NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028100010039-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: September 24, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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Top Secret
September 24, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 24, 1975
PANAMA: US embassy attacked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
LAOS: Renewed demonstrations at
US embassy threatened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
FRANCE: Chirac exhibits
adroitness as a politician . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FRANCE: Reorganization of naval
forces to be implemented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 24, 1975
The stoning of the US embassy yesterday was apparently not a
government-sponsored act, but it nevertheless will probably be used by Torrijos, the
country's strongman, to buttress his contention that popular patience with the
treaty talks is wearing thin.
The approximately 800 students who broke most of the windows in the
embassy were members of several radical groups not under the government's control.
The students also reportedly stoned the Panamanian Foreign Ministry as part of a
continuing protest against recent remarks by top US officials concerning the canal
negotiations. The students also accused the government of complicity with the US in
the talks. National Guard troops at the US embassy prevented the students from
entering the grounds, but they did not halt the stoning.
Torrijos and leaders of the National Guard probably still believe they can
control the general tempo of student protests, which are highly visible
manifestations of the popular impatience which Torrijos frequently cites. Further
demonstrations, with possible government foreknowledge and a potential for
unplanned escalation, are likely.
Probably as part of his general campaign to increase pressure on the US,
Torrijos made an unscheduled trip to Bogota Monday to see Colombian President
Lopez on the eve of the latter's departure for Washington. Torrijos hopes that
demarches by Latin American leaders stressing the need for a new treaty, so as to
avoid a popular explosion and a souring of US - Latin American relations, will
rom t US concessions during the canal negotiations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 24, 1975
The US embassy may be the target of demonstrations this week.
The immediate cause of the latest friction is a demand by recently discharged
embassy guards for additional severance pay; they are threatening to demonstrate at
the embassy gates tomorrow. Although only 14 guards are involved, they could be
joined by Pathet Lao sympathizers.
With the Pathet Lao fully in control in Vientiane, renewed demonstrations at
the embassy would suggest that the communists are intent on further moves against
the US diplomatic presence.
Communist-inspired harassment of the embassy stopped in late June, but the
attitude of the communist authorities toward continued relations with the US has
been ambiguous.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 24, 1975
French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac has shown in his 16 months in office a
talent for capitalizing on opportunities to increase his own standing. As matters now
stand, he is regarded by growing numbers of voters as a potential successor to the
presidency.
Chirac has succeeded not only because of his own abilities and a top-flight
staff, but also because no rival exists within President Giscard's camp-except the
President himself.
Only 42, Chirac has identified himself with those who are tired of worn-out
political theories. He cultivates a reputation as a problem-solver who is willing to
borrow leftist and liberal ideas if they will help keep France strong, stable, and
socially progressive. To some, Chirac is tenacious, tough, pragmatic, frank, and
intelligent; his critics see him as mechanical, boundlessly ambitious, unprincipled,
and insensitive.
He has been largely successful in avoiding no-win issues such as the unrest on
Corsica, which has brought heavy criticism to Interior Minister Poniatowski,
Giscard's right-hand man. On the other hand, where points are to be gained, the
Prime Minister has on occasion taken the political spotlight from the minister
directly involved.
Chirac's energy and an ability to grasp the political dimension as well as the
technical details of issues have made him both a strong ally and a potential rival of
Giscard. When the President rejected his advice last spring to take early action to get
the French economy back on its feet, Chirac exploited the situation by leaks
bolstering press charges that Giscard and his economics minister were doing too little
too late.
Still, Chirac's public relationship with the President seems on solid ground; the
Prime Minister is careful to avoid direct expressions of disloyalty. An open break is
unlikely, unless the political situation changes radically, because both men would be
hurt. Giscard needs Chirac to keep Gaullists in line for the next legislative election,
which must be held before March 1978. For his part, Chirac, with the next
presidential election six years off, has no need to rush to establish a more
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French Shift Emphasis to Mediterranean
UNITED KINGDOM
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF
I. Brest
OPARIS
GERMANY {
QToulon
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 24, 1975
The French have begun implementing their previously announced
reorganization of naval forces.
The plan, which the navy formulated over a year ago, calls for major shifts in
the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets. The key aims of the shift are to concentrate
France's naval strike force in the Mediterranean and increase its antisubmarine
warfare assets in the Atlantic.
The aircraft carrier Clemenceau is moving from the Atlantic port of Brest to a
new home port at Toulon. The aircraft carrier Foch, as well as a guided-missile
cruiser and two guided-missile frigates, will also be relocated at Toulon next year.
Five antisubmarine warfare units are to be shifted from Toulon to the Atlantic.
The shift probably reflects France's desire to increase its influence in the
Mediterranean area-particularly in light of that sea's importance as a route for
transporting Middle East oil.
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