NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010029-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: August 19, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 19, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Goncalves seeks
popular support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
FEDAYEEN: Sinai agreement opposed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
LAOS: Demonstrations continuing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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CHILE: Crackdown on dissidents
will hurt government's image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
LATIN AMERICA: Peru may acquiesce
on Bolivian issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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ANNEX: Struggle for Control of
Portugal Limited to Leftists
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 19, 1975
Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves used a left-wing labor union rally last night on
the outskirts of Lisbon to appeal again for public support. Pro-Goncalves sources
said the rally was the first is a series of public demonstrations to drum up popular
support for the Prime Minister.
Goncalves' decision to appear in public-a rare occurrence since the present
challenge to his leadership began-followed several days of emergency meetings with
his cabinet and renewed efforts by President Costa Gomes to resolve differences
among the various factions of the ruling Armed Forces Movement.
The anti-Communist group led by Major Melo Antunes is continuing its effort
to reach a compromise with the radical leftist group of General Otelo de Carvalho.
Carvalho reportedly is seeking assurances that the revolution will not veer to the
right if the present regime is ousted. A source close to Antunes has told Ambassador
Carlucci that this week will be decisive, and the newspaper Republica reported
yesterday that the two groups had already reached agreement.
One key officer who has remained in the background during most of the
present power struggle is Admiral Rosa Coutinho. The ambitious admiral traveled to
Havana yesterday to begin a two-week visit to Latin America. After spending a week
in Cuba, he will head the Portuguese delegation to the conference of nonaligned
nations in Lima-which Portugal is attending as an observer-before returning home
on September 2. Rosa Coutinho's absence during this critical period may permit him
to avoid taking sides in the current struggle and maintain his position and influence
whatever the eventual outcome.
Goncalves' Communist Party supporters, meanwhile, have scheduled another
rally for today in the northern city of Porto. The Communists' objective in
continuing to hold rallies where the people are known to be overwhelmingly hostile
is not yet clear. It may simply be an effort by the Communists to assert their right
to meet wherever they choose, although it could, along with Goncalves'
re-emergence in public, be the initial effort in a Communist counteroffensive. The
30-minute general strike called for today by the Communist-dominated trade union
confederation to protest the recent wave of anti-Communist violence has been scaled
down to apply only in the Lisbon area.
Security forces yesterday fired on a mob that attacked and destroyed the
Communist Party headquarters in Ponte de Lima, a small town north of Porto. One
person was killed and 100 were injured.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 19, 1975
Violence against the Communists has also spread to the Azores, where
thousands of angry farmers yesterday destroyed offices of left-wing parties and beat
up Communists in the streets. Fifteen persons were injured in the disturbances,
which occurred on the island of Terceira. The Portuguese contingent at Lajes air
base-where the US maintains facilities-was placed on alert. Anti-Communist
sentiment in the Azores has been a key motivating factor in the islanders' drive for
independence from the mainland and recurring remonstrations at the present time
could be exploited by separatists to trigger an independence
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 19, 1975
Leaders of the less radical fedayeen organizations, including Palestine
Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat, may adopt more extreme policies in
the event another Egyptian-Israeli disengagement is implemented. The possibility of
an early agreement has already strained Egyptian-Palestinian relations and prompted
the Palestinians to move even closer'to Syria.
Arafat, according to z pro-fedayeen newspaper in Beirut, has said that his Fatah
organization "rejects the American settlement and will resist it through the barrels
of our guns." Although such rhetoric is usually intended for internal fedayeen
consumption, it might in this case presage an increase in terrorist activity designed to
improve Arafat's position. Since Arafat's widely publicized appearance at the UN
last year, his prestige has diminished steadily as a result of his failure to produce
anything concrete for the Palestinians.
Last March, Fatah commandos raided Tel Aviv in an effort to undermine
Secretary Kissinger's attempt to arrange a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement.
That attack had no direct effect on peace negotiations, but helped protect Arafat
against charges by fedayeen "rejectionists" that he was cooperating with Egypt and
the US in the false hope that the Palestinians would gain something from
negotiations.
Arafat's strategy in the near future will be to minimize the disaffection of
leaders of the Syrian-controlled Saiqa group and the Marxist-oriented Popular
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, both of which have generally
supported his conciliatory policies on a Middle East settlement. Failing this, Arafat
will try not to be very far behind them in any swing toward more radical policies on
political strategy and the use of terrorism.
Syria's stand will be the most important single force in determining the extent
to which the more conciliatory fedayeen groups oppose Egyptian President Sadat. If
the Egyptians are able to reassure Syrian President Asad and limit Syrian criticism of
Egypt, those Palestinians will probably have to follow Damascus' lead. This would
further weaken Arafat.
More may be known of Syria's position on a further Egyptian-Israeli agreement
when Damascus responds to the latest Palestinian initiative to implement the
"Palestinian-Syrian joint political and military command." The command was
originally proposed by Asad during the March round of peace negotiations. The
proposal lay dormant until late last week, however, when the PLO central
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 19, 1975
committee called for the "highest speed possible" toward setting up a joint body
that could take a unified stand on "current developments."
If Syria becomes disillusioned with Egypt and abets Palestinian obstructionism,
Arafat and his associates will move toward a more direct and forceful criticism of
Egypt, the US, and the principle of a negotiated settlement. If unchecked by
Egyptian promises of early negotiating progress on Palestinian issues, this could lead
ultimately to a new round of terrorist activity in Israel and abroad.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 19, 1975
Communist-sponsored demonstrations in support of an end to Vientiane's
neutral status are continuing.
Two groups of several hundred each demonstrated in separate parts of the city
on August 18. The demonstrators were orderly, peaceful, and heavily escorted by
Pathet Lao troops. The communists seem unable to stir up any real enthusiasm for
these affairs, and one march was described as more like a funeral procession than a
political rally. The participants parroted communist slogans, calling for the removal
of non-communist focal government officials.
Restrained anti-US demonstrations are expected to coincide with a final mass
rally by city residents and people from surrounding villages augmented by Pathet
Lao troops in mufti. Demonstrators at this final rally are supposed to call on the
government to "liberate" Vientiane by changing the 1973 peace accords so that the
city is no longer termed neutral.
The communists are concentrating only on the administration of Vientiane city
and have made no apparent effort to use the rallies to make any further changes in
the national government, which is still nominally a coalition. According to press
reports, new local officials have already been selected in the city's four districts, but
no changes have been announced in the central municipal administration.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 19, 1975
The government's decision last week to crack down on dissident university
personnel and students will further hurt its image in the human-rights area.
Moving without warning, security forces reportedly arrested 44 persons for
"Marxist" activity at the University of Chile. The education minister, Rear Admiral
Troncoso, said the professors, students, and administrative employees now in
custody were meeting clandestinely to plan protests against university policies.
The minister also said that an investigation was under way and that the
government would prevent a return to "unrestricted permissiveness." Most of those
being held presumably will be prosecuted for violating the state of siege provisions.
The minister told the press that some will be released, but that they will still be fired
from their jobs or expelled from the university. He added that arrests may be made
at other universities.
The military government probably intends the crackdown as a warning to
opponents who may have been planning to take advantage of the junta's poor
economic performance and international reputation. The latest round of arrests,
however, following last month's detention and exile of labor leaders in the north,
will only aggravate the regime's difficulties in trying to convince international
opinion that it has moderated its internal security practices.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 19, 1975
Peru appears willing to permit Chile to grant Bolivia access to the sea.
Peru's proposal was conveyed by Prime Minister Morales Bermudez during his
trip to La Paz on August 6 to celebrate the 150th anniversary of Bolivian
independence. In mid-July, President Velasco had taken the position that Peru
would not accept any Chilean proposal on the issue, but in his Independence Day
speech on July 28 he recognized Bolivia's "just" need to resolve the long-standing
access problem. The shift in Velasco's position may reflect Morales Bermudez'
influence.
With Peru's about-face, the next move on the access issue is clearly up to Chile.
Neither Chile nor Peru can cede a border area without the other's consent. Bolivia is
not expecting an early resolution of the problem, and inasmuch as Peru has
apparently removed one of the negotiating obstacles, Chilean-Bolivian relations
could deteriorate if Santiago does not make some kind of initial offer on the access
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 19, 1975
Struggle for Control of Portugal Limited to Leftists
Portugal has had several political crises since the Armed Forces Movement
seized power in April 1974. In each case, a segment from the right side of the
political spectrum has disappeared until only varieties of leftists remain in the ruling
circles.
Those still in contention are now deeply split into three factions. Ideological
divisions are not neat, and some of the disagreements derive from personality clashes
as well as genuine differences over how best to solve the many problems facing
Portugal.
--The group associated with Prime Minister Goncalves is thought to be closely
connected with the Communists and their sympathizers.
--A second faction, led by internal security chief Otelo de Carvalho, is
anti-Communist, but promotes radical nationalist policies that are often more
extreme than those of the Communist Party.
--The third group, led by former foreign minister Melo Antunes, is not as
extreme as the other two groups, although many of its revolutionary goals
mesh with the aims of the other two factions.
In the past two weeks, Antunes has spearheaded an effort to oust Goncalves.
He and his supporters have sought support from all quarters for his effort to reverse
the steady move toward Communist domination of Portugal.
Portuguese President Costa Gomes' refusal to remove Goncalves, even in the
face of overwhelming opposition, is an important element in the confused political
situation. The President appears to have no ideological affinity with Goncalves; his
reluctance to act seems to be based on his concern over a possible violent reaction
by the Communists and on the close relationship that has developed between the
two men and their families.
Costa Gomes' delaying tactics on behalf of Goncalves could not have worked,
however, had the opposition been determined and better organized. There appear to
be no strong leaders among the nine dissidents dismissed from the Revolutionary
Council for circulating an anti-regime document drafted by Antunes. The
anti-Communist forces seem to have fallen victim to the same weakness that has
plagued the military's efforts to govern-the desire to make decisions by consensus.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 19, 1975
For all the radical statements hurled back and forth since the Armed Forces
Movement took power in a near-bloodless coup in April 1974, the Portuguese
revolution has been essentially nonviolent. Even the anti-Communist rioting of the
past two weeks has resulted in only six deaths. The reluctance of the Portuguese to
deal harshly with their fellow countrymen can also be seen in the willingness of the
security forces to permit demonstrators to operate with near impunity while troops
look on and in the refusal of troops to obey orders to go to the Azores to control
the separatists.
The twin motives of obtaining consensus and avoiding violence have prevented
anti-Communists from moving to a showdown with Goncalves or Costa Gomes. The
manifesto drafted by Antunes reportedly has obtained the support of some 80
percent of the armed forces-even the pro-Communist press credits the
anti-Communists with the support of 60 percent-but Antunes appears to want
something approaching unanimity.
This would explain why Antunes is now reportedly working on a compromise
document that will take into consideration some of the views put forward in a much
more radical program drafted by officers under the command of Carvalho. If
Carvalho decides to join forces with Antunes, and some reports say he already has,
the move to depose Goncalves will have at least the tacit agreement of nearly every
important military unit. Such contrived unity, of course, will begin to break down
almostas soon as it is accomplished.
Carvalho's Support
Carvalho's support seems especially important to Antunes because of the
security chief's following in those units stationed in and around Lisbon that are
most closely associated with Prime Minister Goncalves. Some of these units, such as
the military police stationed near the presidential palace, are believed by many
Portuguese to have stockpiled weapons for dissemination to Communist militants in
the event of a showdown. Antunes may also fear that without control of these units,
the Communist Party will be able to put up a stiff fight for control of Lisbon.
If such fighting were to develop, it could degenerate into civil war, despite the
Portuguese aversion to violence; passions have reached a high pitch in recent weeks.
There are some indications, however, that the Communist Party may already be
backing away from Goncalves, whose position looks more and more in jeopardy.
The Communists may have yet another move to try. The party is sponsoring
mass rallies in the conservative north, despite the possibility of a serious incident
developing. At the same time, however, the party appears to be looking for a way to
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retain as many of the gains it has made as possible. The Communists have based their
hopes for an eventual take-over in Portugal on maintaining close ties with the Armed
Forces Movement, and if the Movement deserts Goncalves they may have little
choice but to do the same.
Communist Party secretary Cunhal continues to have kind words for Prime
Minister Goncalves, but he has also renewed his pitch for unity of the "revolutionary
forces," including the Socialists. He must know that such unity has little chance of
developing as long as Goncalves hangs on. Tactically, at least, the Communists are
opportunists and could seek a modus vivendi even with Antunes, himself an avowed
Marxist, if he began to emerge the winner. The Communists, however, would find
Carvalho and his radical leftist followers more attractive.
Frustrations Building
With frustrations building each day, a break must come soon. There has been
an upsurge in rumors that a coup is imminent. If the anti-Goncalves group continues
to hold back, the small but determined Communist minority may yet find a way to
turn things around.
The Communists and Goncalves retain essential control of the state machinery,
and with Carvalho's position uncertain, a few key arrests, with trumped up charges if
necessary, might give Goncalves the time he needs to consolidate his position.
A continuation of the present confused situation, with no faction clearly
emerging on top, would also set the stage for rightists-like the exile group under the
leadership of former president Spinola-to launch an effort to recapture power.
Rightists see the continued dominance of Goncalves and the Communists as
providing the most propitious setting for their move. Support for a move by
Spinolist forces would be seriously undercut if the Antunes group succeeded in
wresting power from Goncalves. The exiles are as opposed to Antunes-whom they
see as a leftist-as they are to Goncalves.
The rightists have little chance of success, particularly if they move too soon,
and they might succeed in maintaining Goncalves in power. A rightist move would
permit the Prime Minister to rally the nation and the armed forces around him and
lend substance to the char es that Antunes is opening the way for a turn toward
fascism.
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