NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027700010042-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: May 24, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top secret
ININNOIN
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
0
May 24, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 24, 1975
LEBANON: Military government
appointed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
LAOS: The situation
remains tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
PORTUGAL: Feuding parties meet with Revolutionary
Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
BURMA: Anti-government protests held . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
SPAIN - SPANISH SAHARA: Spain prepared to
end role in the Spanish Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
AZORES-PORTUGAL: Separatist activity prompts
Lisbon to step up security in the islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Husak to become president . . . . . . . . . 16
WEST GERMANY: Economic slump continues . . . . . . . . . . 18
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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National Intelligence Bulletin May 24, 1975
President Franjiyah, in a dramatic attempt to end. civil unrest in Beirut,
yesterday appointed a predominantly military cabinet headed by a retired security
service official. This is Lebanon's first military government since the country became
independent in 1943, and it is sure to be considered a threat by Lebanese leftists and
the Palestinians.
The New Government
The new prime minister, 76-year-old Brigadier General Nur al-Din Rafai, is
essentially an apolitical figure who has stayed out of public life since his retirement
as : head of the security services in 1962. He is a Sunni Muslim-required of all
Lebanese prime ministers-and is known for his authoritarian ideas on public
security Six of the eight members of his government are
army of icers who will apparently retain their military posts while serving in the
cabinet.
President Franjiyah almost certainly turned to the strategy of installing a
military government out of a conviction that no foreseeable civilian coalition could.
deal effectively with the deteriorating security situation; some 150 persons were
killed in Beirut last month and perhaps 40 more this week. Religious and political
tensions. have grown steadily among the country's traditional political leaders, both
between Christians and Muslims and within each group. Christian political groups
have been at odds with one another over how to deal with the fedayeen, while
Muslim factions have been reduced to intramural clashes over who should form the
next government.
Franjiyah's action will be applauded by right-wing elements, including the large
Phalanges Party, which for four days has been engaged in armed clashes with radical
fedayeen in a Beirut suburb. The conservative Christian parties have repeatedly
called . for' more forceful action by the government and the armed forces in
restricting the activities of Palestinian commandos in Lebanon.
Lebanese leftists and the fedayeen will see the new government as a threat to
the continued presence of fedayeen forces in Lebanon. They will be especially upset
with the appointment of the army commander in chief as defense minister. The
leftists have called for his replacement since the outbreak of fighting between the
army and fedayeen in Sidon last February.
For the moment, major fedayeen and leftist leaders are withholding comment
on the new government. They are probably undecided on how to react to
Franjiyah.'s unexpected initiative, and moderates among them are hopeful that the
cease-fire that went into effect last night will hold.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 24, 1975
The situation in Vientiane remains tense, as communist-inspired students and
communist troops continue their occupation of several AID facilities in and around
the capital.
Communist members of the city's joint military security force are guarding the
main entrance to a large American residential housing compound just north of
Vientiane. It took considerable haggling by US officials before the soldiers finally
permitted more than 100 American dependents to leave the compound for Wattay
airport yesterday. The dependents were subsequently evacuated to Thailand.
Some 150 to 200 demonstrators-many reportedly Lao employees of
USA ID-briefly blocked off the US embassy in Vientiane today. The occupation of
the main AID compound by communist-inspired demonstrators has kept many local
employees from drawing their pay and this apparently prompted the action at the
embassy. Efforts by US officials to spark negotiations between the unpaid AID
employees and the communist-inspired demonstrators were not fruitful. At last
report about 50 demonstrators remained outside the embassy.
The coalition government's joint peace-keeping commission, at the strong
insistence of the communists, recently agreed to permit both sides to station combat
troops, tanks, armored cars, and antiaircraft artillery in Vientiane, ostensibly to
safeguard the capital's neutrality. For the non-communist Royal Lao Army,
however, the agreement is strictly academic; it is leaderless, disorganized, and
ineffective.
Meo Migration
The situation in the hill country north of Vientiane reportedly has become very
unstable. Large numbers of Meo tribesmen are said to be trying to follow their
leader, General Vang Pao, to Thailand.
Some 11,000 Meo have begun moving across Laos toward northern Thailand.
As many as 50,000 additional Meo, said to be heavily armed and led by former
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May 24, 1975
guerrilla officers, reportedly have assembled at Ban Xon-one of Vang Pao's former
-bases near the Plaine des Jarres. They have said that unless Vang Pao returns to Laos,
they, too, will leave for Thailand.
Vang Pao, who is at Nam Phong in northeast Thailand along with some 5,000
of his followers, has made serious efforts to discourage any further migration by the
Meos to Thailand. The general, however, believes that he is now powerless to stop an
exodus.
The communists in Vientiane would like to stop such an exodus, fearing that
the presence of the Meos along the Thai border would pose a threat to them.
Communist Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi Vongvichit has asked the Thai
government to expel Vang Pao's forces and to take similar action against a group of
recently ousted rightist politicians and generals, who, Phoumi claims, have set up a
Lao government in exile in Bangkok.
The presence of prominent Lao rightists in Thailand is clearly an
embarrassment to Bangkok, but we have no evidence that a shadow regime has
actually been formed in the Thai capital. The Thai would almost certainly not
countenance such a move because of their strong desire for good relations with their
communist neighbors.
The Meos pose a difficult problem for politicians and foreign policy-makers in
Bangkok, who are already embarrassed by the large numbers of Cambodian and
Vietnamese refugees in Thailand. Some Thai military leaders, however, might
privately welcome Vang Pao's army in the border area as a buffer against possible
future aggression from Laos and as a potential valuable weapon against Thai
communist insurgents. The Bangkok press has heard of the Meo migration, however,
and the possibility of student demonstrations against their presence cannot be ruled
out.
Thai officials have taken steps to defuse the issue. Defense Minister Praman
yesterday announced that the government has a "definite" policy of not allowing
Lao refugees to remain in Thailand and that those "temporaril " in the north will be
sent back to Laos when the situation "returns to normal.'
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 24, 1975
Leaders of the Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties yesterday began
separate talks with members of the ruling Revolutionary Council in an effort to save
the governing coalition from collapse.
Socialist leader Soares emerged after the four-hour meeting with military
leaders saying only that the future will show whether the meeting had been a
success. The Council then began its session with the Communists. The Socialists are
due to meet with the Council again next week. The Movement's general assembly
may also consider the interparty conflict on Monday.
Much of the responsibility for the outcome lies with the Socialists, who have
turned the closing of their newspaper into a test of the military's intentions toward
representative government. The Socialists believe that if they do not challenge the
government on this issue, their position will deteriorate to the benefit of the
Communists. The Socialist challenge is supported by the Popular Democrats and
some parties of the extreme left.
The Communists have warned that if the Socialists break up the coalition
government there will be no need for the constituent assembly, now scheduled to
convene on June 2. The Communist Party's primary aim, however, is to maintain its
influence with the Armed Forces Movement. The Communists, therefore, will
probably heed the Movement's wishes and negotiate with the Socialists. At the same
time, Communist leader Cunhal is preparing for a possible ban on political party
activity.
I he Movement is
divided over the issue of political parties, but that a slight majority of the
Revolutionary Council favor a multiparty solution.F-- 11 many
Movement members resent the Communists' power play in taking over the
newspaper.
The Spanish, meanwhile, are becoming more alarmed with Portugal's move to
the left, the potential threat to the political parties, and the breakdown in military
discipline. A Spanish Foreign Ministry official has said that Spain will continue its
policy of strict nonintervention in Portugal's affairs, despite provocations. Spain, he
said, will ignore the majority of the provocations and protest only the most serious.
Portuguese General Otelo de Carvalho, for instance, recently gave an interview
to the Spanish media in which he referred to "socializing Iberia." The Spanish
government refused to allow the interview to be broadcast, but did not lode a
formal complaint.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Burmese students and workers are again staging anti-government protests in
Rangoon, but it seems unlikely that the disturbances will approach the scope of
those last year.
Rangoon University students have held two brief, relatively peaceful protests
this month over alleged police brutality. The university has just reopened after being
shut down last December during student demonstrations over the government's
handling of the funeral of former UN secretary general U Thant.
Workers at several factories in the Rangoon area are engaging in slowdown
strikes to demand larger food rations and wage increases. Some workers reportedly
hope to organize a more extensive strike early next month, the first anniversary of
violent labor protests in Rangoon.
Students and workers in general have little love for the government, but many
may be reluctant to join in protests again so soon after authorities used troops to
put down the earlier demonstrations. There is no sign that the students and workers
are coordinating their anti-government efforts.
The government so far is reacting cautiously, but some students and workers
have been arrested. If the protests spread, the regime will not hesitate to use force to
May 24, 1975
bring the situation under control.
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National Intelligence Bulletin May 24, 1975
The Spanish government announced yesterday that it is prepared to end its role
in Spanish Sahara if the process of self-determination which Madrid has planned is
delayed. In such a case, the announcement said, Spain would be prepared to hand
over power in the territory after first informing the UN. The announcement did not
say to whom the power would be handed.
Spanish Foreign Minister Cortina told the US ambassador on Thursday that
Spain hoped to get an agreement from Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria to begin
direct negotiations and guarantee the peace pending the outcome. Cortina said
Madrid was not prepared to have this matter drag on interminably. If negotiations
proved impossible and the International Court of Justice decision expected in
October led to no agreement, Spain might withdraw completely.
Spain's position has been that a referendum should be held under UN auspices.
Consideration of a referendum has been postponed pending the International
Court's decision, but Cortina did not say that Spain had given up on the idea.
Morocco has argued that this is a bilateral dispute with Spain that should be
negotiated. Rabat might be willing to include Mauritania, but is opposed to Algerian
involvement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 24,1975
Lisbon has demonstrated its concern over the growth of separatist activities in
the Azores by stepping up security measures in the islands.
This week, Portuguese security forces initiated regular patrols of Ponta
Delgada, the capital of the main island of Sao Miguel, and cars are being stopped and
searched at roadblocks. The US consulate reports that in the past few days,
Portuguese ships have unloaded military supplies, including trucks and jeeps,
suggesting that additional security forces may soon be arriving from the mainland.
Separatist activity has been increasing in recent weeks. Earlier this month,
separatist wall slogans began to appear and leaflets were issued calling for
independence and an end to Portugal's "colonial economic exploitation." Se aratists
ma have been responsible for two recent cases of suspected arson. 25X1
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primary goal is to force Lisbon to hold a referendum on zorean in epen ence.
I the separatists
plan to announce an Azorean government in exile. a announcement-apparently
authorized by the Azorean Liberation Front-reportedly will be made soon by
Azoreans in the US and could have an impact on Washington's negotiations with
Lisbon on renewal of base rights in the Azores
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 24, 1975
Party chief Gustav Husak will probably be named president next week,
replacing the aged and ailing General Ludvik Svoboda. Husak will almost certainly
continue as party leader.
The change in presidents does not portend any change either in Czechoslovak
policy toward the US or in Prague's subservience to Moscow. As president, Husak
would have the opportunity for expanded contacts with visiting foreign dignitaries,
particularly from the West. He may also do more traveling in the West, in an effort
to refurbish Czechoslovakia's tarnished image.
Husak's decision to hold both the country's top party and state posts would
not be unprecedented in Czechoslovakia. Some reports, however, say that he will
wear the two top hats only until the party congress next spring. This arrangement
could lead to jockeying for position by those who see themselves in line for Husak's
party mantle.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 24, 1975
The preliminary first-quarter figures for West Germany's gross national
product, released in Bonn this week, show no letup in the country's economic
slump. Real gross national product declined at a 6-percent annual rate, the same as
in the last quarter of 1974. Sagging exports-down some 10 percent in
volume-apparently accounted for much of the drop.
Indications of further slippage since March make it very unlikely that Bonn's
forecast of 2-percent growth in 1975 will be realized. There is a strong possibility
that the gross national product will decline for the year as a whole.
The Bundesbank has responded to the first-quarter results by cutting the
discount rate from 5 to 4.5 percent. While an official spokesman admitted Bonn's
disappointment, no new major expansionary measures are likely. The Schmidt
government still hopes for a recovery in the second half of the year, and is
determined to avoid rekindling inflation.
CUBA: Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez has signed a
trade agreement with the United Kingdom that will give Cuba medium-term credits
of at least $580 million for purchasing British capital goods. This is the third major
trade deal the Cubans-have made with a West European country since last December.
Earlier, Cuba had obtained about $350 million in trade credits from the French and
$900 million from the Spanish; the Cubans secured $100 million in credits from
Canada in late March. Cuba's improved economic situation has made it an attractive
market for Western countries eager to expand exports.
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