NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028100010008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 6, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National 1 ntel l ig~nce
Bulletin
~ DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
September 6, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 6, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Goncalves out of leadership
but factionalism persists 1
C~IINA: Peking's new
propaganda campaign 3
SPAIN -SPANISH SAHARA: Madrid preparing
for possible withdrawal from Sahara 5
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FOR THE RECORD 13
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i~lational Intelligence Bulletin
September 6, 1975
The removal of Vasco Goncalves from the Portuguese leadership leaves the
armed forces divided into opposing factions, but may improve Admiral Azevedo's
chances of forming a new government. There has been no public reaction from the
rival factions.
A communique issued after a rump session of the Armed Forces General
Assembly last night said Goncalves had "declined" the post of chief of staff of the
armed forces. It is clear, however, that he was forced out by antiCommunist officers
in the army and air force. Goncalves and three of his closest supporters also were
purged from the Revolutionary Council, which has apparently regained most of its
former power as Portugal's dominant policy-making body.
Goncalves' removal may have been part of yet another attempt by the
President to arrange a compromise that would not make any faction the complete
winner or loser. In addition to the pro-Communist officers purged from the
Revolutionary Council, Commander Vitor Crespo, a loyal supporter of Major Melo
Antunes, also was dropped.
'The list of the revamped council also fails to include Antunes and Major Vitor
Alves, leaders of the anti-Goncalves drive. The assembly's communique said the
council would have to decide later whether Antunes and Alves, along with
Goncallves' labor minister Costa Martins, would be asked to rejoin its membership.
Separate lists for the revised council apparently were drawn up by the
individual service assemblies earlier this week. The members, all previously on the
council, reflect the predominant political leanings of the services they represent. The
anti-Communist faction generally associated with Antunes appears to have a
majority, although that could be changed by the switch of only a few votes.
This apparent effort at compromise may defuse a situation that had moved
dangerously close to a violent confrontation, although there has been no indication
of hove either the Antunes or Goncalves factions are reacting to the announced
changes. General Carvalho was quoted as saying after the meeting yesterday that it
contributed nothing to restoring unity or tranquility in Portugal.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 6, 1975
The principal demand of the Antunes group and the democratic political
parties-the ouster of Gancalves-was met, however, and Prime Minister -designate
Azevedo may now receive greater cooperation in forming a government. Socialist
leader Soares' demands for an election and a separation of civilian and military
responsibilities, together with his strong criticism of the Communist Party, will pose
problems, however, if Azevedo continues to press for a government that includes the
Socialists, Communists, and Popular Democrats.
With yesterday's decisions failing to resolve decisively the factional power
struggle, there also remains the possibilit of the ri htist forces of former resident
Spinola playing the spoiler role.
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hlati~nal Intelligence Bulletin
September 6, 1975
Peking may be speaking with two voices on the scope and content of the new
campaign to criticize the ancient novel "Water Margin." A People's Daily editorial of
September 4, published 12 days after the campaign began, appears to take a more
limited view of the campaign than that expressed in the earlier articles.
Using a new quotation from Chairman Mao, the editorial stated that Mao had
initiated the campaign. This tardy reference to the Chairman as the originator seems
aimed at negating the idea that the campaign is aimed at him. The novel's leading
figure teas been attacked for failing to oppose the "emperor," a reference that is
almost certain to be read by the Chinese populace as an attack on Mao. The earlier
articles,, beginning on August 23, did not credit the Chairman with launching the
campaign.
Thre editorial appears to differ in several other respects from the earlier
material. While the other articles promote continuing revolutionary struggle, the
editorial makes a strong bid for unity. It also relegates the campaign to a
"discussion" movement, noting that study of the novel will have a significant impact
on literary criticism, history, philosophy, and education. The latter comment seems
to dilute the campaign's potential as a political attack on current leaders.
Thre editorial makes it clear that policy toward the Soviet Union is an issue in
1:he campaign. This aspect is probably the most important in Mao's view. The Mao
cluotati~on dubs the novel an important description of "capitulationism," and the
editorial pointedly notes that disgraced Chinese leaders Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao
c;apitul~rted to the Soviet Union. The former leaders are linked with the novel's
leading figure, also attacked as a "capitulationist."
Art article by Liang Hsiao, apparently a pseudonym for a prominent Chinese
official,, was released in English by the official news agency on September 2 and
deals specifically with the problem of the Soviet Union. Although it does not
mention the current campaign, its release at this time-it first appeared in the August
issue of the party theoretical journal Red Flag-suggests that Peking is trying to draw
i:he attention of the outside world to the Soviet question and to play down the
possiblc~ explosive domestic implications of the current campaign.
l-aken together, the Liang Hsiao article and the new People's Daily editorial
seem to be an effort to focus the campaign on the issue of "standing up to the
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 6, 1975
Soviets"-perhaps in order to isolate those who advocate a less contentious policy
toward Moscow. The earlier People's Daily commentary with its clarion call to
criticize the "emperor" could have been an attempt to line up support for a coming
struggle with Mao on the Soviet and other issues. In particular, the earlier
commentary could be an attempt to rally elements within the military who-as
suggested by last year's propaganda-are most critical of current Chinese policy
toward the Soviet Union. If so, the new campaign has potential for considerable
conflict within the leadership. This seems to be tacitly acknowledged by the People's
Daily editorial, which, in contrast to other articles in the campai n, a ears to be
trying to establish strict boundaries for the m ve
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Natienal Intelligence Bulletin September 6, 1975
SPAIN -SPANISH SAHARA
Madrid is making some preparations for withdrawing from Spanish Sahara but
is unlikely to pull out precipitously. Spain will probably wait for the opinion of the
international Court of Justice on the Moroccan claim to the territory, expected next
month, rather than pull out suddenly and leave a power vacuum in the Sahara. It
does not want to become engaged in a colonial war, however, and may pull out
before the parties involved reach a settlement among themselves.
Some school teachers, medical personnel, and skilled as well as semiprofessional
workers reportedly are migrating or have decided not to return from summer
vacations on the mainland. These actions are believed to be in res onse to Spanish
contingency activities in Sahara
The Algerian-supported Polisario Front, a heretofore anti-Spanish liberation
guerrilla movement, has ceased its terrorist activities against the territorial
government and may have agreed to cooperate in maintaining law and order. This
reversal indicates that the movement is convinced of Franco's intent to withdraw
soon, possibly by early 1976.
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iVatienal Intelligence Bulletin
September 6, 1975
SUDAN: The short-lived coup attempt of September 5 by a small group of
dissidents failed because the plotters were not able to gain significant military
support:. In a public statement, President Numayri has assured the people that
security will be maintained. The Sudanese leader can be expected to take harsh
measures against the plotters and increase internal security measures throughout the
countryr. Meanwhile, the capital remains calm.
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