NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 12, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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State Dept. review completed
August 12, 1975
N2 669
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 12, 1975
PORTUGAL: Communists concerned
about their increasing political isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ARGENTINA: Cabinet changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PORTUGUESE TIMOR: Power grab
heightens anxiety in Jakarta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
LAOS: Pathet Lao preparing
for take-over of Vientiane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
CAMBODIA: Sihanouk ambivalent
about returning to Phnom Penh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
INDIA: Latest on Supreme
Court's decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
RHODESIA: Smith agrees to begin
negotiations with black nationalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
ANGOLA: Popular Movement almost
in complete control of Luanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1
CYPRUS: Transfer of Turkish
Cypriots has begun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
PERU: Velasco moves
against opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 12, 1975
The conciliatory tone of Portuguese Communist leader Cunhal's statement on
Sunday to the party central committee shows a growing concern about the
mounting violence in northern Portugal and the increasing political isolation of the
Communists.
Cunhal called for changes in the government to broaden its support and
improve its efficiency. He also stressed a need to overcome widening rifts between
civilian organizations and within the military. The Communist leader appeared to
back away from his previous tough positions, renewing an earlier Communist theme
that his party is willing to work with all groups that "cooperate with the goals of the
revolution." Cunhal also mentioned the need for Portugal to maintain close relations
with capitalist countries-especially those in the EC.
A softening of the Communist line is evident in the renewed Soviet interest in a
broadly based leftist coalition in Lisbon. The Soviet press in recent weeks has
treated the Portuguese Socialists harshly, but in reporting on a recent meeting
between Soviet and Italian Communist delegations Pravda noted that both sides
"advocated unity of action" by all forces of the left, including the Socialists.
Cunhal's remarks have had no immediate effect on anti-Communist activity in
northern Portugal. I n Braga, violence continued for a second day. Demonstrators
there have burned down the party's headquarters and destroyed the offices of the
Communist-dominated Portuguese Democratic Movement and the
Communist-controlled labor confederation.
General Pinto Soares has resigned from the Revolutionary Council and from his
post as head of the military academy to protest the way decisions are made in the
Armed Forces Movement and the continuing radicalization of the military. He
voiced even stronger opposition to the dissidents' document drafted by former
foreign minister Antunes, labeling it "divisionist" and "opportunistic."
The nine officers suspended from the Revolutionary Council for circulating the
antiregime document reportedly have decided not to comply with an order to report
to their respective general staffs for reassignment. Sources close to Antunes now
claim that 85 to 90 percent of the armed forces support the views set forth by the
dissident officers.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 12, 1975
These sources told the US embassy that they still hope to avoid force to
remove Goncalves. They expect to demonstrate so much support within the military
that President Costa Gomes will have no alternative but to dismiss Goncalves and his
newly formed government. President Costa Gomes' performance to date, however,
has raised speculation in Lisbon that he may be reluctant to move against Goncalves
because of the close ties between their families, or because he is being blackmailed
by radical officers for alleged cooperation with the Caetano regime.
Antunes' group claims to have the backing of most enlisted men and
presumably thinks it can count on them for -a show of force. The dissidents may be
overestimating their support, however, because the men have been subjected to
considerable Communist and extreme left-wing propaganda.
Goncalves is unlikely to relinquish power without a struggle, and he still has
considerable backing. Despite Cunhal's more conciliatory tone, Communists in the
unions and the media would probably lend their surmort to an effort to mai
Goncalves in office.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 12, 1975
The cabinet changes yesterday-the third within a month-are an effort to
create a government team with which labor and the military, who share power
uneasily, can live comfortably. Only the defense and justice ministers from the
previous cabinet retained their jobs. The government has yet to find anyone willing
to take the difficult post of minister of economy.
Government spokesmen played down the political aspects of the cabinet
changes, maintaining that they were an effort to give President Maria Estela Peron a
free hand in choosing new officials to deal with the severe economic problems. In
the process, the remaining ministers with links to former strongman Lopez Rega
were ousted.
The military backed labor in its successful defiance of Lopez Rega and of
government attempts to impose economic austerity, but did so in the face of a
common enemy--Lopez Rega-and not because of any basic compatibility of
interests. Indeed, the officers have apparently become steadily more uncomfortable
with labor's continuing assertiveness. The military will be represented in the new
cabinet by an army colonel who will head the important Interior Ministry.
Of particular interest is the departure of Antonio Benitez as the interior
minister. He had emerged as head of the so-called "mini-cabinet," a trio of ministers
who in recent weeks had assumed a growing role in the conduct of day-to-day
government business. Benitez' initiative in office-he was the only cabinet member
with personal stature-may have unnerved both labor and the military, who are
unprepared to accept such independence of action. The lack of any strong
personalities in the new cabinet is an indication that the power groups want people
they can control, or who are at least considered to be innocuous, at the top levels of
government.
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PORTUGUESE
Dill* TIMOR
INDONESIA
Djarkarta*
Soropg0
MaliT'l. G ..;N
Kendari Ambon
9
5 PORTUGUESE
TIMOR
Kupang
.Djajapura
GUlIV
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 12, 1975
The power grab staged by pro-independence Timorese leaders over the weekend
is bound to heighten anxiety in Jakarta that Timor will become a threat to stability
and security in the Indonesian Archipelago.
Information about the situation in Timor is sketchy. Initial reports indicate
that members of the Timor Democratic Union Party, an anti-communist,
pro-independence group, led the power grab against Portuguese authorities in Dili.
On August 9 and 10, party members reportedly occupied communications centers,
the airport, and the police station and laid siege to the military headquarters. It is
not clear, however, whether they were seeking to take full control of the
government.
There has been no reaction as yet from local Portuguese troops, most of whom
were apparently out of the capital conducting political education missions in the
countryside. The Portuguese governor is reported to have met with the dissidents,
but so far there has been no word about their demands or intentions.
The events in Timor this weekend evidently caught the Indonesians by surprise
and are likely to reawaken their fears about the prospects for an unstable or
anti-Indonesia regime in Dili. Jakarta may conclude that the power grab was
launched as a pre-emptive move against pro-Indonesia forces in the colony. Reacting
to coup reports, Indonesia's security chief publicly warned on August 11 that
Jakarta will not allow a situation to develop in Timor that threatens Indonesia.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 12, 1975
The communists are planning three to five days of demonstrations in Vientiane
this week supporting changes in the city's formal neutral status.
Parades and other rallies are scheduled to begin throughout the city on August
12 urging changes in the 1973 peace accords, which specify joint communist and
non-communist control of local security and other functions. Once the city's status
is changed unilaterally by the communists, they will assume direct control, abolish
joint governing bodies, and change local officials. Communist cadre have been
visiting Lao residential areas for eight weeks to organize support for these
demonstrations. The organizers claim that the national government would not be
directly affected by these changes in Vientiane's administration.
Anti-US and anti-Thai demonstrations may be staged as offshoots of the main
effort. All demonstrations are supposed to be peaceful. Small anti-Thai
demonstrations took place on August 9 to protest the expulsion of two Lao
diplomats from Bangkok. The Thai sent the Lao home in retaliation for the arrest
and detention without charge of two Thai military attaches in Vientiane last week.
The change in the city administration will almost certainly be followed by
stricter controls on the local people and, possibly, on the foreign community. The
Vientiane military command, already controlled by the communists, issued an order
for increased security on August 10 claiming that the US, in "collusion with the
Thai, has infiltrated agents to destroy public order."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 12, 1975
Prince Sihanouk reportedly is having second thoughts about returning to
Cambodia at this time.
If Sihanouk decides to go, he will visit Phnom Penh briefly in September and
then make an official visit to several friendly countries. Other diplomatic sources in
Peking and Pyongyang have reported recently that Sihanouk might attend the UN
General Assembly session in September, after a stopover in Cambodia, and then
travel abroad.
This is the second or third invitation Sihanouk has received to return to
Cambodia, and the Prince believes that he can no longer postpone his decision. He
reportedly is concerned that the invitation includes only himself and Prime Minister
Penn Nouth, and he even fears that he might be arrested upon arrival in Phnom
Penh. The Prince also reportedly took a poll among his followers and found no
desire on their part.to return to Cambodia.
Sihanouk's hesitancy no doubt reflects his concern with the conditions he may
find in Cambodia and his wariness at placing himself even temporarily under the
physical control of Phnom Penh's communist authorities. The Cambodian
communists do have some old scores to settle with Sihanouk, but they probably
view his international prestige as a useful symbol of legitimacy and may want to
continue to use his foreign contacts. Peking's desire to maintain good relations with
the Khmer communists probably would preclude any Chinese effort to secure
led es from Phnom Penh in regard to Sihanouk's safety or future role in Cambodia.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 12, 1975
The Supreme Court's decision to rule on the constitutionality of last week's
amendment to the Indian constitution that placed election of the prime minister
above challenge in the courts will delay, but the US embassy in New Delhi believes it
is unlikely to alter, a final outcome favoring Prime Minister Gandhi.
The court has agreed to hear a challenge to the amendment on the grounds that
it violates a 1973 decision that the "basic structure" of the constitution cannot be
changed by amendment. The disputed amendment-rushed through parliament,
ratified by a majority of the states, and immediately signed into law by the
president-provides that the election of the prime minister, among others, is outside
the jurisdiction of the courts.
Earlier, Gandhi's lawyers had argued unsuccessfully that the amendment, which
is retroactive, had already erased the guilty verdict handed down in June against the
Prime Minister for engaging in illegal campaign activities.
Four of the five justices on the Supreme Court panel that will begin hearing
arguments on the case on August 25 have been described by the US embassy as the
"most committed" to Gandhi of the 13 on the court. A finding in her favor,
therefore, is quite possible.
Even if Gandhi were to lose the current battle, the court might void the lower
court's decision against her. The violations for which she was convicted in June have
since been deleted from the electoral law by parliament. That legislation also is
retroactive.
Finally, if the court fails her, Gandhi can use her overwhelming majority in
parliament to assist her-possibly through creation of a constituent assembly to
make basic changes in the constitution.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 12, 1975
South African Prime Minister Vorster and Rhodesian Prime Minister fan Smith,
who met in Pretoria last weekend, have announced that they agreed on proposals fo
starting the long-delayed negotiations between Smith and black Rhodesian
nationalists. They withheld the details of the proposal, however, suggesting the"
anticipate objections from white politicians in Smith's Rhodesian Front Party o'
from the leaders of the African National Council.
Smith and the Council's leaders agreed last December to a truce and an earll-
settlement conference, but they have since only wrangled over arrangements. Smith
has insisted that the conference take place in Rhodesia, while the black nationalists
have maintained that their exiled leaders might be arrested if they returned.
Zambian President Kaunda's special aide, Mark Chona, who visited Pretoria last
weekend and concurred in the Smith-Vorster proposals, subsequently told black
Rhodesian leaders in Zambia that:
--After the Rhodesian government and the black leaders define the basic
constitutional issues in the initial session, several joint committees will
formulate the particulars of a settlement.
--The committees will then adjourn to Rhodesia to complete the text.
--The Rhodesian government guarantees that all black leaders engaged in
negotiations will be free to come and go and that no black nationalists will be
arrested as long as negotiations are under way.
--When the drafting committees have completed their work, a final conference
will convene in London to conclude a formal settlement.
We doubt that either the Rhodesian cabinet or Smith's Rhodesian Front Party
will accept the guarantees for the black nationalists. Government spokesmen have
been preparing white Rhodesians for an early intensification of the
counterinsurgency campaign, and some white politicians have called for the rearrest
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 12, 1975
Attacks instigated by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola in Luanda on August 8 and 9 against rival liberation groups were designed
to establish total domination in the capital.
The Popular Movement forces squeezed troops of the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola out of Luanda and engaged the National Front for
the Liberation of Angola in several clashes over the weekend. Under an arrangement
with the Portuguese, Front elements in a fortress stronghold just north of Luanda
were evacuated by a Portuguese naval vessel yesterday. The Popular Movement is
now in almost complete military control of the city.
In the countryside, Front forces continue to hold Caxito, a town some 40 miles
northeast of Luanda. Popular Movement forces, however, hold defensive positions
south of the town and have blown a bridge along the coastal road leading to the
capital. Areas several hundred miles south of Luanda, such as Benguela and Novo
Redondo, which earlier were controlled by Front forces, are now in the hands of the
Popular Movement. It has also won back Malange, 200 miles east of Luanda.
The Front now controls the northwestern section of Angola, with the Popular
Movement dominant in the east and along the coast south of Luanda. Union forces
hold political sway over much of the southern portion of the country, but without
access to new sources of arms they may not be able to secure the area militarily.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 12, 1975
The transfer of Turkish Cypriots from the Greek sector to the Turkish sector
began on August 9 without incident.
Agreement to allow the Turkish Cypriots to move north was reached during the
last round of the intercommunal talks in Vienna. Approximately 9,000 Turks
remain in the south; it is anticipated that the transfer will take three to four weeks
to complete. UN forces are escorting the Turks to the Turkish-occupied zone. Once
the transfer is completed, the separation of Greeks and Turks on the island will be
virtually complete with the exception of about 10,000 Greeks who will be allowed
to remain in the north.
Ankara previously had refused to discuss territorial concessions while Turks
remained "captives" in the south. Greek consent to allow the Turks to move north
removes a major obstacle in the way of consideration of the territorial concessions
issue. This issue, however, could prove difficult to resolve. Ankara is prepared to
return some occupied land to the Greeks, but it now may find it politically
unacceptable to do so while the US arms cutoff remains in force. Furthermore,
National Salvation Party leader Erbakan reportedly will oppose any territorial
concessions, thus restricting the government from acting on the issue. The Greek
side is ready to accept a bizonal federation with a weak central government, but
makes these concessions contingent upon a satisfactory reduction of the
Turkish-controlled zone.
The Greek Cypriot position calls for about a 75-25 territorial division, while
the Turks reportedly will settle for 30 to 35 percent of the island. They currently
occupy about 40 percent of Cyprus. Should the Cypriot negotiators agree to a
compromise in the 25- to 30-percent range, however, its implementation could be
obstructed by Ankara or Makarios. F77 I
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 12, 1975
The arrest and deportation last week of key opposition figures and the closure
of a leftist magazine demonstrate the Peruvian government's determination not to
allow dissent or interference with its policies.
The move to exile three leaders of the American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance, a longtime opposition party, and a number of other leftist peasant and
labor leaders follows President Velasco's address on July 28 in which he lashed out
at the Alliance and "communist groups" for opposing the military-led revolution.
Alliance leaders were probably caught off guard by the regime's move, however,
because the President in the same speech alluded to "democratic" competition with
opposition forces. Revolutionary Alliance leaders had taken Velasco at his word and
were apparently planning to publish a response to his speech this week.
The government's move against the Alliance was probably designed not only to
prevent the party from publishing its response, but perhaps more importantly to halt
party inroads into the military establishment. One of the deported leaders
reportedly had expanded the party's military contacts beyond links with dissident
navy elements and had met with a group of army colonels. There have been recent
reports that some officers, particularly in the navy, have expressed concern that
Velasco has failed to stem leftist influence in the government. Exiling of radical
leftist leaders last week may have been in response to these concerns.
The move against civilian opponents and the closure of the leftist biweekly
Marka for its anti-Chile statements also reflect the government's desire to keep
things under control during the conference of nonaligned foreign ministers
scheduled to meet in Lima later this month. According to the US embassy, there
have been indications that some opposition groups were planning disruptive acts to
embarrass the government.
Top officials also probably felt the moves would help the government in its
current effort to build a political organization. The repressive measures, however, are
more likely to harden opposition to the government's planned political organization.
A number of labor grow s have already called for strikes to protest the deportations
and other related moves.
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Probable Operating Area fo
ndia's IL-38/MAY Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 12, 1975
After years of neglect, the Indian navy has embarked on a program to upgrade
its naval air arm. New Delhi is concerned about the increased great-power presence
in the Indian Ocean and considers it potentially destabilizing. As a consequence, the
government has apparently decided that its navy must be able to monitor and, to
some extent, influence foreign naval operations in the area.
India's surface navy, although expanding, remains primarily a coastal defense
force and cannot fulfill such broadened responsibilities by itself. To achieve such
goals, the government.is upgrading the reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and
strike capabilities of the Indian naval air arm.
The key to India's naval air capability is its 16,000-ton aircraft carrier, the INS
Vikrant. Although a small carrier, it is the only such ship permanently based in the
Indian Ocean.
New Delhi used the carrier effectively during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war to
help seal the coastline of what was then East Pakistan, but the ship's effectiveness
began to deteriorate soon thereafter. It was frequently out of commission because of
mechanical difficulties most often associated with the boiler system, and the
obsolescent antisubmarine warfare and strike aircraft assigned to it provided little
offensive or defensive capability.
The Vikrant's capability, however, is being improved. The aircraft carrier
underwent an extensive overhaul and refitting during 1973 and 1974 and is now
fully operational. Furthermore, replacement of the carrier's Sea Hawk jet attack
aircraft, a priority for several years, appears likely.
India has almost completed negotiations to buy the British VTOL/STOL MK1
Harrier and will probably acquire six of them in the near future. Additional Harriers
will be acquired when the UK begins constructing a maritime version in two or three
years. The Harrier is one of the few aircraft that can operate from the Vikrant
without costly modifications to the carrier's flight deck and catapult system.
The Alize antisubmarine warfare aircraft assigned to the Vikrant also are in
poor condition, but India has not yet shown any interest in replacing them. Instead,
the navy apparently will rely on helicopters for its airborne antisubmarine warfare
capability.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 12, 1975
During the last few years, India has acquired a substantial number of
antisubmarine warfare helicopters, including 12 Sea Kings from the UK, 6 of which
are permanently assigned to the aircraft carrier. Alouette III utility helicopters are
currently being employed in such -a role on India's two Leander-class destroyer
escorts. A small number of KA-25 Hormone antisubmarine warfare helicopters-on
order from the USSR-may replace the Alouettes, or could be used on larger combat
ships expected to be delivered by the USSR during the late 1970s.
The navy has recently been given responsibility for India's maritime
reconnaissance program. In the past, the air force performed this mission with a
squadron of nine modified Lockheed C-121 Super Constellations. The marginal
performance of these aircraft, however, made their replacement essential to an
effective program.
Although India evaluated several Western-designed aircraft, including the
French Breguet Atlantique and the British Hawker Siddeley Nimrod, a shortage of
foreign exchange apparently made it necessary to select the IL-38 May offered by
the USSR. The navy will receive three of these aircraft shortly, and as many as ten
could eventually enter the inventory. The May's will be able to operate over the
Indian Ocean to distances of more than 1,300 miles. India has acquired most of its
combat and combat-support aircraft from the USSR since the US-UK arms embargo
of South Asia in 1965.
While the addition of modern equipment will add new impetus to India's
expanding naval air capability, the effectiveness of the Indian naval air arm will
probably not immediately improve.
The navy has no previous maritime reconnaissance experience, and it will take
time before naval attack, antisubmarine warfare, and air reconnaissance aircraft can
effectively perform integrated flight operations. However, once effective
command-and-control procedures are developed and necessary training programs
have been instituted, the Indian naval air arm will be able to assume an expanded
role in India's effort to monitor and influence great-power activities in the Indian
Ocean. Further development of Indian naval air capabilities is expected as the
great-power presence in the Indian Ocean expands.
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