NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 24, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 24, 1975
SPAIN: Franco takes
turn for the worse ........................................... 1
PORTUGAL: Communist-sponsored
demonstration in Lisbon ...................................... 2
SPANISH SAHARA: Hassan
plans to go ahead with march ................................... 5
LEBANON: USIA
officials still missing .......................................... 7
ANGOLA: MPLA launches campaign
against "foreign intervention" .................................. 8
USSR-TURKEY: Moscow reportedly
selling helicopters to Ankara ................................... 9
GUATEMALA-BELIZE: UN resolution ......................... 11
ANNEX: Negotiations Begin on Icelandic Fishing Issue
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 24, 1975
General Franco has taken a serious turn for the worse, and an early transfer of
power to Prince Juan Carlos now seems likely.
A medical bulletin signed by Franco's doctors was issued yesterday,
announcing that Franco is showing additional signs of heart failure. Previous, more
optimistic bulletins had not been signed by doctors.
In the face of this development, all major political forces, including the
military, reportedly have reached a consensus that Franco should step down
immediately. Following a nine-hour cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Arias took
Franco the papers that would transfer power to Prince Juan Carlos. Franco,
however, was incapable of signing.
If Franco remains unable or refuses to sign the decrees renouncing his position
and transferring power to the Prince, his team of doctors may issue a certificate of
incapacity. This would permit Spanish officials to initiate the proceedings provided
in the constitution. Alternatively, the cabinet, at its scheduled meeting today,
could formally recognize his incapacitation. Its finding would then have to be
approved by two thirds of both the advisory Council of the Realm and the
legislature.
If Franco dies or signs the document transferring power to Juan Carlos, the
three-man Council of the Regency will immediately become the collective head of
state. Parliament would be convoked within 24 hours or so and informed of the
Prince's designation. Within about 48 hours after that, possibly as early as October
27, Juan Carlos would take the oath as king of Spain before a joint session of the
parliament and the Council of the Realm.
Intensive maneuvering for the post-Franco period has already begun.
Yesterday, Spanish Ambassador to London Fraga Iribarne-long touted as a
candidate for the prime ministership after Juan Carlos takes over-returned hastily
to Madrid.
According to a US embassy source, Fraga has struck a deal with the powerful
minister secretary of the National Movement, Solis Ruiz. Fraga reportedly has
promised to take part in a government-supported political association in return for
the government's adoption of his program, a major point of which is free
parliamentary elections.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 24, 1975
Thousands of radical leftists marched through Lisbon last night in a
Communist-sponsored demonstration, but there were no violent or untoward
incidents.
The demonstrators called for an end to the current government and the return
to power of General Vasco Goncalves, the pro-Communist former premier who was
forced to resign several weeks ago.
Despite open talk of a possible coup, the government did not attempt to stop
the demonstration. It evidently is still playing for time in its struggle to survive.
In allying themselves with the far left, it is clearly the Communists' present
objective to bring down the government by creating sheer chaos and by splitting the
Socialists and Popular Democrats, who are its principal bulwarks. Thus far, at least,
the two parties are sticking together. The Socialists have roundly denounced the
Communists and have said that they too would leave the government if the Popular
Democrats were forced out.
The next few days may be decisive for Azevedo. The government's offer of
amnesty expires tomorrow, but no armed civilian groups have turned in any
weapons. One of the most militant and most heavily armed extreme-left groups, the
Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades, announced that it
will go underground to avoid a government crackdown. General Otelo Carvalho,
leader of the internal security forces, said that this decision might mean that the
group is planning a coup.
Despite the generally grim outlook, people who support the regime continue to
argue that a policy of avoiding confrontation at this time is the right one. In a
meeting with Ambassador Carlucci yesterday, the secretary for information claimed
that, in trying to provoke a clash, the Communists are leading from weakness.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 24, 1975
The secretary also denied that a split had developed among the nine moderate
leaders who brought Azevedo to power and said that the government would be
moving step by step to purge Communists from the various ministries, restore
discipline in the military, and gradually regain control of the information media.
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SPAIN
Madrid
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 24, 1975
King Hassan, in a brief radiobroadcast yesterday directed at the inhabitants of
Spanish Sahara, indicated that he is going ahead with his planned march into the
territory.
In his address, Hassan reviewed Morocco's claim to sovereignty over the Sahara.
He appealed to the inhabitants to renew their religious and political allegiance to
him and not to resist the march by force.
His remarks were clearly directed at members of the Spanish-backed Saharan
National Union Party and the Algerian-supported Polisario Front. The two groups,
which favor independence for the territory, have announced plans to confront the
unarmed marchers at the border.
Hassan did not announce a date for the march. The first contingent may cross
the border early next week.
Moroccan contacts with Spain are accelerating. Foreign Minister Laraki arrives
in Madrid today to continue talks started in Rabat earlier this week by a Spanish
official. Press reports from Rabat claim the two countries have reached a tentative
understanding for a partition of Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania,
and that only a "symbolic contingent" of marchers will go all the way to El Aaiun,
the capital of Spanish Sahara.
Military Preparations
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October 24, 1975
There are indications that some Spanish air force and army units on the
mainland were placed in early stages of alert yesterday. The US defense attache in
Madrid reports that Spain's entire parachute brigade probably is in the Canary
Islands and in Spanish Sahara. Madrid also canceled a joint Spanish and French air
force exercise on Tuesday, presumably to keep its aircraft at a high state of
readiness.
Meanwhile, Mauritania, which hopes to divide Spanish Sahara with Morocco,
has publicly supported Rabat's march, but only in principle. On October 20,
President Ould Daddah said Mauritania opposes using force to settle the dispute. He
is anxious to avoid a military confrontation and is concerned that Hassan's march
will create a volatile situation.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 24, 1975
Heavy fighting flared again in Beirut yesterday as efforts continued, without
success, to find and free the two US officials kidnaped on Wednesday.
Intense mortar, rocket, and small arms fire began before dawn yesterday and
continued throughout the morning in the central and eastern sections of the city.
Two Palestine Liberation Organization military officers were killed in Christian areas
in and near Beirut on Wednesday night. The Palestinians were not involved in the
fighting yesterday, but more fedayeen were in evidence manning barricades. Less
radical Palestinian leaders will come under pressure to retaliate.
Beirut radio announced at midday that all roads in the city were unsafe and
that, for the first time in this round of the fighting, the Beirut-Damascus road has
been cut just outside Beirut. It is the only road out of the capital to Syria and to the
mountains, which have been free of fighting. The US embassy reports that its
interdiction has added a new element of nervousness among city residents.
Interior Minister Shamun and Prime Minister Karami announced yesterday that
"strict" new measures to stop the fighting would be implemented, although neither
elaborated. Greater use of the army apparently is not planned; Karami seemed to
dismiss the possibility as potentially too destructive.
It now appears that the two kidnaped US officials are in the hands of the
radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. F_ I
Efforts to locate them have thus far been to no avail. Lebanese security
authorities say they have no firm leads, and the Algerian ambassador in Beirut, who
has offered his services, has come up with nothing. Fatah says it has no information
on their whereabouts. Fatah leaders assisted in bringing pressure on the Popular
Front to release a kidnaped US army colonel in June and, the US embassy believes,
might be willing to do so again.
On the political front, Karami is coming under attack for his government's
inability to handle the situation. Karami himself is at loggerheads with President
Franjiyah, who continues to support the intransigent stand of the right-wing
Christians. Karami reportedly was threatening to resign in frustration at Franjiyah's
obstructionism but was dissuaded by the Syrians.
Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt is still in Damascus, and an embassy source in
Beirut reports that the Syrians are again attempting to persuade him to join the
cabinet with Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil. Jumblatt has consistently refused to
be associated with Jumayyil in a new cabinet.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 24, 1975
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has launched a major
propaganda campaign against "foreign intervention" in Angola. Military hard-liners
in the Movement probably will try to use the campaign to set the stage for a
unilateral declaration of independence, possibly before November 11.
Last night, the Popular Movement ordered the mobilization of all men between
the ages of 18 and 35 to combat a force claimed to number nearly 1,000 troops,
including mercenaries and regular South African army troops. The force reportedly
is led by Daniel Chipenda, a former Popular Movement military commander.
Chipenda joined the rival National Front for the Liberation of Angola almost a year
ago and has been commanding the Front's forces in central Angola since then.
According to the Popular Movement announcement, the "invading force" has
advanced approximately 150 miles into southern Angola. Popular Movement forces
in that part of the territory are stretched thin.
The mobilization order and the charge of foreign intervention come at a time
when the Popular Movement is beginning to feel heavy pressure from military
operations by the National Front in northern Angola and from the approaching
deadline for Angolan independence.
In northern Angola, the rival National Front has advanced to within 13 miles of
Luanda. Some fighting is now taking place at that point.
The approach of the deadline for independence takes on added importance for
the Popular Movement by virtue of Portugal's continued insistence that it will not
transfer sovereignty to the Popular Movement alone. The Movement is equally
insistent that it is the only liberation group capable and deserving of running the
territory after independence. Thus it is attempting to discredit its rivals as
instruments of foreign powers and therefore not true representatives of the Angolan
people.
The Popular Movement's ability to carry out a successful mobilization
campaign is questionable. The Movement has always had strong popular support in
Luanda, but its support in the rural areas-and even in the towns of central and
southern Angola that it claims to control-seems less certain. There, the Movement's
mobilization effort could well bog down.
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October 24, 1975
Moscow reportedly is selling Ankara 60 MI-8 Hip helicopters. The Soviets also
offered to sell either MIG-21 Fishbeds or MIG-23 Floggers, but the Turks have
rejected this offer.
The MI-8 helicopter can be used for either commercial or military purposes,
but Ankara's interest in such a large number of them suggests the Turks plan to use
them in a military role. The only Soviet equipment now in the Turkish inventory is a
small number of trucks delivered prior to 1972.
The Demirel government wants to diversify its sources of military equipment.
Ankara is wary of Moscow's intentions, however, and the Soviet performance in
resupplying Egypt will prevent Turkey from turning to the USSR as its primary
source of weapons.
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GUAtEMALA
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 24, 1975
Discussions among officials from the UK, Belize, and other Carribbean
countries have produced a draft UN resolution that pays only lip-service to
Guatemala's territorial claim to Belize.
Guatemala has previously insisted that its century-old claim be settled prior to
Belize's independence. Guatemalan officials have threatened military action if the
UK grants independence without settling the claim or if the UN passes a resolution
calling for independence without a favorable territorial settlement. The Guatemalan
government has recently increased its troop strength from 300 to 500 men at a base
near the Belizean border.
The draft resolution calls for negotiations to resolve "differences" with
Guatemala, but it insists the territorial integrity of Belize must be preserved.
Guatemalan officials are likely to conclude that this provides little, if any, basis for
serious negotiations, despite British efforts to convince them otherwise.
The Guatemalan press is aware that the British have reinforced their military
presence in Belize, but only one paper has published this information. Guatemalan
officials have denied the reports in order to avoid overheating public opinion.
The UN resolution will be debated between November 5 and 8 and will receive
heavy play in the Guatemalan media. A vote on the resolution is likely around
November 20. Public reaction to press reports of British reinforcements, combined
with a diplomatic setback at the UN, would bring heavy pressure on the Guatemalan
government to take military action in pursuit of its territorial claims against Belize.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 24, 1975
NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN ON ICELANDIC FISHING ISSUE
Icelandic and British negotiators began another round of talks yesterday in an
attempt to reach a new agreement regulating fishing in waters around Iceland. If
agreement is not reached by November 13-when the current agreement
expires-another round of incidents between British fishermen and Icelandic patrol
vessels appears likely. Other countries with strong fishing interests in the area-West
Germany, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark-also are planning to seek agreements
with Iceland.
The fishing industry is vital to Iceland's economy, and the Icelandic
government is sensitive to any developments that might affect the industry's
prospects. In addition, public emotions are easily aroused over this issue and
Icelandic leaders claim they cannot defend membership in NATO if their allies do
not support them on an issue of economic survival. At the time of the last."Cod
War" between Iceland and Britain in 1972-73, Reykjavik sought US intercession by
threatening not to renew the bilateral defense agreement under which the US
operates the NATO base at Keflavik. Although the agreement was subsequently
renewed, base opponents are once again becoming active, and Icelandic leaders warn
privately that the base will again become an issue.
Economic Background
Iceland derives about 75 percent of its export earnings from the sale of fish and
fish by-products, and the fishing and fish processing industries are the largest
employers. During the past decade, Iceland's economic prosperity has been
increasingly threatened by the expanded operations of foreign fishermen, tougher
competition for foreign markets, and declining fish resources.
Reykjavik has for some years tried to control foreign access to its fishing
grounds. A 4-mile fishing limit declared in 1952 was extended to 12 miles in 1958,
and to 50 miles in 1972. Despite the growing restrictions, foreigners still catch more
than half the fish netted around Iceland. In addition, each extension provoked a
"Cod War" between the Icelandic coast guard and foreign fishermen that finally had
to be settled at the governmental level. Iceland's 1973 pact with the UK was written
for only two years because Reykjavik believed that the UN-sponsored conference on
the Law of the Sea might set international limits greater than 50 miles. Earlier this
year, Iceland announced that it was unilaterally extending its fishing limits to 200
miles on October 15, just 29 days before the pact with the UK expires.
Al
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 24, 1975
Talks Begin
At their first round of current talks in Reykjavik on September 11, the British
proposed a new agreement along the lines of the expiring pact. The agreement
provided for:
--a ban on fishing within a 12-mile limit;
--discretionary Icelandic closure of any of six zones comprising the 12- to
50-mile area;
--fishing "seasons";
--fishing by specific trawlers only;
--an annual catch limit of 130,000 tons.
The British proposed to negotiate a reduction in the catch limit, the number of
trawlers, and adjustments in the dates and areas. They want the new agreement to
run up to ten years.
The Icelandic team responded that a new pact had to regulate fishing in the 50-
to 200-mile zone, and that it had no mandate to permit fishing within the 50-mile
area. It agreed that there would have to be sharp cuts in the catch limit and numbers
of vessels. The first round of talks adjourned with the two sides still far apart on
major issues.
The German Angle
Although the British comprise the largest contingent of foreign fishermen and
constitute the principal problem for the Reykjavik government, there have also been
growing difficulties with West German fishermen. The main issue is Iceland's refusal
to allow large freezer trawlers to operate in its waters. In recent years, the West
German fishing fleet has largely converted to this modern, efficient type of vessel.
Reykjavik and Bonn, nevertheless, had a draft agreement in hand in 1974, but
it was too controversial for the weak Icelandic coalition to push through parliament.
After a series of incidents at sea, Bonn prohibited the sale of Icelandic fish on the
West German market and, more important, blocked implementation of a pending
Icelandic tariff agreement with the European Community.
In talks with the UK and the Belgians last month, the Icelanders insisted that
they would not implement new fishing agreements with any EC member until the
tariff agreement is unblocked. Foreign Minister Agustsson subsequently told his
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October 24, 1975
West German counterpart that Iceland would not even "negotiate" as long as the
tariff agreement was in suspension. Following Bonn's decision on October 15 to lift
the ban on fish imports, however, Agustsson agreed to begin talks on October 28.
Looking for Help
Iceland has tried to rally international support for its position, but with only
modest success. The International Court of Justice did not support the 50-mile limit
in 1972. As a result, Reykjavik has adamantly rejected the Court's jurisdiction in
such matters. Reykjavik has found a gradually emerging consensus at the Law of the
Sea Conference to allow coastal states to determine the allowable fish catches in
200-mile zones. Iceland is particularly encouraged by what it sees as growing support
within the US for the 200-mile principle.
Iceland has been disappointed, on the other hand, that the other Scandinavian
states have been relatively lukewarm in their support. The Nordic Council last spring
limited itself to an anodyne "understanding" of Iceland's reasons for extending the
fishing limit. In late September, a Norwegian official added that while the long-run
objectives of the two countries coincide, Norway prefers to await the results of the
Law of the Sea Conference. Iceland will have to negotiate with Norway and
Denmark if both ultimately adopt the 200-mile principle; Jan Mayen Island, the
Faeroes, and Greenland are less than 400 miles from Iceland.
View From Reykjavik
The ability of the current Icelandic coalition to negotiate is restricted by
history and by domestic political considerations. Past fishing agreements more
frequently than not have been negotiated in the wake of bitter disputes over fishing
rights, and no previous government has begun negotiations in a spirit of compromise.
To adopt an easy line now would leave Prime Minister Hallgrimsson's coalition
vulnerable to charges that it is not protecting Iceland's vital national interests. The
opposition, indeed, is already charging that the coalition has failed in this regard.
Deep political divisions, the link between fishing and the national economic
well-being, and a chauvinism bred of relative physical isolation militate against an
easy compromise. By early September, numerous public and private organizations
had petitioned the government to allow no foreign fishing within the old 50-mile
limit, where most fish are caught, and sharp limitations in the 50- to 200-mile area.
The Communist-dominated People's Alliance, the principal opposition party which
holds 11 of the 60 seats in parliament, eagerly champions this line. In addition,
important elements in both coalition parties, Hallgrimsson's Independence Party and
Agustsson's Progressive Party, support this tougher line.
The deep divisions with the Progressive Party have forced the party leadership
to delay taking a stand. This failure in turn prevented the coalition from adopting a
formal government position, leaving Reykjavik's negotiators for a time in the
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position of listeners rather than bargainers. Hallgrimsson and other Independence
leaders privately have been inclined to seek accommodation with the British on
continued, but restricted, access within the 50-mile zone. In public, however, they
have advocated a hard line for fear of being outdistanced by rank-and-file party
members.
Prospects
The differences between Iceland and the UK and West Germany are too great
to be resolved in the talks this week. British and German officials believe, however,
that all parties are now ready to move quickly and reasonably to agreement. The
British further believe that although the talks will extend beyond the expiration of
the current treaty, Iceland will not resort to "Cod War" harassments.
We believe the Europeans are overly optimistic. Although Iceland no doubt
would like to avoid a new "Cod War," domestic pressures are likely to compel the
government to take a harder line than either the UK or the West Germans anticipate.
London and Bonn officials apparently are confident that they have the upper hand,
a position Icelandic leaders would sharply dispute.
Harassments will become more likely the longer the talks continue. This could
inflame emotions on all sides, especially in Iceland, and generate new pressures for
US intercession.
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