NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010043-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: August 27, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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l op Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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August 27, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 27, 1975
PORTUGAL: Fabiao reportedly ceases
attempts to replace Goncalves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ARGENTINA: Tensions heightened over
army colonel's cabinet appointment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
BAHRAIN: National Assembly
to be dissolved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
FRANCE-ITALY-PORTUGAL: Communists
lukewarm to conference with
Socialists on Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
GREECE: NATO role
may be increasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
ANNEX: US Arms Inventory in Vietnam
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 27, 1975
Portuguese army Chief of Staff Fabiao reportedly has ceased trying to form a
new government to replace that of Prime Minister Goncalves.
A Lisbon newspaper
reports a a iao as
given up his efforts. The newspaper account says that further attempts at a
compromise may be under way that would assign the task of forming a new
government to someone else, possibly navy Chief of Staff Azevedo. He is a close
friend of President Costa Gomes and last week gave at least indirect support to
Go nca Ives.
Goncalves, meanwhile, appears determined to preserve the appearance of an
active prime minister presiding over a functioning government. He met with the
decolonization commission yesterday morning and later presided over a cabinet
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 27, 1975
meeting. A communique after the cabinet session underlined the decision to
reorganize certain military bodies, including the Revolutionary Council, which has
opposed Goncalves' consolidation of power.
The government communique also stressed the importance of the newly
organized united front comprising the Communist Party and seven other left-wing
extremist groups as an effective instrument to halt the widespread anti-Communist
violence. The front has called for a series of "unity demonstrations" to be held
throughout the country in support of Goncalves. The first is scheduled for this
evening in Lisbon,
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 27, 1975
Tension has increased sharply - over the issue of army Colonel Vicente
Damasco's appointment as interior minister and his principal backer-army
commander in chief General Numa Lapland 25X1
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Top army commanders have issued statements demanding Numa Laplane's
retirement and Damasco's removal from the cabinet, or at least retirement from
active military status. Military leaders resent the prominent role Laplane and
Damasco played in selecting the latest cabinet and their failure to consult widely in
the process. They believe that Damasco's presence in the cabinet links the armed
forces to what they consider a hopelessly inept government.
President Peron yesterday defied the armed forces by rejecting a resignation
offered by Numa Laplane. Press reports indicate he has again offered to resign and
has proposed First Army corps commander General Caceres as his replacement. The
appointment of Caceres, who is not identified with those pressing hardest for
Damasco and Numa Laplane to go, would presuppose the retirement of most of the
disgruntled generals, who are senior to Caceres. Such a prospect is not likely to be
accepted by the military.
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Kuwall
>PLZZ' 'K%.'
BAHRAIN
Area: 230 sq. miles
plus group of smaller islands
Population: 237,000
Religion: Muslim
Language: Arabic
Government leader: Emir Isa
BAHRAIN
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4 rtz ~\ Oman
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 27, 1975
The Emir apparently will dissolve the National Assembly within the next few
days. The constitution calls for a new national election within two months.
In the interim, the government will probably introduce constitutional changes
to bar the re-election of former members of the "People's Bloc" and strengthen the
Khalifa family's control of the parliamentary process. The result of these
amendments can be expected to limit Arab nationalist participation. While this will
ensure that future national assemblies are cooperative, it will also signal a
polarization between supporters of the Khalifas and dissidents, who will agitate
increasingly for a violent overthrow of the royal family.
Since the first national election in 1973, when 16 dissident Bahrainis were
elected to the National Assembly, the royal family has found its previous authority
challenged. The dissidents, who made up the "People's Bloc," were successful in
turning the assembly into a forum for expanding their influence among the various
anti-Khalifa elements of Bahraini society.
As a result of the assembly's intransigence over the government's new security
proposal last June, the royal family decided that the body's continuation in its
present form presented a threat to the stability of the country. Government
counteraction, however, had to be within the limits of Bahrain's constitution. With
the resignation of the prime minister, the stage has now been set for restructuring
Bahrain's "experiment in democracy."
The royal family has been careful to point out that the assembly had been
negligent in addressing vital domestic issues such as housing and food. It has claimed
instead that the dissident elements had turned the assembly into a forum for debate,
sensationalism, and provocation and had attempted to introduce ideas that were
alien to the basic Islamic nature of Bahraini society. The Emir charged the prime
minister, who has been reappointed, to submit recommended changes to the
constitution. He also called on the government to ensure that Islamic beliefs
underlying Bahraini society and culture be strengthened in the future.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 27, 1975
FRANCE-ITALY-PORTUGAL
French and Italian Communists have responded hesitantly to Portuguese
Socialist leader Soares' call for a conference of southern European Socialist and
Communist parties to discuss Portugal.
French Socialist leader Mitterrand and his Italian counterpart, De Martino,
reacted quickly and positively to Soares' request. Communist leaders in the two
countries, however, appear caught between their desire to be forthcoming for public
consumption at home and their reluctance to get involved in what appears to be an
attempt by Soares to use them to bring pressure on the Portuguese Communist Party
to adopt a more cooperative line.
The Communist parties of all three countries invited to attend-France, Spain,
and Italy-have sought, to one degree or another, alliances with democratic parties
to open the path to power. The parties in Italy and Spain, in particular, have been
critical of the Portuguese Communists' cavalier attitude toward democratic
procedures and adoption of more traditional revolutionary tactics.
In an obvious stalling tactic, French Communist Party leader George Marchais
argued in his reply last week that solidarity of the left in Western Europe is too
important for such a meeting to be restricted to Portugal, France, Italy, and Spain,
and suggested other European parties be invited as well. He probably hopes that at
worst the difficulty of organizing such a meeting will delay it until the situation in
Portugal is more settled, or at best that the proposal will be forgotten entirely.
Marchais realizes that on most issues his party would be in agreement only with the
Portuguese Communists-should they attend, which is doubtful-and does not want
to make his party's isolation even more apparent to the French electorate.
The events in Portugal have provoked a quarrel, widely reported in the press,
between the French Communists and Socialists, in which Marchais has come off
second best. His image as the more doctrinaire, inflexible, and less democratic leader
has been reinforced. His rival, Socialist Party secretary Francois Mitterrand, has
gained by appearing to be a traditional social democrat who knows the limitations of
his alliance with the Communists and can stand up to their ideological assaults.
the implications for the Communist image
in ranee o e quarrel with the Socialists are now of major concern to the French
party's leaders, who hope to be able to mute the disagreement. This will be difficult,
however, because the Portuguese issues touch sensitive nerves in the party that are
already irritated by internal debate over the value of continued cooperation with the
French Socialists.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 27, 1975
Mitterrand reportedly will be meeting within the next two weeks with Socialist
leaders Harold Wilson, Willy Brandt, and Swedish Prime Minister Palme to discuss
aid to Portugal.
The Italian Communists also responded cautiously to Snares' proposal. They
made a statement approving in principle understandings between West European
Communists and Socialists so long as they have been adequately prepared. This
circumspection seems to reflect the party's desire to play along, while avoiding
polemical exchanges with the Soviets. In recent weeks, the Italian Communists
seemed to be backing away from their earlier open criticism of the Portuguese
Communists' strong-arm tactics.
The Italian Socialists, on the other hand, reacted enthusiastically to Soares'
proposal and expressed satisfaction with the Italian Communists' equivocal support.
The Socialists are trying to give the impression that they lead the left, in part by
avoiding open differences with the Communists. The Socialists also welcomed
Soares' proposal as a vindication of their joint communique with the Communists in
mid-August, which called for a political agreement between Portuguese
"democratic" parties and the Armed Forces Movement. The Socialists drew strong
domestic criticism for that act of "neo-frontism" with the Communists.
The Spanish parties have yet to respond to Soares' invitation.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 27, 1975
Athens has not as yet officially made known its intentions regarding its future
role in NATO, but the Greeks appear more favorably disposed to the alliance than at
any time since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
Most Greek armed forces officers believe their military withdrawal from the
alliance was a mistake, and Prime Minister Karamanlis may now feel that sentiment
against the US and NATO has reached a low enough ebb to allow a slow return to
the alliance's integrated military command. Athens, moreover, is looking more
toward Western Europe both for military and economic assistance, for which
improved relations with NATO would be beneficial. A solution to the Cyprus
problem, however, will be a likely prerequisite for returning to full participation in
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National Intelligence Bulletin
In their sudden victory over South Vietnam last spring, Hanoi's forces captured
large amounts of US-made military equipment, ranging from small arms to modern
attack aircraft-in fact, every type of equipment the US had provided the South
Vietnamese forces during the war. Much of this hardware is intact and operable, and
there are large quantities of munitions for the weapons.
As a consequence, the communists have a problem deciding what equipment to
integrate into their own forces to strengthen existing capabilities and to provide new
capabilities, and also what to do with any surplus hardware. One of the options open
to Hanoi is that of providing arms to insurgents-a possibility that is causing
considerable concern in several nearby countries, notably Thailand and Malaysia.
Thai insurgents in the northeast, for example, have received aid from Hanoi in the
past, and the North Vietnamese could increase that support now that they have
more than sufficient stocks.
Hanoi could earn hard currency by selling the US equipment on the world
market. The communists face major economic development costs in both North and
South Vietnam and need foreign exchange for this. Hanoi claims that the equipment
is worth about $5 billion; this appears reasonable. The windfall profits the
communists could realize from the sale of a substantial part of this US hardware
would be considerable and would obviously ease the financial burden of
development. A number of countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa
reportedly are interested in obtaining the US equipment. There is, however, still no
indication that Hanoi has decided to sell.
US-made aircraft constitute the most valuable items of captured military
hardware. The communists seized some 1,100 aircraft, including 75 F-5 and 113
A-37 fighter-bombers, and the North Vietnamese apparently are integrating some of
these into their forces.
US Arms Inventory in Vietnam
August 27, 1975
e US-made tighter-bombers give the ort
Vietnamese a significant ground attack capability for the first time. Until now, the
North Vietnamese air force had a clearly defensive orientation.
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August 27, 1975
There is a shortage of some spare parts for the US aircraft, but the problem
does not seem to be insurmountable over the near term. The communists can
cannibalize other aircraft and may be able to find a source of replacement parts on
the international market. There are enough US-trained South Vietnamese
maintenance personnel available to repair and keep the aircraft operational if spare
parts can be obtained.
In addition to the fighter-bombers, the communists seized large numbers of
helicopters. Among these were about three dozen large transport helicopters, and
I as many as 400 smaller combat-su ort helicopters, including
gunships, a into communists hands.1
the North Vietnamese appreciate their mobility and firepower and
probably will keep some for their own forces; many, however, could still be available
for sale.
The communists also captured approximately 50 transports, including C-119s
and C-130s. These aircraft enhance their transportation capabilities, and for this
reason some of them probably will be retained. Moreover, the transports could be
used commercially to earn hard currency and win increased international prestige by
carrying the flag abroad.
The North Vietnamese got significant quantities of communications and radar
equipment, including relatively sophisticated items such as navigational equipment
that permits all-weather operations from airfields in the South. This and other
electronic hardware is difficult to maintain, and the communists will have difficulty
in obtaining the spare parts to keep the equipment operating effectively for very
long. The communists do not, however, need this gear to conduct air operations
during good weather. Most air bases in the South are modern and in good condition.
Moreover, the ground support equipment at the bases is adequate to support
US-made aircraft. Some of this captured sophisticated electronic gear may well be
passed along to the Soviets and the Chinese.
With the take-over, the communists came into possession of some 400 naval
craft and approximately the same number of transport vessels.
The naval craft are mostly coastal and river patrol boats, along with a few
deepwater ships. While these craft provide the communists with an improved patrol
capability, they do not appear necessary and may well become available for export.
communists are likely to retain most of these vessels tor their own use.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Ground Forces Weapons
August 27, 1975
The bulk of the US equipment captured in the South consists of ground forces
weapons and munitions. The inventory contains over 500 tanks, approximately
1,200 armored personnel carriers, about 45,000 trucks and jeeps, some 1,300 pieces
of artillery, nearly 1 million M-16 rifles and other small arms, and thousands of
mortars, antitank weapons, grenade launchers, and machine guns. In addition, there
are large stocks of munitions for all of the weapons.
Much of this equipment appears to be surplus to communist requirements. The
North Vietnamese army is already well equipped with Soviet and Chinese hardware,
and their stockpiles declined little as a result of the spring fighting.
Moreover, the North Vietnamese have been attempting to standardize their
weapons throughout the regular forces, and they probably would be reluctant to
change unless they gained a significant improvement in the process. In most cases,
changing to US weapons would provide little if any improvement. The communist
AK-47 infantry rifle, for example, is considered an effective weapon.
0
Since most of the US
equipment is readily marketable, it seems likely that Hanoi will eventually dispose
most of the armor and other ground forces equipment.
Serious questions of economic advantage, political impact, and international
reputation must, however, be decided before Hanoi begins disposing of its captured
arms stockpile.
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