NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010049-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: August 23, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 23, 1975
CONTENTS
USSR-PORTUGAL: Pravda article
prompts varied interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PORTUGAL-AZORES-MADEI RAS: Support
for independence gaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
JORDAN-SYRIA: Further steps
taken to increase cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
MOROCCO: Hassan vows to recover
Spanish Sahara by year's end . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
RHODESIA: Talks may be undermined
by procedural problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
ARGENTINA: Damasco's appointment
upsets some fellow officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FOR THE RECORD . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
ANNEX: Soviet Support for
Angola's Popular Movement
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 23, 1975
On August 8,.Pravda reprinted an article by K. I. Zarodov concerning Lenin's
analysis of the abortive revolution in Russia in 1905. The article has attracted
considerable attention, particularly in Western Europe, for its implications for the
West European communist parties, for the Soviet Union, and even for Brezhnev
himself.
Zarodov begins: "It is the summer of 1905. Russia is engulfed in the flames of
revolution. All classes and parties are on the move." He goes on: "Seventy years
have passed, but Lenin's work reads today as if it referred to events developing
before our very eyes." Clearly, Zarodov is referring to Portugal.
Zarodov's line is tough, orthodox Leninism. He emphasizes that a communist
party must maintain its hegemony, its separateness from other parties, and its
commitment to lead the revolution. It is precisely this hegemony, he says, that
makes it possible for a communist party to apply the "specific levers" that turn a
"democratic revolution" into a "socialist revolution."
He is scornful of "modern conciliators" who believe that gaining control of the
"levers of power" is the final act of the revolutionary process, which comes after
some kind of "referendum" that expresses the will of the majority. Leninists,
Zarodov says, know that the popular majority is a political, not an arithmetic,
concept; i.e., the communist party expresses the will of the majority, whatever the
results at the ballot box may be.
Zarodov is providing an ideological rationale for Cunhal's tactics in Portugal.
He is justifying the Portuguese Communist Party's infiltration of the state machinery
and the military establishment. Zarodov's article sanctions the assertion of
Communist control over the unions, the shutdown of Republica, and the use of
violence against opponents. At the same time, the article is not an unqualified
endorsement of Cunhal's tactics. Some of Zarodov's observations can be interpreted
as guarded criticism of the Portuguese Communist Party.
Open to different interpretations is Zarodov's wider purpose. The article first
appeared in the July issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism, of which Zarodov is
senior editor. It was written at a time when the Portuguese Communist Party was in
reasonably good shape, when it appeared to have an excellent chance of achieving
power in Portugal, and when its heavy-handed tactics were being openly criticized
by the Italian and other. West European parties. It is possible that Zarodov's purpose
was to tell the Italians and others that they, not Cunhal, are the apostates and that
Portugal might serve as a model for how a West European party comes to power.
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Zarodov may also have had the Soviet audience in mind. His article can be
interpreted as part of the debate on the appropriate strategy and tactics for
nonruling communist parties during the current "crisis of capitalism." In placing his
emphasis on the hegemony of communist parties, Zarodov is trying to refute
theorists who give heavier weight to unity of action between the communist and
other parties.
In reprinting the Zarodov article, Pravda seems to be intervening on the side of
the hard-liners. This raises a question of whether there has been a fundamental
switch in Moscow away from countenancing the quasi-constitutional approach to
achieving power, as exemplified by the Italian Communists, toward the approach
exemplified by the Portuguese.
We have problems with this hypothesis. When Zarodov was writing his article,
the Portuguese Communists were riding high; when Pravda reprinted it, the
Portuguese party was under violent attack and in danger. It is hard to believe that
the Soviets would commend to the West European parties and the world communist
movement the old orthodoxy at exactly the time when the leading exemplar of that
orthodoxy was tottering on the brink of disaster.
It would take some fast, and probably unconvincing, footwork for Moscow to
argue that the reaction against Cunhal is an example of what would happen to the
Italian and French communists if they were on the brink of gaining power. Cunhal
has clearly been playing a different game than Berlinguer or Marchais.
Another hypothesis is that Pravda's message was more modest: the West
Europeans and others should not interpret a defeat for Cunhal as vindication of their
own approach to achieving power. It is also possible that Moscow reprinted
Zarodov's article in Pravda as a token of its "solidarity" with the beleaguered
Portuguese comrades. The Soviets always feel themselves under some obligation to
protect their revolutionary credentials.
The Zarodov article may have been the instrument for a militant note after the
European security conference and before a meeting of European communist parties.
The Soviets are making a valiant effort to have it both ways. Thus, their line on
Portugal has consistently supported Cunhal's grab to power even though they
supported the unity of action by the Communists and other parties.
Zarodov's boss, Politburo candidate-member Ponomarev, last year wrote a
widely discussed article on the lessons of Chile that emphasized the importance of
controlling the levers of power. Last month, Ponomarev was extolling the
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 23, 1975
appropriateness and importance of maintaining relations between communists and
social democrats. Indeed, Ponomarev, along with his superior, senior ideologist
Suslov, was speaking at a conference commemorating the 40th anniversary of the
popular front.
This is not to say that Zarodov's article and the situation in Portugal do not
raise questions about the relationship between detente and revolutionary change.
The supporters of the current Soviet detente policy have cited Portugal as a case
where revolutionary progress has been possible as a consequence of detente. If the
Portuguese Communists come to a bad end, those who are less enamored of detente
will have another string for their bow. F77 I
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 23, 1975
Portuguese Popular Democratic Party leaders in the Azores foresee eventual
independence for the islands regardless of the outcome of the political turmoil in
Lisbon. Should a nonradical government emerge, the timetable for independence
will be deferred rather than abandoned.
Two Popular Democratic Party leaders, one recently named to the new
governing board of the islands, have admitted their membership in the Azores
Liberation Front to the US consul. They claim the Popular Democrats control the
Front in the Horta and Angra districts, but factionalism within the Front has kept
the party from taking control of Ponta Delgada district. The Front's contingent in
Horta district is purportedly well-organized and has the support of the police and
the army battalion except for the commander.
On the mainland, the Armed Forces Movement apparently is divided over
policy toward the Azores. Movimento, the Movement's official bulletin, has been
critical of members who have on the one hand underestimated the intensity of
sentiment for independence or who on the other have accepted it as accomplished
fact. The "correct" view, according to the bulletin, is to recognize the plight of the
Azorean worker and take revolutionary measures to solve his problems. The
publication underscores the lack of consensus in the Armed Forces Movement over
what to do about the Azorean problem.
The continuing crisis in Lisbon is also contributing to increased support for
independence in the Madeira Islands. Failure to redress the grievances of the
islanders apparently is generating support for the recently formed Front for the
Liberation of the Madeiran Archipelago. It reportedly has formed a government in
exile and demands total independence rather than increased autonomy. Although
this organization is said to believe independence will be achieved peacefully, its
members apparently are armed. They probably are responsible for blowing up the
state radio transmitter on August 22.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 23, 1975
Jordan and Syria have taken further steps to increase cooperation in a number
of fields.
In a communique capping King Husayn's five-day visit to Syria, the two
countries announced the formation of a "Supreme Syrian-Jordanian Command
Council" composed of Husayn and Syrian President Asad. The council is supposed
to meet at least once every three months to act on recommendations of the
ministerial committee formed at the time of Asad's visit to Jordan last month.
The communique avoided any mention of a joint military command, and its
specific labeling of the new council as "political" seems designed to relieve Israeli
and US apprehension that Jordan and Syria have established a military command.
The command council will, however, review plans for "coordination and
integration" between the two armed forces.
The prerogatives of the command council appear to be sufficiently broad to
permit Husayn to keep his options open and move toward closer military
cooperation at his own pace. Although the King sees benefits in closer cooperation
with Syria, he will be careful not to alienate the Jordanian army, his major power
base. For its part, the army remains skeptical of Syrian motives, fearing that Asad
will prevail on the King to allow the fedayeen to re-establish a presence in Jordan.
The pro forma treatment of Palestinian aspirations in the communique may reassure
the army for the time being.
The communique lists several other areas in which the two governments are to
work together. In addition to planning for a "unified foreign policy," particularly
with respect to Arab issues, the command council will discuss coordination of
economic and social development plans, the formation of joint economic companies,
unification of markets, and establishment of a unified customs policy.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 23, 1975
In a speech on Wednesday, King Hassan again vowed to "recover" Spanish
Sahara by the end of the year, by force if necessary.
At the same time, Hassan repeated his desire to acquire Spanish Sahara by
peaceful and legal means. He promised to limit his efforts to the diplomatic level
until October or November so as not to interfere with the forthcoming advisory
opinion by the International Court of Justice or the UN General Assembly's
response to that opinion.
Hassan first set a deadline for resolution of the dispute a year ago, when he
characterized 1975 as the year of mobilization to liberate Spanish Sahara. He is a
clever tactician, however, and will find a way around his own deadline if that suits
his purposes.
In a clear reference to Algeria, the King expressed disappointment with the
attitudes of those who go back on their commitments each time they see that their
interests lie elsewhere. He declared Morocco must be willing to take "decisive
action" with regard to other countries if they do not give the support Morocco has
the right to expect.
Hassan's thinly veiled criticism of Algeria reflects his disappointment that
Algeria has not actively supported the communique of July 4 in which Algeria
publicly accepted a Moroccan-Mauritanian understanding that would partition the
disputed territory. Algiers is trying to keep its options open for as long as possible
by continued public support for the principle of self-determination for Spanish
Saharans and for a pro-independence Saharan political group.
The King's sabre rattling was, in part, a response to continuing Spanish efforts
to put together a coalition of various political groups in the Sahara looking toward a
settlement by self-determination and to Madrid's unwillingness to negotiate a
bilateral deal with Morocco before the Court's opinion is rendered. He is also
worried that the opinion may be either neutral or unfavorable to Morocco's claim.
The speech, prepared for a major holiday that traditionally inspires strong
rhetoric, also was meant for domestic consumption. The King wants to keep
Moroccan attention focused on his Saharan campaign to reap as much internal
support as possible. He may also be responding to reports of restiveness among army
units who are bivouacked with little to do in the desert heat near the Saharan
border.
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August 23, 1975
Prime Minister Smith and black Rhodesian nationalists are to begin settlement
talks Monday, but an early break-off is threatened by disagreements over further
procedural arrangements.
Both sides have confirmed that they will meet in a railroad car on the bridge
spanning the Zambezi River at Victoria Falls. Smith will be accompanied by four
cabinet ministers and a few aides. The Rhodesian African National Council has
named a 28-man delegation, including all leaders of its rival factions.
The Council's leaders, however, have repudiated an earlier agreement that the
specific settlement terms will be drawn up by joint committees working inside
Smith has said publicly that the initial session will be merely a brief formality,
and he may welcome the Council's partial repudiation of the earlier agreement as an
excuse for scrapping settlement talks. The Prime Minister appeared to be preparing
for a crackdown on the Council until two weeks ago, when he acceded to the latest
plan for salvaging settlement talks under heavy pressure from South African Prime
Minister Vorster.
Since the Council's leaders decided to reject negotiations inside Rhodesia,
British envoys in Zambia and Zambian officials have urged
new procedural compromises.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 23, 1975
Recurrent rumors of an impending military coup, which have now reached the
press, may be emanating from officers upset by the presence of a fellow
officer-army Colonel Vicente Damasco-in a government they consider without
merit. The rumors seem designed to make his position untenable.
The appointment of Damasco as interior minister has given these long-time
critics something to zero in on. They feel his participation will be construed as
military support for the government and that, as an institution, the army will be
made to look foolish should the administration continue to falter. Resentment of
Damasco's rapid rise to prominence and his failure to consult with these officers in
the process of selecting the new cabinet, a process he directed, also play a part in
the current problem.
In the current climate of political uncertainty, heightened by sharply escalating
leftist violence, speculation that the army will intervene openly has risen again but
with increased prominence. The obstacles to a take-over, however, are many and
formidable.
In addition, there is very genuine, widespread sentiment in favor of a
constitutional solution to the leadership vacuum. This stems from the realization by
most officers that there is no current problem-whether it is terrorism, economic
chaos, or inept leadership-that the. officers have not already sought vainly to
remedy under three successive military regimes from 1966 to 1973.
If the army as a whole is to be goaded into seizing full control of the
government, it will require an event of unprecedented magnitude, such as a
nationwide halt to all economic activity or a gue. rilla take-over of an entire city. An
attempt by a minority faction would likely fail.
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August 23, 1975
TURKEY: The Turkish general staff yesterday set up new procedures that
prohibit US air force flights to and through lncirlik air base, unless on a
NATO-related mission. Flights to third countries must now be routed through
civilian airports at Istanbul and Ankara, thus entailing landing, parking, and service
fees. The move does not appear to be a new effort to step up pressure on the US
Congress to lift the arms embargo, but rather the implementation of the Turkish
government's earlier decision to restrict operations at Incirlik to NATO-related
activities. Ankara appears willing to await the result of a new vote by the US
Congress on the arms embargo before taking further action against the bases. A new
vote is expected during the second week in September.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Soviet Support for Angola's Popular Movement
August 23, 1975
Moscow is giving strong support to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola. It is not only training Popular Movement troops, but more important, it is
delivering military equipment. These deliveries do not cost the Soviets much, but
they have considerable impact in Angola. Moscow has sharply increased shipments
during the past year, almost certainly because it calculated that the revolution in
Portugal would foster change in Angola, which the Soviets wanted to be in a
position to exploit.
Even before the increased shipments began, the Popular Movement had
amassed an impressive array of Soviet equipment. The Movement's arsenal was
well-stocked with a variety of small arms, including machine guns and grenade
launchers, and some heavier items, such as 82-mm. mortars, B-10 82-mm. recoilless
rifles, and 122-mm. rockets.
The new deliveries have continued the flow of some of this equipment and have
added several other types of materiel, including armored cars, trucks, armored
personnel carriers, antitank weapons, and rocket launchers. The Popular Movement
is far and away the best equipped of the contending groups in Angola.
Moscow conducts training programs for the Popular Movement both in the
USSR and in the Congo. Thousands of Popular Movement troops have received
training in the USSR since the early Union,
Popular Movement troops are thus better organized and better led than
tot se of its major rival, the National Front.
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Lobito
Benguela)
Ondangua
iOWEST AFRICA
ttntem on& Terdtoryi
Areas controlled by:
Popular Movement
National Front
National Union
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August 23, 1975
The Soviets presumably see the pro-Soviet Marxist Neto as the kind of
liberation movement leader they prefer to work with. Their relative generosity to
the Popular Movement may be intended to exemplify the rewards that await those
who associate themselves with Moscow. Over the longer term, the Soviets may hope
that with an amenable government in Luanda, they will be able to exert a major
influence on events in southern Africa and to limit Chinese advances in the region.
The Soviets probably have not lost sight of the strategic or economic
opportunities that might flow from an Angola under the control of Neto's Popular
Movement. But it is hard to see how much, if anything, Moscow would gain from
bases in Angola. With the opening of the Suez Canal, the South Atlantic seafaring
lanes are even less important to the Soviet navy than they have been. Bases in
Angola could not add significantly to any current Soviet military activity, and
Angola would be strategically important to Moscow only if the Soviets
contemplated a major new increase of their activities in the South Atlantic. There is
no evidence they have any such plans.
The Soviets themselves have no need for Angolan or Cabindan resources, but
they might want to use Cabindan oil to supply some of their East European clients.
The Soviets many also want to hinder Western access to the minerals in the area.
The Soviets probably do not expect any immediate return on their investment.
While Soviet arms and equipment have helped the Popular Movement to assert
control over Luanda, Cabinda, and some other areas, they have not-and probably
cannot-overcome the Popular Movement's inherent weaknesses. The Popular
Movement's essentially urban character, its relatively limited personnel resources,
and Neto's doctrinaire and unappealing personality make significant inroads into the
countryside strongholds of the National Front or National Union unlikely, no
matter how much equipment the Soviets send.
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On the other hand, neither of the other two groups-or both in concert for that
matter-appears able to defeat the Popular Movement decisively on its own territory.
Since there is no support whatsoever for a partition agreement, a protracted war of
attrition seems in the offing, and Moscow wants to make sure the Popular Movement
is well-provisioned for the ordeal.
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