CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027300010048-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: January 16, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
N2 654
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 16, 1975
USSR: Soviets appear to be playing down implications
for detente of their rejection of the US-Soviet trade
agreement. (Page 1)
EGYPT: Sadat links UN presence in the Sinai to Israeli
withdrawals on all fronts. (Page 4)
TURKEY-GREECE: Ankara's military alert winding down.
(Page 5)
PORTUGAL-ANGOLA: Accord signed giving Angola transi-
tional government now and independence in November.
(Page 6)
BOLIVIA: Postponement of economic austerity measures
apparently result of mine workers' strike. (Page 8)
CAMBODIA: Military situation. (Page 11)
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 16, 1975
Thus far, the Soviets seem to be playing down the
broader implications for detente of their rejection of
the US-Soviet trade agreement.
Premier Kosygin, in the course of a banquet speech
on January 14 honoring Australian Prime Minister Whit-
lam, made repeated references to the necessity of con-
tinuing detente. Kosygin, the first Soviet leader to
speak on foreign policy issues since Moscow's note to
the US last Friday, specifically reiterated the Soviet
goal of making detente "irreversible." His evident ef-
fort to indicate, without mentioning the US, that detente
is still on the track will be reinforced for the Soviet
public by an otherwise routine press announcement Wed-
nesday regarding the resumption of SALT.
Moscow informed its domestic audience of Secretary
Kissinger's statement in a Tass summary broadcast 12
hours after the announcement. The Tass summary, carried
in izyestia on January 15, said the Secretary noted the
Soviet government's message that it does not intend to
accept a trade status that is discriminatory and subject
to political conditions, and accordingly would not bring
into force the 1972 trade agreement. The report concluded
with the Secretary's assurance that the administration
would continue to pursue all avenues, including legisla-
tion, to promote mutually beneficial trade relations.
A possible sign that the leadership has hope of an
eventual reversal of its fortunes on the trade issue
was provided by a Soviet commentator on Tuesday when he
laid the blame for the trade impasse on an anti-detente
faction in the outgoing Congress, He said that many of
this faction remain in the new Congress, but he also
noted that.,the new Congress would have a different com-
plexion. Moscow may hope that its tough line will con-
vince Congress to reconsider the US action,
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 1.6, 1975
The decision not to accept the conditions of the
US trade and Export-Import Bank bills and the events
that led up to it were a sharp setback to a major element
of Brezhnev's detente policy and may ultimately affect
his basic political position He has also suffered a
recent setback in his consumer program and an embarrass-
ing postponement of his visit to Egypt,
There is no evidence of a crisis atmosphere within
the leadership or signs of a concerted challenge to
Brezhnev's position, He faces the problem, however, of
keeping the combination of policy setbacks
from leading to an erosion of his authority. To
prevent this, he must resume an active work schedule
and give new impetus to domestic and foreign policies.
The pressures to take an active role will increase as
politicking for next year's party congress picks up.
The Soviet rejection of the agreements should not
substantially affect the volume of US-Soviet trade in
1975, Two-way trade was approximately $1 billion in
1974--down from a high of $104 billion in 1973, when
the USSR imported large quantities of grain. Trade in
1975 is expected to be above the 1974 level.
Exports of US capital goods to the USSR in 1975
.will be largely determined by Soviet orders placed in
1972-1973, when Export-Import Bank credits were available.
Three fourths of the roughly $1. billion in US orders
backed by Export-Import Bank financing have yet to be
exported. US exports also will be boosted by deliveries
of some $350 million in grain previously ordered by the
USSR.
The lack of' Export-Import Bank financing could,
however, reduce substantially the volume of future con-
tracts placed in the US. Western Europe and Japan, which
continue to grant low-interest credits, will be the
principal beneficiaries.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 16, 1975
The Soviets may be able to obtain commercial loans
from US banks to cover US exports of equipment as long
as the USSR is willing to pay market interest rates and
guarantee the loans. Furthermore, the USSR currently
enjoys a much stronger financial position than at any
time in its history and could keep buying from the US
on a cash basis. The prospects of major cooperative
projects such as the development of Yakutsk natural gas
will be dimmed considerably, however, without Export-
Import Bank funds.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 16, 1975
President Sadat, in a meeting on Tuesday with a
group of French legislators, :Linked the continued pres-
ence of the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai Peninsula
to further Israeli withdrawals on all Arab fronts, but
he stopped short of imposing conditions for the exten-
sion of the UN Sinai mandate, which expires on April 24.
According to an authoritative Cairo news service
account of the meeting, Sadat said, in a reference to
renewal of the mandate, that Israel "must withdraw a
further distance on the three fronts"--Sinai, the Golan
Heights, and the West Bank. He did not explicitly demand,
however, further pullbacks on all fronts before the sta-
tus of UN forces in the Sinai comes up for review. He
noted only that Egypt would decide the mandate issue
"in the light of the situation and of Israel's behavior."
Sadat probably intended by his remarks to press for
quick progress on a second-stage Sinai withdrawal by hint-
ing he will not renew the UN mandate unless another with-
drawal agreement has been concluded by late April. He
may in fact intend to let the mandate lapse if there is
no satisfactory progress by then toward an agreement.
Despite Sadat's linking of the situation on the
other Arab fronts with the status of UN forces in the
Sinai, it is unlikely he would condition continuance of
the UN Sinai mandate on agreements in the other areas.
If Egypt achieves an agreement with Israel in the Sinai
by April, allowing the UN mandate to expire would jeop-
ardize that agreement by removing the force that polices
the disengagement lines and keeps Israeli forces behind
those lines.
Sadat also told the Frenchmen that when the Suez
Canal is reopened, Egypt will permit passage by ships
of "all nations except Israel as long as the state of
war continues." This restriction would not necessarily
preclude the passage of Israeli cargoes and crews in
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 16, 1975
ships flying the flags of other nations, although Sadat
did not address this question specifically. The Israelis
have said that these indirect passage rights were part of
the disengagement agreement last year, and they will
insist again on a commitment from Egypt in return for
another withdrawal in the Sinai.
The US embassy in Ankara reported yesterday that
the Turkish military alert appeared to be winding down.
The air base at Murted reportedly was back to nor-
mal operations, and the field at Eskisehir also has re-
laxed its alert. The Turkish chief of staff told a US
military official that the order raising the level of
alert over the weekend was in response to Greek Defense
Minister Averoff's strong statement re ardin. Greece's
rights in the Aegean. the alert
was connected with the pending arrival in the Aegean Sea
of a Turkish-sponsored oil survey ship. The ship, how-
ever, may not reach the area for some time.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 16, 1975
An accord giving Angola a transitional government
and providing for full independence in November was
signed yesterday by Portugal and leaders of Angola's
three liberation movements.
The agreement, which follows nearly a week of se-
cret talks, provides for a transitional government to
rule until November 11, 1975, at which time Angola is
scheduled to become fully independent. The government
will be under the direction of a Portuguese-appointed
high commissioner assisted by a presidential council
composed of three deputies to the leaders of the insur-
gent organizations. Leadership of the council will re-
portedly be rotated. There will be 12 cabinet posts,
with the liberation groups and Portugal each holding
three portfolios.
The government is charged with drafting a constitu-
tion and organizing elections for a constituent assembly
that would take place prior to independence day. The
assembly, in turn, will choose the future president of
Angola's independent government from among candidates
proposed by the three liberation groups. The president
would take office on independence day.
Under the agreement, the three liberation movements
will contribute an equal number of men to an integrated
army. Portugal will match their total force, and keep
its troops in Angola until independence is achieved.
Protection for Angola's white settlers is guaranteed by
the black leaders.
Angola is the last of Portugal's African territories
to work out a decolonization arrangement with Lisbon.
Rivalries among insurgent leaders have delayed the proc-
ess and are sure to complicate the transition to indepen-
dence. The agreement's delicately balanced machinery
for sharing power among the liberation groups may not
hold up for long. In addition, the attitude of Angola's
whites toward the agreement is still in question; they
were not invited to take part in negotiating the accord.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 16, 1975
A major strike by mine workers has apparently per-
suaded President Banzer to postpone the announcement of
economic measures that would adversely affect the general
standard of living.
In a national address on January 14, Banzer stated
that he will not grant major wage increases at this time
but failed to give any further indication of his inten-
tions. Earlier reports stated that the government was
planning to raise fuel and transportation prices and in-
crease export taxes in order to ease the national deficit.
Earlier this week the government antagonized miners
by shutting down four radio stations on charges of polit-
ical subversion. The ensuing walk-out of approximately
5,000 workers has already resulted in several arrests,
and there have been unconfirmed reports of armed clashes
between strikers and military forces.
A deterioration in the already shaky security situa-
tion could force Banzer into backing off further from
some of his austerity plans. If he holds too tight a
line on anticipated salary adjustments, he could spark
further expressions of discontent. Although Banzer
recently obtained military approval for his program
during a tour of army bases, such support could prove
only temporary in the event of widespread public pro-
tests.
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Cambodia: Lower Mekong
PHNOM
PENH
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 16, 1975
Heavy fighting along the Mekong River near the
navy base at Neak Luong and continued Communist control
of the river banks south of Neak Luong have forced the
postponement of a large resupply convoy originally
scheduled to move upriver from South Vietnam at mid-week.
Phnom Penh has a five-week supply of rice and enough fuel
and ammunition to sustain military operations through the
end of the month. Military stocks, however, are being
supplemented by increased air deliveries.
Communist ground attacks in the Neak Luong area
are still centered on the town of Banam and government
positions on the west bank of the river opposite the
navy base. Government troops are fighting well and have
reportedly killed over 150 insurgents in the past sev-
eral days. Navy convoys from Phnom Penh are still get-
ting through to Neak Luong but are running into heavy
Communist shellings. Government forces trying to push
down Route 1 toward Neak Luong are meeting stiff resist-
ance some 15 miles southeast of Phnom Penh.
In the immediate Phnom Penh area Communist initia-
tives remain limited to shellings and ground probes--
primarily against the Cambodian army's 7th Division
northwest of the city. Government counterattacks on the
east bank of the Mekong opposite the capital are begin-
ning to make some progress.
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Top Secret
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