NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: August 20, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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oa ecret
lop
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
I
August 20, 1975
crnr RECORD
P.r
A c,ENN -'z RETURN
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Communist
counteroffensive appears stalled .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ISRAEL: Right wing critical of
government's negotiating strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ANGOLA: Popular Movement increasingly
dominant liberation group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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USSR-PORTUGAL: Pravda attacks
outside meddling in Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 20, 1975
The Communist counteroffensive that began last week when party leader
Cunhal exhorted party militants to return to areas in northern Portugal appears to
have stalled.
The Communists have canceled the second rally of their campaign-scheduled
for Porto last night-in view of "the current political situation." Their first effort, in
Alcobaca, ran into stiff resistance.
The decision to call off the Porto rally was doubtless influenced by continuing
attacks on party offices in the north. In a town near Porto last night, a party
member was killed by gunfire from security forces. Even though the Communists
have vowed to "take precautions" against the anti-Communists, party leaders have
been made cautious by the growing tendency of internal security troops-especially
in the north-to act on their own.
In the recent disorders, troops in three northern towns are reported to have
placed themselves on alert without notifying the military region headquarters.
Troops in the north have been pressing for the removal of the regional commander,
General Corvacho, considered to be a Communist sympathizer and an ally of Prime
Minister Goncalves. According to a communique released yesterday by the northern
regional headquarters, Corvacho has been temporarily relieved of his command.
Communist control of labor is also eroding. The party made a concerted effort
to show its muscle by calling for a half-hour general strike yesterday, then modified
the call by limiting it to the Lisbon area. The impact of the strike was minimal. Its
primary effect was to feed anti-Communist sentiment in Lisbon. The failure of the
strike will be seen as another defeat for Prime Minister Goncalves.
Former president Spinola, who is living in exile in Rio de Janeiro, has added his
voice to the anti-Goncalves chorus. I n an open letter to President Costa Gomes,
Spinola appealed for unity behind his "democratic movement for the liberation of
Portugal." Costa Gomes, who released the document yesterday, criticized Spinola,
but did not condemn the letter.
In fact, the appeal from Spinola may add force to the periodic warnings from
Goncalves that Portugal is in danger of returning to fascism. This danger is of such
an overriding concern for the members of the Armed Forces Movement that many
will continue to hesitate to take action against Goncalves or, if he is finally ousted,
they will seek to make sure that a new government does not provide an opening to
the right. F7777 I
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1975
Right-wing critics of the government's negotiating position with Egypt are
preparing to mount intensive demonstrations to coincide with Secretary Kissinger's
visit to the Middle East starting tomorrow.
It is unlikely that such tactics will dissuade the government from its chosen
course of action, or that right-wing pressures will prevent ratification by the Knesset
of an eventual new Sinai agreement worked out by the negotiating team of Prime
Minister Rabin, Defense Minister Peres, and Foreign Minister Allon. The consensus
among Knesset deputies with whom the US embassy in Tel Aviv has been in contact
recently is that an agreement would pass by a small-to-comfortable margin. Rabin
could, however, at some point decide to cite the demonstrations to justify Tel Aviv's
opposition to making further concessions.
Some of the demonstrations could be large. The Likud opposition bloc
assembled approximately 15,000 people in Tel Aviv last month to protest any Israeli
withdrawal in the Sinai in the absence of a formal Egyptian declaration of
nonbelligerency.
A substantial and growing number of Israelis are clearly uneasy about the
outcome of the negotiations with Egypt. They fear that Secretary Kissinger's arrival
in Tel Aviv tomorrow signals an intensification of US pressure on Israel to make
additional concessions to Egypt, but without receiving adequate safeguards from
Cairo against a new attack. Israeli public opinion polls have reflected a sharp decline
since April in the number of Israelis who think that US Middle East policy supports
Israel.
The most recent opinion poll shows that almost half of the respondents are
dissatisfied with the government's conduct of the negotiations. As reflected in the
Israeli press, this seems in good measure attributable to fears that Tel Aviv is caught
up in a process the timing and outcome of which cannot be controlled by the Rabin
government.
Many Israelis question whether the government has a clear negotiating concept
and is not simply responding to external pressures. Rabin's basic position that a new
agreement will gain time for Israel has also been challenged by prominent Israelis.
Critics within the Prime Minister's Labor Party, such as former defense minister
Dayan and former foreign minister Eban, have on numerous occasions stated
publicly that it is illusory to expect another Sinai agreement to give Israel a respite
from additional negotiations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1975
The government has launched a campaign to counter the critics and to explain
the potential benefits of another agreement with Egypt. Rabin defended the
government's negotiating position and the Secretary's visit at a stormy Knesset
session Monday on the grounds that the negotiations have now reached an
"advanced" stage. He reportedly told a Labor Alignment caucus that an interim
agreement with Egypt would not only provide a chance to improve Arab-Israeli
relations, but would also lead to "unprecedented" US-Israeli cooperation.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1975
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola announced yesterday that
it will establish paramilitary people's defense committees in Luanda and make them
part of its armed forces, The committees will be composed primarily of the
thousands of civilians in the Angolan capital who were armed by the Movement
when the transitional government was in existence.
Coming on the heels of a declaration by acting Portuguese High Commissioner
Macedo that he was assuming administrative control of the territory, the Popular
Movement's announcement will be seen as a move to force Lisbon to choose
between recognizing the Movement as the only effective political organization in
Angola, or backing up its own claim to sovereignty by suppressing the committees.
Macedo will seek the advice of Lisbon before he responds. A delay in his
response, however, will serve to tighten the Popular Movement's control over
Luanda. The Movement will probably soon announce similar committees in other
areas where it is militarily dominant, such as Cabinda.
The Popular Movement is trying to gain military dominance in Lobito and
Benguela, where it has been fighting with the National Union for the Total
Independen Annala for a week, So far- the National Union has out up stiff
Whatever the Portuguese decide, the National Union and the National Front
apparently recognize that they have run out of political options and have no choice
but to fi ht. The Popular Movement's latest maneuver is likely to stiffen their
resolve.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1975
As the process of "liberating" Vientiane is being completed, the communists
have been tightening their control over the population. Police units reportedly have
been rounding up young people judged hooligans because of long hair and
flamboyant Western attire. Pathet Lao troops have set up roadblocks throughout the
city to examine documentation and search vehicles. The police so far have been
polite in dealings with American diplomats and have not subjected them to body
searches.
The communists on August 18 reportedly completed their take-over of Luang
Prabang, the royal capital. According to radio Pathet Lao, demonstrators in the city
demanded the ouster of all local administration officials. The old administration,
therefore, was completely abolished and new "revolutionary" officials appointed.
Under the 1973 peace accords, Luang Prabang, like Vientiane, was jointly governed
by the two sides
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1975
Pravda yesterday published an authoritative "Observer" article on the situation
in Portugal. Unlike most Soviet commentary on the subject, the article expresses
Moscow's views directly, rather than through the mouths of the Portuguese
Communists or other intermediaries.
Like other recent Soviet coverage, the general tone of the "Observer" article is
defensive and pessimistic. As the distress of the Portuguese Communists has
deepened, the Soviets' -apparent confidence about the course of events in Portugal
has given way to increasing criticism of outside meddling.
The "Observer" article draws the same analogy between the present situation in
Portugal and events in Chile just before the overthrow of Allende that first appeared
in a Soviet broadcast to Hungary on August 15. NATO, the Western press, Western
economic organizations and, significantly, "international social democracy" are
severely criticized in the article. The Chinese also are dragged into the cast of
evildoers; they are accused of cooperating with international reaction by fomenting
discord in Angola and the Azores.
Pravda charges that the Portuguese Socialist leaders are providing a rallying
point for reactionaries by attacking the Communists, but the tone is less strident
than when Moscow denounced the Socialists immediately after they left the
government. Indeed, Pravda again calls for "concerted action" by the Armed Forces
Movement, the Communists, the Socialists, and other left progressive forces. The
Soviets have repeated this theme, which is now at least nominally in accord with
Cunhal's own professed policies, more frequently in recent days.
The Soviets would clearly like to see the Portuguese Communists recover from
their present isolation, but there is little indication they believe their exhortations
will have much practical effect. Pravda concludes with a call for "massive solidarity"
with the forces fighting reaction in Portugal. Under the circumstances, this is the
minimum that Moscow might be expected to say to preserve its revolutionary
credentials. Pravda offers no practical advice and provides no clues about what, if
any, action the Soviets themselves might take in support of the Portuguese
Communists
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 20, 1975
CAMBODIA: After signing an economic and technical cooperation agreement
with China, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan left Peking for
Pyongyang on August 19. Samphan and Cambodian Prime Minister Penn Nouth are
expected to meet with Prince Sihanouk-possibly to negotiate the Prince's return to
Cambodia. The meeting will be the first between Khieu Samphan and Prince
Sihanouk since the communist victory in Cambodia and may well settle the Prince's
political fate. Sihanouk's absence during the delegation's official visit to Peking
offers further evidence that the Cambodian leadership regards Sihanouk's value as
diminishing.
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