Arab world is hanging in the
balance as a result of the second Sinai disengagement agreement. His position within
Egypt is sound, but there too he is vulnerable over the longer term.
His best and virtually his only real friend at the moment is the US. He will use
his visit here next week to seek further tangible expressions of that friendship in
order to buttress Egypt against isolation in the Arab world and to reassure his
domestic constituents that his foreign policy has not bankrupted the country.
Egypt's leadership of the Arab world has always been basically a state of mind.
Egypt is not the birthplace of Arab nationalism. Syria, Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia
can lay better claim to this title. Egypt lacks the natural resources to give it the
economic importance of Saudi Arabia and has too many political constraints to
make it, like Lebanon, a commercial center of the Arab world. Its people are
regarded, by themselves and by other Arabs, as a breed apart.
Egyptian leadership in the Arab world has depended on essentially ephemeral
factors. These factors are not working to Sadat's advantage as they worked to
Nasir's; as a result, Sadat could lose his ability to influence and guide the other
Arabs.
Egypt has been the largest and militarily the strongest state bordering Israel,
whose existence is the only thing that has ever unified the modern Arab world. It
has been a basic tenet of Arab doctrine that there can be no war against Israel
without Egypt, and Egypt has been able to command the deference of the other
Arabs by exploiting their fear of the consequences if it signed a separate peace
accord with Israel.
By signing the second Sinai agreement, Sadat has let slip a part of his hold on
the Arabs. Although he does not regard the agreement as a final peace, the other
Arabs are not sure Egypt will take a further part in the struggle for the return of the
occupied territories. Without Egypt, Arabs have less leverage with Israel, but they do
get freedom to plan their moves without regard to Egypt's interests.
Nasir was able to use the tide of anti-colonialism at mid-century, plus an
electric personality and a crusading zeal, to put himself at the head of a resurgent
Arab nationalism. He and Egypt seized the leadership of the Arab political world
when other Arab states, because of internal instability or simple default, were unable
to compete.
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Sadat is no Nasir. Even though Sadat's practical accomplishments actually
exceed his predecessor's, he is not able to inspire the Arabs as Nasir did. Sadat must
instead produce solid results and the prospect for more, not merely for Egypt but
for all Arabs. He has not fully accomplished this.
Memory has faded of the war that gained the first return of Egyptian and
Syrian territory, that enabled the Arab oil states to flex their muscles through the
embargo, and that led to international recognition for the Palestinians. The memory
that it was Sadat who launched these successes has also faded.
Sadat's standing as a leader has suffered subsequently, because he has sought to
achieve Arab goals by gradual steps. A policy featuring moderation and negotiation
is suspect in Arab eyes because it is both unfamiliar and uncomfortable.
Nasir's standing depended as much on his ability to shift with popular opinion
as on an ability actually to lead and to influence. He never appeared less radical than
the most radical of the Arabs. He was the number-one Arab, not because he
produced results either for the other Arabs or for Egypt, but because his radicalism,
his emotional speeches, and his bold strokes of policy were familiar and comfortable
for the Arabs.
Sadat has done little to adjust his policy or his goals to this Arab mainstream.
He has, in fact, rejected the rhetoric and the emotionalism that have long been the
badge of the proper Arab and, with them, he has rejected the rigidity and
inflexibility that have characterized the Arabs' dealings with the non-Arab world and
attitude toward Israel.
Moderation stood him in good stead when he was able to demonstrate to the
Arabs that compromise, even with the Israeli enemy, accomplished more for Egypt
and even for Syria than radicalism ever had. He has lately been unable, however, to
show that accommodation is producing further results, either for Syria or for the
Palestinians. The second Sinai accord is regarded among other Arabs as having
produced too little, even for Egypt, to have been worth the price.
A Residual Recognition
Sadat has not lost, entirely and forever, his ability to lead the Arabs. There is
enough residual recognition of the leading role Cairo has played to make the Arabs
shun, almost as a reflex action, any move to turn away completely from Egypt.
Many Arabs also hope that Egypt has not permanently abandoned the Arab struggle
and will in a few years be back playing the leading role.
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Jordan has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to mediate Egypt's differences
with Syria over the disengagement, for no better reason than that Egypt is the
principal Arab state and must not be allowed to isolate itself from its neighbors.
Saudi Arabia,
tan s
with Sadat. Less radical Palestinians have not cut their ties, because they recognize
that Egypt's support is vital if they are ever to gain anything by negotiation.
Syria, historically Egypt's main rival for pan-Arab leadership, is feeling
unfulfilled, and it is on Syria's attitude that Sadat's rise or fall as an Arab leader
could depend in the last analysis.
Few Arab leaders, no matter what their' basic attitude toward Egypt, are
pleased by the second Sinai accord; most are sympathetic with Syria's frustration
over the lack of progress toward another Golan disengagement.
As has been demonstrated time and again, few Arabs are willing to speak out
for moderation when one of their number remains vocally dissatisfied. The general
Arab silence on the disengagement has not to this point helped Syria, but it has also
not helped Egypt. Silence in this case does not imply consent and, if ever forced to a
choice between support for Egypt's position or support for Syria's and the
Palestinians', few Arabs would back Egypt.
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