CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: April 14, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
OSD review
completed
State Dept. review
completed
Top Secret
N?_ 657
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 14, 1975
CAMBODIA: Reshuffled leadership tries to hold on.
Page 1)
VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 3)
PORTUGAL: Tensions again on the rise. (Page 7)
EGYPT: Prime minister and cabinet resign. (Page 9)
CUBA: Draft constitution foreshadows broad political
changes. (Page 11)
CHAD: Armed Forces commander Odingar seizes power.
(Page 13)
SYRIA-IRAQ: Dispute continues over Euphrates water and
Iraqi meddling in Syria. (Page 14)
USSR-IRAQ: Iusayn makes visit to reassure Moscow.
(Page .6
FOR THE RECORD : (page 17)
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Phnom Penh
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 14, 1975
CAMBODIA
The newly reshuffled leadership in Phnom Penh appears
resolved to hold on as long as possible. In announcing
the formation of a new "Supreme Council" and the imposi-
tion of martial law over the weekend, Council President
Sak Sutsakhan and Vice President Long Boret both pledged
a policy of "strengthening the military and political
position" of the government with the aim of achieving a
"peaceful solution" through negotiations. Despite the
indisputable element of valor in the desire of the re-
maining leaders to see things through to the end, the
government's position will become untenable within two
weeks as it simply runs out of the wherewithal to con-
tinue fighting.
Sak Sutsakhan announced over Radio Phnom Penh early
this morning that a T-28 fighter had dropped two bombs on
the general staff headquarters compound in the capital.
Sak said he and his "colleagues" were unhurt, but that
seven persons were killed and a number wounded. He called
on the populace to remain calm, and imposed a new curfew.
late-breaking radio broadcasts from Phnom Penh said that
the insurgents had commenced a heavy shelling barrage
against the city.
Elsewhere in the country, government defenses around
the southeastern provincial capital of Svay Rieng report-
edly collapsed in the face of heavy insurgent attacks on
April 12. Some government units were still holding on
yesterday, but local officials reported that the fall of
the city was imminent.
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Gulf of
Thailand
NH 'giant Ranh
UA N'
Phan Rang
MILES
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
April 14, 1975
Heavy fighting continues in the Xuan Loc area. The
city's reinforced defenders have beaten back strong commu-
nist attacks, and clashes around the city have resulted
in heavy communist losses. Effective air and artillery
support has contributed significantly to the South Viet-
namese efforts to stand and fight.
Route 1 connecting Xuan Loc and Saigon is, however,
the South Vietnamese
military is using t e "Vietnamese B-52," the C-130, to
bomb enemy troops massed around Xuan Loc, and along in-
terdicted stretches of Route 1 west of the city.
In the delta, strong counterattacks by elements of
the government's 7th Division have forced two regiments
of the North Vietnamese 5th Division to curtail their
drive to cut Route 4 southwest of Saigon.
Moreover, government forces from the delta plan to
hit the 5th Division from the rear. A task force of in-
fantry and armor is to sweep south from its current posi-
tion just inside Cambodia and attack the 5th Division
in western Long An Province. At the same time, a part
of the'South Vietnamese 7th Division has received per-
mission from Military Region 3 Headquarters to move up
from the south and engage the 5th as far north as Tan An.
Meanwhile, the communists are moving additional
forces into position for an assault on the western ap-
proach to Saigon. Most of the North Vietnamese 9th Divi-
sion and supporting air defense units have been detected
shifting into northeastern Hau Nghia Province. These
units had been concentrated along the Tay Ninh - Binh
Duong province border farther north. The communists now
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April 14, 1975
have almost three full divisions--the 3rd, 5th, and 9th--
along Saigon's western defense perimeter, and this could
well force the South Vietnamese to shift reinforcements
to this front.
The most significant communist military action over
the weekend in Military Region 4 was in the central delta.
Government counterattacks against two communist regiments
which had been blocking Route 4 just north of Can Tho in
Vinh Long Province succeeded in reopening the highway early
this morning. Communist losses were described as heavy.
Communist gunners also zeroed in on Can Tho, and shellings
Saturday resulted in fires that destroyed a large residen-
tial section of the city. Government troops manning the
defense line around Can Tho reported they inflicted heavy
losses on the communists.
Government holdings in coastal Ninh Thuan and Binh
Thuan provinces are likely to be seriously challenged
soon. Elements of the North Vietnamese 968th Division
were detected on April 11 along Route 1 near Cam Ranh.
This division participated in the capture of Tuy Hoa and
now has moved south to link up with the North Vietnamese
10th Division, apparently in preparation for attacks on
the cities of Phan Rang and Phan Thiet. The South Viet-
namese also believe the North Vietnamese 320th Division
may be moving into attack positions west of Phan Rang.
The loss of a government position just :four miles north-
east of Phan Thiet;on Saturday and continued shellings
of the city indicate the communists are increasing pres-
sure on the town.
The government is making considerable progress in
rebuilding the combat units extracted from northern and
central South Vietnam, and many of them will soon be
ready for combat. The best of these units, the Marine
Division, already has two brigades that can be used in
combat. A third brigade is scheduled to complete reor-
ganization in a week and a fourth brigade about a week
later.
In addition, the 2nd Division now has four opera-
tional battalions, and several others are scheduled to
be ready for combat late this week. Altogether, the
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 14, 1975
division expects to have 11 battalions formed and opera-
tional by early next month. Parts of two reorganized
regiments have been dispatched to Phan Rang and Phan
Thiet cities.
So far, the 3rd Division has only one battalion
ready for combat, but it plans to form a complete regi-
ment by early May. In addition, three ranger groups
should become operational later this month, and new ar-
tillery units are being created for assignment to the
rebuilt infantry regiments and divisions.
South Vietnamese officials have been buoyed by the
large amount of military assistance requested of Congress,
but remain skeptical that the sums will be appropriated.
April 19 is generally being regarded as a sort of "dooms-
day" for South Vietnam, and the pending debate on the aid
requests between now and then could have a significant
impact on the military and political situation in South
Vietnam.
President Thieu's principal economic adviser has
stated that President Ford's address to the Congress
implied that the US wants South Vietnam to "do all it
can to stabilize the military situation" and that "some
military victories" before April 19 would improve chances
of Congressional approval of the aid package. Such an
attitude probably in part explains the large numbers of
troops and amounts of equipment the South Vietnamese are
committing to the battle for Xuan Loc.
Communist reaction to the President's speech con-
tinues to decry the additional requests for military
assistance and the forced evacuation of Vietnamese or-
phans and civilians. Hanoi and the Viet Cong media,
however, have begun to focus more sharply on the evacua-
tion of Americans. Both have charged that the "protec-
tion of the safety of Americans" is a pretext for mili-
tary intervention and warn that such a scheme will be
"severely punished." The Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment, in a statement broadcast Sunday, maintained
that the best protection the US could afford its per-
sonnel was to "immediately withdraw" them from South
Vietnam. The broadcast stated that such withdrawals
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National Intelligence Bulletin
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"will certainly not encounter any difficulties or obsta-
cles" if begun immediately but that the Viet Cong "are
determined not to "allow the US...to send warships and
marines to intervene in South Vietnam."
Prime Minister - designate Nguyen Ba Can presided over
the first working session of his new cabinet Saturday
preparatory to swearing-in ceremonies scheduled for some-
time tomorrow. The important portfolios of defense,
interior, and foreign affairs apparently have been filled
and approved by President Thieu. Tran Van Don, Buu Vien,
and Vuong Van B.ac, who hold the three positions respec-
tively, are all holdovers from the previous cabinet. Don
and Bac are generally regarded as independents and prob-
ably can be best characterized as members of the loyal
opposition.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 14, 1975
The Revolutionary Council this weekend announced
further efforts to nationalize "basic sectors" of the
economy, while rumors circulating in Lisbon indicate
that political tensions are again on the rise.
The leaders of the ruling Armed Forces Movement
decided Friday to proceed with reorganizing the economy
for the "transition to socialism" by nationalizing pri-
vately held interests in communications and transporta-
tion. The Movement also expressed its concern over
Portugal's sagging economy--decreasing production and
investments, rising prices, and a growing trade deficit.
It announced that controls will be placed on basic food
prices. Previous Movement statements have promised that
the new cabinet will present an emergency economic plan
within three weeks.
The US embassy reports that rumors of a new power
play are widespread in Lisbon, although very little spe-
cific information is available. It is increasingly clear
that the Armed Forces Movement regrets its promise to
hold elections, now scheduled for April 25, because of
fear that the results will show poor support for the
Movement's program. Moderates are still concerned that
an effort will be made to cancel or delay the elections,
and there are rumors that some Movement leaders are con-
sidering a roundup of certain moderate and conservative
opposition politicians.
In addition, the Movement has alienated several ex-
treme left-wing parties, which have voiced opposition
to the institutionalization of the Movement and to the
election process. The Movement has banned one party,
prohibited another from participating in elections, and
suspended a third for five days from campaigning on
radio and television.
The emergence of Admiral Rosa Coutinho's ambitions
to be first among equals within the Movement's leader-
ship contributes to the general tension. Coutinho sug-
gested last week that the performance of the civilian
political parties had been so poor that the Movement
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April 14, 1975
should form its own party, whose ideological base would
lie somewhere between the Communists and Socialists.
Socialist leader Mario Soares responded by denouncing
"intense intrigue to compromise the alliance between the
Socialists and the Armed Forces Movement."
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 14, 1975
EGYPT
Prime Minister Hijazi and his. cabinet yesterday sub-
mitted their resignations to President Sadat. This ac-
tion appears designed to clear the way for the personnel
changes that are expected to accompany the President's
anticipated announcement that he is implementing an "in-
ternal action program" to treat the country's economic
ills.
According to Cairo radio, Sadat will address the
nation today to outline the required "work to be done on
the domestic front in the coming phase." He is expected
to appeal for wide popular support for government programs
to deal with the country's economic, transportation, and
housing problems.
Sadat may also announce the composition of a new
cabinet, although this step could be delayed several days.
Even the promise of cabinet changes will serve his imme-
diate purpose of drawing attention away from the break-
down of peace negotiations and focusing it on his plans
for economic development.
The most extensive cabinet changes probably will
come in the technical and economic ministries. Several
of the incumbents are overworked, incompetent, or ill.
New faces in these ministries would provide evidence
that Sadat is determined to solve Egypt's economic prob-
lems and--presumably--exempt him from heavy domestic
criticism for a period of at least several months.
The future of Hijazi, who has overall responsibility
for the economy, is uncertain. His appointment last year
raised speculation that he was being set up to absorb
criticism of the government's failures and that he would
later be abandoned by Sadat. Hijazi recently has been
doing a good job, however, and the President has few
obvious alternative candidates from whom to choose.
Cairo newspapers reported yesterday that Sadat has
turned aside suggestions that he himself assume the post
of prime minister. The President did serve as his own
prime minister in 1973 and 1974.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 14, 1975
The most important figures in the cabinet--Foreign
Minister Fahmi and War Minister Gamassy--are likely to
retain their posts. Sadat has recently gone out of his
way to demonstrate his regard for Fahmi; only last week
he announced that the foreign minister would be sent to
Moscow on April 19.
According to the Cairo press, Fahmi's mission will
be to discuss Egyptian and Soviet preparations for a
possible resumption of the Geneva peace conference.
Fahmi is reportedly preparing for comprehensive talks
that will range from such substantive questions as the
nature of a final settlement to procedural questions such
as how to provide for Palestinian participation in the
conference.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 14, 1975
The draft of a long-promised constitution published
in Havana on Thursday foreshadows sweeping changes on
the Cuban domestic political scene. The draft, which is
likely to undergo substantial revision before the consti-
tution goes into effect next year, also envisages con-
tinuing hostility to the US.
In its present form, the draft raises questions
about Prime Minister Fidel Castro's role in the new gov-
ernment. The position of prime minister would be abo-
lished, and the Council of Ministers replaced by a State
Council composed of a president, a first deputy president,
and five deputy presidents. The president would be chief
of state.
The post of commander in chief of the armed forces,
which Castro now holds, would be assigned to the presi-
dent. Castro would thus have to become president to re-
tain his statutory authority over the armed forces, his
most important prop.
Two articles in the draft have direct implications
for relations with the US. One, which recognizes "the
right of peoples to repel imperialist violence with
revolutionary violence," is evidently intended to show
Cuban resolve in the face of US and OAS insistence that
Havana stop meddling in the internal affairs of other
countries. Another article, in effect, would require
Cuba to insist that the US admit the "illegality" of the
treaties and agreements that provide the basis for the
US naval base at Guantanamo Bay.
The Cuban Communist Party's Political Bureau ap-
proved the draft constitution as "an adequate base for
public and popular discussion." It added that the draft
would be reviewed at the party's first national congress
this fall, which is to approve a final text. The draft
is then supposed to be approved in a popular referendum,
probably early next year.
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The failure of the Political Bureau clearly to advo-
cate the draft and the care taken to pave the way for
future changes suggest that the party itself may have
doubts about some of the provisions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 14, 1975
The acting commander of the armed forces, Brigadier
General Odingar, seized power yesterday from President
Tombalbaye after several hours of fighting between guards
at the presidential palace and the combined forces of the
army and gendarmerie.
Odingar has suspended the constitution, dissolved
the National Assembly, banned all political activity,
and affirmed support for Chad's international agreements
and commitments. A new government has not yet been
formed. There is no evidence of any foreign involvement
in the coup. France, the country's principal source of
economic, technical, and military aid did not respond
to Tombalbaye's request for military support during the
coup.
According to a radio announcement, Tombalbaye--in
power since Chad gained independence in 1960--was killed
during the coup.
Odingar's decision to move was probably motivated
in part by Tombalbaye's recent efforts to discredit the
army's leadership and his announcement last week to con-
duct a complete reorganization of the army. Odingar has
released the three top military leaders arrested by Tom-
balbaye earlier this month, including the commander of
the gendarmerie. He also released former armed forces
commander General Malloum, who was arrested in 1973 for
allegedly plotting to overthrow the government.
Odingar may also have been influenced by dissatis-
faction with the government's inability to overcome
Chad's chronic economic stagnation and with government
corruption and maladministration. The 43-year-old
Odingar is a fellow Sara tribesman of Tombalbaye and he
received military training in France. There is no hard
evidence on his political beliefs.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SYRIA-IRAQ
April 14, 1975
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam has rejected Iraq's
recent call for an urgent meeting of Arab foreign minis-
ters to discuss Baghdad's charges that Syria is diverting
water from the Euphrates River. In an attempt to halt
the continuing serious deterioration of relations, how-
ever, Khaddam did agree to have the matter discussed at
a technical level, "since it has no political aspects."
Syria does not want the dispute to escalate to the
point that Iraq might refuse to provide Syria with mili-
tary support in the event of another round of hostilities
with Israel. Damascus is also apprehensive that a pro-
longed dispute with Iraq would threaten Syria's now very
good relations with Algeria, another Arab radical.
Despite these considerations, the Syrians probably
are withholding water from Iraq in retaliation for Bagh-
dad's apparent involvement in a recent attempt to weaken
or overthrow the government of President Asad. Damascus
is not likely to allow a meeting of technical experts
to "solve" the problem until it receives some indication
that Baghdad is willing to moderate its propaganda attacks
on President Asad and limit its interference in Syria's
domestic affairs.
By April 8, Syrian authorities reportedly had
arrested approximately 400 Syrians for their involvement
in the alleged Iraqi-sponsored conspiracy to oust or
assassinate Asad.
Damascus is also taking actions against the Iraqis.
According to reports reaching the US embassy in Damascus,
the Iraqi ambassador and his staff are under 24-hour sur-
veillance, and lower level Iraqi diplomats are being
harassed by Syrian authorities. The Syrian Baath Party
congress last week condemned the "suspicious right-wing
regime" in Iraq for its collusion with Iran, its sabo-
tage of Arab solidarity, and its abandonment of the
Palestinians.
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USSR-IRAQ
April 14, 1975
Moscow and Baghdad hope that the visit of Iraqi
strongman Saddam Husayn Tikriti to the USSR beginning
today will serve to keep relations steady, following
the agreement between Iran and Iraq signed in Algiers
last month.
Statements by Soviet officials and Moscow's luke-
warm endorsement of the Algiers accord betray Soviet fears
that the agreement could lead to decreased Soviet influ-
ence in Baghdad. The agreement ended Iranian military
support for the rebellious Iraqi Kurds. The easing of
tension with Iran and the collapse of the Kurdish rebel-
lion have greatly decreased Baghdad's need for Soviet
arms and military equipment. Although Husayn's visit
was arranged before the accord was signed, the Soviets
will be sure to probe him on the terms of the. settlement.
Even before the agreement, the Soviets were upset
with Iraq's efforts to attract Western technical exper-
tise and to buy Western arms. Communist diplomats in
Baghdad now gloomily suggest that Iraq will expand its
ties to the West, even to the point of resuming diplo-
matic relations with the US.
The Iraqis apparently hope that Saddam Husayn's
fifth visit to the USSR since 1970 will reassure Moscow.
The newspaper of the ruling Baath Party took a step in
that direction last week when it marked the third anni-
versary of the Iraq-Soviet Friendship Treaty by reassert-
ing the "firm strategic relations" between the two coun-
tries. Over the short term, at least, Iraq will continue
to look to the USSR for military spare parts, technical
assistance, and training for its predominantly Soviet-
equipped military.
The two sides will probably continue to sidestep
their different approaches to the Arab-Israeli impasse.
Moscow has long wanted Baghdad to moderate its rigid
opposition to a negotiated settlement with Israel and
to support the Soviet approach to the Geneva peace talks.
Baghdad, however, has not budged.
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Iraq is likely.to push for Soviet assistance in
resolving its dispute with Syria over the water flow in
the Euphrates River. Baghdad complains bitterly that the
Soviet-built Euphrates Dam in Syria diverts Iraq's share
of the river. The Soviets, who once proposed an agree-
ment to Baghdad and Damascus to regulate the water flow,
may view mediation of the dispute as one way of maintain-
ing influence in Iraq.
New economic agreements may be announced during the
visit. Iraq, which has over $300 million in unused Soviet
credits, has recently held intensive negotiations with
the USSR on numerous irrigation projects. Baghdad may give
the Soviets a major role in a $2-billion, five-year irri-
gation program in order to reassure Moscow that it will
retain a significant economic role despite the rapid
growth of Iraqi-Western economic dealings.
Turkey: The Demirel government won its initial
parliamentary vote of confidence on April 12. The vote
was 222-218 in favor of Demirel's four-party, right-of-
center coalition. The closeness of the vote illustrates
the fragile nature of the alliance Demirel has pieced
together. It is questionable whether the weak govern-
ment can remain in power for an extended period.
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