NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028100010020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 13, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
WON
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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September 13, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 13, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Announcement of new
government may be imminent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CYPRUS: Greek Cypriots take
their case to UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
EGYPT: Egyptian navy seeking
Western equipment for modernization program . . . . . . . . . . 6
SPAIN: Slated execution of
Basque terrorists raises tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
INDIA: Supreme Court
expected to rule in favor of Gandhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
TIMOR: Portuguese diplomatic
maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CUBA: Havana pressing Puerto Rican independence
partly to deflect domestic criticism of detente with US . . . . . . . 16
ARGENTINA: Cafiero bolsters
his chance of succeeding Peron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 13, 1975
Progress appears to have been made in forming a new cabinet, and an
announcement could come as early as today.
A communique issued yesterday by the Revolutionary Council expressed
approval of Admiral Azevedo's efforts to put together a cabinet of military officers,
Socialists, Communists, and Popular Democrats. The cabinet talks had bogged down
over the Communist Party's refusal to join in a coalition with the center-left Popular
Democratic Party, but yesterday, the Communists reportedly agreed to let their
members participate on a non-party basis.
Even as they move toward the formation of a new government, the politicians
in Lisbon seem increasingly preoccupied with the threat from the right and appear
particularly concerned about the activities of former president Antonio de Spinola.
The Council communique issued yesterday contained a stern warning to Spinola,
now in exile, that he is still considered implicated in the rightist coup attempt on
March '11 and that he will be arrested if he returns to Portugal.
In recent weeks, the Portuguese press has been making much of the possibility
that Spinola might lead an invasion from Spain, where his supporters have been
given sanctuary and moral support.
This speculation was fed by Spinola's arrival on September 3 in Paris, where he
reportedly has been meeting with other exiles to assess the present political situation
and discuss strategy. In a press conference on Wednesday, Spinola denied he is
planning an invasion, but he said that Goncalves' ouster had not changed anything
and that the Armed Forces Movement should turn over power to the political parties
and return to the barracks.
Military and civilian political factions in Portugal have tried to use the Spinola
threat for their own purposes. The announcement by the Revolutionary Council
probably was a move by the influential Antunes group to counter earlier Communist
charges that it was trying to return the country to a fascist dictatorship.
Socialist leader Mario Soares-in an apparent effort to put some distance
between himself and Spinola-warned that Portugal now faces a greater threat from
the fascists than from the Communists and that a right-wing coup attempt might be
imminent. Not to be outdone, Communist leader Alvaro Cunhal said that his party
had agreed to compromise and join the new government because it feared Spinola
might succeed in returning to power.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 13, 1975
Spinola's activities, however, are more than just an excuse for political
maneuvering in Lisbon; some political and military leaders see him as a genuine
threat.
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Months of political and economic turmoil in Portugal and growing public
restiveness, particularly in the north, provide Spinola with potential nodular
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 13, 1975
CYPRUS
The near total collapse of the intercommunal talks this week in New York has
prompted the Greek Cypriots to take their case to the UN General Assembly as a
means of exerting additional pressure on the Turks. They have been encouraged to
take this step by the strong support they received at the recent nonaligned
conference in Lima. President Makarios will come to the UN in late September to
lead the Greek Cypriot delegation.
A full-scale debate in the UN might still be averted, according to Greek Cypriot
negotiator Clerides, who told a US official this week that one would probably not
take place until after the Turkish elections on October 12. This would still give the
Turks time to submit proposals on the territorial question. Clerides cautioned,
however, that a mere promise by the Turks to discuss territory would not suffice for
the Greek Cypriot side to agree to another round of talks. The Turks instead would
have to submit their proposals in advance, following which the Greek side would
indicate whether another meeting would be useful. Clerides' statements apparently
reflect Makarios' determination to avoid future negotiations that merely give the
appearance of progress and lessen the pressure on the Turks to negotiate seriously.
The impasse in the talks may prompt the EC Nine to try to narrow differences
and thereby avert an acrimonious debate in the UN that could further harden the
respective positions. Earlier this summer the EC Nine offered to mediate the dispute
and have subsequently made demarches to the interested parties urging them to be
flexible. The Nine decided to await the results of the New York talks before taking
additional steps.
The Turks generally have been cool to an EC role in the Cyprus dispute, but
the prospect of possibly heading off consideration of the issue by the General
Assembly could make them more receptive.
Meanwhile, a period of increased tension is likely along the cease-fire line in
Cyprus as a result of the suspension of intercommunal talks.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 13, 1975
Egyptian navy commander Zikry recently indicated interest in Western supply
sources for the navy's modernization program. He said the navy urgently needs to be
re-equipped and that the Soviets are no longer a reliable source of supply. Zikry
revealed that he will soon begin a two-week shopping visit to the UK.
He says the navy's priorities include: new missile boats capable of dealing with
Israeli Saar gunboats, three new submarines, and four new multipurpose frigates
with antisubmarine, air defense, and helicopter capabilities.
The Egyptians are considering both British and French missile boats. Zikry also
expressed a preference for a US-designed boat equipped with the Harpoon antiship
missile, although he understands that acquiring it is not possible at this time. His
reference to a US system may be a signal that the Egyptians may soon be in the
market for US military equipment.
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PORTUGAL
ALGERIA
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ANDORRA
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 13, 1975
Tension continues to mount as time runs out for the two Basque terrorists
condemned to death late last month for killing a member of the Civil Guard.
The controversy stirred by the handling of the case, which is now being
reviewed by the supreme military tribunal, is likely to be intensified by the death
sentence passed yesterday against three members of a Marxist-Leninist terrorist
organization-the Patriotic and anti-Fascist Revolutionary Front--who were
convicted of slaying a policeman in July.
Few issues in Spain are as capable of mobilizing the far right and the security
forces as the killing of policemen. Last month members of the Civil Guard-the elite
paramilitary police force-and civilian rightist groups used the funeral of a slain
guardsman as a focal point for a demonstration that nearly got out of hand. Cars
carrying government officials were damaged and the demonstrators shouted criticism
of the Arias government. Twice since late August, officers and men of the Civil
Guard have conducted demonstrations to demand the prompt executions not only
of the two convicted Basque terrorists but also of others as yet untried.
The guardsmen have accused Prime Minister Arias and Interior Minister Garcia
of being weak, ineffectual, and cowardly.
The campaign to pressure Franco into commuting the death sentences also is
gathering support. A wave of demonstrations and strikes has swept the Basque
province since the two terrorists were convicted last month. One demonstrator has
been killed by police and several others wounded, but even greater violence is likely
if the executions are carried out.
The death sentences have prompted a flood of protests by foreign governments,
trade unions, and other organizations. In addition, Spanish diplomatic and consular
facilities in Portugal, as well as the Spanish consulate and Spanish-owned businesses
in the French Basque country, have been bombed, and there have been large
demonstrations in Lisbon, Brussels, and Paris.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 13, 1975
Under similar circumstances in 1970, Franco commuted the death sentences of
six Basque terrorists. The reaction from rightist forces in Spain this time is probably
an effort to counterbalance the expected arguments by more liberal elements of the
government that Spain's image will suffer serious damage abroad if the sentences are
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 13, 1975
Most observers expect the Indian supreme court to rule in Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's favor in the important constitutional case currently before it. The decision,
expected later this month, will be on a challenge to the legality of an amendment to
the constitution, rammed through parliament in August, that exempts a prime
minister's election from review by the courts.
There may not be a clear-cut decision. The five-man bench hearing the case
might, for instance, prolong the controversy by calling for the full court of 13
justices to decide on whether the amendment violates the constitution.
A favorable verdict is important to Gandhi because it would negate her court
conviction last June for breaking campaign laws in the 1971 election. With pressure
on her reduced as a result of vindication by the court, the Prime Minister might relax
some of the restrictions she has imposed on the press and her political opponents
since the emergency was proclaimed on June 26. The publicized release of a
prominent Indian journalist yesterday, and a few politicians earlier this week, may
be a trial run.
In the less likely event the court rules against Gandhi, she might decide to press
for major changes in the structure of the government. She has already made it
known that she favors a less powerful judiciary. Her party's large majority in
parliament would give her the necessary votes to secure passage of such legislation.
Meanwhile, the general public continues to accept Gandhi's authoritarian
measures, largely because of the country's encouraging short-term economic
prospects and the increased discipline in both the bureaucracy and the economy
resulting from emergency regulations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 13, 1975
The crisis in Portuguese Timor seems likely to remain in the diplomatic arena
Lisbon is trying to steer the parties back to the gradual decolonization scheme
reached in Macao in June. Following informal meetings with Portugal's special envoy
in Jakarta on September 11, Indonesia announced its agreement in principle to
negotiations between the Portuguese and the three Timorese factions, to begin
September 20 in Macao. It is not yet clear, however, whether the radical Fretilin
party, which now controls most of the territory, will agree to join the talks.
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Meanwhile, an Indonesian press report sa s that western districts of the
territory have proclaimed merger with Indonesia.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 13, 1975
Cuban President Dorticos' address on Monday to the closing session of the
Puerto Rican Solidarity Conference reaffirmed Cuba's "unlimited support" for the
cause of Puerto Rican independence. The way Havana handled the conference,
however, suggests that the Cubans do not want the Puerto Rican issue to become a
stumbling block in the way of negotiations designed ultimately to normalize
relations with the US.
Dorticos reiterated Cuba's long-standing position that Puerto Rico "is a Latin
American nation subjugated to colonial domination and is not a domestic problem
of the US." He asserted that debate on Puerto Rico will continue in the UN and that
the Cuban government neither regrets nor will change its advocacy of the Puerto
Rican cause in that organization. Dorticos further denounced US pressures that
succeeded in shelving until next year a UN resolution on Puerto Rico, which Cuba
co-sponsored.
Despite Dorticos' strong statement of support for Puerto Rican nationalists, he
concluded his address with an ambiguously worded statement on the relationship
between Cuban support for Puerto Rican independence and US-Cuban detente.
Dorticos observed that "the Cuban government cannot accept involvement in the
Puerto Rican cause and our unyielding duty of solidarity with it as a controversial
bilateral issue between the United States and Cuba." He continued that Cuban
support for any independence movement which might emerge from the conference
would be "clearly explained" by Prime Minister Fidel Castro "in connection with
the problem of relations with the US."
There is some evidence that Castro was surprised by the vigor of the US
reaction to Cuba's UN initiative and tried to limit the impact of the Puerto Rican
campaign in the US.
--Dorticos' speech contained none of the more extravagant accusations against
the US included in the conference's final declaration and limited itself to a
fairly standard Cuban analysis of Puerto Rico's relationship with the US.
--Castro had a quasi-governmental organization rather than the Foreign Ministry
prepare for and conduct the solidarity conference.
--Castro also chose to have Dorticos make the speech rather than himself,
perhaps calculating that a tough speech by someone else would have little
long-term effect on Cuban-US relations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 13, 1975
--Furthermore, in what appears to have been a deliberate effort to ensure that
the, event was not spotlighted in the US, he limited US press coverage and even
canceled the scheduled visit of a US television network correspondent.
The Cuban leadership apparently had decided to exploit the Puerto Rican issue
in order to re-emphasize its commitment to revolutionary, anti-imperialist principles
and provide a counterbalance to Cuban gestures toward normalizing relations with
the US. The solidarity campaign also allowed Castro to answer domestic opposition
to a modification of Cuba's relationship with the US.
Castro and Deputy Prime Minister Rodriguez evidently believe that Cuban
support for Puerto Rican independence will enhance Havana's prestige in Latin
America and reinforce Cuba's claim to leadership of the Latin American bloc in the
Third World. However, neither Castro nor Rodriguez is reported to have a personal
interest in the issue, since both recognize the impotence of the Puerto Rican
nationalists.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 13, 1975
Argentine Economy Minister Cafiero, just back from negotiations in the US,
has announced significant progress in obtaining badly needed financial assistance
from abroad.
His success not only will bolster the nation's serious balance-of-payments
situation but will also enhance Cafiero's personal reputation. He has already emerged
as the cabinet's most prominent figure.
Cafiero told a press conference on his return from Washington that he had
secured over $800 million in loans. The International Monetary Fund has agreed to
supply a $200-million credit for export expansion and petroleum purchases; the
Inter-American Development Bank will provide $100 million and may be prepared
to supply still more for a variety of projects; commercial banks will lend $440
million; and Venezuela will increase its deposits in a major Argentine bank by some
$60 million.
Cafiero again sounded a basically optimistic note on prospects for the
economy, while not minimizing the magnitude of such problems as inflation,
unemployment, disinvestment, and a highly unfavorable balance of payments.
Cafiero indicated that no new massive devaluations were in store, but said that
frequent mini-devaluations designed to keep exports competitive would be carried
out.
Cafiero's advent as the government's man of the hour is a mixed blessing at
best. A succession of highly visible and often competent cabinet officers before him
have been stripped of their influence, at least in part because of fears that they were
seeking too much personal power.
The concerted efforts of organized labor and the military ultimately achieved
the ouster of social welfare minister and chief presidential adviser Lopez Rega.
Similar pressure was brought to bear on former interior minister Benitez, whose
activist role, despite his competence, aroused suspicions. His successor, Col. Vicente
Damasco, was almost immediately perceived to be reaching for power and lost his
military commission and most of his prestige as a result.
Cafiiero's successful beginning in dealing with the nation's number-one problem
has enhanced his prospects as a potential presidential candidate in 1977 and will
thus draw the fire of other contenders for power. He will have to match his skill as
an economist with adroit political moves if he is to succeed where many others have
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 13, 1975
ARGENTINA: According to press accounts, President Peron has formally
transferred her authority to Senate president Italo Luder and today will begin a
40-day leave of absence within the country. The often rumored vacation is said to be
for health reasons. Luder is next in the line of succession and would take over at
least temporarily in the event Mrs. Peron did not resume her duties. Effective power
has long since passed from her hands; some observers have speculated that a vacation
might be the prelude to her departure from office.
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