CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027400010030-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: February 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
flz
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
February 10, 1975
N2 638
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 10, 1975
SOUTH VIETNAM: Tet expected to bring only a moderate
increase in military activity. (Page 3)
SOUTH KOREA: President Pak certain to win referendum
this week. (Page 6)
PAKISTAN: Assassination of key Bhutto aide may further
strain relations with Afghanistan. (Page 8)
PERU: Velasco's support shaken as result of last week's
violence. (Page 9)
SPAIN-MOROCCO: Madrid sends military reinforcements to
Ceuta and Melilla. (Page 10)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 11)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
February 10, 1975
With the approach of the South Vietnamese Lunar New
Year, Teti on February 11, all indications point to some
step-up in Communist shellings and terrorist attacks, but
there is no reliable evidence that anything heavier is
in store. Saigon's military forces throughout the coun-
try are on full alert, and government holiday celebra-
tions will be limited to one day instead of the usual
three. Such preparations
point to a moderate eve of military activity in
the various military regions.
Countrywide by military region, the following mili-
tary activity appears likely;
--In Military Region 1, local skirmishing is ex-
pected to continue in varying degrees of intensity.
Some government commanders see the current localized
activity, however, as the prelude to a full-fledged
main force offensive sometime this spring.
--In Military Region 2, reports from the principal
trouble spots--Binh Dinh Province on the coast,-and
th
e central highland provinces of Kontum and Plei-
ku--indicate little action is expected.
--In Military Region 3, stepped-up action is ex-
pected in the provinces around Saigon, especially
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1975
--In Military Region 4, Communist forces reportedly
have celebrated the holiday early and will conduct
shellings and terrorist attacks against government
outposts, some. district and provincial towns, and
highways and canals. Most government commanders
feel, however, that recent heavy casualties and low
morale among Viet Cong forces in the delta will limit
both the intensit and effectiveness of their Tet
actions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1975
President Pak will win the February 12 referendum,
which is designed to validate his leadership under the
authoritarian 1972 constitution. The evidence of the
past two weeks indicates careful government preparation
to ensure a solid national majority for him; no one in
South Korea expects otherwise.
In this situation, the question is why Pak chose to
hold the referendum in the first place. What does he
hope to gain by what is generally seen by opponents and
outsiders as little more than a political exercise?
Pak apparently sees the referendum as a useful tac-
tic in his continuing effort to suppress domestic dissent.
He hopes to:
--Put his opponents on the defensive--they had
been planning a major antigovernment campaign
this spring.
--Lay the public relations groundwork for new
suppressive measures if the opposition campaign
materializes.
--Demonstrate to audiences at home and abroad--
particularly in the US Congress--that, however
vocal, his opposition has relatively little sup-
port nationally.
--Reassert, in the broadest sense, the legitimacy
of his government.
Despite the certainty of victory, Pak faces a minor
dilemma in pursuing his referendum strategy: what should
the margin of victory be? A 92-percent majority on the
pattern of the vote on his 1972 constitution would be
unbelievable--even to his supporters--and hence counter-
productive in public relations terms. It would not be
credible as a basis for a new crackdown by the regime.
A 55- or 60-percent majority, on the other hand, would
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 10, 1975
undercut the government's argument that the dissent of
the past two years has been the work of malcontents and
Communist dupes. Under the circumstances, it might be
seen as a moral victory for the opposition.
. A basic defect of Pak's referendum process, of
course, is that it can resolve none of his political
headaches. But Pak is undoubtedly aware of this and
may be shooting for nothing more than a breathing space--
a few months of public attention to what he plans to do
with his new mandate, and diminished interest in the com-
plaints of his opponents.
There are reports, for example, that Pak will follow
up the referendum with major changes in the structure of
the government party as well as a cabinet reshuffle--
including perhaps the replacement of Prime Minister Kim
Chong-pil. There are also rumors of conciliatory ges-
tures to the opposition. in the end, therefore, what
appears to be a meaningless political exercise might
well help achieve at least some of the purposes for which
it has been designed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1975
The assassination on Saturday of a high Pakistani
official in the politically sensitive North West Frontier
Province has forced Prime Minister Bhutto to cancel a
stop in Romania following a visit to the US.
The incident, in which Home Minister Sherpao was
killed, poses no direct threat to Bhutto's personal posi-
tion, but Pakistan's already strained relations with
Afghanistan may become further embittered. In recent
months, Pakistani authorities have accused the opposition
National Awami Party and neighboring Afghanistan
of complicity in a number of bombings in Pakistan, in-
cluding an attempt late last year on Sherpao's life.
Both the NAP and the Afghans denied the charges.
No information is available yet on who was respon-
sible for the bomb that killed Sherpao. The government
has arrested at least 60 opposition leaders, including
National Awami Party (NAP) chief Wali Khan and all of
his top aides. Bhutto's decision to crack down hard on
the NAP--the strongest party in the province--will have
a direct impact on relations with Afghanistan. Kabul
has long supported the NAP because of 'the ethnic ties
between Afghans and most of the people in the Pakistani
province. The Prime Minister apparently concluded that
the assassination is a direct challenge that demanded
an immediate show of strength against his opponents.
Bhutto periodically has arrested NAP workers in the past,
but he has stopped short of trying completely to sup-
press the party.
Bhutto can also be expected to act promptly to en-
sure his continuing control over the shaky coalition that
controls the provincial government. While there is no
immediate danger that the government led by Bhutto's
party will collapse, the Prime Minister will be hard
pressed to find. another strong and reliable lieutenant
to replace Sherpao.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10? 1.975
The repercussions of last week's violence in Lima
that left dozens dead and extensive property damage are
beginning to be felt in the top echelons of President
Velascols military government. There are no signs that
Velasco?s position has been critically weakened, but
there are indications that his support has been shaken.
Although the military has been unable during the
past six years to build a popular base of support, it
has taken pride in its ability to run the country ef'
fectively and without bloodshed. in the wake of last
week's events, howevero what little support the mili-
tary has had will, be jeopardized. Both moderate and
radical officers are sensitive to this state of affairs,
If it appears Velascoas continuation in power will serve
only to further alienate civilian elements,, a move to re-
place him with another general is likely to pick up steam,,
The chances for a successful move along these lines
are increased as a result of recent events. Much de-
pends on what the newly installed Prime Minister, Gen
eral Morales Bermudez decides to do; his intentions
remain unclear.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1975
Spain's move over the weekend in sending naval and
marine reinforcements to its enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla
on Morocco's Mediterranean coast was evidently designed
to make clear Madrid's rejection of Moroccan claims to
the territories.
Late last month, Rabat made a formal demarche to
the UN Committee on Decolonization requesting'an exami-
nation of the status of the Spanish enclaves. Moroccan
Foreign Minister Laraki followed this with a call for the
return of the two enclaves, as well as Spanish Sahara.
The Moroccan move is seen as an effort by King Hassan to
enhance his domestic prestige, now that interest in the
Spanish Sahara question is diminishing, following refer-
ral of that issue to the International Court of Justice.
The Moroccan action on the enclaves provoked sur-
prise, alarm, and near-unanimous indignation in Spain.
Spanish military contacts of the US defense attaches in
Madrid immediately stressed that, although Madrid in-
tends to withdraw from the Sahara, it will never with-
draw from the enclaves.
Spanish officials are aware of their vulnerability
on the Ceuta and Melilla issue in the UN because of the
strong influence exerted in that forum by the third
world nations, which support decolonization. The US em-
bassy in Madrid believes that if Spain loses in the UN
on this issue, it will ignore any subsequent resolution
calling for withdrawal from the enclaves.
The enclaves issue is also likely to affect Madrid's
relations with the US. Spain may raise this issue with
the US in the negotiations that resume today in Madrid
over renewal of US base rights in Spain. Spanish offi-
cials reacted negatively to news reports of US arms sales
to Morocco during the Spanish-Moroccan dispute over the
Sahara, and this bitterness may intensify.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1975
USSR: The two Soviet cosmonauts in the Soyuz 17
space ferry were brought back to earth successfully yes-
terday after completing 30 days in space, 28 of them in
an orbiting space station. This is the third successful
docking of a Soyuz spacecraft and a Salyut space station.
According to the Tass announcement, the space ferry landed
in a designated area in Kazakhstan.
Cyprus: Cyprus remained quiet over the weekend,
despite several indications on Friday that a Turkish
military operation might be imminent. The US defense
attache reports that the chances of an early Turkish
military initiative have dimmed.
Venezuela: President Perez is planning to meet with
the five Central American presidents following his trip
to Mexico late next month. Neither the agenda nor the
exact timing has been worked out, but a Costa Rican For-
eign Ministry announcement last week said that Perez will
stay for three days to meet with the region's leaders.
This will be the second meeting in little more than three
months, demonstrating the Central Americans' interest in
clarifying the terms of recent Venezuelan aid and Perez'
interest in obtaining their support on a number of issues
that will come before a Latin American summit meeting in
March and an OAS meeting in April,
(continued)
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 10, 1975
Argentina: President Peron has given the go-ahead
to the army to move forcefully against left-wing guerril-
las that have become increasingly active in recent weeks,
according to press reports. The first target area will
be the northwest province of Tucuman, where the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP) is active. The army heretofore
has resisted efforts to have it assume primary responsi-
bility for combating guerrillas. Police ineffective-
ness in this task and numerous assassinations of army
officers by guerrillas, however, apparently have con-
vinced the army that it must resume the role. It is
uncertain whether the army will be able to achieve quick
success in its operations against the ERP; in the past
this group has successfully eluded army troops trying
to smash its organization.
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