CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010042-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: April 24, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
April 24, 1975
0
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 24, 1975
CONTENTS
SOUTH VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1)
LAOS: Royal Lao troops recapture two key positions.
Page 5)
EGYPT-SYRIA: Sadat-Asad meeting appears to have smoothed
relations, but disagreements probably remain. (Page 6)
USSR-PORTUGAL: Soviets more openly endorse Lisbon regime.
(Page
ARGENTINA: Political pressures on the administration
a versely affect economic situation. (Page 10)
ECUADOR: Civilian opposition surfaces for the first
E11' a since military government came to power. (Page 11)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 12)
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CAMBbDIA
a Ham
Tan,
'Hung Tau
CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE
SOUTH
VIETNAM
Thiet
Phan 44AIGCON
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 24, 1975
SOUTH VIETNAM
The communist thrusts toward Saigon have slowed.
Communist units reportedly are still having difficulty
moving supplies forward, and there could be some addi-
tional delay before some units are ready to resume the
attack. Most evidence, however, points to direct assaults
on Saigon's outer defenses this week or by the middle of
next week at the latest.
In addition to supply problems, the communists may
also have been delayed by the lack of training and expe-
rience among some recently arrived troops, exhaustion
from traveling long distances, and the unfamiliarity of
new units with the terrain. It is extremely difficult,
moreover, for all battalions to arrive at assembly and
attack positions simultaneously, and a lull of several
days before a coordinated attack by a number of divisions
is not unusual. Most of the communists' difficulties
around Saigon are expected to be solved shortly. We
cannot rule out the possibility that the communists have
in mind that a pause, following Thieu's resignation,
would allow Saigon leaders time to move toward a nego-
tiated surrender,
Strong North Vietnamese counterattacks against gov-
ernment troops and positions in Tay Ninh Province again
closed the road to the provincial capital. The South
Vietnamese were also forced from Rach Kien, district
town in Long An Province just ten miles southwest of
Saigon. The communists' sweep on the east side of Route
4 has been led by two regiments of the North Vietnamese
8th Division. F_ I
On the central coast, the North Vietnamese are now
moving supplies and equipment by sea into ports as far
south as Nha Trang. Aerial photography shows
a number of small coastal vessels and barges unloading
at Nha Trang. Similar activity has been previously noted
at Qui Nhon and Da Nang, and the North Vietnamese will
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probably soon begin using their newly acquired port fa-
cilities as far south as Ham Tan, including Cam Ranh Bay
and Phan Thiet.
Hanoi Radio announced yesterday that Lt. General
Nguyen Vinh Nghi and Brig. General Pham Ngoc Sang have
been captured. General Nghi was the commander of the
Military Region 3 Forward Command at Phan Rang, and Gen-
eral Sang was the commander there of the South Vietnamese
Air Force 6th Division. These men and their staffs were
unable to fly out of Phan Rang when it fell to the com-
munists last week, because rebellious Rangers seized and
took off in the only available escape` aircraft.
In the face of communist intransigence, South Viet-
nam's new President, Tran Van Huong, still appears to be
trying to open some sort of political dialogue. He met
twice yesterday with the French ambassador to Saigon and
recalled his chief negotiator in Paris, Ambassador Phong,
for "urgent" discussions.
What Huong has in mind is not clear, but he appears
hopeful that the Viet Cong will accept some offer of po-
litical dialogue with the government short of surrender
discussions. The French government, which has been in
contact with communist representatives in Paris, appar-
ently still believes that such talks can be arranged.
Ambassador Phong, whose opinion probably has been influ-
enced heavily by the optimistic line of the French, also
shares that view..
Most political opposition leaders, such as former
vice president Nguyen Cao Ky and General "Big" Minh,
also hope that some form of solution short of surrender
can be arranged. They recognize, however, that the com-
munists will not negotiate with the remnants of the
Thieu regime and that the first order of business is to
replace it with one that might meet communist specifica-
tions.
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There is, however, considerable disunity among var-
ious opposition elements. Four of the principal oppo-
sitionists--Catholic leader Father Thanh, "Big" Minh,
former senate chairman Huyen, and Buddhist activist Vu
Van Mau--met today to prepare a joint statement demand-
ing that President Huong step aside and allow a new cab-
inet to take charge, but the four were unable to agree
on the procedures under which a new cabinet would oper-
ate. There is also some doubt that Vu Van Mau and the
An Quang Buddhist elements he represents will endorse
the statement.
The support of the military--or at least its agree-
ment not to interfere--is needed before a new government
can be formed, and we are not certain how the military
will respond.
President Huong accepted the resignation of the
Can cabinet today. Huong says he hopes to have a new
government formed by Friday.
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iLuang Prabang
Sala Pli u Khoun rre
T AiLA,
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7ETvAM
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 24, 1975
Some 50 Royal Lao army troops reportedly recaptured
two key positions overlooking the Sala Phou Khoun road
junction on April 22. Communist artillery attacks in the
area apparently ended the day before, and the Pathet Lao
offered little or no resistance to the Lao army's reoc-
cupation of the positions.
General Vang Pao believes the Pathet Lao may be re-
sponding to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's appeal for
an end to the Sala Phou Khoun fighting. The senior com-
munist aide to Foreign Minister Phoumi Vongvichit charged
the Royal Lao army with violating the cease-fire first
and implied that last week's communist attacks were in
retaliation for earlier rightist military initiatives
elsewhere in northern Laos.
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Presidents Sadat and Asad appear to have papered
over some of their differences during the two-day summit
held under Saudi Arabia's auspices, but the communique
issued yesterday openly acknowledged past differences and
is so lacking in specifics as to suggest continued serious
disagreements.
The communique affirmed that "political action during
the coming stage demands the establishment of the closest
cooperation between Syria and Egypt." It noted that "any
action"--presumably meaning any negotiated agreement--on
a particular front should be "part of" similar action on
all fronts. These assertions are obviously designed to
mollify President Asad, who has consistently demanded
that Sadat refrain from unilateral agreements with Israel
in favor of pursuing a settlement that satisfies all
Arab territorial demands.
The communique did not mention the Geneva conference,
however, and made scant mention of the Palestinians,
suggesting that the two presidents may have found little
common ground on the issues that are most basic to a joint
negotiating strategy. The communique referred only in
passing to ensuring the "legitimate rights" of the Pales-
tinians, and it avoided standard Arab formulations on es-
tablishing a Palestinian state and guaranteeing the pres-
ence of the Palestine Liberation Organization at Geneva.
Sadat has been attempting to devise a formula that
would delay PLO participation in the conference and ob-
scure it by absorbing the PLO in a broader Arab delega-
tion. He has apparently had no success in getting the
Palestinians to agree and may have run into difficulty
with Asad as well. The Syrians have hinted broadly that
they might boycott the conference unless the PLO is in-
vited to attend from the start.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April. 24, 1975
Sadat's declared willingness to coordinate more
closely with Asad costs him nothing at this point. He
probably has no hope that an Egyptian-Israeli disengage-
ment can be negotiated and thus sees the Geneva confer-
ence, where closer cooperation with Syria will be inevi-
table, as the only negotiating avenue still open.
The two presidents established a new vehicle for
future coordination, which offers some hope of improved
bilateral relations. According to the communique, they
have formed a permanent coordination committee under the
joint chairmanship of the Egyptian vice president and the
Syrian prime minister. Contacts in the past had been the
province of the two foreign ministers, whose
personal an
range of bilateral relations.
Following Asad's departure from Riyadh yesterday,
Sadat stayed to talk briefly with King Khalid and the
new Saudi leadership, to whom he probably made an appeal
for financial assistance. He then flew to Tehran for a
meeting with the Shah. He is scheduled to return to
Cairo today.
tagonism soured the full
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 24, 1975
Articles in Pravda and Izvestia this week on the
approaching Portuguese elections show the Soviets edging
toward closer identification with the present regime.
Both articles deny that there is any conflict between
detente and Soviet support for Portugal's "progressive"
course. This line is probably intended to assure domes-
tic audiences and put the West on notice that detente con-
siderations will not keep the USSR from assisting, and
benefiting from, Portugal's leftward movement.
The Soviets cast themselves as the true supporters
of democracy in Portugal, saying that it is the West,
not Moscow, that is meddling in Portuguese affairs. The
Pravda commentary, written by its correspondent in Lisbon,
is particularly critical of social democratic leaders in
Western Europe, who, it says, are undermining the commu-
nists in order to advance the cause of the Portuguese
socialists. Moscow has been under some pressure from the
social democrats to exercise a restraining influence in
Portugal, but the articles suggest that, thus far at :Least,
Western demarches have had little impact.
Since the coup attempt of March 11, the Soviets have
also been more sharply critical of NATO and the Catholic
church in Portugal.
Despite these signs of more open support of the
Portuguese, Moscow still seems to be feeling its way.
The Soviet equities are complex, and broader interests--
including relations with the West--dictate a degree of
prudence.
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Political pressures on Mrs. Peron's government are
continuing to stifle efforts to stabilize the domestic
economy and to stem the deterioration of Argentina's
position in the world market. If the administration con-
tinues to give in to wage demands of Peronist labor unions
and to ignore the growing financial strains in manufac-
turing and agriculture, the economic decline will become
worse during the latter half of 1975.
Although price controls are now in effect, inflation-
ary pressures continue to be strong, and the rise in the
cost of living will probably exceed 40 percent this year.
Most of the benefits of government-sponsored wage hikes
are being eroded, and the diversion of numerous consumer
goods into the black market is creating shortages and
widespread public discontent.
An even more serious problem is Argentina's worsen-
ing balance-of-payments position--expected to produce a
$600-million deficit this year. The value of agricultural
and beef exports, the largest earners of foreign exchange,
has declined steadily in recent months. The devaluation
of the peso last month has helped strengthen the competi-
tive position of manufactured goods, but it has done
little to improve the prospects for grain and meat exports.
The value of grain sales will decline by about 40 percent
this year because of a poor harvest and lower prices in
the world market. Depressed beef prices and the lack of
available overseas markets are also expected to remain a
problem.
The government's inability to cope with the present
situation has contributed to a growing mood of pessimism
regarding both the economy and the administration's capa-
bilities. Barring a change in present policy, Argentina
will be forced to pay a heavy price in terms of stagnating
or declining production in the months ahead. The conse-
quent increases in unemployment and losses in real income
will make Mrs. Peron's political problems even worse.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 24, 1975
ECUADOR
Ecuador's military government is facing the first
concerted civilian opposition since coming to power in
1972. Although not seriously threatened, the Rodriguez
administration is adding to the tension by overreacting.
Antigovernment sentiment, apparently reflecting a
consensus among major political, labor, and student groups,
has surfaced in bold press attacks. Principal Quito
dailies are attempting to discredit President Rodriguez
by pointing up his alleged communist ties and suggesting
that he is pocketing official funds. The government has
issued an arrest order for Julio Prado, a respected edi-
torialist and former foreign minister who is in the van-
guard of the press campaign.
Through a combination of government-financed press
rebuttals to the charges, an attack by thugs on Prado's
office, and the arrest order based on flimsy charges, the
opposition has also been given grounds for its new charge
of harassment by officials. Prado is writing now from
underground, further embarrassing the government and iv-
in the opposition yet another rallying point.1
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Venezuela: The Venezuelan government has offered
the European Community's planned borrowing facility a
line of credit of between $200 million and $300 million
during 1975. The loan would be financed at a rate of
about 8 percent over five or six years. EC officials,
who recently discussed such a loan with Venezuelan offi-
cials, were favorably impressed with Venezuela's terms.
The EC commissioner for financial affairs asked EC mem-
bers at the council meeting on April 21 to decide within
two weeks whether they want to borrow from the facility
this year. Italy, Ireland, Denmark, and the UK had ear-
lier been considered possible borrowers, but commission
officials now think that no member country will seek
these funds this year.
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