CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010053-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 53
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
DOE review completed.
Top Secret
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
April 30, 1975
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National Int lli nce Bulletin
April 30, 1975
CONTENTS
JAPAN-CHINA--USSR: Sino--Japanese negotiations on a
friendship -treaty are stalled, but a compromise is
likely. (Page 1)
WEST GERMANY: Bonn accelerates review of policy toward
deve. o~ g nations . (Page 3)
USSR-PORTUGAL: Soviet reaction to the Portuguese elec-
(Pace: 4)
TURKEY: Civil authorities take a harder line on growing
student violence. (Page 5)
SOUTH AFRICA: New uranium enrichment process will allow
Pretoria to be a world supplier by the late 1980s.
(Page 7)
ARGENTINA: Line of succession established in accord-
.nce-with President Peron's wishes. (Page 8)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 9)
ANNEX: Turkish Perspectives on the Aegean Problem
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National Intelligence Bulletin
JAPAN-CHINA-USSR
April 30, 1975
Tokyo and Peking are now stalemated in negotiating
a peace and friendship treaty, but an eventual compromise
is likely.
The central problem is China's proposal that the
treaty include a clause opposing third-country attempts
to establish hegemony in Asia--a veiled reference to the
Soviet. Union. Tokyo, anxious to maintain a rough balance
in its relations with Peking and Moscow, would prefer to
avoid any language that could be construed as anti-Soviet.
Despite the disagreement, "line-by-line" drafting
of the treaty reportedly is under way in Peking, suggest-
ing that both sides are interested in a compromise. Tokyo
would be willing to accept a hegemony clause that could
not be read as a direct attack on the USSR. Peking has
an incentive to show greater flexibility in the interest
of nailing down the treaty and showing up the Soviets,
who have no immediate prospect of a peace treaty with
Japan.
Moscow seems reconciled to the early conclusion of
a Sino-Japanese treaty. The Soviets, however, have tried
to stiffen Japanese opposition to an anti-Soviet clause,
most recently in signed commentaries in Pravda and
Izvestia.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 30, 1975
The commentaries are tough on the Chinese and--given
the fact that Moscow would prefer that Tokyo not sign any
treaty with China until Japan is willing to sign one with
the USSR--relatively easy on the Japanese. The Soviets
charge that Chinese leaders have admitted that the Soviet
Union is the target of the hegemony language and that Pe-
king's purpose is to drive a wedge between the USSR and
Japan. The commentaries praise those Japanese leaders
who are sensitive to the real purposes of the Chinese and
are resisting the hegemony language in the treaty.
The timing and tone of these commentaries suggest
Moscow sees some hope that Tokyo will be able at least
to water down the treaty's language. The Soviets prob-
ably believe that their previous representations in Tokyo
against the treaty caused the Japanese to take a tougher
stand in the talks with Peking. If Tokyo capitulates,
the Soviets may feel that their many warnings will have
put the Japanese on the defensive when they finally de-
cide to deal with Moscow on a treaty.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
WEST GERMANY
April 30, 1975
Bonn has decided to accelerate its review of West
German policy toward the developing world as a result
of the collapse of the Paris preparatory conference of
oil producers and consumers. Chancellor Schmidt has long
felt that present West German policy fails to take into
account current political and economic realities. The
coalition partners also have been under increasing pres-
sure recently to make sure that development aid policy
helps ensure West German access to vital raw materials.
In undertaking the policy review, Schmidt recognizes
the futility of a continued stalemate in the dialogue
between developed and developing states. The review will
aim at. finding a way to take the initiative away from the
developing states, perhaps with counterproposals that
skirt the objections of the industrialized states but
nevertheless recognize some of the developing nations'
fundamental demands.
Under strong prodding from the Chancellor and with
the support of Development Aid Minister Bahr, Bonn's
policy review will reassess West German interests re-
lating to energy, raw materials, and overall relations
with the Third World. The West Germans hope to develop
proposals to assist the developing countries attain their
goals by considering all the issues that these states had
hoped to include in the agenda for a full conference
after the Paris meeting. The present schedule calls for
cabinet consideration of the review in mid-May--prior to
the ministerial meetings of the International Energy
Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, scheduled for late May.
It is still too early to tell whether Bonn's review
will result in fundamental changes in West German policy
toward the Third World. Of the West European nations,
West Germany has been among the most conservative in its
policy toward developing countries. It is clear, however,
that the Development Aid Ministry, under the ambitious
Bahr, is making a determined effort to bring Bonn's pol-
icies more into line with the views of moderate developing
states.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 30, 1975
The Soviets have tried to put a good face on the
outcome of the Portuguese election, asserting that the
voting took place peacefully, fascism was repudiated,
and the policies of the provisional government were en-
dorsed. But their media coverage has also been unusually
explicit about the poor showing of the Portuguese Commu-
nist Party.
The election results are presented in a straight-
forward way, with detailed returns and sometimes candid
observations. The success of the Socialist Party is made
abundantly clear. One commentary notes that the Social-
ists, by joining with the Communists, would have a ma-
jority, but adds that they would have a still larger
majority with the Popular Democrats. Communist leader
Cunhal is quoted as saying that he "always thought" it
desirable for the Socialists and Communists to work to-
gether.
The Soviet commentaries raise the possibility that
Moscow is not altogether displeased by the results. By
presenting its home audience with this sober coverage of
the elections, Moscow could be guarding against inflated
expectations should developments turn out badly for the
Portuguese Communists and the Soviet Union.
Moscow may calculate that the relative lack of elec-
toral support for the Portuguese party will make it more
amenable to Soviet influence. The Soviets are also likely
to interpret the results as evidence of the wisdom of the
Portuguese Communist Party's associating itself closely
with the Armed Forces movement, which remains the locus
of power.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
TURKEY
April 30, 1975
Civil authorities are taking a tougher stance against
the growing student violence in Turkey.
Istanbul University on April 24 was the scene of the
most violent clashes between rightist and leftist student
factions since the demonstrations that ultimately led to
the downfall of the Demirel government in 1971. Until
the most recent encounters, police showed great restraint
toward the students and seldom actually engaged them,
while students avoided provoking the police. In the
latest demonstrations, however, mutual restraint appears
to have disappeared, and both sides used a great deal more
force. It is too early to tell if the police crackdown
represents a hardening position at the local level or is
the result of a "get-tough" policy on the part of the
Demirel government.
Meanwhile, the Middle East Technical University in
Ankara, which was closed on April 16 after student dis-
turbances, was scheduled to reopen this week and may again
be the scene of violence.
All law enforcement
agencies have been notified and appropriate measures have
been taken to respond to any violence.
The growing incidence of violence among students,
which stemmed initially from legitimate grievances against
the Turkish educational system, appears to be taking on
political overtones and may signal mounting student oppo-
sition to the Demirel government. The rectors of 13
Turkish universities who met in Izmir last week denounced
the incidents as politically motivated and called upon
the government to take appropriate measures to restore
order. This move is an effort to absolve the universi-
ties of responsibility for the discontent, making it a
political problem necessitating government solution.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 30, 1975
Although not anywhere near as critical as the situa-
tion in 1971, that led the armed forces to unseat Demirel,
the student disturbances could prove embarassing to the
government. They have already provided fuel for the
opposition, which has charged that right-wing backers of
Deputy Prime Minister Turkes have been active in the dis-
turbances.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH AFRICA
April 30, 1975
Pretoria expects to be a world supplier of en-
riched uranium, as well as uranium ore, by the late 1980s.
Earlier this month, South African officials announced
that their uranium-enrichment pilot plant, using their new
aerodynamic process, had gone into operation. It is likely,
however, that only part of the plant is actually operating.
The South Africans also reiterated their confidence that the
process will be competitive on the world market. South
Africa's first commercial enrichment plant using the new
process is currently scheduled to begin operations in 1984
and to reach full capacity two years later.
To make the process economically competitive, the
South Africans must keep to a minimum both the amount and
cost of the electricity used in the process. They have indi-
cated that the amount of electricity needed has been reduced
at least below original estimates. Relatively cheap electric
power is available in South Africa today because the country
has considerable amounts of inexpensive coal. Nevertheless,
South Africa plans to supplement its own electrical power
supply with power from neighboring Mozambique's Cabora
Bassa hydroelectric project, which is scheduled to begin
operations this fall.
The South Africans could adapt their enrichment
process for the production of weapons-grade material.
The government claims it has the capability to build
nuclear weapons, but says its policy is to use the en-
riched uranium for peaceful purposes. Pretoria, however,
has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and
could assist other potential nuclear-weapons states.
Details about the South African enrichment process
remain closely guarded
seems willing to export its technology, as well as its
uranium, to countries seeking their own independent uranium-
enrichment capabilities.
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Pretoria
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National Intelligence Bulletin
ARGENTINA
April 30, 1975
The election of congressional officials on April 25
has established the line of presidential succession in
accordance with President Peron's wishes.
The constitutional successor, Senate leader Jose
Allende--a non-Peronist--has resigned. Some members of
the Peronist bloc had wanted to fill the position from
their own ranks. The leadership, however, has apparently
prevailed on the majority to heed Mrs. Peron's preference
for leaving the post vacant, probably because a strong
incumbent might increase the chances of her being re-
placed.
Instead, Chamber of Deputies president Raul Lastiri,
who has been reelected, now stands next in line for the
presidency. Lastiri, who served as provisional president
before Juan Peron's election in September 1973, is the
son-in-law of presidential adviser Lopez Rega and thus
a member of Mrs. Peron's official "family."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Cambodia: The French have
provided details on the Khmer
communists' plan for deporting
foreigners from Phnom Penh,
All foreigners now stranded in
the French embassy compound--
over 600 at last count--will
be transported by road from
Phnom Penh to the town of
Poipet on the Thai border.
The foreigners will be shut-
tled to the border in groups
beginning on April 30; the
total. evacuation could take 15
to 20 days. The French have
made arrangements with the Thai
government and the Red Cross
for medical treatment and trans-
portation for the evacuees once
they cross the border. Al-
though all French personnel
will be leaving, Paris has al-
ready expressed its willing-
ness to establish ties with the
new regime in Phnom Penh and
will presumably seek to reopen
its embassy as soon as possible.
April 30, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 30, 1975
Turkish Perspectives on
the' Aegean Problem
Although both Greece and Turkey have apparently
agreed to discuss the Aegean issue within the next few
weeks, both sides are increasing their military posture
in the event of a confrontation. The nature of the long-
standing problems between the two countries enhances the
possibility that a miscalculation or misinterpretation
could lead to hostilities.
Turkish Military Preparations
The possibility of a military confrontation between
Greece and Turkey has decreased for the moment, but An-
kara continues to prepare for this eventuality. From
Ankara's viewpoint, Greece currently poses a major threat
to Turkish interests in the Aegean. This preoccupation
has temporarily diverted traditional Turkish concern for
its security away from the Soviet threat and has resulted
in several changes in its military posture.
The most significant change is the planned creation
of a 4th Army, to be headquartered at Izmir. The new
command's mission is to defend the Aegean coast and to
develop contingency plans for the occupation of one or
more of the easternmost Greek islands in the Aegean. It
will serve as a nucleus to which units from other commands
can be quickly assigned, and it will have operational
control over air, naval, and ground forces in the area.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 30, 1975
The Turkish General Staff has approved plans for an
Aegean naval force, and an increase in the number of
ships in that area can be expected. The US naval attache
in Ankara, who toured the Aegean coast in mid-April, how-
ever, has reported no unusual concentration of naval
units at any of the Turkish ports. A major concentration
of combatants and amphibious craft would be a necessary
prelude to any Turkish invasion of the islands.
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ATHENS
Samos..,
O^ Kos
FC
4+
S~.
0 25 50 75 Miles
F ice--r i '
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
Cyclades
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 30, 1975
Turkish Perception of Greek Threat
e
Turkish General Staff views the Greek ui up on e
easternmost Aegean islands as a means of putting Greece
in a position of strength from which, the General Staff
fears, the Greeks will become more aggressive in their
claims to the Aegean. They fear, too, that Athens might
be tempted to risk a more adventurous military policy on
Cyprus.
Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil has stated that
Greek fortification of the'Aegean islands has created a
"delicate and grave situation" and that Greece must re-
store the demilitarized status of the islands. Ankara
believes that Athens has now upset the balance of forces
established by the 1923 Lausanne Convention. Turkey is
also concerned that Greece may declare a 12-mile terri-
torial seas limit in an attempt to reinforce its claims
to the Aegean. Such an effort to make the Aegean a
"Greek lake" could, from Ankara's viewpoint, lead to war.
Another major source of Turkish concern is the fact
that Greek military procurements have far surpassed those
of the Turks since the Cyprus invasion. With the US arms
suspension to Turkey still in effect, Ankara is aware of
a potential unfavorable shift in the balance of forces
between the two countries. This consideration could en-
courage the Turks to force an early showdown on the
Aegean issue.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 30, 1975
Outlook
The potential for a serious incident in the Aegean
has grown over the past few months. Both Greece and Tur-
key are prepared to discuss their differences during the
next month, which will help to defuse the tensions, but the
problem does not allow for an easy solution. Meanwhile,.
Ankara will continue to view all Greek military activity
in the area with deep suspicion and counter any moves with
increased readiness on the mainland. Athens will respond
to Turkish military actions, which could result in a con-
tinuing escalation of alert-posture and force readiness on
both sides. A military incident, either by accident or
provocation, could be used by Ankara as justification for
full-scale military action.
US arms shipments play an important role in Turkish
calculations. If they are not resumed and alternate sources
of supply cannot be found, Turkey may feel forced to act
before its military capability is reduced to the level of
the Greek armed forces. A resumption of US military ship-
ments, on the other hand, would not prevent a continuation
of preparations for response to Greek provocations. On
balance, political factors could exert a strong restraint
on the Turkish leadership, which recognizes that a pre-
emptive attack on Greece would jeopardize chances for re-
sumption of US arms shipments, embroil Turkey with its
NATO allies, and remove all possibilities for a rapproache-
ment with Greece, long an objective of Turkish governments.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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