CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027400010050-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 50
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
February 22, 1975
N?_ 638
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 22, 1975
CONTENTS
CYPRUS-UN: Waldheim hopeful intercommunal talks can be
renewed-.--- (Page 1)
PORTUGAL: Military's role in government formalized.
(Page 3)
USSR: Soviet destroyer apparently fired toward a US ship.
(Page 7)
CAMBODIA: Officials' morale strained as military situa-
tion deteriorates. (Page 8)
THAILAND: Confidence vote likely to be close next week.
(Page 13)
ETHIOPIA: Fighting continues. (page 15)
FOR THE RECORD: (page 18)
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 22, 1975
CYPRUS-UN
UN Secretary General Waldheim reported to the Secu-
rity Council yesterday on his visits to Ankara and Athens
earlier this week. He is hopeful further international-
ization of the Cyprus issue can be avoided and the inter-
communal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots renewed.
Shortly after his return to New York on Wednesday,
Waldheim told US representatives at the UN that he had
found the Turkish government anxious to get on with the
negotiations suspended when the Greek side brought the
matter to the Security Council. The Turks turned down
the Greek suggestion that the talks be transferred from
Nicosia to New York, although they are receptive to
Vienna as an alternative site.
Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel confirmed this to
US Ambassador Macomber, noting that the Turks were de-
lighted with the prospect of shifting the talks from
Nicosia and the overshadowing presence of Archbishop
Makarios. The Turks, however, gave neither Waldheim nor
the US ambassador any indication that they were prepared
to make any new moves to break the impasse in the talks.
In his conversation with the Greek Prime Minister,
Waldheim detected a note of desperation in Karamanlis'
insistence on the need for some forward movement that
would help strengthen his hand in dealing with restive-
ness in Athens. Waldheim told US Ambassador Scali that
Karamanlis believed that, if progress were not made on
the Cyprus issue within a reasonable time, he was in
danger of losing control to right-wing elements in the
military.
According to Waldheim, Karamanlis indicated he
was willing to become personally involved in efforts
to negotiate a settlement if he could get a statement
clarifying the Turkish position, and presumably showing
some flexibility, on the crucial elements of an agree-
ment on a federal state, the number of Turkish Cypriot
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 22, 1975
zones, and the percentage of the island to be included
in the Turkish sector. The Turks have not formally pre-
sented their position on these issues, but have made it
clear that they will accept only one zone--a biregional
state--with a weak central government; in essence, a
loose confederation of two autonomous states.
Sentiment in the Security Council appears to be
running against any further broadening of the Cyprus
talks. Waldheim reportedly told Karamanlis not to ex-
pect much from the council beyond a condemnation of the
Turkish Cypriot declaration of an independent federated
state and a call for the continuation of the intercom-
munal talks. The possibility of a Security Council mis-
sion to Cyprus, probably to be made up from am the
on
nonpermanent members, is also being discussed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
PORTUGAL
February 22, 1975
The Armed Forces Movement's 200-member General As-
sembly has approved a plan to formalize the military's
role in the government's decision-making process.
Reliable sources have told US embassy officials that
a seven-point program was approved by the assembly last
Monday and is now being discussed with the military rank
and file and political party leaders. The program pro-
vides that:
--The Movement will continue to guide Portugal's
political process indefinitely.
--The recently announced economic plan cannot be
made more conservative, but only more "progressive."
--The campaign for constituent assembly elections
will not begin on March 3 unless the political par-
ties have agreed on minimum standards for their
platforms set by the Movement.
--Presidential candidates must be approved by the
Movement.
--The future constitution will be based on the pro-
gram of the Armed Forces Movement that was published
shortly after the coup last April.
--The new constitution will grant legislative powers
to the Council of State, now a rubber-stamp body that
approves all legislation. The Council will be con-
trolled by the military, and the Movement will help
select the civilians that comprise one third of the
body.
--The Movement will choose the ministers of defense
and economy after a constitutional government is
elected.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 22, 1975
Although the Movement has repeatedly insisted that
it does not intend to install a military dictatorship,
Movement officers have been impatient with the bickering
among political parties and believe that they must keep
a firm hand on Portugal's progress. They fear an inex-
perienced civilian government might destroy the changes
they have already instituted. Continuing dissension
might precipitate a return to a right-wing system and
place Movement officers in jeopardy.
The program is certain to provoke opposition from
Portugal's civilian leaders, although even moderate
politicians recognize that the Movement must have some
role in order to preserve security and to guarantee
basic civil liberties. Moderates will resist, however,
those parts of the program they regard as an overly
active intervention by the military in politics.
Both Socialist and Popular Democratic leaders were
critical of the new "legislative" powers given to the
seven-man military junta earlier this month. Since then,
Movement members, including Prime Minister Goncalves,
have retaliated by attacking those who have warned
against the possibility of a "civil war" and of divisive-
ness within the Movement. These attacks were clearly
directed at Socialist Party leader Soares and others who
have spoken out on these lines.
Yesterday, Soares abruptly canceled a trip to Bonn
for "internal reasons." Soares may have decided he needs
's
bl
y
to concentrate on his party's response to the assem
plan to formalize the Movement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 22, 1975
The commanding officer of the USS Joseph Hewes re-
ported that a Soviet Petya-class destroyer escort in the
western Indian ocean anchorage at Socotra Island appar-
ently fired toward the Hewes early on February 21. A
helicopter from the US ship was conducting surveillance
of the anchorage when the incident occurred. The heli-
copter had been directed to photograph Soviet ships and
drop sonobuoys to the east of the anchorage in an attempt
to locate any submarine that might have been present.
t e detonation was
heard by US personnel, a l oug e gun flash was not
observed. Although the guns of the Soviet ship were
observed to be trained on the Hewes, the US ship con-
tinued to patrol in the area but out of gun range.
The commander of the USS Hewes has stated that his
ship was operating in accordance with established law
of the sea agreements at the time of the incident. The
Hewes has been directed to continue surveillance opera-
tions in the Socotra area, but not to take any action
that could be construed by Soviet units as harassing,
threatening, or provocative.
Moscow will probably be reluctant to make a cause
celebre of this incident. If the US publicizes it or
protests it privately, however, the Soviets will be con-
strained to offer their own version of events, probably
accusing the US of violating the 1972 Soviet-US Incidents
at Sea Agreement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 22, 1975
CAMBODIA
As the military situation has deteriorated in recent
months, there has been a corresponding rise in the level
of frustration, pessimism, and recrimination among senior
government officials. This trend has been accelerated
by the recent military setbacks along the Mekong which
have diminished hopes for an early lessening of Phnom
Penh's supply dilemma. It is impossible to ascertain the
breaking point for the government's morale and internal
cohesion, but it is fairly clear that the strains on the
Cambodian political fabric have never been greater.
During the course of the Cambodian conflict, the
steadying influence of the US mission has been enough to
ensure a basic political stability, and American support
for Lon Nol will continue to discourage any action against
the government by disgruntled political and military ele-
ments. But as the pressures build on Phnom Penh, the
chances increase for the eruption of an essentially un-
predictable and uncontrollable political crisis that
would make it difficult if not impossible for the govern-
ment to continue the war.
President Lon Nol, who often has taken an unduly
optimistic view of his government's position, now appears
to be more aware of the gravity of the present situation.
In a meeting with Ambassador Dean and Admiral Gayler last
week, Lon Nol admitted that malaise exists in official
and unofficial circles and stressed the need to find an
"honorable" solution to the war.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 22, 1975
Earlier this month, the secretary of the ocio-
Republican Party--the President's own political base--
arranged a meeting with Ambassador Dean to inquire
whether Lon Nol's "withdrawal" would increase the chances
for a settlement.
Most of this recrimination being directed against
the President is simply the result of frustration over
the inability to discover any feasible route leading to
negotiations and a compromise settlement. Certainly
there is no indication that the Communists are prepared
to back away very much from their hard.line .on a settle-
ment or that the voluntary or forced departure of Lon
Nol would somehow open the way to a compromise solution.
At this point, the Khmer Communists are confident that
time is on their side and appear to be banking on either
total military victory or a government surrender under
the guise of a negotiated settlement.
In the face of this seemingly intractable Communist
position, there nonetheless appears to be a growing con-
viction in Phnom Penh that some way must be found to
break the negotiations impasse before the government's
military position crumbles altogether. Thus, the Khmer
Communist tactic of portraying Lon Nol and some other
senior leaders as obstacles to peace could become in-
creasingly effective and sentiment for Lon Nol's depar-
ture more widespread and direct.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 22, 1975
The odds are improving that Democrat Party leader
Seni Pramot will win a vote of confidence when he pro-
poses a government to the National Assembly next Thurs-
day.
The vote next week, nevertheless, promises to be close.
Seni won a narrow victory in the assembly's selection of
a prime minister - designate. If the voting on his pro-
posed cabinet is public rather than by secret ballot,
which is likely, Seni's chances of winning the necessary
majority are good. If, however, the conservatives--
'succeed in having the vote
conducted by secret ballot, all bets are off. The parlia-
mentarians have already proven at least once in this
brief session that they are vulnerable to vote-bu in
when the cannot be held to account.
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I I
National Intelligence Bulletin
ETHIOPIA
February 22, 1975
Government forces yesterday used artillery, small
arms, and aircraft to attack a village near Asmara sus-
pected of being held by Eritrean insurgents. The govern-
ment artillery fire came from a base established yester-
day adjacent to a tract of the US communications facility
outside of Asmara. All US personnel have been evacuated
from this site to the US consulate compound. Heavy fight-
ing was also reported on Friday near a town about 50 miles
northwest of Asmara, as well as in the vicinity of the
Red Sea port of Massawa.
An Ethiopian officer told the US .defense attache
this week that he is still confident the military can
defeat the insurgents, but that he is concerned by the
continuing indiscipline in the armed forces, the defec-
tions in the air force and navy, and the high cost of
the war. The government reportedly has ordered about 90
officers and enlisted men to Addis Ababa to face disci-
plinary action for attacks on Eritrean civilians.
The US embassy believes that the ruling military
council's propaganda, media manipulation, and sponsorship
of national unity demonstrations have created a psycho-
logical climate favorable to the council's no-compromise
policy on Eritrea. The council's domestic image also
seems to have improved somewhat. This support may lessen,
however, as the cost of the war becomes more apparent to
the country's educated urban population.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 22, 1975
Colombia-Cuba: Colombia announced yesterday that
it will resume diplomatic relations with Cuba. This
followed by one day President Lopez' announcement that
he would make an official visit to the US later this
year. Lopez' "pluralistic" foreign policy has been eas-
ing Bogota toward relations with Havana since his in-
auguration last August. When the Organization of Amer-
ican States failed to lift the Cuba sanctions in Novem-
ber, Lopez turned to unilateral action. Colombia is the
ninth OAS member to re-establish ties with Cuba; other
countries, such as Ecuador, may follow suit.
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