CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010038-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: April 22, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
OSD Review Completed
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 22, 1975
CONTENTS
VIETNAM: Tran Van Huong sworn in as Thieu's successor.
(Page 1)
EGYPT-USSR: Fahmi's visit to Moscow. (Page 3)
PORTUGAL: Election campaign closes tomorrow amid rumors
the HE military may cancel the election. (Page 5)
TURKEY-GREECE: Turkey making contingency plans for a
possible conflict in the Aegean. (Page 6)
GREECE: US embassy damaged during leftist demonstration.
(Page 7)
CYPRUS: Intercommunal talks will resume on April 28 with
Clerides as the Greek Cypriot negotiator. (Page 8)
PERU-USSR: Lima's army has purchased 30 MI--8 helicopters
from the Soviets. (Page 9)
SAUDI ARABIA: Khalid has acknowledged Fahd's control
over significant government business. (Page 11)
LAOS: Fighting continues. (Page 13)
PHILIPPINES: Reorganization of the Muslim areas an-
nounced. (Page 14)
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PHNOM
PENHI
CAM OD1
ay Ninh
0 30
MILES
557740 4-75
SOUTH
VIETNAM
BINH
TUY
' Binh Tuy
AIGON
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 22, 1975
South Vietnam's Vice President Tran Van Huang was
sworn in as the new President immediately following'
Thieu's resignation yesterday.
In recent weeks, communist statements have gradually
taken a harder line, ruling out any real compromise set-
tlement or coalition government of any substance, imply-
ing instead that nothing less than total surrender would
be acceptable. Initial communist reaction to the Thieu
resignation has continued the same line. A Viet Cong
spokesman in Paris has been quoted as stating that before
negotiations could be considered, the US must "halt all
interference in Vietnam" and that not only Thieu "but
also his whole regime must be overthrown."
At this point, the very best a new South Vietnam
government might obtain is a negotiated surrender. Given
the proximity of communist military forces to Saigon--
and the very real prospect of a rapid disintegration of
South Vietnamese military will in the wake of Thieu's
resignation--time may already have run out for any such
orderly transfer of power.
Communist pressure is being maintained on all sides
of Saigon. Fighting is continuing a dozen or so miles
east of Bien Hoa and along Route 4 southwest of Saigon.
The roads around Tay Ninh city remain blocked, and the
communists could overrun the lightly defended town at
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 22, 1975
any time. In addition to the now routine artillery at-
tacks on Bien Hoa, the communists shelled a number of
other government positions, including Tay Ninh.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 22, 1975
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit to the USSR
appears to have eased tensions somewhat, but evidently
did not make much progress on troublesome bilateral prob-
lems or on reconvening the Geneva conference.
Although Fahmi was enthusiastic about progress in
Soviet-Egyptian relations after meeting General Secre-
tary Brezhnev yesterday, the communique was far more re-
strained, describing the talks as "friendly" and "busi-
nesslike." It failed to give evidence that any progress
had been made on such outstanding issues as debt resched-
uling and military aid.
The Egyptians probably hoped to use Moscow's inter-
est in the Geneva conference as a lever to get conces-
sions on bilateral issues, but the Soviets apparently
would have none of it. Foreign Minister Gromyko, speak-
ing at a dinner during the visit, pointedly indicated
that Moscow still views Cairo's independent policies as
the major obstacle to an improvement in bilateral ties.
On Geneva itself, Moscow and Cairo agreed that care-
ful and serious preparations must precede reconvening
the conference. Fahmi said that the Soviets thought such
preparations could be completed by June. The Soviets,
however, made clear that they do not favor the Egyptian
suggestion that the conference be expanded to include
France, the UK, and at least one nonaligned country.
During the visit, Fahmi also told newsmen that
Egypt now rejects the step-by-step approach to negotia-
tions. He was responding to a question about recent
Israeli suggestions that disengagement negotiations
might be revived under US auspices. It is not clear,
however, whether he was rejecting the concept of a dis-
engagement or simply another publicized round of with-
drawal talks. President Sadat recently suggested that
Egypt would accept a "quiet" disengagement, but would
not participate in highly visible negotiations to
achieve it.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 22, 1975
Moscow and Cairo seemed deliberately to leave the
question of Palestinian representation ambiguous. They
called for PLO participation "with the same rights as
other participants," but they did not specify at what
point the Palestinians should attend nor appear to
close the door on PLO participation as part of another
delegation.
The Soviets, meanwhile, will continue their prep-
arations for Geneva during Syrian Foreign Minister
Khaddam's visit to Moscow tomorrow. In addition, the
Soviet chief of staff, General Kulikov, left for Damas-
cus yesterday. He may be seeking to reassure the
Syrians of Moscow's military support in order to en-
courage their attendance at Geneva.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 22, 1975
The Portuguese election campaign closes tomorrow
amid rumors that the military may still cancel the elec-
tion scheduled Friday.
The pending release of the preliminary conclusions
drawn by Admiral Rosa Coutinho from his investigation of
the coup last month has contributed to pre-election ten-
sion. The conclusions are likely to be most damaging to
the moderate political parties and could hurt their
chances at the polls if they get no chance at a rebuttal.
Meanwhile, the 12 legal parties have stepped up
their activity in the final days before the election.
Violence, which has been infrequent during the three-
week campaign, broke out yesterday in northern Portugal
between left-wing extremists and members of the center-
right Social Democratic Center. Over 25 people were
hurt, several from gunshot wounds inflicted by internal
security troops. The military will remain on alert
through the election against the possibility of further
violence.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 22, 1975
The Turkish general staff has been doing some con-
tingency planning for a possible conflict with Greece
in the Ae can
Ankara appears to be signaling Athens that Turkey
means business in the Aegean. By taking actions that
are likely to increase international tension, the Turk-
ish government may also be trying to influence the US
at a time when the ban on US military assistance to
Turkey is being reconsidered; Assistant Secretary of
State Hartman is scheduled to visit Ankara this week.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 22, 1975
We have no evidence that Athens plans to declare
a 12-mile limit around the islands. The idea was sug-
gested, but rejected, a year a o by the military junta
that then ruled Greece.
A large crowd of leftists--estimated at 100,000 to
150,000--severely damaged the US embassy in Athens yes-
terday in protest of US support for the previous military
regime. The demonstrators were eventually driven off by
riot police. Some 15 policemen were hospitalized and
about 25 demonstrators were hurt, according to police
estimates.
The incident marked the first major test in crowd
control for a weak government. Prime Minister Karamanlis
must avert the kind of chaos in the streets that set the
stage for the 1967 military "restoration of order"; he
knows the military have been complaining of his "softness"
toward demonstrators. The Prime Minister cannot go too
far, however; harsh measures would be likely to cause
counterdemonstrations by the left, possibly leading to
the fall of the government. Late yesterday, the Greek
government condemned the incident, blaming it on a few
extremists.
The rally last night, initiated by youth organiza-
tions, communists, Maoists, and other radical leftists,
was to commemorate the "black anniversary" of the coup
that brought the junta to power in 1967. The demonstra-
tion began peacefully, led by the Socialist mayor of
Athens. At the US embassy, most of the demonstrators
merely shouted and threw paint and firecrackers, but
about 500 of them broke through police lines and caused
considerable damage. Embassy personnel were evacuated
and none was injured.
Early this morning, groups of demonstrators occupied
other buildings in the city. Requests by the police for
permission to dislodge the rioters have been denied by
the Athens city prosecutor.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 22, 1975
Glafkos Clerides will continue as negotiator for
the Greek Cypriot side in the intercommunal talks,
thereby ensuring that the talks will resume as scheduled
in Vienna on April 28.
Clerides apparently decided to stay on after Presi-
dent Makarios reaffirmed Clerides' negotiating mandate
in the upcoming talks. The Greek Cypriot negotiator ap-
pears to have been upset by reports that Makarios had
made a commitment to the extremist hierarchy of the
Church of Cyprus to refuse to sign any settlement nego-
tiated by Clerides and adopt the policy of a "long strug-
gle" against the Turks.
The Greek Cypriot negotiator had also been discour-
aged by the harsh reaction to his conciliatory speech on
April 1. Clerides argued in that speech for a realistic
negotiating strategy in the talks and suggested that
Greek Cypriots consider accepting the Turkish Cypriot
demand for a biregional federation in return for Turkish
Cypriot concessions in other areas. Makarios has opposed
opening the negotiations with such a major concession.
Clerides noted in a statement on April 19, however,
that in Vienna he would be discussing the Turkish Cypriot
plan for a bizonal federation as well as the Greek Cyp-
riot proposals for a multiregional federation.
In a conversation with an American official yester-
day, Makarios was pessimistic about the Vienna talks.
Makarios said he wanted the Turkish delegation in Vienna
to give specifics on what Ankara is prepared to do in
the areas of refugee return, territory, and--though less
important at this stage--powers of a central government
and guarantees. Given the internal problems and weakness
of the Demirel government, however, Makarios did not think
such specific negotiating would be ossible.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 22, 1975
The Peruvian army has purchased 30 MI-8 helicopters
from the USSR, after negotiations with the US on a pack-
age deal that included helicopters ended inconclusively.
Delivery of the Soviet aircraft is scheduled to begin in
July. Peru currently has about six MI-8s in commercial
use; three were gifts from Moscow following the 1971
earthquake.
Pilot training for the MI-8s is likely to present
problems for the army, which has few trained helicopter
pilots.
Moscow hopes to follow up the MI-8 deal with a sale
of its 65-passenger MI-6 helicopter. Since mid-1973,
when Moscow first sold T-55 tanks and other ground equip-
ment to Peru, the USSR has endeavored to impress Lima
with the quality of Soviet arms. To date, only land
armaments have been sold. The MI-8 purchase will likely
expand the small number of Soviet personnel presently
in Peru.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 22, 1975
Saudi Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister Fahd
has assumed control of all significant government business.
Although King Khalid will retain the title of prime min-
ister, he has sent an order to all ministers telling them
that matters of substance are to be handled by Fahd.
Three ministers have confirmed to Ambassador Akins
their receipt of such an order. Khalid has also written
Fahd a personal letter to say he is depending on him to
take the "proper decisions."
In a meeting with US Deputy Secretary of Defense
Clements on April 14, Khalid again demonstrated an in-
ability to grapple with affairs of state. His discourse
was rambling and disjointed.
Ambassador Akins, who was present, believes the
royal family clearly appreciates the dangers of allowing
Khalid to rule. The ambassador anticipates that Khalid
will be restricted more and more to matters of protocol.
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ii LAOS
NORTH
VVETNAM 6
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 22, 1975
Fighting continues in the Sala Phou Khoun area of
north Laos. Regional commander General Vang Pao's coun-
terattack to recapture positions lost last week east of
Sala Phou Khoun has been turned back b stiff resistance
The abortive counterattack by one Royal Lao army infan-
try battalion was supported by a dozen T-28 air strikes.
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is apparently be-
coming more concerned about developments in the Sala
Phou Khoun area.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 22, 1975
PHILIPPINES
On April 21 President Marcos announced a govern-
mental restructuring of the Muslim areas. This action
followed the Muslim conference, which was held in Zam-
boanga city from April 17 to 19 and was attended by
more than 100 delegates. Although boycotted by the ex-
tremist Moro National Liberation Front, the conference
was carefully stage-managed by the government, producing
a predictable litany of loyalty oaths, but at the same
time allowing the airing of Muslim demands.
The announcement of the reorganization, not demanded
by the conferees, was obviously timed for maximum effect
both at home and abroad. Under the new plan, western
Mindanao and the Sulu Islands will be divided into two
sectors governed by ethnic Muslim regional directors,
who will hold cabinet rank. Marcos announced his ap-
proval of a conference demand that those who surrender
be integrated into the armed forces. He also affirmed
that the "peace dialogue" would be continued.
The President apparently hopes to rally the popu-
lace and isolate the extremists by the new measures.
Although the reorganization is being billed as a major
concession, it does not appear to be very different
from the present provincial structure. Its impact will
depend largely on whether a genuine transfer of authority
is made to leaders not discredited by past ties to the
regime.
Even so, the new measures fall short of the front's
demands for local autonomy and an independent Muslim
military force. They may strengthen the government's
efforts, however, to dissuade the international Muslim
community from recognizing or supporting the front or
using Philippine dependence on Arab oil as a possible
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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