CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
25X1 March 1, 1975
N2 638
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 1, 1975
CONTENTS
EGYPT-PLO: Deteriorating relations. (Page 3)
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Truce to control border incidents appar-
ently worked out in late January. (Page 5)
INDOCHINA: Infiltration continued at a heavy rate last
month. (Page 7)
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 9)
INDONESIA: Jakarta prepares to step up
in Portuguese Timor. (Page 10)
activities 25X1
ARGENTINA: US consul killed yesterday; terrorists may be
planning further abductions of US citizens. (Page 14)
WEST BERLIN: City's government taking steps to meet
ransom demand for Peter Lorenz. (Page 15)
SPAIN: Arias promises liberalization, but police still
harsh. (Page 16)
TURKEY: Breakdown of public order reinforces feeling that
Irmak government has outlived its usefulness. (Page 17)
EC-UK: EC Council hopes to reach agreement on terms for
re en gotiating UK membership next week. (Page 19)
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA: New military deliveries to Yugoslavia
include SA-3 missiles. (Page 2.1)
IRAN-FRANCE: Negotiations reportedly complete on long-
term loan to France. (Page 22)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 23)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 1, 1975
Egyptian officials and information media this week
launched a verbal counterattack on the Palestinians for
their continued sniping at Egypt?s Middle East policies
and negotiating tactics. Cairo is apprehensive that the
Palestinians--possibly with Syrian connivance--are making
headway in their effort to stimulate wider Arab criticism
of another Egyptian-Israeli agreement.
The Palestinians retaliated yesterday by recalling
to Beirut the Cairo representatives of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization. A PLO spokesman had said earlier
that PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat was not likely to make an
anticipated early visit to Cairo.
President Sadat personally snubbed the Palestinians
on Thursday by declaring himself unwilling to receive a
delegation that the PLO had proposed sending to Cairo in
an attempt to resolve the current Egyptian-Palestinian
differences. Underscoring the organization's inability
to speak with one voice, Sadat said in a statement re-
leased to the Cairo press that he would talk only with
the PLO's entire governing executive committee.
This Egyptian move came in direct response to a com-
munique' issued by the PLO on February 26 that condemned
what the Palestinians allege. to be Cairo's preparations
to abandon the Palestinian cause for the sake of limited
territorial gains in the Sinai. Since Secretary Kis-
singer's latest trip to the area, the Palestinians have
repeatedly charged that present settlement efforts are
only a plot by the US and Israel to find a "partial solu-
tion" that will divide Egypt from Syria and the Palestin-
ians.
Sadat's action is but one more step in his continu-
ing effort to put his dealings with the Palestinians on
a more formal basis. By so doing, he could spare himself
some of the frustration of attempting to assuage Palestin-
ian sensibilities on a day-to-day basis. Despite his
statement on Thursday, Sadat really prefers to deal only
with Arafat, who is among the more reasonable PLO leaders;
he has insisted that Foreign Minister Fahmi deal with PLO
political spokesman Qaddumi and with other lesser figures.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 1, 1975
The issue of UN resolutions was first raised by the
Palestinians themselves in their propaganda assault on
Sadat. The Palestinians are particularly upset over
Sadat's recent expression of willingness to accept the
internationalization of Jerusalem, which has been called
for in UN resolutions and in which the UN would be
heavily involved.
Hoping to create an additional problem for Sadat,
pro-fedayeen newspapers in Beirut again raised the point
that the PLO has denied it will participate in any Geneva
talks based on Security Council Resolution 242, which
refers to the Palestinians only as refugees. Spokesmen
for the PLO are expressing increased apprehension that
the organization will be called on to make fundamental
policy changes--meaning the recognition of Israel's right
to exist--as a condition for its attendance at the talks.
The Palestinians' difficulties with Egypt, however
temporary, are proving worrisome enough that the PLO is
seeking support from other Arab leaders. PLO delegations
have been dispatched to various Arab and other "friendly"
capitals, and Arafat made a point of cabling congratula-
tions to Syria's President Asad for delivering a strongly
pro-PLO speech on February 26.
Asad, who in a more limited way shares the Palestin-
ians' misgivings about the ramifications of another agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel, affirmed his support for
the PLO in unusually vigorous terms as part of his own
effort to maintain Syrian influence with the Palestinians
and put pressure on Sadat. Damascus would like to see
some assurances for Syria and the Palestinians written
into any new Egyptian-Israeli accord.
To keep the heat on Egypt, Syria and the Palestin-
ians are also calling for a high-level meeting of Egyp-
tian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Palestinian officials to be
held prior to Secretary Kissinger's next trip to the Mid-
dle East. The Syrians and Palestinians consider that they
could use such a meeting to force their demands on Cairo.
Aware of this, the Egyptians would prefer to delay the
quadripartite meeting still further; originally, it was
to have been held in February at the foreign minister
level.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 1, 1975
The quiet situation along the Lebanese-Israeli bor-
der appears to be the result of agreement on 25X1
steps to reduce the chances of major military operations
growing out of fedayeen cross-border terrorist attacks.
Because the Lebanese army is ill- pre-
pared to deter such operations on its own, continuation
of the unofficial truce rests ultimately on the PLO's
willingness and ability to control its own and allied
guerrilla forces.
Israeli sources have told US embassy officials in
Tel Aviv that Israel suggested this "truce" and agreed
to limit retaliation for minor border incidents, in re-
turn for a Lebanese commitment to exercise better control
over the fedayeen. One Israeli cabinet minister told
the embassy last week that Israel wanted to keep things
cooled down, particularly in the present pre-negotiation
period.
both Beirut and
Tel Aviv are anxious to avoid a repetition of the series
of violent incidents in January that culminated in a
major Israeli military operation to drive the fedayeen
from the southern Lebanese village of Kafr Shuba. Tel
Aviv is said to be concerned that further incidents
might cause Beirut to accept substantial military aid
and cooperation from the other Arab states.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 1, 1975
The Lebanese government has, in fact, been under
domestic and foreign Arab pressure to improve its mili-
tary forces in the wake of the Kafr Shuba incident.
Only one incident involving a fedayeen infiltration
attempt from southern Lebanon has been reported since
the "truce" went into effect on January 31.
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National Intelligence (Bulletin
INDOCHINA
March 1, 1975
Troop infiltration to South Vietnam continued at a
moderately heavy rate during the past month, with approx-
imately 22,000 men starting the trek south.
Since infiltration picked up in late November, some
60,000 troops have left North Vietnam.
Hanoi's infiltration effort is running substantially
higher than a year ago. During the first three months of
the current dry season, the North Vietnamese concentrated
on moving manpower to the provinces around Saigon and to
the highlands. Since mid-February, troops have been
going to the north-central coast for the first time since
last summer. As the current dry season. progresses, it
is likely that Hanoi will diminish its troop flow to the
southern areas and send an increasing number to the north-
ern provinces. Last year, Hanoi stopped sending troops
to the highlands and the provinces around. Saigon in April.
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CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh Area
Kompong
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 1, 1975
Much of the manpower has probably arrived, and other
troops in the pipeline should reach their destinations
over the next few weeks. The new troops appear to be
more than sufficient to replace Communist losses and
strengthen units in preparation for the next round of
fighting.
CAMBODIA
The capture of Tuo:L Leap by the Khmer Communists
yesterday gives them control of key terrain on the ap-
proach to the ammunition dump at Kantouk, as well as
to Pochentong airfield. It also will facilitate attacks
against government units to the north.
Units of the Cambodian army's 1st and 2nd divisions
have been deployed from southeast of Phnom Penh to rein-
force the 23rd Brigade in its efforts to retake Tuol Leap.
The situation southwest of the capital apparently
has improved somewhat, and elements of the 3rd Division
are moving forward to reinforce some positions that have
been holding out despite repeated Communist attacks and
high casualties since early this week. The division is
still maintaining` its primary defensive line.
Northeast of Phnom Penh, government forces have
abandoned Prek Luong and have'evacuated some 300 troops
to the capital. This places the Communists much closer
to Phnom Penh, and increased rocket attacks against the
capital can be expected.
Cambodian army clearing operations on Route 1 along,
the Mekong River have made little progress. A primary ob-
jective of other army units is to retake the island north
of Neak Luong that was recently lost to the Communists.
The present situation in this area, with the Commu-
nists in control of stratecric narrows along the river,
has prompted the Cambodians to postpone the next river
convoy indefinitely.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 1, 1975
Lurid accounts of a supposed "hate Indonesia cam-
paign are now appearing in bulletins circulated by the
Indonesian government news agency. The most recent
story claims that conditions on Timor are moving toward
a "sensitive and explosive stage" because of efforts to
"drag the Timorese into the communist orbit." It fur-
ther alleges that key positions in the Timorese govern-
ment have been taken over by leftists and that the Por-
tuguese governor of the province is a member of the
Communist Party. The allegations are untrue, but the
stories create an atmosphere in which Jakarta would feel
justified in taking some action against Timor.
President Suharto is obviously concerned about the
possible threat posed to Indonesian security by an un-
stable Timor, but he also i_s worried that overt moves
against the colony would open Indonesia to world condem-
nation. He apparently still hopes to avoid taking direct
military action against the colony.
Australia, which has very close relations with Indo-
nesia, has already publicly indicated its concern about
Indonesian intentions toward Timor. Portuguese officials
in Lisbon have told the US and Australian ambassadors that
Portugal does not plan any precipitous action regarding
Timor's future and intends to keep Indonesia informed
about its planning. The Portuguese currently envision
a lengthy transition government under their tutelage and
would like Australian and Indonesian financial assist-
ance during the transition period.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 1, 1975
Jakarta's concern at what the Indonesians perceive
as growing leftist influence in the Portuguese government
strengthens the hand of those in Suharto's government who
favor early military action. Last fall, the Indonesians
would have been reassured by Portuguese promises to remain
in Timor, but now they are less certain. Portuguese offi-
cials are attempting to arrange consultations on this
problem--perhaps as early as this weekend--with Indonesian
representatives in Paris.
In any event, Portuguese officials told the US em-
bassy that they would not resist an Indonesian invasion
of Timor, They also said they will begin training
Timorese to take the place of metropolitan Portuguese
in the civilian bureaucracy of Timor. The commander of
the Portuguese forces in Timor said in a press interview
in January that most of the 1,000 Portuguese troop
stationed there will be repatriated by Easter.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 1, 1975
Terrorist groups in Argentina may be planning fur-
ther abductions of US citizens, following the killing
yesterday of the US honorary consul they kidnaped on
Wednesday.
A press dispatch
on Thursday reported that. elms is ributed by the
consul's kidnapers stated. that their victim was "the
first on a long list of servants of imperialism in Ar-
gentina" who will have to "render accounts."
The government may have been able to produce one of
the four prisoners the guerrillas had demanded to be
shown. Two others reportedly were dead, and the third
had undergone such harsh treatment during interrogation
that authorities did not want to admit holding him.
Shortly after the deadline set by the guerrillas
last evening, Foreign Minister Vignes announced that the
government would not deal. with extremist groups. The
official statement came after Vignes and Interior Minis-
ter Rocamore met with President Peron to discuss the
government's position.
The consul's murder will be an acute embarrassment
to Mrs. Peron's government, which recently has been try-
ing to play down the terrorist problem, particularly in
discussions with potential foreign investors.
Yesterday, the terrorists also struck in and around
the capital. The chief justice of the Buenos Aires pro-
vincial supreme court was kidnaped and, in two separate
incidents, three policemen were machine-gunned to death,
one terrorist killed, and another wounded in a shootout.
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National Intelligence (Bulletin March 1, 1975
With only one day before the state election, the
Social Democratic government in West Berlin is taking
steps to meet the ransom demands of the anarchist group
that kidnaped the opposition's mayoral candidate, Peter
Lorenz. Local official:, are requesting allied support
to find a way for the terrorists to leave West Berlin
through the air corridors sometime tomorrow.
The kidnapers, who call themselves the June 2 Move-
ment, have demanded the release of six imprisoned an-
archists, some of whom have been closely associated
with the Baader-Meinhof gang. They have also demanded
that a Boeing 707 be made available to them and that
former West Berlin mayor Heinrich Albertz accompany
them as a hostage.
West Berlin authorities this morning met the
terrorists' first demand by releasing two radicals ar-
rested in demonstrations last November following the
assassination of the city's chief magistrate. They
plan, with cooperation from Bonn, to turn over the six
anarchists to the kidnapers later today:
Transporting the anarchists through the air cor-
ridors presents serious problems. The corridors are
restricted to use by the three Western allies who are
being pressured to provide either a military or civilian
aircraft to fly the terrorists and presumably Albertz
out of West Berlin. Local officials have so far re-
ceived no positive replies, although Paris may urge Air
France to make a plane and crew available to the ter-
rorists.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 1, 1975
SPAIN
Prime Minister Carlos Arias continues to mix prom-
ises for the gradual introduction of new freedoms into
society with stern warnings that his government will
crush any attempts to disrupt public order.
In his first televised press conference earlier this
week, Arias attempted to gave the impression that his
liberalization program is proceeding smoothly. He admit-
ted that his labor minister had resigned, but he did not
address the issue--a conflict within the cabinet over a
right-to-strike law--which led to the resignation. Arias
dismissed the rightist criticism that has caused his pro-
gram to be watered down as "pinpricks from a minority."
Despite this rhetoric, the actions of the govern-
ment indicate that Arias is responding to pressure from
the right, On Wednesday, police dispersed students in
Madrid, Bilbao, and Barcelona who were protesting the
closure of the University of Valladolid. On Thursday,
they broke up a sit-in at the Madrid cathedral by arrest-
ing about 300 students, This led to a protest by church
authorities over the unauthorized entry into the cathe-
dral by the police.
The government has also stepped up action against
labor dissidents. Even white-collar demonstrators have
been arrested, and there are indications that the gov-
ernment will bring to trial a number of labor leaders
charged with subversion. The police have moved to can-
cel a number of public meetings--even those :having prior
approval--if they suspect the meetings may become polit-
ically disturbing.
Authorities have also been cracking down on the
press. Several publications have been censored, and a
number of journalists arrested or fired from official
posts because of their candid coverage of strikes or
their criticism of the government,
In his press conference, Arias said the government
would vigorously attack subversion but support legally
acceptable protests. By its action, however, the gov-
ernment is clearly having difficulty distinguishing be-
tween subversion and legitimate dissent.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
TURKEY
March 1, 1975
Civil disturbances in Turkey's eastern provinces
are increasing the pressure on President Koruturk to
take new action to break the political deadlock that has
left the country under interim rule for more than five
months.
At the same time, the clashes between right- and
left-wing political factions have resulted in a deepen-
ing of political differences on the national level.
The conservative Justice Party has accused former prime
minister Ecevit's left-of-center Republican People's
Party of encouraging the incidents. Ecevit has hurled
similar charges at the Justice Party.
The outbreak of demonstrations and rioting in mid-
February reportedly torpedoed negotiations that were
close to achieving an agreement between these parties--
Turkey's two largest--to form a coalition government.
Both sides apparently saw the breakdown in public order
as an opportunity to make political gains.
The riots initially were sparked by rightist ef-
forts to break up demonstrations organized two weeks
ago by leftist teachers' associations to protest "rising
prices and fascism." Since then, disorders have occurred
in several towns in eastern Turkey, but these have often
been motivated as much by disagreements between rival
Muslim sects as by political differences.
Turkish security forces are concerned that they
will be unable to prevent such disorders from spreading,
especially after the universities reopen this month.
The demonstrations have been targeted against domestic
issues so far, but if they continue they may well take
on an anti-American cast as extremists seek to capitalize
on the wounding of nationalist pride caused by the cut-
off of US military aid.
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March 1, 1975
This breakdown of public order--as well as the
problems caused by the aid cutoff--has reinforced the
growing feeling that the caretaker government of Prime
Minister Irmak has outlived its usefulness. President
Koruturk probably still would prefer to turn again to
Ecevit to form a government, but he may decide that
Suleyman Demirel, the Justice Party's leader, has the
best chance of success. Demirel's four-party National-
ist Front falls just eight votes short of the 226 needed
for a majority in parliament.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 1, 1975
EC-UK
The EC Council, which meets in Brussels on March 3
and 4, hopes to complete. Britain's ten-month-long renego-
tiation of its EC membership terms. Unless unforeseen
problems arise, final agreement should be ready for the
approval of the nine EC heads of government when they
meet in Dublin on March 10 and 11.
Britain's EC partners, including France, are aware
that the British public remains sharply divided over the
question of continued membership, and they recognize
that the Community would suffer a sharp setback if Brit-
ain were to withdraw. As a result, they have tried to
accommodate London's demands and have expedited their
deliberations to permit the Wilson government to hold to
its timetable for a national referendum in late June.
On the basis
of recent conversations with leading government and.
political personalities, the US embassy in London con-
cludes that the Wilson government expects to be able to
announce that its demands have been met and thus to rec-
ommend continued membership?
The chief problems still to be resolved are the
establishment of guidelines for an EC regional develop-
ment fund and a new formula to determine the contribu-
tions of members to the Community budget. It appears
that all members are willing to accept the Commission's
proposals with some technical modifications.
The EC agricultural ministers are also meeting on
March 4 to receive the Commission's "stocktaking" report
on the Common Agricultural Policy. Although EC agricul-
tural policy has been a subject of prime concern in
Britain, London is probably prepared to live with t--hp
limited modifications already adonted_
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 1, 1975
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
The Soviets have recently made new military deliv-
eries to Yugoslavia, apparently in an effort to allay
Belgrade's suspicions of Moscow's intentions.
Since November 1973, when General Secretary Brezhnev
and President Tito met in Kiev, the Yugoslavs have been
seekin sophisticated wE~apons to modernize their defenses.
April of the Soviet-supported Cominformist organization
in Yugoslavia delayed delivery of the arms.
Last fall, Tito decided to ease up on his exploita-
tion of the subversive affair, in part presumably to
pursue a rapid modernization of his armed forces. Yugo-
slav insecurity in the wake of the Cyprus crisis was
probably a factor.
Moscow undoubtedly considers Tito's waning years
the appropriate time to enhance its influence in Yugo-
slavia, particularly with the powerful Yugoslav military.
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National Intelligence (Bulletin
March 1, 1975
Tehran reportedly has recently completed negotia-
tions, begun last year, for a long-term loan of $1 bil-
lion to France in return for part interest in a uranium-
enrichment gaseous-diffusion plant. The plant, now under
construction in France, will be operated under the auspices
of Eurodif, a French-led multinational consortium.
The agreement calls for the formation of two joint
companies. The first will own 25 percent of Eurodif
stock, of which two fifths will belong to Iran. The
other company reportedly is to study the feasibility of
constructing a second gaseous-diffusion plant at an unde-
termined location, with Iran acquiring a 20-percent in-
terest.
These arrangements will ensure a steady supply of
enriched uranium fuel for Iran's ambitious nuclear power
and desalination program. Letters of intent have already
been signed for the purchase of two large power reactors
from West Germany and two others from France. Other
nuclear power stations are in the planning stage. The
Iranians have also been exploring the possibility of ob-
taining assistance from other countries to aid in their
program.
Tehran's nuclear program apparently is directed
toward peaceful purposes. Iran is a party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and the nuclear facilities it ac-
quires will be subject to international safeguards.
Although the Shah has exhibited an interest in de-
claring the Indian Ocean area a nuclear-free zone, he
probably would not hesitate to launch a nuclear weapons
program should other countries in the area emerge as
nuclear powers.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 1, 1975
West Germany - China: West German Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt has postponed his visit to China, scheduled for
late March, on the advice of his physicians. Schmidt,
who has been slowly recovering from pneumonia and pleu-
risy, has been absent from his official duties for nearly
two weeks. The visit to Peking will be rescheduled for
later this year.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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