CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
f/2
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
April 8, 1975
N2 657
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I I
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 8, 1975
SOUTH VIETNAM: Thieu may use palace bombing as pretext
to move against political rivals; military situation.
(Page 1)
CAMBODIA: Communist attacks force further government
withdrawals north of Pochentong. (Page 5)
USSR: Jewish emigration down. (Page 7)
CSCE: Another troublesome issue may soon be resolved.
(Page 10)
ARGENTINA: Peron's initiatives buy time. (Page 11)
SYRIA: Baath congress to elect new executive group.
(Page 14)
USSR: Second ocean-reconnaissance satellite launched.
(Page 16)
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t ,xtt of
I haitand
Communist controlled
territory
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 8, 1975
Accounts so far indicate that the bombing of the
Presidential Palace in Saigon this morning was not part
of a larger conspiracy against President Thieu. Even so,
the incident will generate tensions among South Vietnam-
ese military leaders and could cause President Thieu to
move against air force officers, including the current
commander and Thieu's long-standing political rival, for-
mer commander Nguyen Cao Ky.
The bombing occurred at about 8:30 a.m. Saigon time,
shortly after two South Vietnamese air force F-5s took
off from Bien Hoa air base north of Saigon for a bomb-
ing run near Phan Thiet. One of the aircraft veered
over Saigon and dropped two bombs, the closest of which
landed about 30 yards from the palace. Flying glass
caused several injuries but no fatalities were reported.
The aircraft has not been located and may have left the
country. Although no appreciable public disorder en-
sued after the bombing, Saigon was placed under curfew
and Tan Son Nhut airport is also closed for the time
being.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 8, 1975
Most of the military action remains in the delta.
The communists began their assault on the Moc Hoa front
early yesterday with a mixed barrage of some 1,000 rocket,
artillery, and mortar rounds against a government position
less than eight miles northeast of that provincial capital.
The communists also are becoming more active in other
parts of the delta, particularly in Dinh Tuong Province.
The North Vietnamese 4th Division is probing Can Tho City
defenses, but has made no appreciable gains. The commu-
nists have also stepped up sabotage operations against
the major delta highways, thus far without. much success.
General Toan, commander of the provinces around
Saigon, and now responsible for the few remaining govern-
ment enclaves in the central coastal provinces, made an
inspection tour to these areas last weekend and has taken
steps to improve the government's position there. He has
established a forward command headquarters at Phan Rang,
in Ninh Thuan Province, which will command the airborne
battalion sent there last weekend and a regrouped regi-
ment from the 2nd Division which will arrive shortly.
Toan found that most of the government's territorial
forces were still in place around the Phan Rang area.
General Toan also located the Ninh Thuan Province
chief who had fled earlier, and ordered him back to the
province until he can find someone stronger to replace
him. Toan is checking the situation north of Phan Rang
and may consider moving forces there if he can reorganize
his troops rapidly enough--and if the communists do not
move first. Some government naval units have moved into
the Nha Trang area and are reported to be holding posi-
tions at the port and at the airfield.
General Toan claims he is satisfied that all re-
turning government units and stragglers at several loca-
tions east of Saigon are under control and that progress
is being made reorganizing them into usable military
units. In addition to the marines and 2nd Division
troops that are regrouping, over 7,000 officers and men
of the South Vietnamese 22nd Division--perhaps a half of
that unit's former strength--reached the Vung Tau area.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 8, 1975
It is expected that these troops will be the basis for a
reorganized 22nd Division. Following initial difficulties
in regrouping the South Vietnamese 2nd Division, consider-
able progress is now being made. One regiment, in fact,
has been totally refitted and is to be sent to Phan Rang
today.
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Phnom Penh
Gap in defense Tine
Tuol
Leap,
Communist
units cross river
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 8, 1975
Khmer communist ground attacks have forced further
government withdrawals in the area north of Pochentong
airport. So far the communists have not moved in force
to exploit the new gap in government defenses, but US
defense attach4s who visited the area yesterday reported
that government units are doing very little to improve
the situation and that some Cambodian officers have ex-
pressed the belief that "the end is near." Communist
rocket and artillery attacks against Pochentong airport
yesterday set a small ammunition dump on fire.
Government troops on the Mekong River northeast of
the capital claim that insurgent forces are crossing the
river presumably to participate in a push south toward
the main navy headquarters. Elsewhere, government rein-
forcements are moving into blocking positions on Route 1
southeast of the capital in' anticipation of increased
attacks in this sector.
In the countryside, the southwestern provincial cap-
ital of Kompong Speu is seriously threatened. The army
high command stripped Kompong Speu of its best units
several weeks ago to reinforce Phnom Penh's defense, and
the communists have been making steady gains against the
territorial units left to defend the town. Insurgent
units briefly penetrated the town's market on Sunday be-
fore being pushed back. At the southeastern provincial
capital of Prey Veng, communist attacks have forced gov-
ernment troops to abandon positions north of the town
and some fighting has occurred along the city's outskirts.
Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai's claim yesterday
that Cambodian "negotiations" might soon be held in
Bangkok is probably overstated. Prince Sihanouk's son,
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 8, 1975
Prince Yuvaneath, was scheduled to arrive in Bangkok
yesterday at Thai government invitation. Chatchai may
have arranged a meeting between Yuvaneath and Cambodian
Prime Minister Long Boret, who also arrived in Bangkok
yesterday on his way back to Phnom Penh.
Even if Chatchai managed to bring the two Cambodians
together, it is doubtful that any substantive discussions
took place. Prince Yuvaneath--who has a reputation as a
playboy and who has been staying in Macao--would be un-
likely to have any real authority to speak for his father,
let alone the Khmer communists. In discussions with the
US charge last week, Chatchai himself admitted that the
chances for any breakthrough were "slight." At best,
Yuvaneath might be expected to relay some message from
Boret to his father. Under present conditions, however,
Boret would appear to have little to offer the other
side except surrender.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 8, 1975
Approximately 875 Jews emigrated from the Soviet
Union in March. This is the lowest monthly total in more
than three years. The first-quarter total for 1975--just
over 3,000--is nearly 50 percent below the comparable
figure for 1974.
The Soviets apparently are reducing the flow by dis-
couraging applications, rather than by outright refusals.
They have mounted a psychological campaign emphasizing
the problems emigrants will face in Israel and the West,
while making it clear that would-be emigrants will have
a tough row to hoe before they can leave the USSR. Ap-
plicants for emigration remain subject to loss of employ-
ment and other forms of harassment, as well as to the
considerable expense of obtaining exit permits.
At the same time they are discouraging overall
Jewish emigration, the Soviets are applying a carrot-
and-stick approach to Jewish activists. Recently, several
have been allowed to emigrate, for example, but two others
have been sent to Siberia because of their participation
in a brief Moscow street demonstration. Moscow's policy
may be to get rid of the most articulate Jewish activists,
particularly those who are well known in the West and
to intimidate the others.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 8, 1975
Another troublesome issue at the European Security
Conference in Geneva may soon be resolved. The Western
allies and neutral delegates are ready to accept in prin-
ciple a Soviet proposal that would end the deadlock con-
cerning one of the major military-related "confidence-
building measures."
In mid-March Soviet representatives hinted that
Moscow could accept the Western idea of providing advance
notice about national and multinational maneuvers to all
conference participants, if the notification is given on
a voluntary basis. They also suggested that Moscow would
make some concessions concerning categories of maneuvers
that would fall under the prior notification provision
of any agreement reached in Geneva.
On April 2 most of the NATO allies agreed that they
should hint to the Soviet delegates that the West would
accept the idea of voluntary notification if the Soviets
are forthcoming concerning what maneuvers would come
under the agreement. The Dutch representative was the
sole holdout, but his country is likely eventually to
accept the views of the other NATO allies? The repre-
sentatives from the neutral states, initially very crit-
ical of the Soviet approach, agreed on April 3 that the
delegates should make a "gentleman's agreement" to ac-
cept the Soviet terms as a working hypothesis.
Resolving all the issues related to this measure
will require some hard bargaining. In addition, the
Soviet, Western, and neutral delegations will have to
convince the recalcitrant Romanians to accept any agree-
ment they work out.
Both sides, however, are anxious to conclude the
Geneva conference. The Soviets have recently given some
indications that they are anxious to finish this stage
of the conference in time for a final summit-level meet-
ing on June 30 and have shown some signs of flexibility
concerning other outstanding issues. The Western dele-
gations, which have been growing increasingly weary, are
now discussing the possibility of completing this stage
by the end of May or mid-June.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 8, 1975
ARGENTINA
Recent political initiatives by President Peron
have bought some time, but she still must face up to a
number of demands from labor and political leaders.
In a speech to representatives of the massive
Peronist trade union confederation, Mrs. Peron made a
strong plea for worker support and suggested that many
of Argentina's problems were being caused by enemies
seeking to discredit and undermine her government from
within. In the emotional address, Mrs. Peron frequently
invoked her dead husband's name, but offered little more
than a promise to fulfill his programs and to consult
with labor more frequently. She did not respond specif-
ically to the grievances outlined by union leaders in
a document released last week spelling out complaints
against official policies.
The President also met with political leaders allied
with the Peronists. She promised to hold regular. monthly
sessions with the group and listened to criticism of her
economic policies and her "deteriorating image"--an
allusion to Lopez Rega. She responded to the latter by
insisting that no one told her what to do.
In congress, meanwhile, Peronist legislators deliv-
ered a strongly worded secret document to party vice
president Raul Lastiri putting them on record as opposed
to the government's lack of coherent direction and the
dominant role played by certain key officials. They
also demanded that the party be thoroughly reorganized.
The expulsion of 13 prominent left-wing Peronists
from party ranks last Friday was undoubtedly intended
to appease some of the President's critics on the right.
It is unlikely, however, that she can win back their
much-needed support unless she deals with the Lopez Rega
problem and makes some major concessions on labor's de-
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 8, 1975
SYRIA
The Syrian Baath Party congress, is expected to
elect a new party executive group that will. be more
responsive to President Asad's dictates than was the
previous group, which included some influential lead-
ers more radical than Asad. The congress, which opened
last Saturday, will also debate and probably endorse
whatever approach Asad now decides to take on Middle
East peace negotiations.
The President and his supporters have taken a number
of precautionary measures over the past few weeks to en-
sure that the congress is stacked in their favor. The
US embassy in Damascus has heard, for example, that there
have been widespread detentions of Syrian Baathists, in-
cluding some prominent members from Aleppo and Damascus
itself, who are known to be ideologically aligned with
the Iraqi Baath Party.
It now seems increasingly likely that the charges
of conspiring with Baghdad lodged against some 250-300
party members reportedly rounded up by Syrian authori-
ties in mid-March were, at least in some cases, trumped
up by Asad's supporters. The purpose was to overturn
the election of local Baath members known to be pro-Iraqi
or otherwise opposed to Asad's leadership and policies.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
USSR
April 8, 1975
Cosmos 724, launched on April 7 from Tyuratam, is
the second radar ocean-reconnaissance satellite orbited
in five days and the 14th launched since the program
began in 1967. Cosmos 723 was orbited on April 2.
Each satellite's radar system has a swath width of
about 245 nautical miles and can detect destroyer-size
ships when weather and sea conditions are favorable.
In poor weather, they are believed to be capable of de-
tecting an aircraft carrier. The concurrent operation
of two such satellites was first tested last spring.
The launching of Cosmos 723 and 724 may indicate that
the Soviets have completed the development phase and
are now using a two-satellite system operationally.
In addition to normal worldwide activities
723
and
724 will probably monitor Soviet activities in
the
In-
dian ocean during a routine rotation of ships later
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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