NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010039-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: August 29, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 29, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Communist leader makes
dramatic appeal to avert civil war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PANAMA: Blast at US played
down by Panamanian officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
SPAIN: Antiterrorist law
may inspire demonstrations
WEST GERMANY: Government
spending to be held to minimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
NAMIBIA: Constitutional
convention opens September 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 29, 1975
Portuguese Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal made a dramatic appeal last
night for a summit conference of military and civilian political leaders for what he
described as a last-minute effort to avert civil war.
Cunhal's appeal was made at a hastily assembled midnight press conference. He
said that there was a real danger that a rightist government would be formed, that
there was a growing feeling in the country that a recourse to force was inevitable,
and that the only way to avoid the worst was to find a common political solution to
the present crisis immediately.
He announced his party was prepared to meet with President Costa Gomes;
members of the present Goncalves government; the military's Revolutionary
Council, including the anti-Communist Antunes group; rival factions in the military;
representatives of parties allied to the Communists; and, the Communists' archrival,
the Socialist Party of Mario Soares. It would appear that Cunhal is concerned about
Goncalves' staying power as prime minister, but he may also be maneuvering to
avoid the onus for an armed showdown should one occur.
In addition to a limited number of military units that might support Goncalves
in such a showdown, the Communists and allied leftists are reported by some
sources to~have 15,000 armed paramilitary men, although this may be a figure the
Communists have deliberately circulated to frighten their opponents. Approximately
half of this number are alleged to be in the immediate Lisbon area; the rest are
widely scattered, some being as far away as Porto.
Costa Gomes' hesitancy to remove Goncalves has been attributed by some
sources to the threat posed by these armed militants. There have been increasing
signs in the past few days, however, that Costa Gomes now intends to take a tougher
stand. On Wednesday, he warned the news media about adding to the present
political tension. He was especially critical of a false report of a meeting between US
Ambassador Carlucci and the anti-Goncalves faction.
The President cut short his speech to a pro-Goncalves demonstration the same
evening because of harassment from the crowd.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 29, 1975
Top military leaders met throughout the day yesterday amid new reports that
Costa Domes would replace Goncalves. Shortly after midnight, the Portuguese radio
announced that navy Chief of Staff Azevedo might soon be named prime minister,
but such reports have been circulating in Lisbon all week.
As the crisis drags on, Cunhal's warning of civil war takes on added credibility.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 29, 1975
Panama's blast at the US at the nonaligned conference in Lima appears to be a
display intended primarily for the Third World audience, and not an attempt to
disturb relations with the US on the eve of another round of treaty negotiations.
Panamanian Minister Juan Tack celebrated Panama's admission to the
nonaligned by telling reporters on August 27 that the US was carrying out
provocative military maneuvers in the Canal Zone that were a "manifestation against
Panamanian sovereignty." He indicated the issue would be formally raised at the
conference. Echoing Tack, another Panamanian delegate warned that Panama will
recover the Zone "through negotiations or other means."
The day before, however, Lieutenant Colonel Noriega, G-2 of the National
Guard, had called US military authorities with advance warning of Tack's charges. In
addition, an editorial in one of the government-controlled papers, while terming the
US maneuvers a provocation, counseled patience and caution so as to avoid
obstructing the negotiations. Panama's Washington ambassador has also notified the
US that Panama will conduct "parallel military maneuvers" next week.
US treaty negotiator Ambassador Bunker is due to arrive in Panama for the
next round of negotiations on September 4 and, despite the theatrics at Lima,
Panama is still ap roachin the talks with cautious optimism
near-term o tion.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 29, 1975
The Spanish government's new crackdown on political dissent could inspire
protests that might test the cohesiveness of Spain's dominant political and military
forces.
A tough new antiterrorist law, approved by the cabinet last Friday, imposes an
automatic death penalty on anyone convicted of killing a member of the security
forces. The law also prescribes the same sentence in cases where a kidnaping results
in the death of a hostage. The decree will be applied retroactively to at least 16
accused terrorists already under detention.
The first test of the law began yesterday in the trial of two Basques charged
with killing a member of the paramilitary civil guard. Spaniards are likely to
compare the trial with the famous Burgos trial of 1970, in which six Basque
terrorists were sentenced to death.
Franco commuted their sentences to 30 years imprisonment, but not before
the verdict had led to widespread demonstrations, involving students, workers, and
the church, and adverse reaction from abroad. The affair also revealed serious
disagreements among various sectors of the power elite as to the direction future
developments in Spain should take.
If a similar storm of protest arises this time, the strain on Spain's ruling circles
could be compounded by publicity given to the cases of the military officers
recently arrested for political activity. Counsel for the defendants is reportedly
considering the tactic of trying to focus as much national and international attention
on the case as possible.
The antiterrorist law's provision for closing newspapers that show sympathy for
the terrorists and the government's recent threat to resort to legal action against
papers spreading rumors about Franco's stepping down are likely to add fuel to
opposition protests and further divide regime supporters. The current editions of
three of Spain's most influential weekly newspapers were seized on August 27, the
day the new law came into effect.
Differences already exist within the government and military on such questions
as the handling of dissent, the proper way to deal with terrorists, and the general
advisability of looser political controls. Those favoring a tough approach have
seemed to be in the ascendancy recently.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 29, 1975
A strong reaction, however, could lead to a more forceful stand by some
Spanish leaders, such as Prime Minister Arias, who are seeking to improve Spain's
image and who believe the only way to achieve a smooth transfer of power is to
begin now to ease political restrictions.
Although Bonn announced Wednesday a one-time infusion of $2.2 billion into
the economy, the government already is hinting that spending increases next year
will be held to a minimum. The stimulus-largely to the severely depressed
construction industry-will be applied quickly to short-term projects that
concentrate impact.
At best, the program will keep some 50,000 to 75,000 construction workers
off the unemployment rolls. The rise in federal spending is equivalent to only 0.5
percent of gross national product, and even this will be offset in part by the
continuing retrenchment in government spending at the state and local levels.
The new program, plus a $2.5-billion budget supplement to keep the
unemployment insurance system viable, will push the federal deficit to about $15
billion this year. Anticipation of a similar deficit next year, which would be
unpopular with West German voters during a national election, has led to plans to
hold spending increases to under 7 percent next year, following the budgeted growth
of 21 percent this year.
Although the government may not be completely successful, in real terms, the
effect will be almost no growth in government spending. By implication, Bonn is
banking on a revival of foreign and private domestic demand-not stimulus from
government spending-to produce the lion's share of growth in 1976. With no clear
sign that either foreign or domestic private demand is on the rise, Bonn may be in
the process of undermining its chances of achieving an economic upswing.
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SOUTH
'AFRICA
[_ African Homeland R Copper mine
White area Diamond mine area
Grazing land
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 29, 1975
A constitutional conference on the future of Namibia (South-West Africa),
opens in Windhoek, the territorial capital, on September 1. It is sponsored by the
South African government.
South African Prime Minister Vorster claims that the delegates, representing
most of the territory's 12 ethnic groups, are free to choose any form of government
for Namibia-even independence for the whole territory as a unified state.
Arrangements for the conference, however, make almost inevitable the emergence of
a loose federal system that would maintain white control of the territory's major
mineral resources.
The delegates to the conference have been chosen indirectly by legislative or
advisory bodies formed for every ethnic group. A few of the legislative councils for
non-white groups have been popularly elected, but even the elected bodies are
dominated by old-line tribal chiefs who usually have gone along with South African
tutelage.
The South Africans say that all ethnic groups in Namibia are to have equal
standing in the conference, although the groups vary widely in numbers and
capabilities for autonomous existence. Some 90,000 whites comprise only 12
percent of the population, yet the sector of the territory that is reserved for whites
includes much of the better grazing lands as well as the rich diamond and copper
mines that contribute substantially to the South African economy. On the other
hand, the Ovambo tribe makes up almost half of the population, but Ovamboland,
situated along the Angolan border, has inadequate resources. Ovambos provide most
of the unskilled labor for the mines.
Pretoria apparently reasons that fear of Ovambo domination will motivate
delegates from the smaller tribes to back the whites in voting for a federal system
that will perpetuate the present ethnic homelands. Although the Ovambos
theoretically might control a popularly elected central government, the tribal leaders
who will go to the conference actually want maximum autonomy for Ovamboland.
A federation might involve no more than cosmetic changes in the South
African policy of separate development that has long incurred broad international
censure. Although some of the "petty apartheid" rules that Pretoria has applied in
the white sector of Namibia have already been lifted, Vorster has not proposed to
abandon the basic discriminatory measures that have kept non-whites from
advancing in the territory's modern industries.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 29, 1975
Inside Namibia, the most articulate opposition to separate development has
come from the South-West African People's Organization, which wants Namibia to
have a unified, popularly elected government. Although its membership is
predominantly Ovambo, the People's Organization is the only Namibian nationalist
group that is recognized by the UN or the Organization of African Unity. Its
foreign-based guerrillas have seldom penetrated Namibian territory, but its youth
wing organized a highly effective boycott of Ovambo legislative elections in
1973-the first popular elections to be held in Namibia. To offset the fiasco, South
African administrators held a new election in Ovamboland last January and achieved
a 55-percent turnout of eligible voters.
Vorster may have no illusions that the outcome of the constitutional
conference will be acceptable to the UN. His primary intention is to show that there
is no serious Namibian opposition to separate development. If Vorster's case is to
gain credence, the proceedings of the conference must be publicized and any draft
constitution must eventually be submitted to a freely conducted referendum.
Meanwhile, the South African and tribal authorities must refrain from the mass
arrests of nationalists they employed in 1973 during the Ovambo elections.
Vorster's strategy has already been threatened by the assassination of the
Ovambo prime minister on August 16. Although the identity of the assassin is
unknown, the deed has been applauded by several exiled leaders of the People's
Organization, and the principal chief of the Herero ethnic group claims that agents
of the People's Organization are plotting his death. The South Africans have
reinforced their security forces in Namibia and arrested some members of the
People's Organization, but they have not clamped down on the whole group.
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