CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 2, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
Top Secret
man ~10
:..
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
April 2, 1975
D
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0276000 044 7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79 00975AO27600010004-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
CONTENTS
SOUTH VIETNAM: Hanoi's forces control virtually all of
Military Region 2. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 3)
SAUDI ARABIA: Intention to form "consultative council"
announced in King Khalid's first policy statement.
(Page 5)
IRAN; Terrorism on the increase. (Page 7)
HONDURAS: Military persuades Lopez to relinquish com-
mand of armed forces. (Page 9)
YUGOSLAVIA: The military's role in politics. (Page 12)
ANNEX: An Assessment of the Khmer Rebel Leadership
25X11
E
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79TOQ975AO27600010004-1 25X1
Gulf of
!"Aland MR 4
MILES
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/03/13 - CIA-RDP79T0
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
North Vietnamese forces now control virtually all
of Military Region 2, including the southern provinces.
Since the loss of Qui Nhon and Nha Trang yesterday, the
government has apparently abandoned the coastal provinces
of Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan. There were no South Viet-
namese regulars in Tuyen Duc Province, including the re-
sort city of Da Lat, and much of the population had al-
ready fled.
The fate of the civilian refugees recently taken to
Cam Ranh is unclear, following the movement on to Vung
Tau of the approximately 9,000 marines just evacuated
from Da Nang. These marine units are to be reorganized
for deployment near Saigon by the end of next week. Ef-
forts to refit and reorganize some 4,000 troops from the
South Vietnamese 2nd Division, now heading for Military
Region 3, are being slowed by the lack of replacement
equipment.
In the delta provinces, the communists are giving
new priority to cutting the major highways to block the
movement of military supplies south from Saigon and of
foodstuffs north to Saigon from the delta. This may
have delayed planned attacks against Can Tho and My Tho
cities. Nevertheless, elements of the communist 8th
Division remain in position to begin attacks against
these major urban centers at any time.
Approved For Release 209ZI03113 ? r_in-Rnp79TOO975nn27600010004-1
 Approved For Release 2a
Cambodia: Lower Mekong
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release 20 7/03/13: CIA-RDP79T009 5A027600010004-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
CAMBODIA
April 2, 1975
The Khmer communists have overrun the government
enclave that included Neak Luong and nearby Banam, the
last government holdings on the Mekong River between
Phnom Penh and the South Vietnamese border. The two
neighboring towns were defended by over 4,000 troops.
The loss is a major defeat.
Neak Luong fell yesterday afternoon.
Banam was overrun sometime last night. The situa-
tion there is still confused, but ten Cambodian navy
craft from Banam have arrived in Phnom Penh with a small
number of survivors.
After the communists have eliminated remaining pock-
ets of resistance in the Neak Luong - Banam area, they
will be able to redeploy toward Phnom Penh a substantial
number of the 6,000 to 7,000 troops they now have along
the lower Mekong.
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010004-1
 Approved For Release 1 2007/03/13 - 975AO27600010004-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
In the immediate area of the capital, communist
forces yesterday fired over 30 rockets at Pochentong Air-
port, but they again failed to affect airlift operations.
Several rockets fell near the US embassy in the city's
southeastern quarter.
Inconclusive fighting continued on the other battle-
fronts around Phnom Penh, except along the Bassac River
to the southeast where government units abandoned posi-
tions on an island four miles from the capital's out-
skirts. Communist reinforcements moved into this area
last week, and government units have been gradually los-
-4-
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release
2007/03/13 - CIA-RDP7 T00975A027600010004-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
SAUDI ARABIA
April 2, 1975
In the first major policy statement of his reign,
King Khalid announced on Monday night the regime's in-
tention to "reorganize" its relationship to the people
by forming a "consultative council." The statement,
broadcast over the Saudi radio, was read by Crown Prince
Fahd, who continues to stand forth as the country's pre-
eminent political leader now that Faysal is gone.
The statement did not elaborate the plan, but at-
tributed it to King Faysal. Khalid alleged that Faysal
would have established such a council had he lived.
25X1 -
25X1
Fahd's support for political change is not new.
When he was making his move--between 1970 and 1972--to
secure family and public recognition as the number-two
man in the county Fahd publicly endorsed such moderniz-
ing changes-
King Khalid's recommendation in his statement Mon-
day night for changes in provincial government arrange-
ments has also been around a long time. In fact, a
thorough revamping of provincial government was drafted
in 1963, at the direction of Faysal, who was then crown
prince. It was never implemented, however.
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
F7777 I
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
Elsewhere in the statement--which generally stressed
continuity with Faysal's policies--Khalid made a point of
emphasizing Saudi Arabia's commitment to the liberation
of Jerusalem "from the claws of Zionism." By stressing
that Jerusalem must be the first step in dealing with the
Palestine question--not something to be taken up when
everything else is out of the way--the new leaders prob-
ably intend to signal their support for a firm Arab posi-
tion, following the collapse of the step-by-step negotia-
tions. They presumably want to discourage any speculation
that their regime will be softer than Faysal on Israel and
also to stiffen Egypt's resolve to hold out for an Arab,
not just Egyptian, settlement.
Khalid also called for Islamic solidarity, Arab
unity, and the recovery of the occupied territories. In
a passing reference, he said his government would continue
to strengthen the armed forces and provide them with the
necessary weapons for defense of Saudi Arabia and the
"Arab nation." With respect to the country's oil reserves,
Khalid talked about avoiding confrontation and not letting
"selfishness" affect world prosperity; he.supported the
resolutions of the OPEC summit conference in Algiers F_
-6-
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010004-1
 Approved For Release 209
National Intelligence Bulletin April 2, 1975
An upsurge in terrorism and student unrest in Iran
since January portends further terrorist acts against
Iranian security officials and installations. The Shah's
concern over Iraqi support of Iranian dissident groups
probably was an important contributing factor behind the
rapprochement with Baghdad. The effectiveness of Iranian
internal security should now be enhanced by that part of
the accord between the two neighbors dealing with border
security, prevention of subversive and terrorist infil-
tration, cessation of propaganda broadcasts, and curtail-
ment of funds to dissident organizations.
The increased terrorist activity has been attributed
to successful internal reorganization and possible merg-
ing of resources of the following three active terrorist
organizations in the country:
--The People's Sacrifice Guerrillas, a large and
well-organized communist terrorist group.
--The People's Strugglers, a radical, religious
conservative group.
--The People's Democratic Front, the smallest group
of the three, but well led.
The Shah's recent decision to revert to a one-party
political system reduces the outlets for legitimate po-
litical activism, and quiescent liberals may now view the
terrorist organizations as an acceptable alternative to
the Shah's authoritarianism. The recent restructuring
of the political party system has also sparked renewed
student unrest
Approved For Release 2 75AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Releaso
2007/03/13: CIA-RDP79 00975A027600010004-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
Classes at the nation's universities have been dis-
rupted for the fourth successive month, despite a govern-
ment crackdown on student protesters.
Iranian security o icia s hope that
the current Iranian holiday season will ease the situa-
tion.
The majority of terrorist acts committed in recent
months has been directed against the Iranian security
organization, SAVAK,
Terrorism and discontent in Iran in
the near term are unlikely to surpass the current capa-
bilities of the security forces. Continued success of
terrorist operations, including effective anti-regime
propaganda attacks, will likely lead, however, to more
repressive police action, resulting in martyrs and pos-
sible increased popular support for dissident activities.
-8-
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release G-1 A 0975A027600010004-1
National Intelligence Bulletin April 2, 1975
Honduran military leaders have persuaded Chief of
State Lopez to relinquish command of the armed forces,
and probably intend to assume wider responsibility for
directing the affairs of the country. Lopez will remain
as titular chief executive, according to an announcement
issued yesterday by the Superior Defense Council.
Lopez' removal from the position that he used since
the late 1950s to guarantee his control of government is
the latest step in a process under way for several months
in which senior military officers have taken over a
larger share of decision-making.
Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar, a protege of Lopez, has
succeeded him as armed forces commander. Melgar, who
previously demonstrated little interest in affairs of
state, will probably depend heavily on the advice of a
collegium of military officers, including younger ones
Dissatisfaction with. Lopez has grown steadily in
the military during the last year or so. Despite strong
pressure from fellow officers, deteriorating economic
conditions, and deep divisions in his government, Lopez
continued to procrastinate. Important decisions--includ-
ing the need to replace the foreign minister who resigned
last October--were put off, and relief efforts for the
victims of the hurricane last year have faltered.
Although his power clearly has been circumscribed,
at least for the time being, Lopez can still summon pow-
erful support. His extensive web of business interests
and the continued loyalty of some top officers--perhaps
including Melgar--could enable him to regain a preeminent
role. Whatever his role, nonetheless, it seems likely
that the military will now provide more dynamic leader-
ship and pay more heed to the advice of younger, reform-
minded officers.
Approved For Release 2007/03/1 T-.9 1A-RDP79T00975A027600010004-1
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release 12007103113 : CIA-RDP79T 0975AO27600010004-1 25X1
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
The Yugoslav army is becoming an open participant
in the regime's efforts to achieve political unity be-
fore Tito dies. Its role is causing some antagonism
between local civilian authorities and their military
counterparts.
The military's first move into previously civilian-
controlled state activities came last spring with the ap-
pointment of military officers to key posts in the inter-
nal security network. This resulted in a more organized
and determined effort to detect and control dissenters.
As a result of the army's success in the security
field, the military has also been entrusted with a wider
political role. The Yugoslav leadership, presumably at
Tito's urging, is using the army as a means of ensuring
the success of a program to organize an orderly transfer
of power that has been operating since early 1974 .
This increase in military political involvement has
already led to friction with some civilians. The most
serious occurred early this year in Croatia. The clash
involved a dispute between the Croat party leader and
the regional army command over a personnel appointment
in the Zagreb party organization. Defense Minister
Ljubicic and the army political administration inter-
vened to settle the issue before it reached Tito's desk.
Approved For Release 2007/03/13: CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010004-1
 Approved For Release Lnm1ns1VI ? (IA-RnP79Tnn 75AO27600010004-1 25X1
National Intelligence Bulletin April 2, 1975
Although the actions of the top command indicate that
it is wary of the resentment of some civilian authori-
ties, further clashes are inevitable.
A politically active and reliable National Defense
Force would be valuable in preparing an orderly succes-
sion. Party leaders in Belgrade, however, are also taking
precautions against the possibility that the political
power of the military might rival their own. Civilian
leaders are going along with the political activation of
the military, but they are using the strong party admin-
istration within the army to ensure that the party line
is closely followed.
-13-
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release 007/03/13 : CIA-RDP7 T00975A027600010004-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
An Assessment of the
Khmer Rebel Leadership
April 2, 1.975
As the Cambodian conflict approaches what may be its
final stages, the Khmer insurgents and their administra-
tive apparatus stand ready to take the reins of power in
Phnom Penh. The handful of leading insurgent figures
known in the West probably will assume prominent positions
in a successor regime, but real power will be in the
hands of the covert Khmer Communist Party.
In the five years since their creation, the National
United Front of Cambodia and the Cambodian People's Na-
tional Liberation Armed Forces have formed the overt ad-
ministrative and military apparatus of the communist-led
insurgency. Although Sihanouk's Royal Government of Na-
tional Union--now dominated by the communists--may even-
tually be installed in Phnom Penh, to date it has had no
significant role inside Cambodia, serving instead merely
as the institutional conduit for the insurgents' external
relations.
In Cambodia, the insurgent apparatus is controlled
and directed by the Khmer Communist Party, which traces
its orgins to the early 1950s and Ho Chi Minh's Indochina
Communist Party. The Khmer party apparently became a
formal organization only in 1961. From a handful of
Cambodians, it has expanded to a membership of over
10,000, led by a central committee of about 20 members.
Party Leadership
Party members occupy virtually all key positions
in the front and its panoply of mass organizations, from
the national to the local level, and party cadre form
the backbone of the insurgency's military arm.
The precise makeup of the party leadership is a
closely guarded secret. Sihanouk's "defense minister"
and "deputy prime minister" Khieu Samphan is the best
known of the senior leaders, but it is generally be-
lieved that Saloth Sar is the top man and is probably
Approved For Release 1 CIA-RDP79T7975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
Prince Sihanouk poses with Khmer Communist leaders during a meeting in Cambodia in 1973. The photo from China Pictorial is
the only known photograph of the leaders together. Front row, left to right: Hou Yuon, Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and
leng Sary. Back row, left to right: Unknown, Saloth Sar, Unknown, and Koy Thuon.
the secretary general. Widely traveled Ieng Sary, who
now handles most direct contacts with Peking and Hanoi,
also appears to occupy a top position.
From there on the picture dims. A number of other
central committee members have been identified, in vary-
ing degrees of certainty. These include better known
individuals like Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, as well as lesser
knowns like Son Sen, Nuon Chea, Sok Thuok, Chou Chet,
Tiv 01, and Koy Thuon. Top insurgent military commanders
and regional party chairmen are probably members of the
central committee.
The relative rankings of the lower echelon of the
central committee are open to conjecture. Hou Yuon and
Hu Nim for example, are given broad propaganda exposure,
but they actually
wield little power. Given the party's emp.asis on "armed
struggle," it would seem only natural that military lead-
ers like Nuon Chea and Son Sen would wield considerable
influence.
Approved For Release 2007/03/h2: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
All of the individuals whose central committee mem-
bership is fairly well established are in their forties.
Most qualify as Cambodian intellectuals, having been edu-
cated during the 1950s in France--where they got their
leftist if not their. communist ideology--and having sub-
sequently worked as journalists or teachers. Khieu Sam-
phan and Hou Yuon, in fact, have doctorates in economics.
A significant number have had considerable experience in
politics: Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim held
cabinet portfolios under Sihanouk during the 1960s.
Almost all the
known or suspected
party leaders are
remembered as tough
nationalists and un-
yielding ideologues
even before their
active involvement
in the insurgency.
Another collective
trait appears to be
long-standing oppo-
sition, and in many
cases personal en-
mity, toward Prince
Sihanouk. Saloth
Sar, Ieng Sary, and
Son Sen,for example,
are among a number
of today's communist
leaders who fled
into the bush in
1963 following one
of Sihanouk's crack-
downs on leftists.
Others like Khieu
Samphan, Hou Yuon,
and Hu Nim stayed
in Phnom Penh until
1967, when Sihanouk
made it impossible
for them to remain.
Sihanouk (L) with military strongman Son San in 1973.
A3
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010004-1
 Approved For Releas4 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP7gT00975A027600010004-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
These common bonds probably have grown stronger after
eight or more years of struggle together and help to ex-
plain the cohesion and determination with which party
leaders have prosecuted the war. They have had their
differences, but have been able to submerge or resolve
them and work together once a decision has :been reached.
Given the intellectual sophistication of most of the
leaders, it is not surprising to find evidence of differ-
ences on international communist issues. Reports speak
of heated ideological debate among Khmer communists who
previously were part of Sihanouk's entourage in Peking
and of "Soviet" and "Maoist" factions. A party history
prepared for a party anniversary last September hinted
about such debate. It referred to a "state of disunity
still existing in the party" and to "partisan factions."
The party's ties with Hanoi are a related cause of
friction. The relationship has always been ambivalent.
Hanoi nurtured the Cambodian party when Sihanouk was in
power, and ties became even closer when the North Viet-
namese increased their support during the initial years
of the conflict. From the beginning, however, Hanoi has
had to buck an undercurrent of distrust rooted in Cambo-
dia's historical experience with Vietnamese expansionism.
As the Khmer party expanded and gradually assumed greater
responsibility for its own military and political affairs,
its Vietnamese connection appears to have become even
more contentious.
Lines of division on this issue are murky, but a
number of reports have identified Ieng Sary---who, along
with several other top leaders, is supposed to have re-
ceived training in North Vietnam--as the leading propo-
nent of close ties with Hanoi. Khieu Samphan has fre-
quently been reported as heading a more nationalistic
faction, which apparently had some success in strengthen-
ing the party's ties with Peking as a balance to Hanoi's
influence. The Chinese, for their part, have appeared
eager to cultivate ties with the insurgents, both to pre-
vent Vietnamese dominance over the Cambodians and to
foreclose a Soviet intrusion.
Approved For Release 2007/03/4: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release 17103113 m 975A027600010004-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
The discernible drift toward a middle ground between
Peking and Hanoi may involve practical considerations.
North Vietnam's ability to extend post-war reconstruction
aid to a communist-controlled Cambodia is limited, while
Peking will be in a position to help rebuild the country's
war-torn economy. The party, in fact, has been careful
to keep open all potential sources of foreign aid. A
policy statement issued by a recent "congress" of party
front organizations, for example, juxtaposed a promise
of an "independent and nonaligned foreign policy" with
a statement that it would accept all "unconditional aid."
Sihanouk's Role
The party line toward Sihanouk also appears to have
been developed with an eye to the future. There is now
some evidence that the party plans to retain Sihanouk as
nominal leader, if and when the insurgents win a military
victory or the current government in Phnom Penh capitu-
lates. Party leaders have long recognized that the Prince
has given their movement a legitimacy that it would not
otherwise have had. During a period of post-war consoli-
dation, Sihanouk's value as a domestic rallying point and
his ability to attract international recognition and aid
would help. The Prince's close relationship with Chinese
leaders was probably an important consideration in this
regard, and the party may, in fact, have been under some
pressure from Peking to retain Sihanouk.
For many in the party, any role at all for Sihanouk
is a bitter pill. The Prince symbolizes the old order,
at whose hands many party chiefs suffered. The party
leaders know first hand that Sihanouk is an unscrupulous
and adroit political operator and are probably more than
a little suspicious of his intentions and concerned about
his ability to make mischief for them.
Sihanouk, for his part, appears painfully aware of
the party's attitude toward him. His statements that
he will not involve himself in post-war domestic affairs,
limiting his activities to foreign relations, may in fact
reflect the arrangement he has been forced to accept as
the price for any role at all. Similarly, his frequent
AS
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
references to the possibility of early retirement prob-
ably grew out of a recognition that his usefulness will
decline, and the pressures to jettison him will increase,
as the party gains confidence in its ability to rule.
Party Aims
The party aims to impose its own brand of Marxism
on Cambodia. Essentially, this would mean the implemen-
tation on a country-wide basis of programs long under
way in the communist zone. These include:
--Destruction of the traditional administrative
system and its replacement by a centralized govern-
ment controlled by the party.
Approved For Release 2007/03/13T:6CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010004-1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 2, 1975
--Confiscation of privately owned land and the tools
of agriculture, followed by the establishment of
government-run communes.
--Nationalization of all industry and means of
commerce.
--Gradual replacement of Buddhism with communist-
controlled mass organizations.
So far, in the communist zone such measures have
not gone down well with the land-proud and independent
Cambodian peasants. Over the years, the program has
caused large numbers of villagers to flee the communist
zone. Smoldering resentment among those who have re-
mained behind has on occasion flared into small-scale
uprisings, which the communists have put down ruthlessly.
Even if the communists win control of the country,
they can expect to meet similar resistance to their
programs. The Khmer party leadership lacks a large pool
of well-trained cadre, but it can be expected to push its
ro ram relentlessly, using force when necessary.
Approved For Release 20 - 75A027600010004-1
 Top Se MYed For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010004-1