NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A028100010018-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 20, 2006
Sequence Number:
18
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 12, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A028100010018-0.pdf | 346.44 KB |
Body:
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National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
September 12, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 12, 1975
CONTENTS
LEBANON: Situation report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
PORTUGAL: Negotiations for government
of national unity continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR-UN: Soviets again
propose nuclear test ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
PANAMA: Disclosure of terms of canal
agreements could jeopardize negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CHILE: Lackluster
speech by Pinochet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 12, 1975
Lebanese army units moved into position between Tripoli and Zagharta early
yesterday, effectively ending civil unrest in northern Lebanon. A few leftist and
Muslim politicians in Tripoli have criticized the cabinet's decision to bring in the
army, but the majority of Muslims and Christians in the area appear to have
welcomed it.
The country's main Muslim political leaders, who reside in Beirut and
ordinarily oppose any use of the army for internal security purposes, have so far
withheld comment. This is partly out of deference to Kararni, who heads one
important Sunni Muslim faction, but it also reflects their admiration for the
concessions he has been able to wring from Lebanon's conservative Christian leaders.
The cabinet yesterday approved a bill reorganizing the army to establish the
"command council" proposed by Karami in a policy speech last month. Although
no details have been made public, the council presumably would include
representatives of Lebanon's major religious sects and have the final word on such
matters as army deployments and promotions. Loss of these prerogatives would
significantly reduce the power of the army commander, who by custom is always a
Maronite Christian.
Christian groups in parliament have in the past strongly opposed proposals to
reorganize the army. Karami's position has been strengthened considerably by his
handling of the current crisis, however, and his proposals may now win greater
backing from centrist Christian politicians hoping to avoid another round of
violence.
In return for their support for the government, Muslim leaders apparently are
demanding also that the Christians responsible for the killing of 12 Muslims on the
Tripoli-Beirut highway last Sunday be turned over to authorities. Christian leaders so
far have refused to meet this demand.
Leftist leaders who follow Kamal Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist
Party, met yesterday and reportedly will assemble again today to consider their
reaction to the government move. They have promised a formal policy statement,
which probably will be critical but will fall short of advocating armed resistance.
Zuhayr Muhsin, head of the Syrian-controlled Saiqa fedayeen group and the
Palestine. Liberation Organization military department, announced yesterday that
the Palestinians have no objection to the government's use of the army. The decision
to do so, he said, is a "purely domestic question."
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 12, 1975
Lebanese and Palestinian radicals backed by Iraq have called for a general strike
on Monday to protest deployment of the army. Their call is not likely to be heeded,
however, unless the continuing cabinet talks on army reform break down.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 12, 1975
Portuguese President Costa Gomes and the next prime minister, Admiral
Azevedo,, are trying to overcome the latest obstacle to forming a new government:
the Communist refusal to cooperate.
The military leaders, reportedly including Major Melo Antunes, have continued
negotiations with representatives of the Socialist, Communist, and Popular
Democratic parties toward forming a "national unity" government. They want to
avoid a formal coalition agreement but to attract enough support and participation
from civilians to give the new government a chance of dealing effectively with
Portugal's growing economic and social problems. Their task has been greatly
complicated, however, since the Communists launched a harsh propaganda campaign
against the center-left Popular Democrats. The Communists'campaign appears to be
a stalling tactic designed to get them better terms for joining the government.
Socialist leader Mario Soares has reportedly been asked to help overcome the
differences between the Communists and the Popular Democrats.
A Popular Democratic Party source told a US embassy official yesterday that
Azevedo, Costa Gomes, and the Antunes faction had agreed to the conditions of his
party and the Socialists for joining the government. Military leaders met twice
yesterday with the Communists and the Socialists; the Communists apparently were
putting up stiff resistance to the conditions of the other two parties. The Popular
Democratic source said, however, that he thought that the Communists would
eventually agree to enter the government.
Costa Gomes also presided over a meeting of the Revolutionary Council
yesterday, presumably to discuss the new government, efforts by pro-Communists to
stir up trouble in the military, and the unfavorable reaction to the decree law it
passed on Monday restricting publication of the military's political views.
Not only have the press, radio, and television criticized the decree law as an
abridgement of press freedom, but some in the media have even disobeyed it. A
meeting called by journalists to fight the new law was held yesterday at the leftist
independent daily A Capital.
On the island of Madeira, meanwhile, a serious threat to Lisbon's authority
appears to be gathering steam. On Wednesday, the independence movement there
threatened to expel from the island anyone opposed to independence unless they
declared their support by midnight, September 17. The list of expellees includes the
chief of staff of the Portuguese forces in Madeira, all continental officers stationed
there, and all Communist Party members.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 12, 1975
Moscow has announced that its annual showcase disarmament proposal for the
United Nations General Assembly this year will take the form of a draft treaty
banning all testing of nuclear weapons. One key purpose of the exercise is to
embarrass the Chinese.
As with previous Soviet proposals, Moscow avoids making any significant
concessions. All nuclear weapons tests would be banned, and verification of
compliance would be by "national technical means" rather than by an international
body. Exempted from the ban would be "peaceful" underground nuclear
explosions. States without nuclear weapons could conduct "peaceful" explosions as
provided in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, while nuclear weapons states would
negotiate a new accord to cover their activities. The treaty would not come into
effect until all nuclear weapons states, including China and France, had agreed.
Furthermore, it would have no time limit; any signatory would be able to withdraw
if it felt the treaty conflicted with its "higher interests."
Moscow obviously is following the same propaganda route it took with
proposals for a World Disarmament Conference (1971), a permanent ban on the use
of nuclear weapons (1972), a reduction of military budgets (1973), and bans on
environmental modification (1974). Its lack of consultation with the other nuclear
states before announcing its latest proposal and the foreordained opposition of
China and France show that Moscow expects no serious negotiations on the subject.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 12, 1975
The details of agreements in principle reached thus far by the Panama Canal
negotiators have been made public by a radical student group. Their release could
embarrass the Panamanian government and possibly jeopardize the talks.
A leftist student group gave the secret Foreign Ministry text of the agreements
to the Law Faculty of the University of Panama, various news agencies including
Cuba's Prensa Latina, and to an opposition broadcast station. Using the document as
its source, the station called on the government to denounce the accords,
characterizing the agreements as extremely favorable to the US and implying a
Panamanian "sellout."
The details released include a provision that could be used to give the US a role
in canal defense following the expiration date of the new treaty. This sensitive clause
could provoke a highly negative reaction on the part of Panamanian nationalists.
Government authentication of the prematurely disclosed accords would also draw
attacks on the administration from other students, as well as conservative opponents
of national leader General Torrijos, at a time when the Panamanian negotiating team
is not prepared to defend the compromises.
The student group and the opposition radio claim that the government
withheld details during earlier briefings of the students on the status of negotiations
and that Torrijos is not complying with his recent promise to be candid with the
public.
So far, the government is denying the authenticity of the released document.
The release of the accords and the government's denial of their authenticity will
complicate government efforts to publish the official text, however, when treaty
talks conclude and the ratification process gets under way.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 12, 1975
In a ceremony yesterday marking the second anniversary of the military
take-over, President Augusto Pinochet declared that his government would partially
ease the state of siege, but he reaffirmed its intention to restrict individual rights.
Most of the speech was devoted to reiterating the regime's moral righteousness, its
fierce opposition to Marxism, and its determination to stick with a hard line.
No new departures were announced in economic or foreign affairs. The only
noteworthy innovation was a proposal to create a "council of state" composed of
former presidents and other prominent citizens to advise the junta on major
questions. While this would seem to open the door to cooperation with key
politicians such as former president Eduardo Frei, leader of the large Christian
Democratic Party, the odds are against the move toward a meaningful dialogue. Frei
is probably hoping that economic difficulties will force the
government to abandon its extremely conservative advisers and perhaps alter the
junta leadership.
The President's strong distrust of political parties and his indirect criticism of
them in his speech seem to show that there has not been any real shift in the
government's authoritarian attitude or in its tendency to equate all opposition with
subversion. Actually, the proposal is more likely to be a public relations gambit than
a forthright step toward greater political tolerance.
Pinochet's decision to reduce the state of siege may also be a largely empty
gesture. The decision will allow some review authority by civil courts, but there will
probably be little substantive impact unless the government chooses to abide by
decrees more closely than it has in the past. There has been a repeated tendency to
look the other way while the security forces ignore the letter as well as the spirit of
the law. There was no new word on the release of prisoners.
For the most part, the President dwelled on his now standard theme that Chile
stands virtually alone in its campaign against monolithic world communism. The US
embassy observed that his generally lackluster statements found a less enthusiastic
reception than last year. The relatively minor modifications he proposed will not go
far toward satisfying Chileans who had hoped for greater political liberalization and
a more humanistic economic policy. Nor will they do much to bolster Chile's
international image.
Although Pinochet said the internal unity of the junta was "like granite," we
believe that General Leigh, the air force member of the junta, is unlikely to be
satisfied with the President's hard-line stance. More friction over policymaking seems
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