CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027400010028-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 8, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National 1 ntel 1 igence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
February 8, 1975
N?_ 638
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National Intelligence Builetir~-
February 8, 1975
CONTENTS
TURKEY-CYPRUS: Indications that Turkish forces are pre-
paring or new military operations; negotiations continue.
(Page 1)
BRAZIL: Government officials continue to stress ecpnomic
ach evements, despite prospect Qf slower growth this year.
(Page 6 )
CHILE-BOLIVIA: Meeting between Pinacret and Banter could
mean restoration of full diplomatic relations. (Page 9)
LATIN AMERICA: Venezuela has been criticized privately
by some Latin American governments for its recent role
in regional affairs. (Page 10)
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FOR THE RECORD: (Page 18)
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National Intelligence Bulle?~ir~ February s, 1975
Turk-
ish forces on Cyp~ are re ar~.n o ~n~ ~a e new mili-
ar o erat~.ons o
This morna.ng, a s~, ua io
remains quiet, an no new cease-fire violations have been
reported?
the U8 defense attac~.~ in Nicosia reit-
erated on Fri ay that today, or Sunday at the latest,
the Turks will carry out the previously reported plan
to clear the Greek National Guard out of several posi-
tions around Nicosia and to the west as far as Lefka near
Morphou ~aym Military moves in the eastern portion of
Cyprus, as well as the plan concerning the objectives in
the west, suggest the Turks maybe moving into position
to seal off the northern half of the island presently
:held by Turkish forces9
An embassy official..
reported that i.n the morning, up to 1,000 Turkish com-
mando troops In battle gear were waitin for trans ort
at two locations near IC renia~
T'he defense attach a so
stated that Turkish reconnaissance aircraft were active
west of Nicosia yesterdayo
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National Intelligence Bulletin
N`ebruary 8 , l9 75
On the political front, a Bess ominous note was
sounded yesterday when Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides
and Turkish Cypriot. leader Denk~ash heed their eighth
session on substantive polit~ca~ negotiations and agreed
to meet again on Monday-
There was still no movemen~ on the airport issue
i.n the meetingo Clerides again r?ejected Denlctash's in-
sistence that the airport be managed b~ representatives
of the guarantor powers--the UI{; Greece and Turkey.
When Denktash reiterated his ofr'er to a'~.low some 5,000
Greek Cypriot refugees to return to areas behind Turk-
i..sh lines near Athienou in the south, Clerides again
dismissed the offer as insigni.f~cant in view of the
180-,000 Greek Cypriot refugees~n the Greek Cypriot zone.
Denktash read a statement at the meet~.ng reaffirm-
ing the Turkish si.de's desire t2'i3t the talks continue,
Clerides took note of Denktash' statement earlier in
the week, however, in which he Threatened to declare
an independent Turkish Cypriot ~tate~ Clerides warned
that the talks would be discontyr~ued if this were to
occur. Denktash admitted that had it not been for "out-
side intervention" he would now be president of an in-
dependent Turkish Cypriot repubi3c of CY~prusm
At the meeting, C1er~i.des arnoun~:ed that he would
present a Greek Cypriot position paper un all issues at
Monday's session., The position paper is likely to spell
out Greek Cypriot terms for ache establishment of a multi-
regional federation wish a strong centra~. government
Should Turkish forces initiate a milita~.?y :operation over
the weekend, however, the Greek Cypriot. side may well
abandon the tanks and turn to air;~uther f arum such as the
UN Security CounciYz
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 8, 19'75
The prospect of substantially lower economic grow t'h
this year--perhaps as low as half of last year's 10-
percent rate--is not dampening the optimism publicly pro-
fessed by government officials. They continue to stress
the very real progress that the country has made and will
continue to make. Top official s, from President Geisel
down, are, however, adjusting their rhetoric in a way that
reflects both recognition of economic challenges and pre-
occupation with current or potential problems,
In his year-end speech, President Gesel stressed
Brazil's continuing ability to meet the objectives of
its development goals. He painted out the high rate of
employment, prospects for good harvests, and ongoing
industrial expansion. Such economic problems as Brazil
has, he said, are largely attributable to outside forces
and can be dealt with.
Finance Minister Simonsen and other top economic
planners have recently been emphasizing how much more
growth Brazil will experience this year than most of the
industrialized nations, whose economies may very well
stagnate or grow only marginally Top officials also
stress that inflation, which went up sharply during much
of last year, has again been brought under control. This
encouraging message is designed for the potential over-
seas investor, notably in the Middle East, as well as for
domestic audiences whose anxiety over economic matters
has been increasing.
Government spokesmen have also sought to capitalize
on the discovery late last year of significant oil de-
posits off the Rio coast. They have tried to dispel the
gloom occasioned by Inflation and balance-of-payments
problems by talking up--rather premature?y--the prospects
for e-arty self-sufficiency in petroleum.
Notwithstanding this outward optimism, it is not
difficult to discern a realization among top officials
that a lowering of economic expectations is unavoidable.
No longer do economic planners confident.?Ay predict a
yearly growth rate of 10 percent--to whi.:h Brazil had
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 8, 1975
become accustomed--or for that matter, any specific fig-
ure. In private, they speak of growth on the order of 5
or 6 percent, still impressive by comparison with other
nations, but nonetheless disappointing for Brazil.
The administration has set no specific target for
the reduction of inflation in the coming year, a prac-
tice that had become routine under the previous adminis-
tration. Finally, in recognition of the serious balance-
of-payments problem, the government is attempting to
limit this year's imports to the level of last year, a
move certain to have an inhibiting effect on growth.
Since the revolution bases its claim to power largely
on its ability to deliver on economic promises, the gov-
ernment is apt to be particularly sensitive to any eco-
nomic setback, especially if there is any possibility
of a prolonged, serious downturn. The Geisel administra-
tion has incorporated in its list of economic priorities
for 1975 a number of items--featured rather prominently--
that reflect increased attention to social, rather than
strictly growth-related, matters.
Specifically, the government has acknowledged the
need to foster social development and more equitable dis-
tribution of national income. A7oreover, Geisel has set
limits on the amount of price increase permissible this
year on goods and services provided by the public sector,
and he is allowing substantial wage increases.
These moves appear to be in response to last fall's
opposition electoral victories, generally seen as a mass
protest against worsening economic conditions. The gov-
ernment's action may signal a realization that, if the
economy no longer booms as it once did, the revolution's
appeal for support must be broadened. If this is indeed
the case, it appears that lowered economic growth pros-
pects will have contributed, at least somewhat. to greater
government responsiveness to the populace.
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Nat101'lal Iri#@IllgenCe BUII@tltl February 8, 19.75
CHILE-BOLIVIA
Chilean President Pinochet and Bolivian President
Banzer will meet today. An end to the 13-year break in
full diplomatic relations between the two nations could
be in the offing.
The meeting, at Chile's initiative, will be the sec-
ond between Pinochet and Banzer in less than a year: It
will be held near the Bolivian town of Charana, which is
an the Arica - La Paz rail line.
Chilean fear of aggression by Peru is largely respon-
sible for Santiago's efforts to eliminate points of fric-
tion with Bolivia. Recent changes in the fees charged to
La Paz for port services at Arica have reduced them below
the break-even point. Pinochet may now be. prepared to
invite Bolivia to share in control of the Chilean leg of
the Arica - La Paz rail line ar announce other moves de-
signed to facilitate Bolivian export:-import trade through
Arica. In any event, Banzer's statement this week that
a solution to his country"s landloek,ed situation is no
longer a precondition for renewing diplomatic ties sets
a propitious atmosphere for the talks.
Bolivia`s chances- of regaining its last seacoast
remain as remote as ever, but La Paz could reap further
political and economic benefits from the tensions between
Chile and Peru.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
LATIN AMERICA
February 8, 19'75
Some Latin American governments are privately ac-
cusing Venezuela of "wielding a big stick" in inter-
American affairs. This criticism centers on their be-
lief that Venezuela was instrumental in the cancellation
of the foreign ministers' conference s-cheduled to be
held next month in .Buenos Aires..
The Argentines apparently have second thoughts about
having called off the meeting. Earlier this week, For-
eign Ministry officials expressed their regret to the
US ambassador, saying that "certain nouveau riche coun-
tries" had forced indefinite postponement by refusing
to attend on grounds of opposition to the US Trade Reform
Act. President Peron's government cannot afford to
jeopardize a pending multi-million petroleum credit from
Venezuela, but resentment over the postponement could
focus on Foreign Minister Vignes and force him out of
the cabinet.
In Uruguay, a leading Montevideo newspaper has
attacked Venezuela for sending delegates to a US con-
ference on bilateral relations, after having called for
hemispheric solidari-ty in opposing Washington.
Government spokesmen in Nicaragua, Guyana, and
Trinidad have recently confessed their reluctance to
support Venezuela's claim to leadership in regional af-
fairs. Their geographic proximity to Venezuela and
their recognition of the acute need for petroleum through-
out the hemisphere, however, will preclude open expres-
sions of hostility.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 8 r 1975
Par~ugal: Extreme leftist demonstrators marched
unmolested through Lisbon last night, defying a govern-
ment ban on public rallies. The Communist Party told
the populace not to take part in the demonstration so
as not to provoke a rightist reaction. Troops stood
ready in nearby barracks, and there were no reports of
violence. Mast of the demonstrators chanted slogans
about unemployment and low wages-, the original targets
of the march. Some demonstrators also protested the
presence in Lisbon of NATO forces on shore leave, follow-
ing a week of anti-submarine exercises off the Portuguese
coast; they carried "out with NATO" and "death to capital-
ism" banners.
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Plational Intelligence Bulletin February 8, 1975
USSR-Cuba: The Soviet.TJnion maintained a moderate.
level of arms deliveries to Cuba during 1974, and no new
weapons svstems are known to have been introduced.
level of deliveries an t e ypes o equa.pmen Jsupplied
suggest the Soviets are s mm'tted onl to a mini-
mum replacement program
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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