CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027400010004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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flit
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
January 25, 1975
N2 638
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 25, 1975
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 1)
UK-CSCE: British now advocating speed and compromise
in Geneva. (Page 2)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Situation report. (page 9)
BURMA: Army and police still being used to prevent fur
t erer'-vio1ence. (Page 13)
ARGENTINA: Government-sponsored, right-wing group at-
tacks newspaper plant in Cordoba. (Page 14)
ISRAEL: Tourism down in 1974, Tel Aviv expects improve-
ment this year. (Page 16)
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CAMBODIA
January 25, 1975
A second Mekong River convoy began the 60-mile run
upriver to Phnom Penh today.
The convoy reportedly consists of two tankers, two
ammunition barges, and a large Cambodian navy escort;
two coastal steamers carrying rice refused to depart at
the last moment. The size and nature of the convoy will
make it more vulnerable to Communist shellings. It will,
however, be well protected by shield barges and will
again be provided'air cover. Seven Cambodian river pi-
lots should be aboard the convoy.
The security situation along the lower Mekong re-
mains unchanged. Government troops still hold several
recently established beachheads south of Neak Luong--
including one at a river narrows. Insurgent forces, how-
ever, hold most of the riverbanks along the lower reaches
of the river, and they are keeping heavy pressure on gov-
ernment riverside positions north of Neak Luong. They
directed heavy fire against navy vessels trying to pro-
vide support to these positions late on January 23.
Combat in the Phnom Penh area has picked up consid-
erably in the past few days,
Elements of the Cambodian army's 3rd Division ave rougnr-
several sharp engagements with insurgent units near Route
4 west of Phnom Penh and the army's 7th Division on the
city's northwestern defenses is again under heavy pres-
sure. The high command has withdrawn several units from
the northwestern sector and the 7th Division will remain
hard pressed unless it is again reinforced.
Pocheritong airport continues to be the target of
sporadic rocket attacks and a few civilian airlines have
curtailed flights The airport remains open,
Shellings against the mi i a ue e-
pot on Route north of the city have destroyed some
stocks.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
UK-CSCE
January 25, 1975
The British, who have been reluctant to offer con-
cessions to the East at the European security conference
in Geneva, now advocate compromise. They have suggested
that the pace of work be accelerated in order to wind up
the conference.
During recent discussions among the EC Nine, the
British took the lead in suggesting that the current,
negotiating stage of the security conference end around
Easter. Some of the Nine, particularly the West Germans,
opposed setting a specific date.
The British suggestion would be welcomed in Moscow.
The Soviets want the negotiations to be over this spring,
so that a summit finale to the conference can be held
this summer. Delegates from EC countries, not unnatu-
rally, have speculated that the British may be seeking
to lay the groundwork for a successful visit by Prime
Minister Wilson to Moscow next month.
The British have also suggested that the NATO Allies
drop their proposal--until now most strongly advocated
by the UK itself--that both sides agree to provide, as a
"confidence-building measure," advance notice of major
military movements. The Soviets and most of their allies
have strongly opposed providing notification on movements,
and the British are now suggesting that the Allies, by
conceding on this issue, might obtain a Soviet concession
on the separate issue of providing advance notification
of military maneuvers.
The British have also suggested that the West offer
a compromise on the issue of follow-on machinery to the
conference. The West has supported a Danish proposal
that calls for senior officials to meet three years after
the conference ends. These officials would assess the
results of the conference and the general state of rela-
tions among the participating states and decide whether
further meetings might be needed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 25, 1975
In contrast, the Soviets support a Czechoslovak pro-
posal to create a consultative committee that would have
a broad mandate to "promote" security and cooperation in
Europe. The committee would have a permanent secretariat,
affording the Soviets an opportunity to influence West
European developments. The British are suggesting that
senior officials meet regularly to review the general
East-West situation, with the first such meeting taking
place one year after the security conference ends.
Foreign Secretary Callaghan has said he wishes to
discuss the security conference when he meets with Sec-
retary Kissinger next week. He Will probably solicit US
views on the British proposals.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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0 aUANGHAM
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 25, 1975
Combat activity during the past week consisted pri-
marily of widespread, small-scale harassing incidents
designed to maintain military pressure on the government.
The Communists launched few significant attacks, while
South Vietnamese forces continued their efforts to retake
areas lost in the early stages of the Communists' current
campaign.
The Communists are continuing terrorist operations
in the Saigon area and have been pressuring Tay Ninh by
firing rockets into the town. The attacks have resulted
in a significant shift in the population. Large numbers
of the Cao Dai faithful have moved closer to the Holy
See, which has, as yet, not been attacked. Others have
fled to the Saigon area.
In the delta, Communist military activity has been
concentrated in northern Kien Tuong Province, near the
Cambodian border. Elements of the North Vietnamese army's
5th Division overran a government village on January 22
from which most of the people had fled long before. The
defending South Vietnamese forces reportedly withdrew
after suffering light casualties. Communist forces are
expected to continue their operations in this area, and
they may try to increase pressure on Moc Hoa, the pro-
vincial capital.
Communist activity in central Vietnam has remained
at a low level during the past week.
The South Vietnamese armed forces have made some
gains in the northern provinces. In Thua Thien Province,
sweep operations around Bong Mountain, after its capture,
uncovered several Communist grave sites and numerous
munitions caches. Communist reactions since the loss of
the mountain have been limited to sporadic attacks by
fire.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 25, 1975
The South Vietnamese again have had some success
against the Communists in Quang Nam Province. In a well-
planned operation that began on January 19, government
forces inflicted substantial casualties while suffering
few themselves.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 25, 1975
The Ne Win government is still relying on army and
police action to prevent any further outbreaks of vio-
lence in Rangoon similar to the antigovernment demonstra-
tions last month. The Burmese capital remains under
martial law, and the leadership reportedly has decided
to maintain army rule indefinitely until a new special
police force for riot control can be set up. The regime
is also developing a citizen informant network to keep
an eye on potential troublemakers.
These plans will keep the harsher aspects of Presi-
dent Ne Win's rule in full public view. The government
has released some of the students who were detained last
month. Unless it also gives the appearance of dealing
with the country's severe economic problems, however, it
runs the risk of strengthening the strong antigovernment
sentiment among the populace.
Despite speculation that Ne Win might find scape-
goats within the administration to blame for the riots,
no government shakeup has been announced. The leader-
ship seems to be trying to put its performance in the
best.possible light by claiming that the Burmese Commu-
d
ers.
nists were responsible for instigating the disor
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 25, 1975
ARGENTINA
The destruction by government-sponsored, right-
wing terrorists of a plant housing one of Argentina's
oldest newspapers is certain to compound President
Peron's difficulties in dealing with the opposition
parties.
The attack against a moderate newspaper in the in-
terior city of Cordoba was carried out by the extreme
right-wing terrorist Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance,
apparently because of the paper's recent criticism of
the government-appointed administrator of Cordoba
Province, retired General Raul Lacabanne. Lacabanne
has waged a harsh campaign against leftists in Cordoba
since he assumed the post last September, and he prob-
ably has close connections with the illegal operations
of the terrorist squads.
In addition, Lacabanne is a close collaborator of
the powerful chief of the presidential secretariat, Jose
Lopez Rega, who has also had a major hand in directing
right-wing paramilitary operations. Lopez Rega, who
has been conducting government business while Mrs. Peron
is resting outside of Buenos Aires, is in a vital posi-
tion to oversee security matters and may have given the
orders for the Cordoba operation.
Opposition political parties have become, increas-
ingly vocal in opposing Lopez Rega's pre-eminent role,
official complicity in right-wing terrorism, and
Peronist strong-arm tactics in the provinces. They
fear that the government might attempt to intimidate
them in similar fashion.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 25, 1975
Tel Aviv's expectations of a good year in 1974 for
tourism--a major foreign currency earner--failed to
materialize. The number of tourists who went to Israel
totaled 624,000 last year, down 6 percent from the level
in 1973 and off 14 percent from the peak in 1972. In-
come from tourism dropped more sharply. Earnings are
likely to be no more than $200 million, some 30 percent
-lower than government projections.
The picture could improve in 1975. Tel Aviv ex-
pects a major increase in Christian pilgrams to Jeru-
salem for the Holy Year observance in 1975. The recent
43-percent devaluation-of the Israeli pound also may
attract cash-short West Europeans and American travelers,
despite tensions in the Middle East and terrorist acts.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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