NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010019-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1, 1975
CONTENTS
TURKEY: Demirel declares suspension
of US activities at bases will continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHINA: Long-range
economic plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ROMANIA: Atmospherics for
President Ford's visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
PORTUGAL: Situation report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
SPAIN: Arrest of army officers warns
military to stay out of politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CANADA: Economic factors
complicate defense review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
PHILIPPINES-USSR: Continuing movement on
establishment of diplomatic relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHINA: Peking denounces Soviet
motives at Helsinki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
THAILAND: Government wins key
initial vote on budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
THAILAND: The aims of Khukrit's
current diplomatic offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
SINGAPORE: Growing importance
as arms supplier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FOR THE RECORD: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1, 1975
Following a meeting with President Ford yesterday, Prime Minister Demirel
declared that the current suspension of activities at US installations in Turkey would
remain in effect "for the time being."
prompted him to reject a offer of $50 million in military aid as an interim
measure. Demirel said it would be contradictory for Turkey to accept such a gift
when it is unable to purchase US arms or take delivery of arms already paid for.
The take-over of US installations by the Turkish military has been completed
with only minor incidents caused by the confusion of Turkish authorities over how
to proceed. F_ I
Ankara is expected to call for US operation of the bases
under Turkish administrative control.
Negotiators for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, meanwhile, began
another round of intercommunal talks yesterday in Vienna. They are expected to
deal primarily with the powers of the central government in the proposed
federation. A major breakthrough is unlikely, although the Greek Cypriot side has
backed down from its insistence on a strong central government
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1, 1975
China's leaders, faced with political infighting last year, have turned their
attention this year to economic affairs. Most of the directives issued by the party
this year deal with economic problems stemming from political disruptions. Peking
seems intent on resolving political problems privately, while pushing publicly for
programs that will benefit the economy. The prime mover behind this new emphasis
on economic development appears to be Premier Chou En-lai.
China is currently on the last leg of a five-year economic plan that will end this
year and is drawing up a plan, to begin in 1976, designed to bring China into the
"front ranks" of the industrialized nations by the end of the century. Chou En-lai
announced this goal himself in a speech to the National People's Congress in January
and indicated that the State Council would be drafting long-range plans aimed at this
goal.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1, 1975
The success of the plan depends on several factors. China will have to achieve
and maintain over a quarter of a century a greater degree of political stability, from
Peking down to the grass roots, than it has had in the last decade. Economic factors,
many of which are beyond China's control, can also intervene. The weather, as
usual, will affect agriculture, which remains the basis of the Chinese economy.
Changes in the world economic situation are likely to have a greater impact on
China's economy now that China is more deeply involved in international trade.
Moreover, the contentious and still unresolved issues of wages and incentive
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1, 1975
Romanian President Ceausescu doubtless sees President Ford's visit this
weekend as further evidence of Bucharest's success in carving out a degree of
economic and ideological independence from the Soviet Union.
Romanian news media have enthusiastically prepared the way for the
presidential talks by lauding US-Romanian relations as an example for all states
regardless of differences in size and politics. The current visit is seen -as important to
the relationship, and Ceausescu clearly hopes to establish the same rapport with
President Ford that he had with former President Nixon.
The visit comes on the heels of action in the US Congress opening the way for
most-favored-nation tariff status for Romania. Because Romania needs an economic
shot in the arm, Ceausescu surely will press for concessionary credits, agricultural
aid, and other assistance to facilitate his country's recovery from recent devastating
floods.
Ceausescu is expected to stress the importance of continued, active US
involvement in European affairs in the post-summit period. Romania has
consistently described the European security summit as merely a first step toward
building a lasting peace in Europe, and Ceausescu, with an obvious eye on relations
between his country and the USSR, insists that the US has a critical role to play in
Europe's future.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1, 1975
Ceausescu is pleased that Belgrade has been selected as the site of a meeting in
1977 of senior government officials to review progress in implementing the
European security agreement. The Romanians think the choice of the Yugoslav
capital will focus international attention on the Balkans and deter Soviet meddling
in the region.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 1, 1975
The government's worries outside Portugal are increasing. According to recent
information, the demonstration on Madeira last Sunday by the Popular Democrats
calling for increased autonomy for the islands and a reversal of the leftist trends in
Portugal attracted an estimated crowd of 25,000. There was also an incident where
Popular Democrats stormed the headquarters of an extreme left-wing party, but
military troops prevented property damage or violence. Another pro-independence
demonstration is being called for Sunday.
President Costa Gomes-before his departure for Helsinki last night-announced
that a new cabinet had been formed. In Helsinki, he said its composition will be
announced Saturday.
The delay in the presentation of the cabinet is indicative of the problems Prime
Minister Goncalves has faced trying to come up with a government made up of more
than Communist sympathizers.
General Otelo de Carvalho, security chief and member of the new executive
triumvirate, has ordered the removal of 13 members of his security troops because
of their lack of "discipline, efficiency, and political conscience."
Carvalho's order followed a statement upon his return from Cuba yesterday
threatening mass arrests, or executions if necessary, to regain control over the
chaotic Portuguese situation. Since the 13 were not charged with conspiracy or
plotting against the government, their removal may have been a precautionary
measure to discourage potential opposition to the new troika arrangement and
cabinet-which is expected to be strongly left wing. Press reports indicate that
further purges of dissidents are in the works.
Among the officers removed was Colonel Neves, leader of a commando
regiment thought to be composed mainly of soldiers who have reservations about
the leftward trend of the government. His removal reportedly has caused some
unrest among his followers.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 1, 1975
In view of the continuing acts of violence throughout the country and the
reported plans of the Socialists and the center-left Popular Democrats to hold at
least two rallies this weekend, such discontent among the security troops is probably
causing Carvalho increasing concern. F77 I
The arrest Tuesday in Madrid of a Spanish army major and six captains is
apparently another warning to the military to steer clear of political activity.
A Spanish officer recently estimated that radical groups constitute less than 5
percent of the army's some 200,000 personnel, whereas some 60 percent are largely
apolitical and conservative. The latter figure is lower than previous estimates.
Last January, when political associations were legalized, the ministers of the.
three armed services issued a warning against the impropriety of political activity by
members of the armed forces on active duty. The arrest in Barcelona last February
of a major and a captain-allegedly for protesting the use of the military in a police
role-was another example of the government's determination to head off dissidence
in the military.
The government is playing down the arrests. The Spanish military are keeping a
tight lid on information concerning the arrested officers, and the press is treating the
case with unusual caution. The Interior Ministry has declared that the arrests should
not be taken as evidence of serious disturbances. Nevertheless, there are rumors of
possible arrests in Barcelona and Seville.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 1, 1975
The postponement of a final decision on a replacement for Canada's Argus
long-range maritime patrol aircraft in itself is not of major significance, but multiple
consideratio,tis involved in the purchase could lead to further delays or a substantial
modification of the program.
Prime Minister Trudeau has told Parliament that uncertainty over the
"industrial consequences" of signing a contract with Lockheed or Boeing prompted
the three-month postponement. His statement indicates that government indecision
over competing production and technology offset offers by Boeing and Lockheed is
the most likely cause for delay. Budget priorities and the currently uncompleted
defense review may also have been factors, as well as possible debate over the size of
the long-range patrol force.
Some Canadian officials believe a mixed force of long- and short-range aircraft
would better suit Canada's needs. This mix would have the advantage of returning
the shorter range, but Canadian-built, De Havilland DHC-7 back into the
competition for new contracts. It could also reduce the cost of the program and
allow modernization of other equipment. On the other hand, it might reduce
Canada's ability to meet its current NATO obligation for Atlantic maritime patrol.
Recent statements in the press by the commander of Canada's armed forces air
command indicate that he wants to buy 100 fighter aircraft and that the US F-15 is
the leading candidate. The general may be lobbying to avoid a commitment to the
patrol aircraft program, which could cost as much as $800 million, until he is sure
that sufficient funds are available for fighter modernization. In addition, a tank
replacement or refurbishment program, another expensive undertaking, is being
considered in the current defense review for the Canadian armed forces in Europe.
Extension of the operational life of the Argus patrol aircraft to 1979 has
lessened the urgency of the replacement decision somewhat. The limited capability
of the Argus and the danger that budget priorities or other factors will force an
overall reduction in the long-range maritime patrol pr gram, however, make an earl y
decision desirable for both Canada and NATO.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1, 1975
Manila and Moscow continue to move toward establishing diplomatic relations
and a trade agreement. President Marcos recently indicated, however, that a hitch
may have developed in the timing of his state visit and that this could set back the
timetable.
The timing of Marcos' visit could be a problem. The Soviets have already told
Manila that August would be inconvenient for a state visit. Most top Soviet officials
will be out of the capital on vacation. Marcos has told the US ambassador that if he
cannot go in August as he wishes, he will delay the trip until next year. Marcos did
not give any convincing reasons why he could not go to Moscow after August, and
his comment to the ambassador may have reflected pique at the Soviets. Manila
would appear to have little to gain by stalling until next year. The Soviets, for their
part, are likely to make a serious effort to accommodate Marcos' desires because
they are anxious to have a state visit by a Southeast Asian leader at a time when so
many Asian statesmen are making well-publicized trips to China.
arcos has repeatedly stressed his desire
to maintain balanced relations with Peking and Moscow. Postponement of his trip
until next year would certainly be regarded by both China and the Soviet Union as
evidence of a considerable tilt toward Peking,
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 1, 1975
Peking has denounced Soviet motives at Helsinki, a move in keeping with its
stance toward the European security conference since talks began in 1972.
The New China News Agency, in a series of recent articles, has castigated the
conference and the Soviet Union, charging that Moscow will use the agreement to
consolidate its power in Europe and branch out into Southeast Asia. One
commentary implied that the Helsinki declaration would not restrain the Soviets
from using force, citing the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
claiming the Kremlin had encouraged India to dismember Pakistan in 1971.
On July 24, People's Daily warned that Moscow neither respects nor
acknowledges any rights of small- or medium- size countries that would impede Soviet
hegemony in the Mediterranean and southern Europe. By way of further belittling
the Helsinki conference, the news agency paraphrased President Ford's comment
that CSCE is "neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating state." It
also cited a statement by the UK's Mrs. Thatcher that "it is both foolish and
dangerous to trust the Russians."
Peking has also indirectly denounced Washington, but in milder terms, saving
its harshest invective for Moscow. One commentary said that one aim of CSCE is to
create a false sense of security and detente in order to cause the Western Alliance to
disintegrate and gradually squeeze the US from the area.
China's main concern over CSCE is the effect of European detente on its own
security. It believes that with tensions lessening in Europe and an agreement possible
on force reductions, the Kremlin will be able to devote more money, military
hardware, and manpower to counter China directly. To prevent West European
countries from lowering their guard, Peking has continuously warned of Moscow's
expansionist nature, military strength, and willingness to sign and break treaties for
its own political purposes. F7 I
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 1, 1975
Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot's government won a key vote on its budget bill
in the National Assembly today. It represents the first significant political hurdle of
the four-month-old coalition government. The government, however, faces two more
votes on the budget before the legislative process is completed.
The odds favor the budget's eventual passage, but Khukrit is leaving nothing to
chance. He has threatened to call for new elections if the budget, which calls for
significant increases in both social welfare programs and military expenditures, is not
approved. Khukrit is also holding out the prospect of a cabinet reshuffle, following
passage of the budget, as a means of keeping his sometime unruly coalition in line.
The bill, which passed its initial review by a slim majority, now goes to
committee for substantive consideration. The lower house is required by the
constitution to vote on the budget within 90 days, and the Senate has another 30
days to attach its approval. If these deadlines are not met, the bill is automatically
approved. These provisions were included in the new constitution to prevent the
assembly from holding the budget ransom to fiscal or political compromise.
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The aims of Prime Minister Khukrit's current diplomatic offensive have become
even more apparent in the aftermath of his successful trip to the People's Republic
of China and subsequent travels to the Philippines and Singapore for meetings with
the heads of state. These include:
--ensuring Thai independence through "balance-of-power" diplomacy;
--promoting regional cooperation by strengthening the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations;
--enhancing his own image to ensure his continuation in office.
The Prime Minister continues to stress the scaling down of Thai dependence on
the US, but he recently commented that he expects the close friendship with
Washington to continue. Regarding the Soviet Union, Khukrit praised expanding
social and cultural cooperation with the Soviets and said that their interest could be
best served by recognizing Thai independence.
To promote regionalism, the Prime Minister, in discussions with other Asian
leaders, has actively urged that an ASEAN summit meeting take place soon and has
endorsed the removal of all foreign military bases from its area. While visiting the
Philippines, Khukrit and President Marcos discussed the need for such a summit as
soon as possible. In addition, a joint communique issued by Khukrit and Singapore's
Prime Minister Le Kuan Yew at the conclusion of the Thai leader's visit called for an
ASEAN summit meeting.
Khukrit's initiatives may prompt an ASEAN summit before the year is
out-possibly in December after the UN General Assembly meets. If the current
enthusiasm by member nations continues, ASEAN could emerge a stronger regional
organization. Whether the ASEAN nations are capable of the cohesiveness necessary
to be an effective regional organization, however, remains to be seen.
Regardless of the outcome of Khukrit's diplomatic initiatives, he apparently
has been successful in enhancing his image asan international diplomat. Through his
accommodations with the military, always a dangerous potential opponent, and his
forays into international diplomacy, it would appear that, barring some internal
crisis-the debate on the budget might still conceivably provoke such a crisis-his
tenure as Prime Minister is relatively secure.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1, 1975
The launching on July 29 of a Seawolf-class missile patrol boat destined for the
Royal Thai Navy points up the growing importance of Singapore as an arms
producer and exporter.
The boat is one of three ordered by Bangkok and the first of this type built for
export. Produced under West German license with Israeli cooperation, the missile
boat is identical to six in the Singaporean navy that mount five Israeli-produced
Gabriel cruise-missile launchers. Actual delivery may be delayed until 1976, pending
missile availability. The Gabriel test-firing scheduled for July 31 from a Singaporean
Seawolf was probably arranged to impress Thai naval officials now in Singapore.
Singapore has sold M-16 rifles and ammunition to Thailand, and additional
purchases are under negotiation. Weapons sales are complimented by other military
cooperation with Bangkok, including a naval exercise and Thai training of
Singaporean troops.
The sale of arms to Thailand exemplifies the government's practice of initially
producing arms for its own use and then placing the items on the regional market,
thereby keeping its weapons industry active and costs competitive. This role as a
regional arms supplier, if developed far enough, could give Singapore leverage with
neighboring states by making them dependent on Singapore for needed arms arts
and ammunition.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 1, 1975
JAPAN - NORTH VIETNAM: Tokyo expects to conclude an economic
assistance agreement with Hanoi this week, clearing the way for an exchange of
embassies. Diplomatic relations were established in 1973. The agreement will
provide about $44 million in nonreimbursable aid, although last-minute haggling
could change the figure slightly. Tokyo acceded to virtually all of Hanoi's demands
for assistance, largely because of Vietnam's new prominence in Southeast Asia.
Hanoi is pressing Tokyo for a high-level emissary to sign the agreement, and Japan
may send its deputy foreign minister. Provided no last-minute hitches develop in the
talks. both sides apparently plan to exchange embassies in late August.
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