CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027200010008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 21, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
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National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 21, 1974
CONTENTS
PLO-UN: Arabs to present draft resolution to UN outlin-
ing "inalienable rights" of Palestinians. (Page 1)
USSR-FEDAYEEN: Moscow shuns Arafat's extremist rhetoric.
(Page 4)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 13)
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that the Arabs will continue, at least for bargaining
purposes, to perpetuate the Palestinian claim to Israel
proper.
In spite of this stand, the majority of Palestinian
leaders seem prepared, for now, to settle for a Pales-
tinian entity limited to the West Bank and Gaza. PLO
leaders will not admit this in public, at least until
Israel indicates a willingness to negotiate with them
or until the PLO realizes other concrete gains through
negotiations.
Tel Aviv considers that UN approval of a statement
authorizing the Palestinians to use "all means" to re-
gain their rights would in reality be an international
endorsement of terrorism. The Arabs, for their part, do
intend that an element of threat remain in this formula-
tion. Some, including the Egyptians, have argued that
fedayeen strikes into Israel are carried out in self-
defense and are, therefore, legal under provisions of
the UN Charter.
PLO representatives in New York have played down
this line of argument, apparently in the hope that they
can in this way win European backing for the draft reso-
lution. The Palestinians consider that the PLO's willing-
ness to give up its earlier call for armed struggle and
to restrict itself to methods that accord with the UN
Charter represents significant concessions.
The draft resolution, in addition to spelling out
Palestinian rights, requests UN Secretary General Wald-
heim to establish contact with the PLO "on all matters
concerning the question of Palestine." This passage may
be intended to lay the groundwork for a second resolution
that would accord permanent observer status to the PLO.
Possible EC Split
The Arab resolution on Palestine may split the vote
of the EC countries. During their consultations in
Paris earlier this week, the EC foreign ministers were
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The Arabs are likely today to introduce a draft
resolution to the UN General Assembly outlining the
"inalienable rights" of the Palestinian people. The
proposal will very likely be approved by a large major-
ity, probably late tomorrow.
The resolution reportedly will affirm the Palestin-
ians' right to:
--gain self-determination without external inter-
ference;
--achieve national independence and sovereignty;
--return to their homes and properties;
--use "all means" in accordance with the UN Charter
to realize their objectives.
It will also assert that the implementation of
these rights is indispensable for a just peace in the
Middle East and that the Palestinian people must be a
principal party to the establishment of such a peace.
The resolution is largely a restatement of long-
standing Palestinian policy goals. Because it does not
threaten Israel directly or explicitly deny Israel's
right to exist, the Arabs consider the proposal to be
moderate. They calculate that it will win overwhelming
support, including that of some wavering delegations.
The Israelis will interpret the resolution, partic-
ularly its references to a Palestinian homeland, as a
denial of their right to exist. They will also charge
that the call for the repatriation of refugees is his-
torically unjustified and totally unacceptable.
The resolution deliberately leaves vague the ques-
tion of a Palestinian homeland. Its reference to the
rights of Palestinians expelled "since 1947" confirms
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 21, 1974
divided over whether to support the proposal--a position
favored by the French--or to vote against it--as urged
by the British. The ministers agreed to abstain, but
their decision may not survive the maneuvering now going
on in New York.
The ministers' main objection to the Arab draft was
its failure to refer specifically to UN Resolution 242
or to Israel's right to secure and recognized borders.
They indicated that they might move their-countries' votes
from abstention to a negative one if the resolution ap-
peared to constitute a direct threat to Israel's exis-
tence.
Should the French break ranks, Italy and Ireland
might follow. They were the only EC countries to join
France last month in voting to invite the PLO to parti-
cipate in the General Assembly debate,
I
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Moscow is clearly uneasy about fedayeen leader
Yasir Arafat's more extreme demands voiced during his
recent appearance before the UN General Assembly and
is seeking to dissociate itself from them.
The Soviets have given considerable favorable pub-
licity to Arafat's appearance at the UN, hailing it as
a major victory for the Palestinian cause. At the same
time, they have avoided any hint of endorsing the maxi-
mum demands of the Palestine Liberation organization
regarding Israel and have reaffirmed the less extreme
Soviet position. The Soviets have:
--obscured Arafat's call for a secular, united
Palestine and attributed to him a position implic-
itly acknowledging Israel's existence;
--emphasized in a variety of forums their view that
a Middle East settlement should be based on the
boundaries of May 1967 and respect of Israel's
right to exist:;
--suggested that a Palestinian state be established
on territories occupied by Israel in June 1967.
In private, Soviet officials have made
more bluntly .
Moscow was urious with ra a
ea er knew perfectly well that Mosduw
Israel's existence and, considering the support the Soviets
had given Arafat, should not have said anything that vio-
lated the USSR's position.
taken the same line
During the past several months, Moscow has moved
toward more vocal support for Arafat and the PLO, and
it has begun to endorse openly the idea of a Palestinian
state. To balance this shift, Moscow has become in-
creasingly explicit in its support for the continued
existence of Israel, periodically indicating its inter-
est in eventually resuming diplomatic relations with
Tel Aviv.
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The Soviets probably want to separate their position
from that of the PLO at this time in order to remind the
fedayeen that Soviet support is not a blank check. Mos-
cow may also believe it has a better chance of winning
US support for an early resumption of the Geneva peace
talks if it publicly disavows seeking the dismemberment
of Israel.
Arafat
will arrive in Moscow today. he visit s" o u Permit
each side to vent its position further.
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USSR-US: General Secretary Brezhnev left Moscow by
air lash n ght for his talks with President Ford near
Vladivostok this weekend. Tass reported that Brezhnev's
plane landed today in Khabarovsk, only 400 miles from
Vladivostok. The Soviet delegation enplaning from Mos-
cow included Foreign Minister Gromyko, Civil Aviation
Minister Bugayev, Ambassador Dobrynin, Brezhnev's for-
eign policy adviser Aleksandrov, Tass director and press
spokesman Zamyatin, and Georgy Kornienko, the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's chief expert on the US0
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 21, 1974
Netherlands: In response to rising unemployment
and
stagnating consumer demand,
The
an
additional $1.3 billion into
the
The
already expansionary budget
for
to
parliament in September, will
now
proposals that are designed to make up for a slower than
anticipated rate of growth in world trade and prevent
unemployment from exceeding 4 percent. Unemployment is
now up to 3.9 percent--a level that was not expected
before 1975. The success of the government's expansionary
policies will depend in part on the policies pursued by
the Netherlands' major trading partners, particularly
West Germany.
Poland-USSR: Many of Warsaw's top military leaders
arrived in Moscow early this week, but the reason for
their visit is unclear. Polish Defense Minister Jaru-
zelski met with Soviet Defense Minister Grechko on Monday
and with General Secretary Brezhnev the next day. The
delegation also includes three of Poland's five deputy
defense ministers and seven ranking officers. Press cov-
erage of the visit has been scanty. Tass has reported
that "there was an exchange of opinion on questions per-
taining to the further development of the relations of
friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and
Poland and also of topical international problems." The
delegation to Kiev and to the Crimea.
Hague plans to inject
economy during 1975.
next year, submitted
include supplementary
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