CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
#4
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
April 10, 1975
N?_ 657
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1975
CONTENTS
VIETNAM: Military Situation. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh's outer defenses seriously eroded.
Page 5
FRANCE - SOUTH VIETNAM: Paris' reaction to developments
in Ind ochina. Page 3)
USSR: Soviets attempt to sell AN-26 transports to Af-
ricans. (Page 9)
BRAZIL: Geisel seeks to revitalize political system.
Page 11)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 12)
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THAILAND
CAM BOD\A
MR 2
//' m Ranh
'jPhan Rang
Gulf of
Thailand
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Communist controlled
territory
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1975
The communists are increasing military pressure on
the approaches to Saigon. Sharp attacks against two
key provincial capitals to the east and southwest of the
capital city yesterday may be the beginning of larger
attacks nearer Saigon.
The ground attack against the provincial capital of
Xuan Loc and surrounding areas was conducted by parts of
both the North Vietnamese 6th Division and the newly
arrived 341st Division. It was preceded by a heavy bom-
bardment of the city. Most of the attackers were forced
out of the city yesterday, but heavy fighting resumed
today. Communist units nearby also hold positions over-
looking Route 1 leading to Saigon. If they can effec-
tively block this road, a large number of government
forces would be cut off.
Regional commanders reacted quickly and moved units
of the South Vietnamese 18th Division from outlying
field positions into Xuan Loc. Armor units were moved
to the new front from Tay Ninh Province and Airborne
Division reinforcements were deployed from Saigon.
To the southwest of Saigon, elements of the North
Vietnamese 5th Division struck the Long An Province capi-
tal of Tan An, the nearby airfield, and several stretches
of vital Route 4 connecting the capital with the delta
provinces. This attack was swiftly repulsed and Highway
4 is open.
Signs are pointing to a widespread increase in com-
munist military action throughout much of the delta. At
the moment, however, the level of fighting is about the
same as in the past few days, with the heaviest activity
concentrated in Dinh Tuong and Kien Giang provinces.
The ultimate target for the new round of communist
attacks appears to be Saigon itself.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1975
It is doubtful that within the next week, the commu-
nists will feel strong enough in the area around Saigon
for an all-out assault against the capital. They prob-
ably will wait until additional units arrive from the
north before attempting such a move.
The communists are expanding their hold over the
city of Nha Trang. Their forces are now in complete con-
trol of the town and are busy collecting abandoned weap-
ons and a ui ment.
at least half of
the shops are open, Saigon's currency is still being
used, and North Vietnamese flags are flying over all
former government civil and military offices.
The communist occupation of Cam Ranh was apparently
slow, taking place some da s after the retreat of South
Vietnamese forces.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
FRANCE - SOUTH VIETNAM
April 10, 1975
French calls for a negotiated settlement in South
Vietnam seem aimed at protecting French interests there
and perhaps moving to fill any vacuum left by waning US
influence.
President Giscard, after a cabinet meeting yester-
day, reaffirmed France's desire for a political settle-
ment in South Vietnam as outlined in the 1973 Paris
agreements. The French have contacted representatives
of the nations involved with the Vietnamese war, as well
as South Vietnamese neutralists, according to a French
radio report on April 8.
On April 8, the Quai's acting Asian director told
a US embassy officer that Paris has decided to "increase
the tempo of its political activity" toward South Vietnam.
He cited as an example a meeting that day between a senior
member of President Giscard's staff and the North Viet-
namese ambassador, but claimed to have no information on
the issues discussed. At a meeting of the EC Asian ex-
perts in Dublin on'April 3-4, the French representative
said Paris has begun a study on the possibility of recog-
nizing the PRG.
The French have announced officially that they are
sending humanitarian aid to areas of South Vietnam con-
trolled by the Saigon government and the Viet Cong.
Medicine, food, medical and paramedical personnel were
to be flown in beginning on April 9. The Viet Cong re-
portedly have agreed to allow the French planes to land
in areas they control.
The French hope to preserve their role as the pri-
mary Western cultural influence in Indochina and to in-
crease their political influence there. They would pre-
fer control of South Vietnam to pass to the coalition
government outlined in the Paris accords rather than a
military victory by the Viet Cong. Since the former
seems unlikely now, Paris may believe that if it were to
call for Thieu's ouster it could both enhance its posi-
tion with the communists and gain international credit
for a gesture of statesmanship.
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Phnom Penh
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 10, 1975
The erosion of Phnom Penh's outer defenses has
reached a point where a major Khmer communist penetration
or a general collapse of government units, or a combina-
tion of the two could occur at anytime.
Although only rocket and artillery rounds landed
near Pochentong airport yesterday, steady communist ad-
vances have brought them within recoilless rifle range
of the airfield in the northwest. US defense attach6s
report that government forces in this area may wilt rap-
idly in the face of continued insurgent attacks.
The communists also opened a new gap-in the defense
line six miles north of the airfield, following the un-
authorized withdrawal of a government unit.
The communists are also maintaining heavy pressure
on government units on the east bank of the Mekong River
near the capital. Government holdings in the area have
now been reduced to a relatively small enclave directly
opposite the city and a few other isolated positions.
Recoilless rifle or mortar fire from the east bank has
begun to hit near Phnom Penh's waterfront, and communist
gunners are also within range of the heavily populated
sections of the city, including the US embassy.
Communist forces along Route 4 west of Phnom Penh
do not yet pose a direct threat to Pochentong airport or
to the city itself. Fighting along the highway yester-
day remained-at a high level, however, and another out-
lying government position was abandoned. Any additional
government withdrawals in this sector will further en-
danger the army's main ammunition dump just south of the
highway.
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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
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Nationa
ntelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1975
The USSR's AN-26 Curl, a short-haul multipurpose
transport aircraft, recently completed a promotional
tour of F ]north and central African countries.
The Curl was first exhibited at the 1969 Paris Air
Show and demonstrated in several Middle Eastern countries
in-the early 1970s. As with the earlier, passenger-
carrying AN-24, potential non-communist buyers have shown
little interest in substantial purchases of Soviet-built
aircraft. Although the twin-turboprop AN-26 has airdrop
capability and a rear-door exit, it is intended primar-
ily as a cargo carrier; it can be adapted as a passenger
carrier. The cargo configuration lifts some five tons,
the passenger version carries 32 people plus a crew of
three.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 10, 1975
President Geisel, displeased by internal divisions
and lack of dynamism within the government party, is
seeking to revitalize it.
Geisel is pursuing what the US embassy calls a "two-
track strategy." On the one hand, he wants to give the
party more of an edge on the opposition by initiating
close consultation with party leaders to keep them better
informed on administration plans and policies. The Presi-
dent also sought to lend prestige to a recent party meet-
ing by giving a personal address.
At the same time, Geisel.has asked his advisers to
devise alternative strategies. One idea is to create a
pro-government third party designed to attract and com-
bine the energies of the most dynamic members of the gov-
ernment and opposition parties. Another would abolish
the present parties and create three or four entirely
new ones. The deliberate leaking of such contingency
planning to the press may well have been intended to
impress on the government party the urgent need to
strengthen itself.
Geisel is concerned not only because of the opposi-
tion's electoral gains last fall, but also because of
the effect a repetition of the government's losses would
have on conservative opponents of his liberalization
program. Moreover, the embassy believes that some within
the military simply could not tolerate an eventual opposi-
tion majority in congress, which, under current legisla-
tion, nominally "elects" the president.
The President is not likely to change the present
two-party system--a creation of the military governments--
since the result would be disconcertingly similar to the
system the military replaced a decade ago. Even if he
were so disposed, there is little indication that the
opposition would readily cooperate with any plan for a
drastic restructuring of the present system. The like-
lihood is, therefore, that Geisel, for the time being
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 10, 1975
at least, will bend every effort to rebuild the govern-
ment party's position within the. current framework. The
President's next overt move probably will be to replace
the party leadership.
Chile: The cabinet shake-up under way in Chile re-
flects an attempt by the military government to deal
more effectively with economic problems.
President Pinochet seems to have decided to in-
tensify current austerity measures despite their unpop-
ularity with most Chileans, including many officers in
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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