NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027700010014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 8, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
/fR
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
May 8, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 8, 1975
CONTENTS
VIETNAM: Still no information about the form of the new
administration in Saigon. (Page 5)
OAS: General Assembly opens today. (Page 8)
IRAN-IRAQ: Shah studying Baghdad's proposal for a Per-
sian Gulf security pact. (Page 14)
ANGOLA: Portuguese official blames Popular Movement for
violence last week. (Page 17)
CAPE VERDE ISLANDS: Assembly elections scheduled for
late June just prior to independence. (Page 19)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 8, 1975
A major speech yesterday in Saigon by General Tran
Van Tra, who commanded communist military forces in the
south, provides few clues to communist thinking on the
new administration there.
Tra took a stridently nationalistic tone, summariz-
ing Vietnam's long history of defending itself against
aggression and stressing the pride all Vietnamese should
share in the recent victory. He left no doubt that the
communists consider Vietnam one country.
He reiterated the policy of "leniency" that was
first broadcast by the Viet Cong's Liberation Radio fol-
lowing the capture of Da Nang last month, emphasizing
that former government, military, and civilian employees
will be welcome in the new society, but warning that
"severe punishment" awaits those who continue to "detach
themselves from the people." He called on students,
women's groups, and workers to form a vanguard to re-
store the society and economy, predicting that the task
ahead would be long and difficult.
Tra spoke as chairman of the "Saigon - Gia Dinh
Military Committee," but he indicated that he was speak-
ing for the Provisional Revolutionary Government when
he congratulated the "people" for their recent victory.
His speech, however, failed to provide any specific in-
formation about the form of the new Saigon government
or the identity of its leaders. No well-known communist
official other than Tra appeared at the ceremonies; the
members of his committee are all from the communists'
southern military command structure and are little known
to the non-communist South Vietnamese.
Although it has been a week since the liberation of
Saigon, there have been no public statements by any of
the other leaders of the various communist political and
military front organizations. Hanoi, moreover, has yet
to publish in its official media anything more than con-
gratulatory remarks on the recent victory. The Vietnam-
ese may be withholding important announcements until the
celebration of Ho Chi Minh's birthday on May 19.
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The communists' evident intention to establish a
nominally separate government in the south indicates
that Hanoi is content to move slowly toward formal re-
unification. North Vietnam may intend to continue
using the international standing of the PRG to establish
the legitimacy of the communists' southern regime. Once
this is accomplished, Hanoi may be willing to stage a
plebiscite or use some other device to legitimize reuni-
fication. This would allow Hanoi to claim that reunifi-
cation has been sought and accepted by the southerners,
and that it is not merely the consequence of conquest by
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North Vietnamese divisions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 8, 1975
A long list of grievances against the US is sure to
be aired at the OAS General Assembly opening today in
Washington. Yesterday, the Peruvian embassy brought to-
gether a number of Latin American foreign ministers for
preparatory talks aimed at keeping alive the consensus
that has repeatedly pitted the Latin Americans against
the US.
The assembly will run for perhaps two weeks. The
opening days, which will set the tone for the remaining
sessions, are likely to be fairly informal, with the
foreign ministers free to raise topics of their choice.
Panama, for example, has laid elaborate groundwork for
a Latin American statement supporting it on the Canal
Zone. Some countries will probably want to hammer again
at the question of sanctions against Cuba. If a decision
is made against verbatim minutes at the initial talks,
some issues may be solved without their having to be
raised formally.
When they do get around to the actual agenda, the
members will find it burdened with complex issues, sev-
eral of them relating to the new international economic
order favored by the Latin Americans. Some of these
topics may lead to heated debate and pose a threat to
Latin unity. These include the US Trade Reform Act, the
high price of oil, collective economic security, and the
election of a new secretary general. Whether the con-
ference gets bogged down in this heavy schedule or
focuses on the major issues will depend on the effective-
ness of the delegations that want the OAS to become a
working instrument.
The small countries in particular value the OAS
highly for the security protection, humanitarian func-
tions, and development programs it offers. The more im-
nat;nnc haves vary na opinions about its utility.
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May 8, 1975
With the breakdown of the hemispheric dialogue, a
number of nations view the OAS as the only enduring pan-
American forum and would be loath to see it collapse.
The Latin Americans come to Washington enjoying a
new sense of self-esteem. They have been active--and in
their eyes effective--in many international conferences,
especially those devoted to economic relations with the
developed countries. They have gained valuable experi-
ence in formulating positions on complicated issues and
have learned to put aside differences for the sake of
matters of common concern. All of this gives them a
better chance to influence the industrialized world.
Their sense of solidarity is enhanced by their view
that US prestige is declining as a result of events in
Southeast Asia and US failure to follow through on the
new dialogue. Some countries hold back support for the
US because they distrust Washington's judgment in such
policies as detente and a possible softening toward Cuba.
An ambivalence remains, however, because many still pre-
fer to see a strong US, clearly benevolent toward Latin
America.
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National Intelligence Bulletin May 8, 1975
IRAN-IRAQ
The Shah has informed Ambassador Helms that he is
studying a proposal for a Persian Gulf collective secu-
rity pact put forward by Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn
Tikriti during Saddam's recent visit to Tehran.
The Shah indicated that Baghdad's proposal would
provide for common action to meet both "local" and "ex-
ternal" threats. The Shah regarded it as offering some
guarantee that Iraq would not move forcibly to secure
its demands for territorial concessions from Kuwait, as
well as suggesting Iraqi willingness to withdraw "some-
what" from Soviet influence.
The Shah has long regarded the conservative Arab
states in the Gulf as vulnerable to radical subversion,
but he has been un-
-- - - - successful in his
~"?- - - - efforts to foster
a regional security
arrangement that ex-
cluded--indeed, was
largely aimed against--
the leftist regime
in Iraq. The Shah's
scheme foundered on
traditional Arab-
Persian rivalry,
distrust of Iranian
power and intentions
in the Gulf, and the
reluctance of con-
servative Arab lead-
ers to antagonize
Baghdad by joining
non-Arab Iran in
such an arrangement.
The comprehen-
sive accord reached
by the Shah and Sad-
dam Husayn in Algiers
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 8, 1975
last March, the recent leadership change in Saudi Arabia,
and now the sponsorship of a security pact by the Bagh-
dad regime itself have altered the situation consider-
ably. A Gulf-wide pact may now be possible, provided
the trilateral relationship among the Shah, Saddam Husayn,
and Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia continues on a positive
course.
Any such arrangement probably would include a mutual
nonaggression pledge, an agreement to consult on Gulf
problems, and some formula expressing the common interest
of Gulf states in excluding foreign powers from inter-
fering in area affairs. Noninterference by foreign
powers has been a common theme in the public statements
of Iranian and Iraqi leaders since the signing of the
Algiers accord. As a possible trade-off, Baghdad might
promise to limit the Soviet navy's access to Iraqi ports
in return for Iranian pressure on Bahrain to terminate
the small US naval presence there.
The Shah's only justification for the presence of
the US navy's middle East force has been that it is a
counter to Soviet naval activity in the Gulf. It would
be difficult for him to push the Iraqis to exclude the
Soviets without also supporting exclusion of the US.
The Shah would consider he had gained by such a trade-
off, partly because it would leave the Iranian navy as
the most powerful in the area.
Baghdad's motives in proposing a Gulf security ar-
rangement are less clear. Iraq is trying to project an
image of a powerful yet responsible Gulf Arab state.
Such a posture, it hopes, will help increase its influ-
ence among the small Gulf states. Baghdad, moreover,
may see a broader security pact as a means of obtaining
a formal nonaggression agreement with Iran.
Saddam Husayn may also hope to trade Iraqi coopera-
tion on Gulf security for Iranian or Saudi help in secur-
ing territorial concessions from Kuwait. Baghdad con-
tinues to press Kuwait to cede two islands flanking the
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 8, 1975
approaches to Iraq's port of Umm Qasr. Kuwait is un-
likely to accept an arrangement that calls for ceding
territory, but it might--under pressure from Tehran and
Riyadh--agree to some face-saving formula such as a
long-term lease of territory.
The Saudi attitude on a security pact would be crit-
ical in determining how the smaller Arab Gulf states--
particularly Qatar and Bahrain--react to any proposals.
The leaders of Qatar and Bahrain generally remain skep-
tical about Iraqi as well as Iranian intentions in the
Gulf. The ruler of Qatar recently told a US official
that he had no illusions about Ba hdad's ending its
subversion against Gulf states.
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May 8, 1975
A high-ranking Portuguese official has blamed the
Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Independence
of Angola for initiating the violence in Luanda last
week. Fighting between the Popular Movement and the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of Angola lasted for a
week and resulted in some 1,000 deaths.
Colonel da Cunha, President Costa Gomes' chief of
cabinet, recently told US officials in Lisbon that the
Popular Movement resorted to violence in an attempt to
revive its flagging political position. The Popular
Movement is not as well organized and equipped as the
National Front, nor is it as popular as Angola's other
liberation movement, the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola. Da Cunha also said the govern-
ment has evidence that clashes between blacks and whites
which occurred during the violence were provoked by Pop-
ular Movement agitators.
Da Cunha believes that Angola will become a "one-
party, one-leader" state. He thinks Jonas Savimbi,
leader of the National Union, will eventually emerge as
Angola's leader, even though Savimbi's military organi-
zation is the smallest among the three liberation move-
ments. The three groups share power in the transitional
government.
Da Cunha's assessments appear generally accurate.
The Popular Movement, which has strong support among
Luanda's workers, apparently was planning massive demon-
strations to coincide with May Day. The National Front
possibly believed its rival was also planning a coup
with Portuguese connivance. With tensions already high,
following a previous wave of fighting in late March, a
new outbreak of violence was inevitable.
Savimbi has been able to keep his organization
from becoming involved in the rivalry between the Popu-
lar Movement and the National Front. He is becoming
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May 8, 1975
known as a responsible moderate among Angolans and neigh-
boring African leaders who have tended to support the
other two nationalist groups. If he can extend his repu-
tation in Angola beyond the central part of the terri-
tory, where he now derives the bulk of his support, he
may become the dominant political force.
Lisbon has announced that elections for a national
assembly for the Cape Verde Islands will be held on
June 30--five days before the archipelago becomes inde-
pendent under arrangements negotiated last December.
The assembly will have two major tasks when it is
installed. The deputies will draft a constitution for
the islands and will take up the issue of union with the
mainland Republic of Guinea-Bissau, which received its
independence from Portugal last September.
The government of Guinea-Bissau is pushing hard for
union. The African Party for the Independence of Portu-
guese Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the sole political
party in Guinea-Bissau, has become the only meaningful
political force on the islands as well. The PAIGC fought
the Portuguese for more than a decade to achieve indepen-
dence for both areas; the bulk of its leadership comes
from the islands. Party militants have been busy poli-
ticking since last fall and now dominate Cape Verde's
transitional government.
At this time, union appears to be a foregone con-
clusion. Party leaders realize, however, that the is-
lands will constitute an economic drain on Guinea-Bissau's
own very limited resources, and they are actively seeking
foreign assistance. A party delegation visited the US in
March to solicit aid for the islands; its members made a
point of referring to the considerable number of Cape
Verdeans who had worked in the northeastern US and then
retired to the islands.
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