CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010028-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: April 16, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
MOMMOM
WIN
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
April 16, 1975
0
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 16, 1975
CONTENTS
VIETNAM: Military situation. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: The communist encirclement gets smaller.
(Page 5)
VIETNAM: North Vietnamese logistic activity. (Page 7)
LAOS: King dissolves National Assembly. (Page 9)
THAILAND: Bickering already undermining coalition.
(Page 10)
LEBANON: Fedayeen and Phalangist militia continue
figs ht ng. (Page 11)
ITALY: Labor leaders will meet to discuss whether to
orm single organization. (Page 13)
CYPRUS: Clerides threatens to resign. (Page 15)
ROMANIA: Tensions in relations have increased recently.
(Page 16)
KENYA: Military contacts with Israel increase. (Page 17)
ARGENTINA: Peron's government registers modest victory
in Misiones Province. (Page 18)
MEXICO: Group of six named from which ruling party will
choose its presidential candidate. (Page 20)
CHILE; Finance minister has received new mandate to
dea~with economy. (Page 21)
COLOMBIA: State of siege still a possibility. (Page 22)
ECUADOR: Oil price frozen; rumor of industry's nation-
sa i'zation dispelled. (Page 23)
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Military Region 3
'r" youth Viernamese Airborne Bririarie
^ North Vietnamese Infantry Division
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National Intelligence Bulletin April- 16, 1975
SOUTH VIETNAM
South Vietnamese forces are expanding their holdings
both east and west of Xuan Loc.
The government units attempting to open the road to
Saigon are still meeting determined communist resistance,
however, and their progress has been slow. Some of the
civilians who fled from the city to the surrounding coun-
tryside are beginning to return.
Along South Vietnam's central coast, government air-
borne and ranger troops defending Phan Rang airbase came
under heavy North Vietnamese armored attack early today.
Phan Rang city, located about five miles southeast of the
airbase and defended by territorial forces, was also re-
ported to be under heavy attack. Unconfirmed press re-
ports indicate that government forces have abandoned both
the airbase and the city, and are being evacuated by
South Vietnamese navy ships anchored off the coast.
Nearer Saigon, Bien Hoa airbase came under renewed
heavy communist shelling and possible sapper attacks again
early today. Press reports claim that the attacks have
forced the airfield to be temporarily closed.
In the delta provinces, fighting has been fairly
heavy in Vinh Long Province as the communists continue
to threaten Route 4 north of Can Tho. The North Viet-
namese 8th Division has been redeploying in preparation
for its long-expected campaign to cut Route 4 in Dinh
Tuong Province. If the 8th Division coordinates its
attacks on Route 4 with the North Vietnamese 5th Division
farther north in Long An Province, the South Vietnamese
7th Division will be hard pressed to keep this vital
link to Saigon open.
The South Vietnamese have contained the communist
drives east and southwest of Saigon, but may be leaving
themselves dangerously vulnerable to heavy new attacks
from the north.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 16, 1975
In an attempt to meet the communists head on and
defeat them well away from the capital, the government
has had to shift a large part of its reserves from Sai-
gon to the Xuan Loc area. The South Vietnamese have re-
inforced the 18th Division here with two airborne brig-
ades, several armored units, and a regiment from the 5th
Division. In addition, two brigades of marines have
been assigned defensive positions near Bien Hoa.
While the South Vietnamese stand at Xuan Loc pro-
vides a much needed morale boost, there is still danger
that the reinforced South Vietnamese division there will
be isolated and destroyed by the communists, who have
more than three full divisions in the area. Even if the
battle continues to go well for Saigon, it will continue
to tie down a large force and leave the South Vietnamese
with relatively few main-force units to defend other ap-
proaches to the. capital.
At the moment, the government appears most vulner-
able in the provinces north of Saigon. The South Viet-
namese 25th Division is in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia prov-
inces, and the rest of the 5th Division is in Binh Duong
Province. Those units appear to be a sufficient blocking
force against existing communist units in the area, but
at least six communist divisions, including four from
North Vietnam, appear to be moving toward Military Re-
gion 3. Advance elements from two divisions--the 312th
and the 320B-.-could already be in the area north of Sai-
gon. All or most of the communist reinforcements could
be in place and ready for action in a matter of weeks.
While there are no signs that any large communist force
is moving into position for a direct assault, the commu-
nists do have the capability to sneak sappers into the
city. Moreover, the recent shellings of Bien Hoa airbase
suggest that the. communists also now may be planning to
shell the outskirts of Saigon and the Tan Son Nhut airbase
with their heavy field guns. An offensive by newly ar-
rived divisions north of Saigon, coupled with sapper at-
tacks and shellings of the city itself, might lead to a
rapid crumbling of the government's position.
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Phnom Penh
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 16, 1975
Khmer communist units yesterday apparently reached
the Monivong bridge leading into Phnom Penh and also
penetrated the southern suburb of Takhmau.
In fighting west of Phnom Penh, battlelines around
Pochentong airport appear to run roughly along the rail-
way embankment less than a mile north of the airfield.
Pochentong has reportedly been hit by machine gun and
mortar fire, but the Khmer air force is apparently man-
aging to fly some combat missions from a dirt strip just
south of the airfield. On the Route 5 front, the commu-
nists have apparently destroyed or captured the military
fuel depot at Prek Phnou. Most of the fuel had previously
been removed to Phnom Penh.
Although Phnom Penh communications with the outside
are beginning to break down, the domestic radio station
in the capital remains on the air. Government officials
continue to issue periodic reports on the military situa-
tion, going so far as to dispute "tendentious" and "mis-
leading" claims by foreign journalists still in the city.
Some military commanders have also been issuing orders
to their units via radio broadcasts.
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THAILANL1
CAMB001A
l.' 1
Capital Special Zone
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 16, 1975
Route 1, with its all-weather capability, will even-
tually become the major logistic route serving North Viet-
namese units in South Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese are also making use of the two
newly acquired ports at Da Nang and Qui Nhon.
Although Route 1 will assume growing importance,
until necessary repairs are made and the associated rear
service apparatus is established, most logistic activity
will continue along the previously established southern
Laos and western highlands logistic corridors.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 16, 1975
After nine months of prodding from Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao, Lao King Savang has
finally dissolved the dormant, rightist-dominated Na-
tional Assembly.
The King's decision represents a potentially signif-
icant political victory for the Pathet Lao.and a sharp
setback for the rightists. The communists successfully
blocked the assembly from reconvening last May, and they
have consistently maintained that, as a creature of the
former Royal Lao Government, the assembly has no legal
role to play in the coalition environment.
It is still unclear exactly what procedures will be
followed in selecting a new legislative body, but the
King has long insisted that the 1947 Lao constitution
must be upheld. Article 33 of the constitution requires
general elections for a new assembly within 90 days of
an old one's dissolution, a formula the Pathet Lao have
categorically rejected in the past. The communists will
almost certainly remain opposed to early elections until
they have had sufficient time to build up popular sup-
port in the non-communist zone.
Article 25 of the constitution, which confers upon
the King authority to appoint representatives from both
sides to a new assembly in the event "general" elections
are not considered feasible, would probably be more to
the Pathet Lao's liking. ideally, however, the commu-
nists would almost certainly prefer to have the coalition's
Joint National Political Council--which their leader Sou-
phanouvong dominates converted into a new assembly. It
is still possible that such a scenario, which would place
the Pathet Lao in a strong position to influence decisively
the government's legislative machinery, may eventually
come to pass.
The King's decision to dissolve the Assembly comes
as a surprise, since it is contrary to the strong recom-
mendations of his royal advisory council. it seems
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April 16, 1975
likely that Souvanna played the pivotal role in convinc-
ing the King, in the interests of national reconcilia-
tion, to take positive action on the highly charged
issue. It is also possible that the King may have been
intimidated by Pathet Lao threats to organize demonstra-
tions against the throne and to block the royal budget
unless a favorable decision on dissolution was soon
forthcomin
Internal bickering is already undermining the cohe-
siveness of Khukrit Pramot's month-old government. The
issue concerns filling four cabinet-level positions that
Prime Minister.Khukrit had been holding open to entice
political support from splinter groups. The. conserva-
tives in the coalition have proposed for the posts four
candidates whose past histories of corruption make it
difficult for Khukrit to accept them.
The current impasse underscores the fragility of the
seven-party coalition government.
the leader of the Largest conservative
party, Thawit Klinprathum, has warned that he may with-
draw the party's support for the coalition, which would
cause the Khukrit government to. collapse. It seems un-
likely, however, that Thawit would seriously consider
such a step without the tacit support of army commander
Krit Siwara, who would have little to gain by helping to
bring down the coalition at this stage. Thawit's gambit
may be just an effort to force Khukrit to accept the con-
servatives' candidates for the empty posts as well as
shuffle some of his own ministers in return for continued
conservative support. If he can do so, Thawit would in-
crease his own stature among the conservative parties,
which would welcome any move to restrict the more liberal
Khukrit's room for maneuver.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 16, 1975
Fighting between the fedayeen and the militia of
the Phalanges Party continued in Beirut yesterday; three
days of fighting have left at least 100 dead and hundreds
wounded. There was also shooting in Sidon and Tripoli.
The Lebanese government is beginning to feel seri-
ously threatened. President Franjiyah, who is in the
hospital recovering from major surgery and who seldom
involves himself in disputes between the country's polit-
ical parties and the Palestinians, met with the head of
the Phalanges Party, Pierre Jumayyil.
Franjiyah almost certainly appealed to Jumayyil to
help halt the fighting lest it grow to the point that it
jeopardizes Lebanon's delicate constitutional balance and
what is, in effect, Christian control of the government.
The Lebanese cabinet has authorized Prime Minister
Sulh to call on the country's 19,000-man army to help
put down the dispute. For the moment, the Prime Minister
is pursuing an intensive round of talks with political
leaders seeking an end to the fighting.
Sulh believes that army involvement would sharply
increase the risk that the major fedayeen groups would
join the fighting in force. A small number of commandos
from the less radical groups--Fatah, Saiqa, and the
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine--
have already entered the fray, although the bulk of the
fighting has involved the smaller, more radical groups.
Palestine Liberation organization chairman Yasir
Arafat has stayed generally aloof.
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The Lebanese Prime Minister met with a Fatah offi-
cial yesterday, probably to try to keep the Fatah out
of the fighting. In addition, Lebanon's foreign minister
has sent an envoy to Damascus to solicit Syria's help
in quieting the Palestinians.
Sulh appears to be trying to arrange a cease-fire.
He has shown no sign that he will step down and appears
to have convinced two Socialist ministers to delay acting
on their threat to resign.
The two have said they will stay on, but only if
the government arrests the Phalangists responsible for
the attack on a busload of Palestinians on April 13 that
resulted in the deaths of 26 Palestinians.
Government security forces have raided some offices
of the Phalanges Party and reportedly have arrested persons
they said were responsible for the attack on the bus.
Palestinians and leftist Lebanese Muslims will not be sat-
isfied with this action; they are still demanding the dis-
solution of the Phalangist militia
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 16, 1975
The leaders of Italy's three major labor confedera-
tions are meeting this week in an attempt to resolve
their differences over whether eventually to form a
single national labor organization. The strongest op-
position is coming from union leaders who fear it would
result in communist domination of the labor movement.
The three confederations--which represent about 40
percent of Italy's workers, including the strongest and
most militant industrial unions--have made substantial
progress toward unification in recent years. Most major
labor actions are now coordinated through a loosely
structured federation set up by the three groups in
1972. The federation, for example, handled the negotia-
tions earlier this year that produced impressive worker
benefits. It will guide the negotiations to renew im-
portant union contracts that expire late this year.
The discussions this week will center on whether to
move beyond this loose arrangement to a complete merger
of the three confederations. The strongest support for
this comes from the largest of the three--the communist-
dominated General Confederation of Italian Workers (CGIL).
Communist union leaders are pushing a timetable that
would within two years assure merger, a unified labor
press, and a single union card. They also want propor-
tional voting in the present federation--a step which
would increase their already predominant influence.
The Christian Democratic - oriented Confederation
of Trade Unions (CISL)--the second largest organization--
is divided over the merger issue. The majority, in-
clined to press ahead, is constrained by an influential
minority that fears the communists. The official Chris-
tian Democratic position is a straddle: support for
merger provided that the unions can guarantee their
autonomy from political parties.
The strongest opposition comes from the small Union
of Italian Labor, a group of Social Democratic, Repub-
lican, and Socialist adherents who believe that labor
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unity has gone as far as it should. The union's leader
claims to have support from elements of the Christian
Democratic - oriented union for the formation of a new
anti-communist labor organization. He says, moreover,
that the US labor movement is prepared to back such a
move financially.
Although none of the unions is completely controlled
by the political parties, the connection between the
merger issue and national political considerations is
close. The communists, for example, view labor unity
as another step toward party legitimization and eventual
government participation. The Christian Democrats, in
their campaign for the nationwide local elections set
for June, are stressing their traditional opposition to
any increase in communist influence.
These political overtones could make labor leaders
cautious about taking a definitive stand at this time.
If they back away from the issue now, however, it will
only postpone a confrontation on the merger question
until after the June elections.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 16, 1975
Prospects for resuming the Cyprus negotiations later
this month are still clouded by the uncertain status of
Greek Cypriot negotiator Glafkos Clerides.
Clerides has argued for a realistic strategy which
accepts the Turkish Cypriot demand for a biregional fed-
eration in return for Turkish Cypriot concessions on
other issues. Makarios claims that to open talks in this
manner would weaken the Greek Cypriot negotiating posi-
tion and that such a major concession should be made only
after a period of long, hard bargaining.
Clerides' latest threat to resign is probably de-
signed to produce stronger expressions of support from
Karamanlis and Makarios. In the event they are not forth-
coming, Clerides may well follow through and step down
from his position as negotiator.
Such a move by Clerides, who is the Greek Cypriot
most trusted by Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots, would
deal a serious setback to the talks, scheduled to resume
in Vienna on April 28, and further complicate efforts to
secure a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem.
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ROMANIA
April 16, 1975
Tensions in Romanian-Soviet relations have recently
increased. A Romanian diplomat in Moscow says that in
addition to differences over the European security talks,
CEMA policy, and the proposed European communist confer-
ence, Bucharest is now resisting Soviet efforts to expand
the political coordinating role of the Warsaw Pact.
The Soviets, according to the Romanian official, are
pushing for the establishment of a permanent Pact commit-
tee of foreign ministers. Moscow apparently wants to
set up a secretariat--similar to NATO's political organ-
ization----that would be headed by a Soviet secretary gen-
eral. The Kremlin reportedly also is calling for regular
meetings of the Pact's political consultative committee.
The Romanian diplomat says that Bucharest has failed to
win support from other Pact members in thwarting Moscow's.
efforts to tighten its grip over the Pact's institutional
levers of control. As a result, the diplomat believes
that the Romanians will probably be forced to compromise
on some points.
The Romanian diplomat speculates that once the Euro-
pean security conference is over, Moscow will increase
its stress on ideological orthodoxy within the Pact--a
move clearly intended to force Romania to identify more
closely with Soviet policies and pronouncements. He
suggested that Moscow's increased emphasis on orthodoxy
was in part intended to ward off Western efforts to hold
the Kremlin to whatever commitments it makes concerning
freedom of movement for people and ideas.
The Romanians are rarely bashful about discussing
either real or imaginary problems with the Soviets. Al-
though the diplomat's version of differences with Moscow
may be somewhat overstated, his remarks dovetail with
other indications of increased Soviet-Romanian strains,
including Bucharest's recent nationalistic and anti-
Soviet reaction to the Kremlin's handling of the 30th
anniversary of victory in World War II.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
KENYA
April 16, 1975
Nairobi's concern over growing military strength in
neighboring Uganda and Somalia may lead to closer coopera-
tion with Tel Aviv.
Three Kenya army officers arrived in Tel Aviv early
this month to inspect an Israeli integrated communica-
tions system. The team is investigating the possible
purchase of this system to link its infantry, armored,
and air units. Since one member of the team is an armor
specialist, there is also a strong possibility that Kenya
may be interested in purchasing US Sherman tanks, of
which Israel has several hundred. Currently there are no
tanks in the Kenya army inventory; the force has tradi-
tionally relied upon armored cars.
Increased military contacts with Israel are taking
place even though Kenya broke diplomatic relations with
Tel Aviv in October 1973.
The Kenyans are clearly
disappointed over their failure to obtain any economic
concessions from the Arabs following Nairobi's break
with Tel Aviv in 1973.
Israel, for its part, would welcome the opportunity
to improve relations with black African states. Nonethe-
less, the Kenyans are unlikely to move ahead of other Af-
rican countries by responding favorably to Israeli over-
tures that the two nations resume normal diplomatic re-
lations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 16, 1975
President Peron's government won a modest victory
in a provincial election last Sunday. The Peronist
coalition's capture of the governorship of Misiones Prov-
ince, despite the failure to obtain a legislative major-
ity, has given the government a badly needed boost at
a time when its policies are under increasing attack.
The most encouraging sign for Mrs. Peron's support-
ers was the severe overall defeat suffered by a splinter
left-wing Peronist party backed by the Montonero guer-
rillas. Extreme leftist Peronists will probably point
to the electoral drubbing as proof that violence is the
only way for them to gain power.
The strong showing of the centrist Radical Party--
which finished a close second--will disappoint those in
the Peronist government who had hoped for a clear-cut
victory. The large opposition turnout probably reflects
a substantial protest vote against the government's
policies. It could also represent a repudiation of the
massive vote-buying by Social Welfare Minister Lopez
Rega, who handed out millions of pesos in "subsidies"
prior to the balloting. Radical Party gains will en-
hance the position of its leader, Ricardo Balbin, who
has been under fire from some elements of his party for
not taking a harder line against the government.
Ironically, the outcome of the Misiones test might
temporarily restrain conservative critics of Lopez Rega
within the Peronist labor movement and the military.
They may have to admit grudgingly that the strategy of
the President's chief adviser worked to contain the
challenge from the dissident Peronist left, even if it
did so at the expense of losing votes to the Radicals.
There is at least a fair chance that the govern-
ment's success in its first test at the polls since
Juan Peron's election in September 1973 will strengthen
the hand of moderates, such as Interior Minister Roca-
mora, who have encouraged the President to adopt a more
open and conciliatory approach in dealing with other
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political parties. Rocamora is a staunch advocate of
close cooperation with opposition party leaders and has
urged Mrs. Peron to hold elections in provinces in which
the central government has intervened. There is no
assurance, however, that the voices of moderation will
be heeded by Mrs. Peron as long as Lopez Rega retains
his dominant influence and ability to undercut other
advisers.
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April 16, 1975
Breaking with a well-established political tradition,
a government official has publicly named the six contenders
from which the ruling party's candidate for the presidency
in 1976 will be chosen. The unprecedented announcement
will encourage public debate on the merits of the contend-
ers, but will not fundamentally change the closed process
by which the final selection is made.
The choice will be named this October by President
Echeverria and the ruling elite of the Institutional
Revolutionary Party, which has never lost an election
for president, state governor, or senator in its 46-year
history.
Secretary of Government Moya, who holds the second
most powerful position in the government, heads the list
of six contenders. The others are Secretary of the Pres-
idency Cervantes, Finance Secretary Lopez, Labor Secre-
tary Munoz, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Gomez, and So-
cial Security Director Galvez. Cervantes is probably
Moya's strongest competitor, followed by Lopez and Munoz.
The remaining two are dark horses,
The listing of names from which the candidate will be
chosen is an attempt by President Echeverria to lend
substance to his promises to reform Mexico's rigid polit-
ical system. He probably hopes that the "uncovering"
will be regarded as evidence that the government has dis-
carded the secret method of selecting the party's candi-
date--almost certainly the country's next president.
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CHILE
April 16, 1975
Increasingly aware of the seriousness of Chile's
economic situation, the military government has given
civilian Finance Minister Jorge Cauas a broad new man-
date to cope with the nation's mounting balance-of-pay-
ments problem and to manage the battle against infla-
tion--60 percent so far this year.
President Pinochet apparently has been convinced
by Cauas that the government's economic program remains
basically sound and that improper implementation is to
blame for failure to achieve results more quickly.
Cauas' determination to reduce deficit spending sharply
in order to dampen import demand and ease inflationary
pressures means increased unemployment and more auster-
ity, especially for the poor. Cauas will have to modify
his market-oriented approach, however, if he cannot find
a way around the seemingly unavoidable need for import
restrictions that would entail vastly increased govern-
ment intervention in the economy. His approach will
also be threatened by military pressure for measures to
spread the burden of austerity in order to curb erosion
of popular support for the government.
Cauas may try to deflect some military disgruntle-
ment by moving against the monopolists, middlemen, and
other privileged economic groups that many officers be-
lieve have been guilty of profiteering and other eco-
nomic abuses. If his program is to survive, however,
it will have to start producing results soon.
Cauas' designation as economic "superminister"
coincides with a major cabinet shakeup that doubles
civilian representation on the 17-man body to six--none
of whom have close ties to any political party. The
departure of the military ministers of justice, public
works, and housing leaves the army with five cabinet
posts while the navy, air force, and carabineros are
down to two apiece. Pinochet may have to act forcefully
to ensure respect for Cauas' new authority to control
ministries, such as agriculture and mining, that are
still run by military men.
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COLOMBIA
Elements of the Colombian government are apparently
still considering imposition of a state of siege, and
are playing up the guerrilla threat to justify an early
crackdown. President Lopez is unlikely to resist such
a move if violence continues.
The state-owned broadcasting network and newspapers
controlled by the governing Liberal Party have been
claiming that the country's two principal leftist guer-
rilla groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have
merged. In addition, the largest single guerrilla oper-
ation in years, which took place late last week, has
received extraordinary daily attention in the press.
Ideological differences between the FARC and the
ELN virtually preclude a merger, however, and last week's
large insurgent operation was most likely a "graduation
exercise" for FARC trainees. Those guerrillas are now
expected to divide into the customary small subgroups
scattered throughout the mountains.
In any case, whether the security threat is genuine
or is being exaggerated as a prelude to strict govern-
ment controls, the likelihood of a state of siege soon
appears strong. Previous administrations have resorted
to states of siege, but Lopez, with more popular support
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than any other Colombian president, had pledged to add
new vigor to the country's democracy. A suspension of
constitutional guarantees, however partial or temporary,
would indicate how much the mandate he received last
year has eroded.
ECUADOR
Ecuadorean Minister of Natural Resources Salazar
has announced that the price of Ecuador's oil will be
frozen at the December 31 level of $11.04 per barrel.
He has also dispelled the rumor that Quito is moving to
nationalize petroleum production.
Salazar blamed the press for distorting the govern-
ment's existing policy of acquiring 51-percent control
of the Texaco-Gulf consortium, which accounts for almost
all the oil extracted in the country. Quito now owns
25 percent of Texaco-Gulf, but is in no financial posi-
tion to acquire an additional 26 percent, nor will it be
in such a position at any time soon.
Ecuador's ability to buy into Texaco-Gulf is limited
by Quito's oil conservation policy, which is of at least
equal importance to government leaders. Daily production
has been held to 210,000 barrels since geological evi-
dence showed less petroleum potential in the eastern
jungle region than had been thought.
In addition, Ecuador's oil policy is somewhat at
odds with the prevailing consensus of OPEC members. In
particular, Quito feels that the price guidelines set
by OPEC in December are too high. The Ecuadoreans also
oppose OPEC's apparent policy of reducing oil production,
preferring to keep their output at about 210,000 barrels
per day.
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Top Secret
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